political killings essay

The Rise of Political Violence in the United States

• Rachel Kleinfeld

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Recent alterations to violent groups in the United States and to the composition of the two main political parties have created a latent force for violence that can be 1) triggered by a variety of social events that touch on a number of interrelated identities; or 2) purposefully ignited for partisan political purposes. This essay describes the history of such forces in the U.S., shares the risk factors for election violence globally and how they are trending in the U.S., and concludes with some potential paths to mitigate the problem.

O ne week after the 2020 U.S. presidential election, Eric Coomer, an executive at Dominion Voting Systems, was forced into hiding. Angry supporters of then-president Donald Trump, believing false accusations that Dominion had switched votes in favor of Joe Biden, published Coomer’s home address and phone number and put a million-dollar bounty on his head. Coomer was one of many people in the crosshairs. An unprecedented number of elections administrators received threats in 2020—so much so that a third of poll workers surveyed by the Brennan Center for Justice in April 2021 said that they felt unsafe and 79 percent wanted government-provided security. In July, the Department of Justice set up a special task force specifically to combat threats against election administrators. 1

From death threats against previously anonymous bureaucrats and public-health officials to a plot to kidnap Michigan’s governor and the 6 January 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol, acts of political violence in the United States have skyrocketed in the last five years. 2  The nature of political violence has also changed. The media’s focus on groups such as the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Boogaloo Bois has obscured a deeper trend: the “ungrouping” of political violence as people self-radicalize via online engagement. According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), which maintains the Global Terrorism Database, most political violence in the United States is committed by people who do not belong to any formal organization.

About the Author

Rachel Kleinfeld is senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She was the founding CEO of the Truman National Security Project and serves on the National Task Force on Election Crises.

View all work by Rachel Kleinfeld

Instead, ideas that were once confined to fringe groups now appear in the mainstream media. White-supremacist ideas, militia fashion, and conspiracy theories spread via gaming websites, YouTube channels, and blogs, while a slippery language of memes, slang, and jokes blurs the line between posturing and provoking violence, normalizing radical ideologies and activities.

These shifts have created a   new reality: millions   of Americans willing to undertake, support, or excuse political violence, defined here (following the violence-prevention organization Over Zero) as physical harm or intimidation that affects who benefits from or can participate fully in political, economic, or sociocultural life. Violence may be catalyzed by predictable social events such as Black Lives Matter protests or mask mandates that trigger a sense of threat to a common shared identity. Violence can also be intentionally wielded as a partisan tool to affect elections and democracy itself. This organizational pattern makes stopping political violence more difficult, and also more crucial, than ever before.

Political Violence in the United States Historically

Political violence has a long history in the United States. Since the late 1960s, it was carried out by   intensely ideological groups that pulled adherents out of the mainstream into clandestine cells, such as the anti-imperialist Weather Underground Organization or the anti-abortion Operation Rescue. In the late 1960s and 1970s, these violent fringes were mostly on the far left. They committed extensive violence, largely against property (with notable exceptions), in the name of social, environmental, and animal-rights causes. Starting in the late 1970s, political violence shifted rightward with the rise of white supremacist, anti-abortion, and militia groups. The number of violent events declined, but targets shifted from property to people—minorities, abortion providers, and federal agents.

What is occurring today does not resemble this recent past. Although incidents from the left are on the rise, political violence still comes overwhelmingly from the right, whether one looks at the Global Terrorism Database, FBI statistics, or other government or independent counts. 3  Yet people committing far-right violence—particularly planned violence rather than spontaneous hate crimes—are older and more established than typical terrorists and violent criminals. They often hold jobs, are married, and have children. Those who attend church or belong to community groups are  more  likely to hold violent, conspiratorial beliefs. 4  These are not isolated “lone wolves”; they are part of a broad community that echoes their ideas.

Two subgroups appear most prone to violence. The January 2021 American Perspectives Survey found that white Christian evangelical Republicans were outsized supporters of both political violence and the Q-Anon conspiracy, which claims that Democratic politicians and Hollywood elites are pedophiles who (aided by mask mandates that hinder identification) traffic children and harvest their blood; separate polls by evangelical political scientists found that in October 2020 approximately 47 percent of white evangelical Christians believed in the tenets of Q-Anon, as did 59 percent of Republicans. 5  Many evangelical pastors are working to turn their flocks away from this heresy. The details appear outlandish, but stripped to its core, the broad appeal becomes clearer: Democrats and cultural elites are often portrayed as Satanic forces arrayed against Christianity and seeking to harm Christian children.

The other subgroup prone to violence comprises those who feel threatened by either women or minorities. The polling on them is not clear. Separate surveys conducted by the American Enterprise Institute and academics in 2020 and 2021 found a majority of Republicans agreeing that “the traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast” that they “may have to use force to save it.” Respondents who believed that whites faced greater discrimination than minorities were more likely to agree. 6  Scholars Nathan Kalmoe and Lilliana Mason found that white Republicans with higher levels of minority resentment were more likely to see Democrats as evil or subhuman (beliefs thought to reduce inhibitions to violence). However, despite these feelings, the racially resentful did not stand out for endorsing violence against Democrats. Instead, the people most likely to support political violence were both Democrats and Republicans who espoused hostility toward women. 7  A sense of racial threat may be priming more conservatives to express greater resentment in ways that normalize violence and create a more permissive atmosphere, while men in both parties who feel particularly aggrieved toward women may be most willing to act on those feelings.

The bedrock idea uniting right-wing communities who condone violence is that white Christian men in the United States are under cultural and demographic threat and require defending—and that it is the Republican Party and Donald Trump, in particular, who will safeguard their way of life. 8  This pattern is similar to that of political violence in the nineteenth-century United States, where partisan identity was conflated with race, ethnicity, religion, and immigration status; many U.S.-born citizens felt they were losing cultural power and status to other social groups; and the violence was committed not by a few deviant outliers, but by many otherwise ordinary citizens engaged in normal civic life.

Changing social dynamics were the obvious spur for this violence, but it often yielded political outcomes. The ambiguity incentivized and enabled politicians to play with fire, deliberately provoking violence while claiming plausible deniability. In the 1840s and 1850s, from Maine and Maryland to Kentucky and Louisiana, the Know-Nothing party incited white Protestants to riot against mostly Catholic Irish and Italian immigrants (seen as both nonwhite and Democratic Party voters). When the Know-Nothings collapsed in 1855 in the North and 1860 in the South, anti-Catholic violence suddenly plummeted, despite continued bigotry. In the South, white supremacist violence was blamed on racism, but the timing was linked to elections. After the Supreme Court ruled in 1883 that the federal government lacked jurisdiction over racist terror, overturning the 1875 Civil Rights Act, violence became an open campaign strategy for the Democratic Party in multiple states. Lynchings were used in a similar manner. While proximate causes were social and economic, their time and place were primed by politics: Lynchings increased prior to elections in competitive counties. 9  Democratic Party politicians used racial rhetoric to amplify anger, then allowed violence to occur, to convince poor whites that they shared more in common with wealthy whites than with poor blacks, preventing the Populist and Progressive Parties from uniting poor whites and blacks into a single voting base. As Jim Crow laws enshrined Democratic one-party control, lynchings were not needed by politicians. Their numbers fell swiftly; they were no longer linked to elections. 10

Risk Factors for Election Violence

Globally, four factors elevate the risk of election-related violence, whether carried out directly by a political party through state security or armed party youth wings, outsourced to militias and gangs, or perpetrated by ordinary citizens: 1) a highly competitive election that could shift the balance of power; 2) partisan division based on identity; 3) electoral rules that enable winning by exploiting identity cleavages; and 4) weak institutional constraints on violence, particularly security-sector bias toward one group, leading perpetrators to believe they will not be held accountable for violence. 11

The rise of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) illustrates this dynamic. In 2002, a train fire killed Hindu pilgrims returning to Gujarat, India, from a contested site   in Ayodhya. An anti-Muslim pogrom erupted. India’s current prime minister, the BJP’s Narendra Modi, was then chief minister of Gujarat. During three days of violence directed almost entirely against Muslims, he allowed the police to stand by and afterward refused to prosecute the rioters. The party won state legislative elections later that year by exploiting Hindu-Muslim tensions to pry Hindu voters from the Congress Party. The party has since stoked ethnic riots to win in contested areas across the country, and Modi reprised the strategy as prime minister. 12

In India’s winner-take-all electoral system, mob violence can potentially swing elections. Though fueled by social grievance, mob violence is susceptible to political manipulation. This is the form of electoral violence most like what the United States is experiencing, and it is particularly dangerous. Social movements have goals of their own. Though they may also serve partisan purposes, they can move in unintended directions and are hard to control.

Today, the risk factors for electoral violence are elevated in the United States, putting greater pressure on institutional constraints.

Highly competitive elections that could shift the balance of power:  Heightened political competition is strongly associated with electoral violence. Only when outcomes are uncertain but close is there a reason to resort to violence. For much of U.S. history, one party held legislative power for decades. Yet since 1980, a shift in control of at least one house of Congress was possible—and since 2010, elections have seen a level of competition not seen since Reconstruction (1865–77). 13

Partisan division based on identity:  Up to the 1990s, many Americans belonged to multiple identity groups—for example, a union member might have been a conservative, religious, Southern man who nevertheless voted Democratic. Today, Americans have sorted themselves into two broad identity groups: Democrats tend to live in cities, are more likely to be minorities, women, and religiously unaffiliated, and are trending liberal.   Republicans generally live in rural areas or exurbs and are more likely to be white, male, Christian, and conservative. 14  Those who hold a cross-cutting identity (such as black Christians or female Republicans) generally cleave to the other identities that align with their partisan “tribe.”

As political psychologist Lilliana Mason has shown, greater homogeneity within groups with fewer cross-cutting ties allows people to form clearer in- and out-groups, priming them for conflict. When many identities align, belittling any one of them can trigger humiliation and anger. Such feelings are heightened by policy differences but are not about policy; they are personal, and thus are more powerful. These real cultural and belief differences are at the heart of the cultural conflicts in the United States.

U.S. party and electoral institutions are intensifying rather than reducing these identity cleavages. The alignment of racial and religious identity with political party is not random. Sorting began after the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1965 as whites who disagreed with racial equality fled the Democratic Party. A second wave—the so-called Reagan Democrats, who had varied ideological motivations, followed in 1980 and 1984. A third wave, pushed away from the Democratic Party by the election of Barack Obama and attracted by Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, drew previous swing voters who were particularly likely to define “Americanness” as white and Christian into the Republican Party. 15

A 2016 Pew Research Center poll found that 32 percent of U.S. citizens believed that to be a “real American,” one must be a U.S.-born Christian. But among Trump’s primary voters, according to a 2017 Voter Study Group analysis, 86 percent thought it was “very important” to have been born in the United States; 77 percent believed that one must be Christian; and 47 percent thought one must also be “of European descent.” 16  According to Democracy Fund voter surveys, during the 2016 primaries, many economic conservatives, libertarians, and other traditional Republican groups did not share these views on citizenship. By 2020, however, white identity voters made up an even larger share of the Republican base. Moreover, their influence is greater than their numbers because in the current U.S. context—where identities are so fixed and political polarization is so intense—swing voters are rare, so it is more cost-effective for campaigns to focus on turning out reliable voters. The easiest way to do this is with emotional appeals to shared identities rather than to policies on which groups may disagree. 17  This is true for both Republicans and Democrats.

The Democratic Party’s base, however, is extremely heterogeneous. The party must therefore balance competing demands—for example, those of less reliable young “woke” voters with those of highly reliable African American churchgoers, or those of more-conservative Mexican American men with those of progressive activists. In contrast, the Republican Party is increasingly homogenous, which allows campaigns to target appeals to white, Christian, male identities and the traditional social hierarchy.

The emergence of large numbers of Americans who can be prompted to commit political violence by a variety of social events is thus partially an accidental byproduct of normal politics in highly politically sorted, psychologically abnormal times. Even in normal times, people more readily rally to their group’s defense when it is under attack, which is why “ they  are out to take  your  x” is such a time-honored fundraising and get-out-the-vote message. Usually, such tactics merely heighten polarization. But when individuals and societies are highly sorted and stressed, the effects can be much worse. Inequality and loneliness, which were endemic in the United States even before the covid-19 pandemic and have only gotten worse since, are factors highly correlated with violence and aggression. Contagious disease, meanwhile, has led to xenophobic violence historically.

The confluence of these factors with sudden social-distancing requirements, closures of businesses and public spaces, and unusually intrusive pandemic-related government measures during an election year may have pushed the more psychologically fragile over the edge. Psychologists have found that when more homogenous groups with significant overlap in their identities face a sense of group threat, they respond with deep anger. Acting on that anger can restore a sense of agency and self-esteem and, in an environment in which violence is justified and normalized, perhaps even win social approval. 18

The sorts of racially coded political messages that have been in use for decades will be received differently in a political party whose composition has altered to include a greater percentage of white identity voters. Those who feel that their dominant status in the social hierarchy is under attack may respond violently to perceived racial or other threats to their status at the top. But those lower on the social ladder may also resort to violence to assert dominance over (and thus psychological separation from) those at the bottom—for example, minority men over women or other minorities, one religious minority over another, or white women over minority women. Antisemitism is growing among the young, and exists on the left, but is far stronger on the right, and is particularly salient among racial minorities who lean right. 19  On the far-left, violent feelings are emerging from the same sense of group threat and defense, but in mirror-image: Those most willing to dehumanize the right are people who see themselves as defending racial minorities.

Republicans and Democrats have been espousing similar views on the acceptability of violence since 2017, when Kalmoe and Mason began collecting monthly data.

Between 2017 and 2020, Democrats and Republicans were extremely close in justifying violence, with Democrats slightly more prone to condone violence—except in November 2019, the month before Trump’s first impeachment, when Republican support for violence spiked. Both sides also expressed similarly high levels of dehumanizing thought: 39 percent of Democrats and 41 percent of Republicans saw the other side as “downright evil,” and 16 percent of Democrats and 20 percent of Republicans said that their opponents were “like animals.” Such feelings can point to psychological readiness for violence. Separate polling found lower but still comparable levels: 4 percent of Democrats and 3 percent of Republicans believed in October 2020 that attacks on their political opponents would be justified if their party leader alleged the election was stolen; 6 percent of Democrats and 4 percent of Republicans believed property damage to be acceptable in such a case. 20

The parallel attitudes suggest that partisan sorting and social pressures were working equally on all Americans, although Republicans may have greater tolerance for online threats and harassment of opponents and opposition leaders. 21  Yet actual incidents of political violence, while rising on both sides, have been vastly more prevalent on the right. Why has the right been more willing to act on violent feelings?

The clue lies in the sudden shift in attitudes in October 2020, when after maintaining similarity for years, Republicans’ endorsements of violence suddenly leapt across every one of Kalmoe and Mason’s questions regarding the acceptability of violence; findings that were repeated in other polling. 22  In January 2020, 41 percent of Republicans agreed that “a time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands”; a year later, after the January 6 insurrection, 56 percent of Republicans agreed that “if elected leaders will not protect America, the people must do it themselves even if it requires taking violent action.” 23  Moral disengagement also spiked: By February 2021, more than two-thirds of Republicans (and half of Democrats) saw the other party as “downright evil,”; while 12 percent more Republicans believed Democrats were less than human than the other way around. 24

The false narrative of a stolen 2020 election clearly increased support for political violence. Those who believed the election was fraudulent were far more likely to endorse coups and armed citizen rebellion; by February 2021, a quarter of Republicans felt that it was at least “a little” justified to take over state government buildings with violence to advance their political goals. 25  This politically driven false narrative points to the role of politicians since 2016 in fueling the difference in violence between right and left. As has been found in Israel and Germany, domestic terrorists are emboldened by the belief that politicians encourage violence or that authorities will tolerate it. 26

It is not uncommon for politicians to incite communal violence to affect electoral outcomes. In northern Kenya, voters call this “war by remote control.” Incumbent leaders who fear losing are particularly prone to using electoral violence to intimidate potential opponents, build their base, affect voting behavior and election-day vote counts, and, failing all that, to keep themselves relevant or at least out of jail. 27  Communal violence can clear opposition voters from contested areas, altering the demographics of electoral districts, as happened in Kenya’s Rift Valley in 2007 and the U.S. South during Reconstruction. Violent intimidation   can keep voters away from the polls, as has occurred since the 1990s in Bangladesh; from the 1990s through 2013 in Pakistan; and in the U.S. South in the 1960s.

Communal violence often flares in contested districts where it is politically expedient, as in Kenya and India. Likewise, political violence in the United States has been greatest in suburbs where Asian American and Hispanic American immigration has been growing fastest, particularly in heavily Democratic metropoles surrounded by Republican-dominated rural areas. These areas, where white flight from the 1960s is meeting demographic change, are areas of social contestation. They are also politically contested swing districts. Most of the arrested January 6 insurrectionists hailed from these areas rather than from Trump strongholds. 28  Postelection violence can also be useful to politicians. They can manipulate angry voters who believe their votes were stolen into using violence to influence or block final counts or gain leverage in power-sharing negotiations, as occurred in Kenya in 2007 and Afghanistan in 2019.

Not all political violence directly serves an electoral purpose. Using violence to defend a group bonds members to the group. Thus violence is a particularly effective way to build voter “intensity.” In 1932, young black-clad militants of the British Union of Fascists roamed England’s streets, picking fights and harassing Jews. The leadership of the nascent party realized that its profile grew whenever the “blackshirts” got into violent confrontations. Two years later, the party held a rally of nearly fifteen-thousand people that became a brutal melee between blackshirts and antifascist protestors. After the clash (which was not fully spontaneous), people queued to join the party for the next two days and nights and membership soared. 29  As every organizer knows, effective mobilization requires keeping supporters engaged. Given the role of gun rights to Republican identity, armed rallies can mobilize supporters and expand fundraising. Yet even peaceful rallies of crowds carrying automatic weapons can intimidate people who hold opposing views.

Finally, politicians may personally benefit from violent mobilization that is not election-related. In South Africa, former president Jacob Zuma spent years cultivating ties with violent criminal groups in his home state of Kwa-Zulu Natal. 30  When he was out of office and on trial for corruption and facing jail time for contempt of court, he activated those connections to spur a round of violence and looting on a scale not seen in South Africa since apartheid. Vast inequality, unemployment, and other social causes allowed for plausible deniability—many looters with no political ties were just joining in the fracas. Zuma has, as of this writing, avoided imprisonment due to undisclosed “medical reasons.”

Electoral rules enable winning by exploiting identity cleavages:   The fissures in divided societies such as the United States can be either mitigated or enhanced by electoral systems. The U.S. electoral system comprises features that are correlated with greater violence globally. Winner-take-all elections are particularly prone to violence, possibly because small numbers of voters can shift outcomes. Two-party systems are also more correlated with violence than are multiparty systems, perhaps because they create us-them dynamics that deepen polarization. 31  Although multiparty systems allow more-extreme parties to gain representation, such as Alternative for Germany or Golden Dawn in Greece, they also enable other parties to work together against a common threat. The U.S. system is more brittle. A two-party system can prevent the representation of fringe views, as occurred for years in the United States—for example, American Independent Party candidate George Wallace won 14 percent of the popular vote in 1968 but no representation. Yet because party primaries tend to be low-turnout contests with highly partisan voters, small factions can gain outsized influence over a mainstream party. If that happens, extreme politicians can gain control over half of the political spectrum—leaving that party’s voters nowhere to turn.

Weak institutional constraints on violence:   The United States suffers from three particularly concerning institutional weaknesses today—the challenge of adjudicating disputes between the executive and legislative branches inherent in presidential majoritarian systems, recent legal decisions enhancing the electoral power of state legislatures, and the politicization of law enforcement and the courts.

Juan Linz famously noted that apart from the United States, few presidential majoritarian systems had survived as continuous democracies. One key reason was the problem of resolving disputes between the executive and legislative branches. Because both are popularly elected, when they are held by different parties stalemates between the two invite resolution through violence. Such a dynamic drove state-level electoral violence throughout the nineteenth century, not only in the Reconstruction South, but also in Pennsylvania, Maine, Rhode Island, and Colorado. It is thus particularly concerning that in the last year, nine states have passed laws to give greater power to partisan bodies, particularly state legislatures. 32  The U.S. Supreme Court has also made several recent decisions vesting greater power over elections in state legislatures. These trends are weakening institutional guardrails against future political violence.

When law and justice institutions are believed to lean toward one party or side of an identity cleavage, political violence becomes more likely. International cases reveal that groups that believe they can use violence without consequences are more likely to do so. The U.S. justice system, police, and military are far more professional and less politicized than those of most developing democracies that face widespread electoral violence. Longstanding perceptions that police favor one side are supported by Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data showing that police used far greater force at left-wing protests than at right-wing protests throughout 2020. Despite this conservative ideological tilt, party affiliation and feelings were more complicated: Law enforcement was also a target of right-wing militias, and partisan affiliation (based on donations) had previously been mixed due to union membership and other cross-cutting identities that connected police to the Democratic Party. In 2020, however, donations from individual law enforcement officers to political parties increased, and they tilted far toward the Republican Party, suggesting that the polarizing events of 2020 have led them to sort themselves to the right and deepen their partisanship. 33

How to Counter the Trends

Interventions in five key areas could help defuse the threat of political violence in the United States: 1) election credibility, 2) electoral rules, 3) policing, 4) prevention and redirection, and 5) political speech. The steps best taken depend on who is in power and who is committing the violence. Technical measures to enhance election credibility and train police can reduce inadvertent violence from the state. But such technical solutions will fail if the party in power is inciting violence, as happens more often than not. In that case, behind-the-scenes efforts to help parties and leaders strike deals or mediate grievances can sometimes keep violence at bay. In Kenya, for instance, two opposing politicians accused of leading election violence in 2007 joined forces to run as president and vice-president; their alliance enabled a peaceful election in 2013. Ironically, strong institutions, low levels of corruption, and reductions in institutionalized methods of elite deal-making (such as Congressional earmarks) make such bargains more difficult in the United States. However, the United States is helped by its unusually high level of federalism in terms of elections and law enforcement, because if one part of “the state” is acting against reform, it may still be possible at another level.

More credible elections:   While there was no widespread fraud in the 2020 U.S. elections, international election experts agree that the U.S. electoral system is antiquated and prone to failure. The proposed Freedom to Vote Act, which enhances cybersecurity, protects election officers, provides a paper trail for ballots, and provides proper training and funding for election administration, among other measures, could offer the sort of bipartisan compromise that favors neither side and would shore up a problematic system. But if it is turned into a political cudgel, as is likely, it will fail to reassure voters, despite its excellent provisions.

Changing the electoral rules:  Whether politicians use violence as a campaign strategy is shaped by the nature of the electoral system. A seminal study on India by Steven Wilkinson suggests that where politicians need minority votes to win, they protect minorities; where they do not, they are more likely to incite violence. 34  By this logic, Section 2 of the U.S. Voting Rights Act of 1965, which allows for gerrymandering majority-minority districts to ensure African American representation in Congress, may inadvertently incentivize violence by making minority votes unnecessary for Republican wins in the remaining districts .  While minority representation is its own valuable democratic goal, creating districts where Republicans need minority votes to win—and where Democrats need white votes to win—might reduce the likelihood of violence.

Whether extremists get elected and whether voters feel represented or become disillusioned with the peaceful process of democracy can also be affected by electoral-system design. Thus postconflict countries often redesign electoral institutions. For example, a major plank of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that ended the Troubles in Northern Ireland involved introducing a type of ranked-choice voting with multimember districts to increase a sense of representation. There are organizations in the United States today that are advocating various reform measures—for example, eliminating primaries and introducing forms of ranked-choice voting or requiring lawmakers to win a majority of votes to be elected (currently the case in only a handful of states)—that could result in fewer extremists gaining power while increasing voter satisfaction and representation.

Fairer policing and accountability:  Even in contexts of high polarization, external deterrence and societal norms generally keep people from resorting to political violence. Partisans who are tempted to act violently should know that they will be held accountable, even if their party is in power. Minority communities, meanwhile, need assurance that the state will defend them.

A number of police-reform measures could help. Police training in de-escalation techniques and nonviolent protest and crowd control, support for officers under psychological strain, improved intelligence collection and sharing regarding domestic threats, and more-representative police forces would all help deter both political violence and police brutality. Publicizing such efforts would demonstrate to society that the government will not tolerate political violence.

Meanwhile, swift justice for violence, incitement, and credible threats against officials—speedy jail sentences, for instance, even if short—is also crucial for its signaling and deterrent value. So are laws that criminalize harassment, intimidation, and political violence.

Prevention and redirection:  Lab experiments have found that internal norms can be reinforced by “inoculating” individuals with warnings that people may one day try to indoctrinate them to extremist beliefs or recruit them to participate in acts of political violence. Because no one likes to be manipulated, the forewarned organize their mental defenses against it. The technique seems promising for preventing younger people from radicalization, though it requires more testing among older partisans whose beliefs are strongly set. 35

A significant portion of those engaged in far-right violence are also under mental distress. People searching online for far-right violent extremist content are 115 percent more likely to click on mental-health ads; those undertaking planned hate crimes show greater signs of mental illness than does the general offender population. 36  Groups such as Moonshot CVE are experimenting with targeted ads that can redirect people searching for extremist content toward hotlines for depression and loneliness and help for leaving violent groups.

Political speech:   When political leaders denounce violence from their own side, partisans listen. Experiments using quotes from Biden and Trump show that leaders’ rhetoric has the power to de-escalate and deter violence—if they are willing to speak against their own side. 37

Long-term trends in social and political-party organization, isolation, distrust, and inequality, capped by a pandemic, have placed individual psychological health and social cohesion under immense strain. Kalmoe and Mason’s surveys found that in February 2021, a fifth of Republicans and 13 percent of Democrats—or more than 65 million people—believed immediate violence was justified. Even if only a tiny portion are serious, such large numbers put a country at risk of stochastic terrorism—that is, it becomes statistically near certain that someone (though it is impossible to predict who) somewhere will act if a public figure incites violence.

Thus while social factors may have created the conditions, politicians have the match to light the tinder. In recent years, some candidates on the right have been particularly willing to use violent speech and engage with groups that spread hate. Yet Democrats are not immune to these trends. Far-left violence is far lower than on the right, but rising. The firearm industry’s trade association found that, in 2020, 40 percent of all legal gun sales were to first-time buyers, and 58 percent of those five-million new owners were women and African Americans. 38  Kalmoe and Mason’s February 2020 polling found that 11 percent of Democrats and 12 percent of Republicans agreed that it was at least “a little” justified to kill opposing political leaders to advance their own political goals. With both the left and the right increasingly armed, viewing the other side as evil or subhuman, and believing political violence to be justified, the possibility grows of tit-for-tat street warfare, like the clashes between antifascist protesters and Proud Boys in Portland, Oregon, from 2020 through this writing. If Democrats have been less likely to act on these beliefs, it is likely because Democratic politicians have largely and vocally spoken out against violence.

Although political violence in the United States is on the rise, it is still lower than in many other countries. Once violence begins, however, it fuels itself. Far from making people turn away in horror, political violence in the present is the greatest factor normalizing it for the future. Preventing a downward spiral is therefore imperative.

1. “Election Officials Under Attack: How to Protect Administrators and Safeguard Democracy,” Brennan Center for Justice, 16 June 2021,  www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/BCJ-129%20ElectionOfficials_v7.pdf ; “Documenting and Addressing Harassment of Election Officials,” California Voter Foundation, June 2021,  www.calvoter.org/sites/default/files/cvf_addressing_harassment_of_election_officials_report.pdf ; Zach Montellaro, “‘Center of the Maelstrom’: Election Officials Grapple with 2020’s Long Shadow,” Politico,  18 August 2021.

2. See the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, the dataset of extremist far-right violent incidents maintained by Arie Perliger at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell, and FBI data on hate crimes.

3. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Andrew Ba Tran, and Derek Hawkins, “The Rise of Domestic Extremism in America,”  Washington Post,  12 April 2021.

4. Robert Pape and the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, “Understanding American Domestic Terrorism: Mobilization Potential and Risk Factors of a New Threat Trajectory” (presentation, University of Chicago, 6 April 2021),  https://d3qi0qp55mx5f5.cloudfront.net/cpost/i/docs/americas_insurrectionists_online_2021_04_06.pdf?mtime=1617807009.

5. Daniel A. Cox, “Social Isolation and Community Disconnection Are Not Spurring Conspiracy Theories,” Survey Center on American Life, 4 March 2021,  www.americansurveycenter.org/research/social-isolation-and-community-disconnection-are-not-spurring-conspiracy-theories ; Paul A. Djupe and Ryan P. Burge, “A Conspiracy at the Heart of It: Religion and Q,” Religion in Public blog, 6 November 2020,  https://religioninpublic.blog/2020/11/06/a-conspiracy-at-the-heart-of-it-religion-and-q .

6. Daniel A. Cox, “After the Ballots Are Counted: Conspiracies, Political Violence, and American Exceptionalism,” Survey Center on American Life, 11 February 2021,  www.americansurveycenter.org/research/after-the-ballots-are-counted-conspiracies-political-violence-and-american-exceptionalism ; Larry M. Bartels, “Ethnic Antagonism Erodes Republicans’ Commitment to Democracy,”  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences  117 (September 2020): 22752–59.

7. Nathan P. Kalmoe and Lilliana Mason,  Radical American Partisanship: Mapping Violent Hostility, Its Causes, and the Consequences for Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming [2022]), 105, 109.

8. Daniel A. Cox, “Support for Political Violence Among Americans Is on the Rise. It’s a Grim Warning About America’s Political Future,” American Enterprise Institute, 26 March 2021,  www.aei.org/op-eds/support-for-political-violence-among-americans-is-on-the-rise-its-a-grim-warning-about-americas-political-future ; Bartels, “Ethnic Antagonism Erodes Republicans’ Commitment to Democracy”; Sonia Roccas and Marilynn B. Brewer, “Social Identity Complexity,”  Personality and Social Psychology Review 6 (May 2002): 86–102.

9. Susan Olzak, “The Political Context of Competition: Lynching and Urban Racial Violence, 1882–1914,”  Social Forces 69 (December 2020): 395–421; Ryan Hagen, Kinga Makovi, and Peter Bearman, “The Influence of Political Dynamics on Southern Lynch Mob Formation and Lethality,”  Social Forces 92 (December 2013): 757-87.

10. Brad Epperly, Christopher Witko, Ryan Strickler, and Paul White, “Rule by Violence, Rule by Law: Lynching, Jim Crow, and the Continuing Evolution of Voter Suppression in the U.S.,”  Perspectives on Politics 18 (September 2020): 756-69.

11. Sarah Birch, Ursula Daxecker, and Kristine Hӧglund, “Electoral Violence: An Introduction,”  Journal of Peace Research 57 (January 2020): 3–14.

12. Steven I. Wilkinson,  Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

13. Frances E. Lee,  Insecure Majorities :  Congress and the Perpetual Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

14. Lilliana Mason,  Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

15. Tyler T. Reny, Loren Collingwood, and Ali A. Valenzuela, “Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting,”  Public Opinion Quarterly  83 (Spring 2019): 91–113; John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck,  Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

16. Bruce Stokes, “What It Takes to Truly Be ‘One of Us,’” Pew Research Center, 1 February 2017,  www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/02/01/what-it-takes-to-truly-be-one-of-us ; Emily Ekins, “The Five Types of Trump Voters: Who They Are and What They Believe,” Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, June 2017,  www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/the-five-types-trump-voters .

17. Costas Panagopoulos, “All About That Base: Changing Campaign Strategies in U.S. Presidential Elections,”  Party Politics  22 (March 2016): 179–90.

18. Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, “Inequality and Violent Crime,” Journal of Law and Economics 45 (April 2002): 1–39; James V. P. Check, Daniel Perlman, and Neil M. Malamuth, “Loneliness and Aggressive Behavior,”  Journal of Social and Personal Relationships  2 (September 1985): 243–52; Mark Schaller and Justin H. Park, “The Behavioral Immune System (and Why It Matters),”  Current Directions in Psychological Science  20 (April 2011): 99–103.

19. Eitan Hersh and Laura Royden, “Antisemitic Attitudes Across the Ideological Spectrum,” 9 April 2021, unpubl ms., www.eitanhersh.com/uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_royden_antisemitism_040921.pdf .

20. Kalmoe and Mason,  Radical American Partisanship ; Noelle Malvar et al., “Democracy for President: A Guide to How Americans Can Strengthen Democracy During a Divisive Election,” More in Common, October 2020,  https://democracyforpresident.com/topics/election-violence.

21. The Democracy Fund’s 2019 VOTER Survey shows 10-point gaps for each in December 2019; however, monthly Kalmoe and Mason polling shows no gap, and Bright Line Watch polling in 2020 shows splits of less than 6 and 3 percent for identically worded questions.

22. Kalmoe and Mason,  Radical American Partisanship,  83–90.

23. Bartels, “Ethnic Antagonism Erodes Republicans’ Commitment to Democracy”; Cox, “Support for Political Violence.”

24. Kalmoe and Mason,  Radical American Partisanship,  86.

25. Kalmoe and Mason,  Radical American Partisanship, 164, 90.

26. Arie Perliger, “Terror Isn’t Always a Weapon of the Weak—It Can Also Support the Powerful,”  The Conversation,  28 October 2018,  https://theconversation.com/terror-isnt-always-a-weapon-of-the-weak-it-can-also-support-the-powerful-82626 .

27. Ken Menkhaus,  Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland  (Copenhagen: Danish Deming Group, 2015), 42; Thad Dunning, “Fighting and Voting: Violent Conflict and Electoral Politics,”  Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (June 2011): 327–39.

28. Arie Perliger, “Why Do Hate Crimes Proliferate in Progressive Blue States?” Medium, 20 August 2020,  https://medium.com/3streams/why-hate-crimes-proliferate-in-progressive-blue-state-72483b2d72a7 ; Pape and Chicago Project, “Understanding American Domestic Terrorism.”

29. Martin Pugh, “The British Union of Fascists and the Olympia Debate,” Historical Journal 41 (June 1998): 529–42.

30. Gavin Evans, “Why Political Killings Have Taken Hold—Again—In South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal,”  The Conversation, 10 August 2020,  https://theconversation.com/why-political-killings-have-taken-hold-again-in-south-africas-kwazulu-natal-143908 .

31. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., “Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies,”  American Political Science Review  75, no. 4 (1981): 861–79; Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, “Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,”  British Journal of Political Science 46 (April 2016): 297–320.

32. Quinn Scanlan, “10 New State Laws Shift Power Over Elections to Partisan Entities,” ABC News, 16 August 2021,  https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dozen-state-laws-shift-power-elections-partisan-entities/story?id=79408455 ; “Democracy Crisis Report Update: New Data and Trends Show the Warning Signs Have Intensified in the Last Two Months,” States United Democracy Center, Protect Democracy, and Law Forward, 10 June 2021, https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Democracy-Crisis-Part-II_June-10_Final_v7.pdf .

33. Phillip Bump, “Police Made a Lot More Contributions in 2020 Than Normal—Mostly to Republicans,”  Washington Post,  25 February 2021.

34. Wilkinson,  Votes and Violence.

35. Kurt Braddock, “Vaccinating Against Hate: Using Inoculation to Confer Resistance to Persuasion by Extremist Propaganda,”  Terrorism and Political Violence (2019), 1–23.

36. “Mental Health and Violent Extremism,” Moonshot CVE, 28 June 2018,  https://moonshotteam.com/mental-health-violent-extremism ; Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset, Global Terrorism Database.

37. Kalmoe and Mason,  Radical American Partisanship,  180-87; Matthew A. Baum and Tim Groeling, “Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War,”  Political Behavior 31 (June 2009): 157–86; Susan Birch and David Muchlinski, “Electoral Violence Prevention: What Works?”  Democratization 25 (April 2018): 385–403.

38. “First-Time Gun Buyers Grow to Nearly 5 Million in 2020,” Fire Arms Industry Trade Association, 24 August 2020,  www.nssf.org/articles/first-time-gun-buyers-grow-to-nearly-5-million-in-2020 .

Copyright © 2021 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press

Image Credit: lev radin/Shutterstock.com.

Further Reading

Volume 9, Issue 4

George Washington and the Founding of Democracy

• Seymour Martin Lipset

Read the full essay here .

Volume 12, Issue 2

The Americanization of the European Left

In postindustrial societies, class is less important as a source of party cleavage. With the European left embracing a market-friendly “third way,” political divisions in Europe are increasingly resembling those…

Volume 2, Issue 4

Democracy & Foreign Policy

• Michael Pinto-Duschinsky

A review of  Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny, by Joshua Muravchik and Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal.

Published daily by the Lowy Institute

The killings in the Philippines grow more brazen

The recent murder of a well-known activist signals a turning point in the campaign to eliminate dissent.

• Philippines
• Human rights

Earlier this month, days after Manila went back into a hard lockdown due to a sharp rise in Covid-19 infections, unidentified assailants slipped past the Philippine capital’s strict quarantine measures and approached the home of Randall Echanis, a left-wing party leader and longtime activist. When they left on the morning of 10 August, Echanis and his flatmate were dead, marked with stab wounds and alleged signs of torture.

City and national police launched into a cycle of denial and contradiction all too familiar to the families of slain activists in Mindanao, Negros and the provinces far from the capital where environmental and land defenders have been killed at alarming rates since President Rodrigo Duterte took power in 2016.

Police initially refused to identify Echanis, then moved his body without his wife’s consent and held it for three days before releasing it to his family. They claimed Echanis’ flatmate, Louie Tagapia, may have been the target of the killing because an alleged tattoo indicating an affiliation with a criminal group. One police chief claimed there was “no forcible entry” in the case, despite a photo showing a broken doorknob on the apartment door .

When Duterte put Mindanao under martial law in 2017 and other areas, including Negros island, under a heightened “state of national emergency” the following year, critics warned that the regions were a “ laboratory ” for the rest of the country. As killings of activists continued to rise in rural areas – the Philippines was Asia’s deadliest country for environmental defenders last year, according to  Global Witness – Duterte’s critics in Manila wondered when the bloodshed would enter the capital city. The death of Echanis, at the height of a strict lockdown and in the wake of a controversial anti-terrorism law, has thus signaled a turning point in the wider campaign to eliminate dissent. Any pretense that the killings resulted from local conflicts over rural land struggles, out of sight and mind from Manila, is now gone.

Most people in Manila’s legal activist network have, at some point during Duterte’s rule, been red-tagged – falsely labeled as communist rebels.

Echanis’ party, Anakpawis, and other left-wing voices have alleged his killing was “state-sponsored”. There’s no hard evidence for this claim, just as there’s no ironclad proof of state involvement in the killings of the nine sugar workers killed in Negros in 2018 or their lawyer, Benjamin Ramos, who was shot dead by unidentified gunmen weeks later. Police responded to these cases by first naming activists as potential suspects before eventually letting the investigations run cold.

It’s a story familiar to the families of the 318 human rights workers and activists killed between July 2016 and 30 June 2020, according to the human rights group Karapatan, and bringing it to Manila indicates the Duterte administration has become even more brazen in its willingness to watch its political enemies be eliminated.

Last autumn, six activists were arrested in Manila as part of a series of raids carried out throughout the country. One rights worker in the capital, who had vacated his office after being tipped that it could be raided, told me the arrests and killings plaguing far-flung activists had always felt distant to him. The raids, he said, changed everything – it was as if state security forces no longer cared if their work was done in full view of the country’s population, in its diplomatic and media hub.

Manila has seen the majority of killings in Duterte’s deadly war on drugs, which the country’s rights commission estimates has taken over 27,000 lives, but unlike the police-led drug war, attacks on activists are more closely associated with a military counterinsurgency campaign ostensibly targeting the New People’s Army (NPA) communist guerilla group. Echanis, like many slain activists, had been named on a government terrorist list , although his name was later removed. Being named on a terrorist list or on one of the various bulletins and releases falsely labeling legal activists as communist rebels (a practice known as “red-tagging”) is often fatal – and most people in Manila’s legal activist network have, at some point during Duterte’s rule, been red-tagged.

Duterte, who has idolised the dictator Ferdinand Marcos and toyed with placing the Philippines under martial law , now oversees a country where armed police and military roam city streets enforcing lockdowns as Congress and the Supreme Court continue to eliminate legal space for dissent.

The UN human rights chief has called for a probe into drug war and political killings, while a bipartisan group of US legislators asked the Philippines to repeal its new anti-terrorism law . But the international community has been slow to condemn the Duterte administration as the Philippines slides into what hardened activists call a Marcos-like authoritarianism. China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects in the country, while the US retains a strong military alliance with the Philippines and recently approved two possible sales of attack helicopters , which critics warn could be used in operations targeting legal activists.

And outside of Manila, the killings have not stopped. This month, the activist Zara Alvarez, 39, was shot dead in Negros. Alvarez, who played a crucial role in chronicling the deaths of farmers on the island and raised human rights issues in Negros before the UN Human Rights Council, had been “red-tagged” herself.

The culprit behind her death: an unidentified gunman.

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Philippines

Philippines: Political killings, human rights and the peace process

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AI Index: ASA 35/006/2006

1. Introduction

Over recent years reports of an increased number of killings of political activists, predominately those associated with leftist or left-orientated groups,(1) have caused increasing concern in the Philippines(2) and internationally.(3)

The attacks, mostly carried out by unidentified men who shoot the victims before escaping on motorcycles, have very rarely led to the arrest, prosecution and punishment of those responsible. Amnesty International believes that the killings constitute a pattern and that a continuing failure to deliver justice to the victims represents a failure by the Government of the Philippines to fulfil its obligation to protect the right to life of every individual in its jurisdiction.

The organisation is also concerned that the killings have played a major role in the break-down of a protracted peace process and an accompanying human rights agreement, between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF), representing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA).

The common features in the methodology of the attacks, leftist profile of the victims, and an apparent culture of impunity(4) shielding the perpetrators, has led Amnesty International to believe that the killings are not an unconnected series of criminal murders, armed robberies or other unlawful killings. Rather they constitute a pattern of politically targeted extrajudicial executions(5) taking place within the broader context of a continuing counter-insurgency campaign. The organisation remains gravely concerned at repeated credible reports that members of the security forces have been directly involved in the attacks, or else have tolerated, acquiesced to, or been complicit in them.

Government and military officials insist that there is no state policy which calls or allows for extrajudicial executions, that there are no secret "death squads" and no use by members of the armed forces of hired killers. They claim that most of the killings were in fact carried out by members of the armed groups themselves in the context of factional rivalries or internal "purges". The Government of the Philippines points to the comprehensive array of international human rights treaties which the Philippines has ratified and asserts that in addition provisions protecting human rights are enshrined in the Constitution and ensured through national laws and institutions, including both an independent judiciary and a Commission on Human Rights.

The international human rights treaties signed by the Philippines impose a clear duty on states to investigate alleged violations of the right to life, including political killings "promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies".(6) Yet the fact that the overwhelming majority of attacks remain unresolved illuminates a continuing failure by the authorities to act with due diligence in investigating and prosecuting such violations. This failure continues to have a serious, corrosive impact on public confidence in the administration of justice and the rule of law. The chairperson of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights noted that a pattern of impunity in relation to the killings is visible, and the government has a responsibility to protect the right to life, whatever the political or other background of the victims.(7)

Amnesty International believes that urgent steps are needed to remedy this situation, not least because the threat of further killings has intensified due to political developments during 2006. These include President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's declaration of a week-long State of Emergency in late February and the continuing collapse of the peace process. Prospect for revival of peace negotiations dwindled further amid intensification of counter-insurgency operations, the direct transfer of names and addresses of NDF negotiators and others listed in a former safe-conduct agreement to an arrest warrant, and an announcement in June of the release of substantial additional funds to allow the armed forces to "crush" the communist insurgency in certain areas within two years.(8)

During and after the Emergency, justified as a response to an alleged coup conspiracy involving an array of actors from the extreme left to the extreme right of the political spectrum, senior officials repeatedly claimed that the major threat to national security came from the CPP-NPA. They publicly linked the legal leftist political opposition directly with communist armed groups, in effect implying that there was no distinction between them. Such public labelling, in conjunction with the arrest and attempted arrest of leftist Congressional Representatives on charges of "rebellion", raised concerns that the risk of further killings of leftist activists was intensifying.(9)

Such concerns proved well-founded. As senior officials and military officers labelled members of the legal left "enemies of the state",(10) and failed to condemn the killings consistently at all levels of government, fears grew that elements within the armed forces might interpret this as a tacit signal that political killings were a legitimate part of the anti-insurgency campaign. At least 51 political killings took place in the first half of 2006, compared to the 66 killings recorded by Amnesty International in the whole of 2005.(11)

While welcoming President Arroyo's condemnation of political killings in her State of the Nation Address to Congress in July 2006,(12) her earlier reported instructions to cabinet officials to put an end to further killings,(13) and the establishment of a special police investigative task force,(14) Amnesty International believes further determined steps are essential. The organization calls on the Government of the Philippines to implement Amnesty International's 14-Point Program for the Prevention of Extrajudicial Executions.(15)

As an integral part of this Program, the authorities should urgently reiterate a clear, unequivocal message to all members of the police, military and other security forces that involvement in, or acquiescence to, such unlawful killings will never be tolerated. All such cases must be fully and promptly investigated and all those responsible, whether linked to the armed forces or not, brought to justice. Only in this manner can public confidence in the impartial and effective administration of justice be restored and a peace process, with respect for human rights by all sides at its heart, be revived.

Footnotes included in full report.

(pdf* format - 264KB)

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Hot issue: political killings in the philippines.

The recent spate of assassinations of local government officials brings to mind a history of political violence that has marred Philippine politics since the last century.

Before Martial Law was declared in 1972, political kingpins ran the areas they represented like fiefdoms. Many employed private armies to assert their power and authority.

During martial rule, enforced disappearances and summary executions threatened activists and other so-called enemies of the state.

In a more recent example, the administration’s two-year War on Drugs has claimed more than 10,000 lives. In other areas, victims of political killings have included left-wing advocates, anti-mining activists, agricultural reform activists, journalists, the political opposition, and outspoken members of the clergy.

According to the human rights organization, Karapatan, there is a pattern to political killings in the Philippines – state security forces (i.e. the military and the police) use forced disappearances or summary executions during “legitimate” operations.

When it comes to political killings, there is no presumption of innocence, a right guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. In fact, political killings upend the very idea of due process.

What is due process of law?

As outlined in Sec. 1, Art. III and Sec. 14(1), Art. III of the Constitution, due process protects citizens from the abuse of government action coming from any of the three branches of government: executive, legislative, or judicial.

There are two kinds of due process:

• Procedural due process US Senator Daniel Webster described procedural due process as “law which hears before it condemns.” The landmark case, “Banco Espanol vs.    Palanca (37 Phil. 921),” said that for due process to take place, the following must be present:
• An impartial court or tribunal with the power to hear and decide the matter before it
• An opportunity for the accused to be heard
• Judgment that is passed only after a lawful hearing
• Substantive due process This principle allows the court to protect constitutional rights from government interference. It states that the government needs sufficient justification to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.

Thus, political killings contravene basic constitutional law as the State or its agents (military and police) have bypassed due process.

Legal basis against political killings

Thus, all political killings are extrajudicial killings (EJKs). In “ Secretary of National Defense v Manalo (GR No. 180906 ),” the Supreme Court defined political killings as violating procedural due process as they are committed without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.

Furthermore, in the case, “Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. Et Al. v Mary Jean Tagitis (GR No. 182498),” the Supreme Court said that political killings and enforced disappearances violate substantive due process as these crimes mean that State, its agents, and private parties violate constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty, and security.

Republic .Act 10353 or the Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012 also defines enforced disappearances as a separate crime from kidnapping, torture or murder.

The law defines an enforced disappearance as:

• The victim is deprived of liberty
• The perpetrator is the State or agents of the State
• Information on the whereabouts of the victim is concealed or denied

Those who violate this law can be further prosecuted if they refuse to disclose the whereabouts of the victim. This is the first law of its kind in Asia.

Contact Duran & Duran-Schulze Law at (+632) 478 5826 or send an email to [email protected] for more information.

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The Causes and Impact of Political Assassinations

January 2015, volume 8, issue 1.

Arie Perliger

Categories:

• Terror Behavior
• Weapons & Tactics
• Individual Terrorist Actors

Political assassinations have been part of social reality since the emergence of communal social frameworks, as the leaders of tribes, villages, and other types of communities constantly needed to defend their privileged status. In the ancient world assassination featured prominently in the rise and fall of some of the greatest empires.

While many people are familiar with the military victories of Alexander the Great, few today recall that his ascendance to power was facilitated by the assassination of his father (an innovative and talented politician in his own right), who was struck down by a bodyguard as he was entering a theater to attend his daughter’s marriage celebrations. In a somewhat more famous incident, Gaius Julius Caesar was assassinated in 44 BCE by Roman senators who increasingly feared that Caesar would revoke their privileges.

In modern times, political assassinations continue to play an important role in political and social processes and, in some cases, have a dramatic effect. For example, many argue that the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin in 1995 was a major reason for the collapse of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.[1] It is also difficult to deny the impact of the assassinations of figures such as Martin Luther King or Benazir Bhutto on the success of their political movements/parties following their deaths.

Thus, it is not surprising that Appleton argues, “The impact of assassinations on America and the World is incalculable,”[2] and that Americans cite the assassination of John F. Kennedy as the crime that has had the greatest impact on American society in the last 100 years.[3] Nonetheless, despite the apparently significant influence of political assassinations on political and social realities, this particular manifestation of political action is understudied and, as a result, poorly understood.

This article is a summary of a broader study that will be published later by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) and aims to improve our understanding of the causes and implications of political assassinations. It makes use of an original and comprehensive worldwide data set of political assassinations between 1945 and 2013. The findings illustrate the trends that characterize the phenomenon and challenge some of the existing conventions about political assassinations and their impact.

Data and Rationale In order to investigate the causes and implications of political assassinations, the CTC constructed a data set that includes political assassinations worldwide from 1946 to early 2013. After defining political assassinations as “an action that directly or indirectly leads to the death of an intentionally targeted individual who is active in the political sphere, in order to promote or prevent specific policies, values, practices or norms pertaining to the collective,” the CTC consulted a variety of resources, including relevant academic books and articles, media sources (especially LexisNexis and The New York Times archive), and online resources, to identify 758 attacks by 920 perpetrators that resulted in the death of 954 individuals. (Some attacks led to the death of multiple political leaders; however, the death of “bystanders” is not included in this number.)

This study is guided by the rationale that the logic of political assassinations is different from that of other manifestations of political violence. Hence, it is important to understand the unique factors that may encourage or discourage violent groups or individuals from engaging in political assassinations. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that these factors vary among different types of assassinations because in most cases the characteristics of the targeted individual shape the nature and objectives of the assassination. Indeed, this study establishes that different processes trigger different types of assassinations and that different types of assassinations generate distinct effects on the political and social arenas.

General Observations Although the first two decades after World War II were characterized by a limited number of political assassinations, the number of such attacks has risen dramatically since the early 1970s. This is reflective of the emergence of a new wave of terrorist groups, radical and universal ideologies operating on a global scale, and a growing willingness by oppressive regimes to use assassinations as a tool in their treatment of political opposition. Indeed, while most assassinations of government officials were perpetrated by sub-state violent groups, most assassinations of opposition leaders were initiated by ruling political elites or their proxies. This important observation supports the notion that a growing number of terrorist groups see assassinations as a legitimate and effective tool, and that one of the major obstacles for democratization is the vulnerability of political opposition.

Additionally, our data indicates that assassinations are not limited to specific regions or specific time frames. In fact, the opposite is true. Both regions that are considered politically stable and economically prosperous, such as Western Europe, as well as regions that are considered politically unstable, more prone to political violence, and economically weak, such as sub-Saharan Africa, have experienced similar levels of political assassinations.

In some regions, however, political assassinations have become dominant only in the last couple of decades. In South Asia, for example, 76 percent of the assassinations have been perpetrated since the mid-1980s, possibly a consequence of the growing instability in the region during and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And more than 85 percent of assassinations in Eastern Europe were perpetrated after 1995 with the start of the transition to democracy in most Eastern European countries, a process that in many cases was accompanied by growing ethnic tensions and political instability. In terms of targets, the data indicates that most assassinations target heads of state (17 percent), opposition leaders (who are not part of the executive or legislative branch) (18 percent), and members of parliament (21 percent). In rarer instances the targets are ministers (14 percent), diplomats (10 percent), local politicians such as governors or mayors (5 percent), and vice head of states (3 percent).

Causes of Assassinations The research findings indicate that, in general, political assassinations are more probable in countries that suffer from a combination of restrictions on political competition and strong polarization and fragmentation.

More specifically, states that lack consensual political ethos and homogeneous populations (in terms of the national and ethnic landscape) and include politically deprived groups will face a decline in the legitimacy of the political leadership and the political system and an increase in the likelihood of direct attacks against political leaders. One of the most glaring examples of such a dynamic may be found in Sri Lanka, where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a group that represents the deprived Tamil minority, organized a bloody campaign of political assassinations against the political leadership of the state and the Sinhalese majority from the early 1980s until approximately 2009. And since these issues tend to be present mainly in times of electoral processes or of actual violent strife, one should not be surprised that our findings indicate that election periods or periods characterized by a general increase in domestic violence are moments when a country is more susceptible to political assassinations.

Another interesting finding is that the territorial fragmentation of a country is correlated with an increase in the number of assassinations. When a government loses control over some parts of a country to opposition groups, both sides are more willing to use assassinations to enhance their influence and to consolidate their status as the sole legitimate rulers of the polity.

When looking specifically at the facilitators of assassinations of heads of state, we can identify some unique trends. To begin with, the polities most susceptible to assassinations against the head of state are authoritarian polities that lack clear succession rules and in which the leader enjoys significant political power. This is true even more so in polities that also include oppressed minorities and high levels of political polarization. Therefore, non-democratic political environments that feature leaders who are able to garner significant power and in which the state lacks efficient mechanisms for leadership change following an assassination, provide more prospects for success in advancing political changes via political assassination. This stands in contrast to democratic systems, in which it is clear that the elimination of the head of state will have only a limited, long-term impact on the socio-political order.

Although heads of state represent what could be considered the crown jewel of political assassinations, lower-ranking political figures also face this threat. In this study, we specifically examined attacks against legislators and vice heads of state. Attacks against the latter are fairly rare and are usually intended to promote highly specific policy changes (related to areas under the responsibility of the vice head of state) or to prevent the vice head of state from inheriting the head of state position. Legislators, on the other hand, are most often victims of civil wars or similar violent domestic clashes in developing countries; in democracies they are almost never targeted.

To illustrate, no less than 34 Iranian legislators were assassinated in 1981, when the new revolutionary regime was consolidating its control over the country. Hence, assassinations of legislators are almost always a result of national-level conflicts rather than local ones, contrary to what some may suspect. Lastly, legislators’ assassinations are rarely perpetrated to promote specific policies or to gain access to the political process. In other words, the assassination of legislators should be considered more as acts of protest against an existing political order than political actions that are intended to promote specific political goals.

One of the unique features of this study, among others, is its focus on assassinations of political figures who are not part of governing platforms. Unlike other types of assassinations, the state is typically a major actor in the assassination in these cases. Consequently, it should not surprise us that opposition leaders are more likely to be targeted in authoritarian systems or in weak democracies, as the political environment in these types of regimes provides a space for the emergence of an opposition while also providing the ruling elites tools and legitimacy for oppressive measures against a “successful” opposition (e.g. Pakistan as well as many Latin American countries). It is also clear that opposition leaders are more vulnerable during violent domestic conflicts, when the number of opportunities, and maybe also the legitimacy, to act against them are on the rise.

Impact of Political Assassinations The study provides several important insights regarding the impact of political assassinations. In general, political assassinations seem to intensify prospects of a state’s fragmentation and undermine its democratic nature. The latter is usually manifested in a decline in political participation and a disproportionate increase in the strength of the executive branch.

When we looked specifically at different types of assassinations, we were able to find significant variations among them. For example, assassinations of heads of state tend to generate a decline in the democratic nature of a polity and an increase in domestic violence and instability as well as economic prosperity. The latter may sound counterintuitive but could reflect the rise of a more open economic system after the elimination of authoritarian ruler. The assassination of opposition leaders has a limited impact on the nature of a political system, but has the potential to lead to an increase in overall unrest and domestic violence. And assassinations of legislators are often followed by public unrest (illustrated by growing anti-government demonstrations) and by a decline in the legitimacy of the government.

Policy Implications This study illustrates that most polities experienced political assassinations at some point in their history. Thus, our ability to improve our understanding of political processes must also include a deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of political assassinations. But how can the findings presented in this study help us to understand the potential role of policymakers in the occurrence or prevention of political assassinations?

To begin with, it is evident that governments can promote political and social conditions that may decrease the prospects of political assassinations. For example, while governments in polarized societies sometimes have the tendency to restrict political participation in order to prevent further escalation in intrastate communal relations, our findings indicate that this action will actually increase the probability of political assassinations.

Moreover, in order for electoral processes to become a viable tool for promoting a productive and peaceful political environment, it is clear that they are more effective after ensuring the most intense political grievances have been addressed. Otherwise, electoral competition has the potential to instigate further violence, including the assassinations of political figures. The shaping of stable and regulated succession mechanisms is also highly important, especially in countries that are struggling to construct stable democratic institutions. Interestingly, it seems that while theories of democratization have for a long time prescribed the creation of institutions as a first step to ensure wide representation, followed by stable routines and protocols, the opposite order may be more effective for the promotion of stability and eventually a liberal-democratic environment.

The findings also indicate that more attention needs to be given to the safety of the political leaders during instances of violent domestic clashes or transitions to democracy. Opposition leaders are most vulnerable in the early stages of democratization, so the effort to facilitate a democratic environment must also include the creation of mechanisms to ensure the safety of opposition leaders. This in turn will enhance the legitimacy of political participation, reduce polarization, and enhance political stability.

Moreover, although civilian victims naturally attract most of the public attention during a civil war, this study highlights the need to evaluate how harm to political figures may be prevented, as this has significant potential to lead to further escalation of a conflict, especially when the assassinated figures are heads of state or opposition leaders.

Lastly, the findings also provide several practical insights for law enforcement. More than half of the assassins (51.3 percent) had been involved in criminal activities prior to the assassination. This may indicate that a group usually prefers one of its veteran members to perform an assassination, probably because of the high stakes involved in these kinds of operations and the relatively high level of operational knowledge necessary to conduct them.

In one extreme example, the leader of the Bangladeshi branch of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), Mufti Abdul Hannan, was revealed to have participated actively in the attempted assassination of Sheikh Hasina, the leader of an opposition party in Bangladesh and the former Bangladesh prime minister, in August 2004. Also, because of the particular risks involved in these kinds of operations, groups may prefer to expose members who are already known to law enforcement agencies to conduct an assassination rather than exposing members who are still unknown to law enforcement bodies. (However, this may be problematic since the veteran members are often at higher risk of being under surveillance).

Conclusion The dearth of research on political assassination represents a crucial oversight, especially considering the frequency of the phenomenon and its implications. Our study highlights the major theoretical and policy implications of assassinations and identifies some promising directions for further research, with the hope that this unique type of political violence will be better understood in the future.

Dr. Arie Perliger is the Class of 1977 Director of Terrorism Studies at the Combating Terrorism Center and Associate Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[1] President Bill Clinton, the main sponsor of the Oslo peace process, speculated that if Rabin had not been assassinated, peace would have been achieved in three years. See Atilla Shumfalbi, “Bill Clinton: If Rabin Would Have Not Been Assassinated There Would Be Peace Today,” YNET News, September 14, 2009: www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3805013,00.html [Hebrew] [2] Sheldon Appleton, “Trends: Assassinations,” Public Opinion Quarterly 64:4 (Winter 2000): pp. 495–522. [3] Zaryab Iqbal and Christopher Zorn, “The Political Consequences of Assassination,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52:3 (June 2008): pp. 385–400.

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Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Strategies to End the Violence

Testimony of G. Eugene Martin, U.S. Institute of Peace Executive Director of the Philippine Facilitation Project, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs

By: G. Eugene Martin

Publication Type: Congressional Testimony

Gene Martin testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on "Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Strategies to End the Violence."

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing on the tragic extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. Having lived in the Philippines for six years and now working to facilitate the peace process in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), I am well aware of the many political, economic and social issues underlying these violent acts.

The Philippine Facilitation Project of the U.S. Institute of Peace is an excellent model for active U.S. engagement in conflict situations. At the request of the State Department, the Institute has been working for nearly four years to end conflict between the central government in Manila and the Islamic Moro people of Mindanao. The centuries long conflict has made the southern Philippines one of the most violent areas of the country. The Institute is actively exploring with negotiators from the Philippine government and the MILF alternatives for resolving the long conflict. As an independent, non-partisan federal institution, the Institute is able to promote U.S. interests unofficially. Our work gives us insights into the causes of violence in society, not only in Mindanao but nationwide. That said, my remarks represent my opinion based upon my experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Root Causes of Violence

I believe there are two underlying causes of the violence. First, weak political and social institutions, particularly a corrupt and ineffective justice system, prompt citizens to resolve conflicts on their own. When one cannot obtain justice through the police or courts, alternative means are found. This can be through direct personal action, drawing upon family or clan support, or arranging for criminal or revolutionary organizations to settle matters.

In Philippine society, family is primary. Nearly any action can be justified if it is to support the family. Kinship ties extend well beyond the nuclear family, into clans and tribal or community groups. Identities often are based on familial or, being an island nation, geographical relationships rather than broader nationalism. In Mindanao, much of the violence is caused by clan conflicts, known as “rido,” which can continue for generations. Absent access to, or confidence in, justice through legal mechanisms and institutions, the aggrieved party often takes direct action against the perceived offender to obtain satisfaction.

The fractious nature of society leads to weak political institutions. Elite families who hold political and economic power in much of the country often seek to maintain their power in any way possible. Elections tend to be corrupt, candidates running against incumbents are often the targets of harassment if not violence, and voters are threatened with retribution for opposition to power holders. Prime targets also for threats and violence, including killings, are media or civil society investigators into political and economic corruption.

The second underlying cause of violence is the legacy of the Marco dictatorship. Martial law politicized the institutions of government and violence against anyone perceived to be opposed to government policies was tolerated if not authorized. Soldiers, police, judges and prosecutors became perpetrators of violent actions against broad segments of the population. Extralegal arrest, detention, incarceration, disappearances and killings (known as salvaging) were condoned and used to advance the regime’s power and reduce political opposition.

Many of those who opposed the Marcos regime responded in similar fashion. Lacking legal of safe alternatives, many allied themselves with revolutionary organizations for protection and influence. These included the National Democratic Front (NDF) of the Communist Party of the Philippine (CPP) and, in Muslim areas, the Moro National Liberation Front and subsequently the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. While many if not most of those who affiliated with the NDF during martial law years were not communist, the NDF provided the only available support network against Marcos. Marcos’ militarized response to the historical struggle of the Moros against Manila’s colonial policies enhanced the appeal of those who advocated armed violence to counter military and militia pogroms against Muslim civilians. The violence of the Marcos regime abetted the communist insurgency and Moro decisions that safety was possible only through independence from the Philippines rather than by working within the political system.

Current Situation in the Philippines

I believe the present rash of violence and killings is the result of political instability and weakness. President Arroyo has expressed her determination to address and resolve the killings. She established the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings, headed by former Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Melo. She also welcomed the investigation of Professor Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council. However, I question her capability to take the necessary steps to end the killings. She has been politically weak since her controversial election in 2004, depending upon support from military and provincial leaders to counter impeachment measures by her opponents in Congress. She has promoted military officers who support her and placed retired military and police officers in high-level civilian offices. Her challenge to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to eliminate the decades old communist New Peoples Army (NPA) insurgency within two years has given the AFP a green light to take any action it wishes against the NPA and their allies. Faced with a persistent low-level NPA insurgency, the military resorts to stretching counterinsurgency strategies to branding leftist organizations as enemies of the state that can be intimidated or eliminated by any means.

The communist insurgency is a serious threat to the Philippine government and democracy. The world’s last remaining Maoist insurgency, the NDF, uses violence and abuses democratic privileges to advance its power. As a legal political movement, NDF leaders are elected to Congress where they continue to oppose the administration and seek to block or destabilize government policies. During election campaigns, the NDF uses kidnappings, “revolutionary” taxes, threats and violence to support its candidates and harass opponents. The Party’s political goals are to weaken the government, gain power through coalitions and eventually replace the democratic system with an ideological communist dictatorship.

One of the legacies of the Marcos regime is the continued alienation of many civil society elements from the government and especially the military. NGOs, religious bodies, academics, small farmers, and indigenous peoples remain suspicious of government officials and military personnel because of the oppression and violence used against them during martial law. Many government officials, particularly in the armed forces and police, reciprocate the mistrust, seeing a communist hand behind civil society protests against administration policies and actions. Powerful elites influence local police or military commanders to use force against farmers’ complaints over land grabs or workers’ demonstrations over working conditions. Murders of activist farmers and labor leaders in rural provinces are covered up. Journalists investigating the crimes become targets. Similarly, prosecutors and judges are intimidated. Tragically, the result is further alienation from and resistance to the government.

The killings have become a major issue within the Philippines, yet there is little public outrage despite the release of the Melo Commission report and the initial criticisms of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council. Public perceptions are influenced by military and official attributions that most of the killings are internal CPP-NPA purges. Most civil society reaction has been from leftist oriented NGOs rather than mainstream organizations, further limiting public concern.

Short-Term Prospects in the Philippines

While we all hope the killings will stop immediately, I am not optimistic in the short run. I am confident, however, that through conscientious efforts by Philippine political and civil society leaders, as well as international partners such as the United States, this cycle of violence can be halted.

My pessimism over short-term remedial action by the government is based upon the following:

• It is election time again. Campaigning for national elections on May 14 is well underway. Little if any serious effort will be exerted to investigate killings of political significance. In fact, as contesting parties struggle to win by any means, there will likely be an upsurge of campaign related violence.
• Candidates from left-wing political parties will be particular targets. National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales stated on March 8 that such candidates must not be allowed to win seats in the Congress. The Gonzales view that party-list candidates “are under the direct influence of the communist party” gives a potential hunting license to military and local officials who agree with him.
• The new anti terrorism law, which President Arroyo signed on March 6, gives new “legal teeth” to the government’s war on terrorism. The Arroyo administration describes the law, titled the “Human Security Act of 2007,” as being “very concerned on human rights.” Many observers fear the law may increase unfettered military operations against opponents deemed to be terrorists. National Security Advisor Gonzales has already stated that the NPA will be labeled a terrorist organization when the new law is promulgated. Legal leftist organizations and elected individuals may be designated.
• The new Defense Secretary, Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr., is a retired police officer. He succeeds a civilian. Senior Department of National Defense officials are now mostly former military officers rather than civilians. Secretary Ebdane likely will promote military perceptions of security threats. UN Rapporteur Alston stated “the AFP is in a state of almost total denial...of its need to respond effectively and authentically to the...killings...attributed to them.”

The killings and the state of democracy in the Philippines have implications for U.S. interests. Prolonged United States support for the Marcos regime in order to save our military bases alienated many in the Philippines. U.S. Ambassador Kenny has rightly expressed official U.S. concern over the extrajudicial killings. However, other U.S. interests—counter terrorism cooperation and training opportunities the AFP provide U.S. forces – may limit pressure on the Arroyo administration.

The U.S. Institute of Peace involvement in the Mindanao peace process provides insights into many of these issues. It is readily apparent that there are multiple, often uncoordinated, policymakers in the Arroyo administration with diverse agendas. The President has authorized her negotiators to propose a forward-looking self-determination package to the MILF. Yet, military officers in central Mindanao continue to support local political leaders who use their militia as private armies to contest MILF influence. The Arroyo administration avoids exercising national authority over local political and economic interests opposed to a peace agreement with the Moros so as to retain their support against administration opponents. It expends little effort to counter biased or incorrect media reports on Mindanao events.

Recommendations

The U.S. and other nations are not without influence to help end the violence of extrajudicial killings. The Philippines is sensitive to and dependent on the goodwill and support of its neighbors and international donors. Some useful tools include:

• Donor nations and international financial institutions already have strong anti-corruption requirements for economic assistance. Linking assistance to forceful judicial reform and independent investigations of the killings would enhance the resolution of the cases.
• Philippine desires to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Corporation assistance gives the U.S. influence to demand rigorous action against the killings.
• The sizeable defense relationship the U.S. has with the Philippines provides a mechanism to encourage civilian control over the armed forces.
• Forceful public U.S. official support for human rights reforms and protections would counter some Filipino perceptions that U.S. concern over the killings is tempered by our efforts to counter terrorism.

Model for Success

The U.S. Institute of Peace has established a unique relationship with key players in the peace process in Mindanao. Working with minimal publicity, the Institute has made a significant contribution to the progress in the talks over the past four years. The Institute has worked closely with civil society to foster open debate to mitigate Filipino public prejudice and discrimination against the Moro minority. Engaging NGOs, church leaders, educators, and media representatives, the Institute seeks to change public perceptions of the conflict and the benefits a durable peace agreement would bring the nation. Similar programs focused on highlighting a need to end the extrajudicial killings and to bring perpetrators to justice could help strengthen judicial institutions and public demands for resolution of the killings.

The Institute’s peace efforts supplement Embassy, USAID and the Pacific Command’s counterterrorism and developmental programs and priorities. Working independently but cooperatively with these official U.S. agencies, the Institute addresses the political, religious, historical and social issues underlying the conflict. Parallel programs dealing with judicial reform, civilian control over security forces, and amelioration of the communist insurgency could begin to address the causes of the killings. Institute efforts to reduce intra-Moro clan and tribal conflict through support for dialogue and cooperation among the next generation of Moro leaders could be duplicated in other conflict situations, which now end in political killings.

Regrettably, the State Department’s support for the Institute’s facilitation project is ending just as the peace process is at a critical juncture. Once the negotiators reach agreement on outstanding issues, a politically contentious, long-term transition period to implement the agreement will require close monitoring and engagement. Granting the Moros self-determination will alter power relationships in Mindanao. The potential for extralegal violence is real. Continued Institute presence is critical to help both Muslim and Christian communities through this difficult period. Without renewed funding, however, the Institute’s unique investment of trust and credibility with key players will be lost prematurely.

The coordinated approach U.S. agencies, the Institute of Peace, neighboring countries and international donors have used to advance the Mindanao peace process can be replicated to resolve the extrajudicial killings. U.S. interests would be served and the Philippines would benefit.

Thank you Madam Chairman. I welcome your questions and those of your colleagues.

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author, not the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues.

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Extrajudicial killings in the Philippines

This country spotlight refers to data published in 2019. For the most recent data, go to our Rights Tracker .

‘War on drugs’ is a denial of the right to life

Since the election of Rodrigo Duterte in June 2016, a violent ‘war on drugs’ has claimed upwards of 5,000 lives in the Philippines. Executions by police and militia groups that target drug dealers and users not only exacerbate the drug problem but constitute a violation of the right to freedom from execution by extrajudicial killing.

On July 1st 2016, Oliver Dela Cruz was shot to death in Bulacan province during a police sting operation. He was playing cards at a friend’s house when a group of armed men broke in, interrogated and executed him. Police denied any responsibility, blaming vigilante violence.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Philippines has signed, recognises the right to life. The death penalty was abolished in the Philippines in 1987, and the country signed the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, becoming part of the global movement against the death penalty.

Under the ICCPR, the right to be free from execution also covers arbitrary and extrajudicial killing. The Human Rights Measurement Initiative tracks the performance of countries around the world on upholding these rights.

The killings of Mr Dela Cruz and thousands of others are a denial of the right to life, the right to freedom from execution.

While the current administration is not directly responsible for the authorisation of these extra-judicial executions, Agnes Callamard, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings, blamed Duterte’s hard-line approach and rhetoric for exacerbating the violence and denounced the lack of investigation into the killings.

Police and militia groups are not being held to account for their actions. This is a rejection of the government’s obligation to investigate violations of the right to life and the right to freedom from extrajudicial killing.

The right to freedom from execution

According to international law, the right to be free from execution includes freedom from any arbitrary or extrajudicial deprivation of life, as well as freedom from the death penalty even with due process of law (ICCPR, Part III, Article 6; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 1).

This is a fundamental human right that must be respected and governments are legally obligated to do what they can to prevent such killings and hold those responsible to account.

HRMI’s Civil and Political Rights data collection

In 2019, we collected information on civil and political rights in 19 survey countries via a secure online expert opinion survey  (please note this is a link to a preview of the survey only, and any responses you make will not be collected).

These countries were selected based on the following two criteria:

• Sufficient interest from human rights experts in that country for inclusion (so that we could be sure to have sufficient numbers of survey respondents and active engagement during the survey).
• A sub-set of 19 countries that offered diversity of sizes, regions, cultures, income levels, degree of openness etc (so that we could learn how well our survey methodology worked in different contexts).

The graph below shows how the 19 countries in the HRMI survey performed on freedom from execution.

It seems likely that the Philippines would perform poorly relative to the survey countries, due to the number of unlawful executions carried out since 2016, but without data it is harder for human rights defenders to do their work and hold governments to account.

As soon as funding allows, we will extend our civil and political rights data collection to the Philippines and the rest of the world, and expand our full set of data to measure other rights protected by international law.

If you want to help fund our expansion to the Philippines, and all countries in the world, please contact us .

Who can use these data?

All of HRMI’s data are freely available to anyone. You can  explore our data site here , and even download the dataset.

We have data on seven  civil and political rights : as well as  five economic and social rights .

HRMI aims to produce  useful  data. Some of the people we expect will use our data are:

• Journalists, especially those reporting a particular country, and those focusing on human rights, politics, social issues or international affairs
• Researchers
• Government policy advisers
• Human rights advocates
• Human rights monitors within a region, and at the international level
• Companies, for decision-making, to minimise risk for investors, and direct capital flows ethically.

If you know anyone in those categories, please let them know about HRMI, in case our data can be useful to them.

HRMI’s data have been available for only a few months so far, but as different people use them, we want to share stories and case studies. Whenever you see our data in action, please tell us, and we’ll include a link on our website.

Thanks for your interest in HRMI. You are most welcome to follow us on  Twitter ,  YouTube ,  Facebook , and LinkedIn and sign up to receive occasional newsletters  here .

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Political Killings in Philippines

We, the undersigned individuals and organizations, join our voices in a call for an end to the wave of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. Over the past five years, a stark increase in politically-motivated violence has claimed the lives of pro-democracy activists, human rights defenders, political opposition figures, lawyers, teachers, peasants, students, union leaders, and religious leaders. These murders are committed under the auspices of an anti-leftist, anti-communist military offensive that targets village and community leaders in communities that are suspected of supporting or being sympathetic to leftist insurgent groups.

We voice a special concern for acts of violence perpetrated against trade unionists. These hard-working men and women who organize to protect their basic rights have paid a heavy price. According to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Philippines is now the second most dangerous country on earth for trade unionists. Both government officials and the corporations that employ union members must take strong action to safeguard the lives and rights of all working people in the Philippines.

Tomorrow, September 22, marks the one-year anniversary of the murder of Diosdado “Ka Fort” Fortuna, a leading figure in the Filipino trade union movement, at the hands of unidentified assailants. As the Commission on Human Rights Philippines (CHRP) would later declare, this killing was a human rights violation and not an isolated incident of tragedy. Fortuna worked at the Nestlé Philippines facility in Cabuyao, Laguna, where the workers have been on strike since 2002; he was shot and killed on his way home from the picket line. We urge Nestlé Philippines to bring a quick and amicable resolution to the labor dispute at the Cabuyao facility. We call on Nestlé and the Filipino government to respect and protect the lives of all trade unionists, guarantee the right to union activity, and investigate the murder of “Ka Fort” and all extrajudicial killings in the Philippines.

Issues: 

• Violence Against Trade Unions

Countries: 

• Philippines

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Related publications.

• Labor Letter to Secretary Raimondo and Ambassador Tai
• Letter Regarding ILO High-Level Tripartite Mission to the Philippines
• Request for Review of the GSP Status of the Republic of the Philippines for Violations of Worker Rights

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How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence

Virginia Held, How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence , Oxford University Press, 2008, 205pp., $45.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780195329599.

Reviewed by Igor Primoratz, University of Melbourne

This is a book on terrorism and political violence more generally, written by a philosopher and accordingly focusing on conceptual and moral, rather than empirical or historical, questions. The book is meant for fellow philosophers and political theorists, but it is written clearly and without philosophical jargon, and will be accessible, and of much interest, to the general reader too.

While political violence is a traditional topic in political and moral philosophy, terrorism -- the type of political violence generally considered most difficult to defend -- was not much discussed before the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. Virginia Held is one of the few philosophers who gave it sustained attention before it became a fashionable topic. The present book is a collection of seven essays she has published over the last twenty-odd years and one previously unpublished paper. Some essays discuss terrorism or political violence generally, while others look into such related issues as the ways the media deals with political violence, or collective responsibility for ethnic hatred and violence. There is also an essay on the methods of moral inquiry.

In her approach to moral questions, Held combines consequentialism, deontological ethics and the ethics of care. The relevance of the last approach to discussing issues of political violence is rather limited, and Held's position on terrorism and political violence is grounded in consequentialist and deontological considerations of a more traditional type. So is just war theory, but Held's views are not a version of that theory. Indeed, she doubts that just war theory can be of much help in understanding and judging contemporary armed conflicts.

The title of the book might be thought somewhat misleading, as Held does not so much seek to show how terrorism is wrong as how it can be right. To be sure, a title highlighting the latter prospect probably would not have been a good idea in the current atmosphere of the "war on terror." This "war" is both driven and defended by a "moral clarity" claimed by leaders of some major powers and by many analysts and commentators. Held rightly challenges this facile "moral clarity," according to which all terrorism is morally the same, clearly distinct from war, and a monopoly of insurgents, who are both amoral and utterly irrational and fanatical, and therefore never to be engaged with in dialogue or negotiation. She goes on to argue that we should not adopt a sweeping moral rejection of all terrorism, whatever the cause it serves, the circumstances in which it does so, and the consequences of refraining from it; that terrorism is not "uniquely atrocious"; and that it is not necessarily morally worse than war.

The scope and import of any moral assessment of terrorism depends on just what is meant by "terrorism". Accordingly, Held discusses at some length the question of how the term should be defined. The usage over the two centuries or so since the term entered political and moral discourse in the West has been notoriously confusing, fraught with moral emotions and political passions, and plagued by relativism and double standards. It is in such cases that philosophy can demonstrate its relevance to public debates by clarifying central concepts and main positions, spotting missteps in argument, exposing prejudice and double standards, and thus facilitating more rational and discerning moral deliberation and choice. Most definitions of terrorism crafted by philosophers acknowledge the two traits that make up the core concept underlining all shifts in descriptive and evaluative meaning: terrorism is violence aiming at intimidation (fear, terror). Beyond this, philosophers tend to disagree, most importantly on whether terrorism is violence against civilians (non-combatants, innocent people), or can also target members of the military and security services and highly placed government officials. This is the question of a narrow vs. wide definition. A wide definition is in line with common use over two centuries, whereas a narrow definition is revisionary. Yet a narrow definition may be more appropriate in the context of moral assessment of violence and terrorism. Surely there is a considerable moral difference between planting a bomb in an office of (what is considered) an extremely oppressive government and killing a number of its officials, and planting a bomb in a coffee shop and killing a number of common citizens.

Held prefers a wide definition, for reasons I do not find convincing. One is common use. Held points out that the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, or much Palestinian violence directed at Israeli soldiers, would not count as terrorism on a narrow definition, while the bombing of Dresden or Hiroshima would, and finds these implications unacceptable. To me, they seem just right. She quotes Walter Laqueur's remark that "most terrorist groups in the contemporary world have been attacking the military, the police, and the civilian population" (p. 55) as showing the inadequacy of a narrow definition. But surely the fact that a group has engaged in terrorism to an extent sufficient to consider it a terrorist group does not turn every act of political violence committed by the group into an act of terrorism. Finally, Held rejects narrow definitions on the ground that "it is not at all clear who the 'innocent' are as distinct from the 'legitimate' targets. We can perhaps agree that small children are innocent, but beyond this, there is little moral clarity" (pp. 19-20). Yet even if only "small children" were morally protected against violence that would be a weighty consideration, as indiscriminate political violence against civilians or common citizens is bound to kill and maim children too. Moreover, there are other classes of civilians that are just as clearly innocent in the relevant sense, i.e. innocent of the (alleged) injustice or oppression: opponents of the government, those too old or infirm to take part in political life, or those inculpably ignorant of the immorality of their government's policies.

The book offers two somewhat different definitions of terrorism: as "political violence that usually spreads fear beyond those attacked" and "perhaps more than anything else … resembles small-scale war" (p. 21), and as political violence employed with "the intention either to spread fear or to harm non-combatants" (p. 76). Both definitions run together war and terrorism, and imply that an act of war proper, i.e. one aimed at a legitimate military target, counts as terrorism. For, as Trotsky pointed out in his defense of the "red terror", "war … is founded upon intimidation… . [It] destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will" ( Terrorism and Communism , Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961, p. 58). Held accepts this implication of her position; I find it problematic.

Philosophers working with a wide definition of terrorism usually distinguish terrorism that targets the military and high government officials and terrorism that attacks common citizens, and argue that the former type of terrorism can be morally justified in certain circumstances, while the latter type is never, or almost never, justified. Held does not take this line. Her book offers two different justifications of terrorist violence, and both apply to the latter as well as the former kind of terrorism.

The first is in terms of the responsibility of citizens in a democracy for what their government does on their behalf. This justification is only suggested at several points in the book and is never developed and defended from likely objections. Held does not make it clear whether she sees common citizens as proper objects of terrorist violence because, as voters, they authorize the government's actions and policies (p. 20), or on account of various types and degrees of support they give the government (pp. 56, 78). Both these lines of argument are open to serious queries.

Held's second justification of terrorism, presented in chapter 4 )“Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals”) is carefully spelled out. It focuses on the issue of human rights. When human rights of a person or group are not respected, what may we do in order to ensure that they are? On one view, known as consequentialism of rights, if the only way to ensure respect of a certain right of A and B is to infringe on the same right of C, we will be justified in doing so. Held does not accept such trade-offs in rights with the aim of maximizing their respect. But she points out that rights sometimes come into conflict, whether directly or indirectly. When that happens, we cannot avoid comparing the rights involved in terms of their stringency and making certain choices. That applies to the case of terrorism too. Terrorism violates some human rights of its victims. But its advocates claim that in certain circumstances a limited use of terrorism is the only way of bringing about a society in which the human rights of all will be respected.

Even when that is so, it is not enough to make resort to terrorism justified. But it will be justified if an additional condition is met: that of distributive justice. If there is a society where the human rights of a part of the population are respected, while the same rights of another part of the population are being violated, and if the only way of putting an end to that and bringing about a society in which human rights of all are respected is a limited use of terrorism, and finally, if terrorism is directed against members of the first group, which until now has been privileged as far as respect of human rights is concerned -- then terrorism will be morally justified. This is an argument of distributive justice, brought to bear on the problem of violations of human rights. It is more just to equalize the violations of human rights in a stage of transition to a society where the rights of all are respected, than to allow the group which has already suffered large-scale violations of human rights to suffer more such violations (assuming that in both cases we are dealing with violations of the same, or equally stringent, human rights). Human rights of many are going to be violated in any case. "If we must have rights violations, a more equitable distribution of such violations is better than a less equitable one" (p. 88).

This is an original, deontological cum consequentialist justification of terrorism. Neither the indispensable contribution of terrorism to bringing about equal respect of human rights of all nor the justice in the distribution of violations of such rights in the transition stage is, in itself, enough to justify its use. Each is necessary, and jointly the two are sufficient for its justification. Obviously, a critique that reduces Held's position to either of its prongs falls short of the mark. So does the objection that terrorism is as a matter of fact highly unlikely ever to help usher in a better, more just society. If so, that tells against terrorism, rather than against Held's (or any other) stringent moral requirements for a morally defensible recourse to it.

Another objection is that in allowing for sacrificing such basic human rights as the right to life and to bodily security of individual victims of terrorism for the sake of a more just distribution of violations of the same rights within a group in the course of transition to a stage where these rights will be respected throughout that group, Held adopts a collectivistic position that offends against the principles of separateness of persons and respect for persons. In response, Held argues that

to fail to achieve a more just distribution of violations of rights (through the use of terrorism if that is the only means available) is to fail to recognize that those whose rights are already not fairly respected are individuals in their own right, not merely members of a group … whose rights can be ignored. … Arguments for achieving a just distribution of rights violations need not be arguments … that are more than incidentally about groups. They can be arguments about individuals' rights to basic fairness. (pp. 89-90)

Still, a common citizen belonging to the relatively privileged section of the population has done nothing to forfeit her right to life. If she is killed by a terrorist seeking to make the distribution of right to life violations in the entire population more just, her right to life is violated for reasons to do with the group: for the sake of more justice within the group. This has nothing to do with her sins of commission or omission, and in this sense Held's is a collectivistic argument -- and an argument that I, for one, do not find convincing. Held argues that, if we fail to resort to terrorism in the circumstances described in her argument, we thereby fail to recognize that individuals belonging to the disadvantaged section of the population "are individuals in their own right," rather than merely members of a group whose human rights can be ignored. This argument is predicated on moral equivalence of acts and omissions, and on ascription of negative responsibility. This, too, I find problematic. We do not fail to respect the right to life of disadvantaged individuals when we fail to kill or maim other individuals, personally innocent of the plight of the former. The disadvantaged individuals do not have a right that we should engage in terrorism in their behalf, and we do not have a duty to do that. Indeed, I believe we have a duty not to do that.

Whether Held's two-prong justification of terrorism can be successfully defended against this and other possible objections or not, it remains an original, complex, and highly important position on the morality of terrorism. The essay presenting it is the centerpiece of Held's book and her most valuable contribution to the discussion of terrorism as far as fellow philosophers are concerned. The general reader will find much of interest in all the essays in this book. In the wider context of public debate about terrorism and the "war" against it, Held provides a strong antidote to the simplistic deliverances of "moral clarity" many of our political leaders and "public intellectuals" claim to possess.

Stop the killings!

UN Human Rights Council, investigate the human rights situation in the Philippines! During the 44th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC) in June 2020, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet reported the widespread and systematic human rights violations in the Philippines. The High Commissioner found that domestic mechanisms have failed to ensure accountability, and that there is persistent impunity for human rights violations. She also cited that authorities’ harmful rhetoric inciting hatred and violence against women, human rights defenders, political opposition, civil society, indigenous peoples, drug users and peddlers, and relief workers, which continued during the COVID-19 period, could amount to a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Weeks after the release of Bachelet’s comprehensive report, the human rights situation in the Philippines took a turn for the worse. In the first week of July, the President signed the Anti-Terror Act that is seen as a measure that will aggravate the attacks and vilification of human rights defenders and civil society. The exercise of fundamental freedoms and rights has been compromised, with numerous challenges to press freedom and activists and protesters arrested and detained on flimsy charges. In August, only days apart, peasant leader Randall Echanis and health activist Zara Alvarez were summarily executed in separate incidents, following the killings of relief worker Jory Porquia, peasant leader Nora Apique and urban poor leader Carlito Badion during the COVID-19 lockdown. The lawyer and paralegal volunteer assisting the family of Echanis are now facing police complaints for allegedly obstructing its investigation. Threats of violence, including death threats, against activists and human rights defenders have continued unabated. We must put a stop to these unrelenting attacks now. And this worsening situation would not end as long as those who perpetrate them run free and unscathed. These perpetrators must be brought to justice before any court, tribunal or body that will act independently, with impartiality, and effectively, having allegiance to human rights and justice instead of powers that be. We need true accountability and genuine transparency in the inquiry into these human rights violations, removing the possibility that investigations would only shield and even absolve the persons liable for the crimes. We cannot rely on the promise of a government that has shown great disdain and disrespect of human rights to exact accountability and operate with transparency. This government has shown nothing but contempt for individuals and experts, including those in the UN and the International Criminal Court, who independently and impartially seek investigation into the relentless human rights violations in the Philippines. The Philippine Justice Secretary, during the 44th UNHRC Session, denied the existence of impunity in the Philippines, promising the creation of an inter-agency panel to review the 5,655 killings during the police’s anti-illegal drug operations. He denied allegations of widespread and systematic killings as well as other human rights violations. He stressed that the Government has respected human rights and other fundamental freedoms, reiterating the existence of accountability measures, such as an inter-agency committee on extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and other grave violations of the right to life, liberty and security of persons. We have witnessed a long history of domestic inter-agency task forces and fact-finding commissions promising to act without fear or favor. But we repeatedly have been frustrated and even enraged by the fruitlessness and ineffectiveness of these so-called domestic accountability measures. Rather than help, these government bodies have even contributed to the infrastructure of impunity and miscarriage of justice against the victims of human rights violations. With the 45th session of the Human Rights Council beginning today, we call on the UN Human Rights Council to exercise its mandate and urgently create an independent and impartial investigative mechanism on the rampant extrajudicial killings and human rights violations in the Philippines. The Human Rights Council’s action may contribute significantly to deter further human rights violations in the Philippines. Likewise, we also support other initiatives in urging States all over the world to send the message that such level of impunity in the Philippines is unacceptable. This must happen now before we lose another Zara Alvarez, another Randall Echanis, another Jory Porquia, another Kian delos Santos, and another Filipino to these cruel, widespread and systematic violations.

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UN Human Rights Council, investigate the human rights situation in the Philippines! During the 44th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC) in June 2020, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet reported the widespread and systematic human rights violations in the Philippines. The High Commissioner found that domestic mechanisms have failed to ensure accountability, and that there is persistent impunity for human rights violations. She also cited that authorities’ harmful rhetoric inciting hatred and violence against women, human rights defenders, political opposition, civil society, indigenous peoples, drug users and peddlers, and relief workers, which continued during the COVID-19 period, could amount to a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Weeks after the release of Bachelet’s comprehensive report, the human rights situation in the Philippines took a turn for the worse. In the first week of July, the President signed the Anti-Terror Act that is seen as a measure that will aggravate the attacks and vilification of human rights defenders and civil society. The exercise of fundamental freedoms and rights has been compromised, with numerous challenges to press freedom and activists and protesters arrested and detained on flimsy charges. In August, only days apart, peasant leader Randall Echanis and health activist Zara Alvarez were summarily executed in separate incidents, following the killings of relief worker Jory Porquia, peasant leader Nora Apique and urban poor leader Carlito Badion during the COVID-19 lockdown. The lawyer and paralegal volunteer assisting the family of Echanis are now facing police complaints for allegedly obstructing its investigation. Threats of violence, including death threats, against activists and human rights defenders have continued unabated. We must put a stop to these unrelenting attacks now. And this worsening situation would not end as long as those who perpetrate them run free and unscathed. These perpetrators must be brought to justice before any court, tribunal or body that will act independently, with impartiality, and effectively, having allegiance to human rights and justice instead of powers that be. We need true accountability and genuine transparency in the inquiry into these human rights violations, removing the possibility that investigations would only shield and even absolve the persons liable for the crimes. We cannot rely on the promise of a government that has shown great disdain and disrespect of human rights to exact accountability and operate with transparency. This government has shown nothing but contempt for individuals and experts, including those in the UN and the International Criminal Court, who independently and impartially seek investigation into the relentless human rights violations in the Philippines. The Philippine Justice Secretary, during the 44th UNHRC Session, denied the existence of impunity in the Philippines, promising the creation of an inter-agency panel to review the 5,655 killings during the police’s anti-illegal drug operations. He denied allegations of widespread and systematic killings as well as other human rights violations. He stressed that the Government has respected human rights and other fundamental freedoms, reiterating the existence of accountability measures, such as an inter-agency committee on extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and other grave violations of the right to life, liberty and security of persons. We have witnessed a long history of domestic inter-agency task forces and fact-finding commissions promising to act without fear or favor. But we repeatedly have been frustrated and even enraged by the fruitlessness and ineffectiveness of these so-called domestic accountability measures. Rather than help, these government bodies have even contributed to the infrastructure of impunity and miscarriage of justice against the victims of human rights violations. With the 45th session of the Human Rights Council beginning today, we call on the UN Human Rights Council to exercise its mandate and urgently create an independent and impartial investigative mechanism on the rampant extrajudicial killings and human rights violations in the Philippines. The Human Rights Council’s action may contribute significantly to deter further human rights violations in the Philippines. Likewise, we also support other initiatives in urging States all over the world to send the message that such level of impunity in the Philippines is unacceptable. This must happen now before we lose another Zara Alvarez, another Randall Echanis, another Jory Porquia, another Kian delos Santos, and another Filipino to these cruel, widespread and systematic violations. Organizers Karapatan Alliance Philippines National Union of People’s Lawyers (NUPL) Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment 350.org Pilipinas Ecumenical Voice for Human Rights and Peace in the Philippines Civicus World Alliance for Citizen Participation International Movement for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net) Association of Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD) Asia Pacific Network of Environmental Defenders (APNED) International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines Supporters: Nnimmo Bassey, Health of Mother Earth Foundation (HOMEF), Nigeria Iniciativa Mesoamericana de Mujeres Defensoras de Derechos Humanos Proyecto de Derechos Economicos, Sociales y Culturales (Pro-DESC), Mexico Project South, US Odhikar, Bangladesh Public Association Dignity, Kazakhstan AwazCDS, Pakistan Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law

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Alarming Pattern of Killings Continues in the Philippines

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This year has seen a series of armed ambushes of local government officials. Meanwhile, the “war on drugs” continues.

Gun attacks over the past month have killed several local officials in various provinces of the Philippines.

From February 17 to 26, four ambushes were carried out by unidentified assailants in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao del Sur in Mindanao; and in the municipality of Aparri and a barangay (village) in Batangas province in Luzon. In Lanao del Sur, the governor survived but four of his companions were killed. In Aparri, six were killed, including the town’s vice mayor.

The police described the killings as isolated incidents .

On March 3, the provincial governor of Negros Oriental was killed inside his family compound while distributing cash relief to constituents. Eight others were killed during the attack. The brazenness of the assault in Negros has alarmed authorities.

“It was shocking. I couldn’t believe that this still happened. This one is particularly terrifying. This does not belong in our society,” Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said during a media briefing . “My government will not rest until we have brought the perpetrators of this dastardly and heinous crime to justice,” he added in a statement released by his office.

Police tagged the governor’s political rival, who is a member of Congress, as a suspect who likely planned the attack. The police also arrested several former soldiers suspected of carrying out the ambush.

The Senate passed a resolution condemning the killings. An excerpt from the resolution states that “injustice and violence do not have a place in any civilized society, and no cause justifies brutalities against the lives of all persons.”

The Senate president urged the police to restore public confidence: “Every single incident like this ambush puts a dent on our people’s trust in the government. It is a failure of intelligence, a failure of police visibility, a failure of our peace and security efforts.”

Even Senator Bato Dela Rosa, the former police general who implemented the infamous “war on drugs” during the administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte, was horrified by the series of killings. “The impunity and brutality instilled horror, anxiety, and panic among our people. This poses an enormous challenge to our law enforcement authorities,” he said in a press release.

Senator Risa Hontiveros, a member of the minority, noted the “complicity and active involvement of men formerly in the uniformed service.” “The virus of impunity continues to proliferate, and our state forces are heavily infected. How can the public trust killers masquerading as law enforcement? Who is giving the marching orders?” she asked .

The Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, which monitors and analyzes news reporting, pointed out that “wanton violence has long been endemic in the Philippines.” It explained how impunity has worsened over the past years. “Political warlords and drug lords keep private armies. Most masterminds get away with their crimes while only hired assassins or fall guys face jail time, reflecting how impunity reigns for those with the means,” it stated.

But aside from the recent attacks against local officials, unabated extrajudicial killings have also targeted activists under the Marcos government. The human rights group Karapatan recorded at least 17 killings linked to the government’s counterinsurgency program in the first five months of the Marcos administration. Meanwhile, a university research center has reported that drug-related killings have continued despite the government’s unveiling of a new program to eradicate the drug menace. Since January, it monitored an average of five drug-related killings per week.

These killings should be condemned as they reflect the disturbing culture of impunity in the Duterte and Marcos administrations. Legislators should broaden their probe by looking into all cases of extrajudicial killings, including those that involve state forces. The Marcos government will also undermine its own credibility if it continues to block the efforts of the International Criminal Court to investigate the accountability of Duterte and some of his subordinates for the brutal enforcement of the “war on drugs.”

Lastly, the quick action of the police in apprehending the suspects and building a case against the mastermind of the Negros Oriental killing showed that authorities can successfully coordinate to deliver justice for the victims and their families. The same political will should be applied as well to other cases, even if the victims do not belong to influential political parties.

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Current Issue

What Is Political Violence?

A conversation about MAGA’s militancy and the strategies to protect Democracy.

Scot Nakagawa, Maria J. Stephan, Sala Cyril.

Democracy requires that we make political choices free from bullying, intimidation, or threats of violence. So it is a problem when rates of political violence go up—as they have in the United States. Reuters reports that we’ve seen some 213 cases, including 39 fatalities in the US just since January 6, 2021. That’s more than we’ve seen in decades. Women, people of color, Muslims, Jews, and LGBTQ people are among the most vulnerable, but the group suffering the biggest increase in reported incidents are conservatives who are perceived to be out of sync with the pro-Trump MAGA line. Most Americans oppose violence in all contexts, but violence also threatens every other effort to strengthen democracy and freedom. My co-interviewer, Scot Nakagawa, is the director of the 22nd Century Initiative. We spoke with Sala Cyril, the interim executive director of Visions Change Win , an organization that focuses on community safety, and Maria J. Stephan, the chief organizer of the Horizons Project and coauthor (with Erica Chenoweth) of Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict .

—Laura Flanders

Laura Flanders: When we talk about political violence, what are we actually talking about?

Maria J. Stephan: Political violence includes threats, intimidation, acts of physical violence that are used with a political motivation to achieve a political goal or to assert political power over another group. We know that in the United States the preponderance of acts of political violence are being committed by the far right, with a smaller number of incidents being committed by the far left. No one is immune from being targeted, although we know that historically marginalized communities—Black Americans, brown Americans, LGBTQ—are being disproportionately targeted with political violence in this moment, but also a number of conservatives, including those that aren’t toeing the MAGA line.

Scot Nakagawa: And a lot of people who are unaffiliated with either political party but who are trying to fulfill the duties of jobs that are related to elections, etc. People who are considered to be functionaries of government who are also viewed in opposition to the MAGA coalition, is that right?

MJS: I’ve been in attendance with secretaries of state, former lieutenant governors. They all have stories of themselves or their families being on the receiving end of political violence. I’ve also heard about conservative librarians who, because they refuse to go along with the book-banning movement, they are being targeted with threats, intimidation.

LF: Sala, it’s not like political violence is a brand-new occurrence in this country. Some groups have been subject to it for centuries. I would love to get a sense of what you do on a daily basis—what’s changed and what hasn’t changed in this moment?

Sala Cyril: Unfortunately, this is not new, and we have been experiencing this level of political violence for decades and centuries. But one of the things that we do at Vision Change Win is we offer organizational development, community safety support, and security support to organizations, activists, leaders, and people that are concerned about political violence in retribution for the work that they may be doing. We believe that creating community safety and security is everyone’s responsibility. We come from a history and a legacy of organizations like the Young Lords, the Black Panther Party that created community safety support and techniques for people to protect themselves. A lot of our legacy came out of New York City–specific safety and security lineage groups like the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, The Audre Lorde Project, The Coalition Against Police Brutality.

LF: The groups that you’ve mentioned and the history that you’ve described speak to a desire to keep certain people intimidated and out of our process. Is that what you’ve seen?

SC: Definitely. My mother was a member of the Black Panther Party. She was one of the cofounders of the Free Breakfast Program, which was declared one of the highest threats to national security. The state thought that, but the kinds of threats that regular people trying to get their children fed faced were high. The kinds of threats that we see regular everyday people face, people being killed, the kinds of work that the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement does is to support groups and people that have been identified as victims of police brutality. The families are being attacked by not only the state but also the right.

SN: What specific guidance can we offer people who are supporting someone who has been threatened or attacked, or who have been threatened or attacked themselves?

SC: The kinds of things that we teach are basic de-escalation techniques, basic safety planning, and digital security support. A lot of threats happen digitally. Not just doxing but hacking and swatting and things that put people in physical danger. A lot of times the groups need organizational-capacity support to ensure that they don’t crumble in the face of threats that come from the right. And overall shifting the paradigm that security and safety is this white, masculine, patriarchal thing. A way to think about moving through the world and creating networks that build resiliency and allow people to lean on each other.

LF: That’s a lot of work for we the people. Isn’t there a role for government in all this? What demands can we make of government to step in here?

MJS: There are certainly litigation strategies that can be deployed particularly against far-right groups. Is that kind of support being provided? Are people being challenged within their parties when they are actively endorsing white supremacist groups or they’re actively supporting violence targeting particular groups in society? Is there that condemnation? I think there can certainly be things that the government can do from a policy perspective. But some state governments in this country are in the hands of anti-democratic forces right now. They’re in the hands of MAGA folks. If you’re hoping to use those regular advocacy or litigation channels, it may not be effective. That’s why we need communities, and communities across this country are doing it. They are going after folks that are targeting gay pride parades through various organizations with religious leaders and veterans groups and businesses, who have been involved in kind of anti–white supremacist campaigns. In Enid, Oklahoma, one of their city council members was Judd Blevins, who was found to be marching with the Neo-Nazis in Charlottesville in 2017. The community mobilized. They got a recall election. They ousted him. And that’s how we win. We organize, we plan, and we use methods they’re not prepared for and that will disarm them.

LF: Sala, you started by saying this is personal for you because your mother was targeted, and yet the reaction of you and your sister has been to become very visible, very leading activists in exactly this area. What turned it into inspiration for you and stimulus for you to get involved, as opposed to get your head down, get out of this and go find somewhere out of view?

SC: As a child of a [Black] Panther, I saw inspiration in every action. Even when I saw my mother’s friends being jailed for long periods of time or even killed by police terror. The kinds of stories that came out of their work, the kinds of inspiration, the kinds of movement and changes that they were able to make was so inspiring. Not just that, but a lot of those folks, it’s my family, right? I was raised with the Panther Party as my family, a lot of those folks went on to continue fighting against terror of the state and building community. And I wanted to be a part of that.

LF: That goes back to storytelling. Maria, you have written extensively covering inspiring stories of civil disobedience in the face of life-threatening violence in this country and internationally.

MJS: I’ve spent a good chunk of the past quarter century working with and writing about movements around the world that have challenged various forms of authoritarianism. What we know is that movements succeed when they attract mass diverse participation. You need people who are ideologically different, who are politically different, who are laborers, who are professionals, who are young people. We know that movements are able to tap into a diverse array of tactics. They don’t just keep doing the same thing, they don’t just go out into the street and demonstrate or march. They do tactics like walkouts. They do pressure tactics like consumer boycotts or other acts of noncooperation. Strikes, which have been one of the most powerful general strikes, whether it was in Chile, whether it was in South Africa, other countries, have been the most powerful tactics to push back against authoritarianism. So what successful nonviolent resistance movements do is they systematically pull those pillars away from an autocrat so that they’re like emperors with no clothes. They no longer have their moral and material support.

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Assassination is always unlawful − regardless of who is killed and on whose orders

Professor of Law and International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

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Assassination is a particular form of murder. Regardless of who carries out the act, on whose orders or why, it is always unlawful.

This is the reason Vadim Krasikov was languishing behind bars in Germany prior to being released on Aug. 1, 2024, as part of a historic prisoner exchange .

Krasikov was serving a life sentence for killing exiled Chechen separatist Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in a Berlin park in 2019 .

The German court that sentenced him found that he was carrying out the Kremlin’s orders ; his victim had fought Russian forces in the Chechen wars and was suspected of terrorist attacks in Moscow. But neither of these factors provide legal justification for the killing.

The same is true in the case of Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas political leader. He was killed on July 31, 2024, while in Tehran at the invitation of the Iranian government. The Israeli government, which is widely believed to be behind the killing , has repeatedly expressed a willingness to hunt down Hamas leadership around the world following the group’s deadly attack on Oct. 7, 2023. Israel has carried out many such assassinations in Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere over the years.

Despite these and other international cases, the term “assassination” is not defined under international law. Legal scholars like me rely on standard dictionary definitions where assassination is defined as “murder by sudden or secret attack often for political reasons.” But treaties and other international law do make clear that killing for political reasons by sudden or secret attack is unlawful.

The most important treaty on this question is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – adopted in 1966 by the United Nations and binding today on 174 states, including Russia, Israel and the United States. The covenant affirms: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”

Treacherous acts

This does not mean that deliberate killing can never be justified. International law contains rules that determine when it is permissible to use deadly force.

In peacetime, it is lawful for police to use lethal force to save lives in immediate danger. Officers killed the man who shot at Donald Trump , for example, to prevent the gunman from shooting again, as lives were in immediate danger.

The use of military force against another state is regulated under the United Nations Charter. The Charter prohibits all uses of force, unless authorized by the U.N. Security Council or in a case of self-defense. The charter allows a state to use force in individual or collective self-defense “if an armed attack occurs” until the Security Council can act .

The U.N.’s International Court of Justice has further clarified that even when a state has the right of self-defense, military action in response must be necessary, proportionate and aimed at a sovereign state responsible for the initial armed attack. The court has repeated these principles in multiple decisions, most comprehensively in a case brought by Iran following lethal U.S. attacks on its oil platforms in the Persian Gulf .

Once an armed conflict has begun, parties to the fighting have the right to use lethal force to defeat the adversary. International humanitarian law permits intentional killing of enemy fighters within legally defined armed conflict hostilities. Even then, no one may be singled out for killing based on what they did in the past. And civilians not participating in the fighting may never be intentionally targeted.

Recent international decisions support the importance of the concept of restricting the killing of fighters to within active zones of hostilities. Outside such areas, the peacetime human right to life applies. The European Court of Human Rights has emphasized this point in a series of rulings, most recently in early 2021 .

These decisions contradict an older view held by some in the U.S. military that political or military leaders of a wartime adversary may be killed wherever they are found .

As a political leader of a party at war with Israel in Gaza, Haniyeh might fit this older interpretation. However, it still would not extend to killing “treacherously or perfidiously,” as laid out in the binding regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907 . To kill treacherously or perfidiously means to kill someone who has no expectation of being in danger of death. For example, a soldier who falsely raises a white flag of surrender to lure an enemy in close enough to kill them would be guilty of killing treacherously.

Haniyeh had such an expectation of safety in Tehran, and as such his killing can be seen as treacherous.

A double standard

All principles on the use of lethal force under international law rule out assassination. And yet, countries including Israel, Russia and the U.S. persist in using it. A few others – France, India, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom – have used it in a few infamous, high-profile cases.

Israel has acknowledged responsibility for assassinations dating to even before its founding .

The U.S. has joined the rest of the world in criticizing these killings. In 1988, for example, Israel assassinated a PLO leader named Khalil al-Wazir in Tunisia. The U.N. Security Council condemned the operation in a resolution that the U.S. refused to veto.

To try to mollify critics, Israel began referring in 2000 to its practice of assassination as “ targeted killings .”

The term makes it sound more like the legitimate killing in wartime. In 2001, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk rejected Israel’s attempt to legitimize assassination when he said on Israeli television: “The United States government is very clearly on the record as against targeted assassinations. They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.”

Then the Sept. 11 attacks occurred and the U.S. itself adopted the practice of targeted killing. The first known case was carried out by the CIA against six suspected members of al-Qaida in Yemen in November 2002. The killings were condemned as unlawful by a U.N. human rights expert soon after .

Yet, U.S. killings with drones and other means have continued to this day. All the while, the U.S. has consistently condemned Russian assassinations. What many international law experts , including me, see is a U.S. double standard when it comes to the use of lethal force, including its use in assassination.

While efforts may have been made to mount a defense of assassinations such as that of Hamas’ Haniyeh, there is a simple truth: Lethal force is highly restricted, and assassination is never legal.

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Trump assassination attempt captured 'true human cost' of political violence

Chicago researchers found both democrats and republicans were less likely to justify political violence after the shooting. it probably helped that leaders from both parties condemned the attack..

Republican presidential candidate and former President Donald Trump is escorted to a motorcade following an attempted assassination at a campaign event in Butler, Pa., July 13.

Gene J. Puskar/AP

Former President Donald Trump was six minutes into his speech in Butler, Pennsylvania, July 13 when a lone gunman perched on a nearby rooftop shot and injured him and two others and killed a fourth man .

The assassination attempt was the culmination of years of warnings from elected officials that they faced an escalation of threats of violence. Studies have documented the rising hostility against mayors , state senators , s tate house candidates , and Congress members .

Our interviews with elected officials and other researchers’ surveys also show that threats of violence can have significant consequences for democracy since victims may be more likely to shy away from controversial policies, meet less often with constituents, not seek higher office or retire from politics.

Since the assassination attempt, many political observers have worried that this event may increase citizens’ support for political violence. Studies of mass shootings suggest that extensive media coverage can normalize such acts and even lead to copycat behavior. If this is also true for political violence, it can explain why many elected officials told us they fear that publicly sharing their experiences may fuel more violence.

We tested whether exposure to news about violence targeting co-partisan or opposing politicians increased citizens’ propensity to perceive political violence as justified.

Exposure to political violence doesn’t make it contagious

Results from two experiments we conducted in 2023-2024 and a daily poll fielded since May 2024 suggest that exposure to actual or hypothetical stories of violence perpetrated against politicians does not increase the average citizen’s appetite for violence and may even reduce it.

In our experiments, we randomly assigned participants to read stories about a senator who was co-partisan (member of the same party) or out-partisan (member of a different party). These stories were not true but modeled on real-life events.

Some respondents read about the senator having a civil meeting with the opposing party constituents or a non-violent protest at his office. Both stories reflect democratic means of political engagement. However, other respondents read about a protest where threats were made against the senator or where the protesters turned violent, seriously injuring him.

Reading about violence against a co-partisan did not make people any more likely to support political violence. And it made them less likely to rationalize political violence. These are crucial findings, given concerns about igniting a cycle of violence.

The assassination attempt against Trump gave us leverage to look at how co-partisans and opposing partisans react to a real-world event involving a person for whom people on both sides feel strongly.

Because a question in our survey about whether political violence is justified has been asked continually since May, we can test if people’s responses differed before and after the assassination attempt.

We find that after the assassination attempt, both Democrats and Republicans were less likely to justify political violence. This difference is statistically significant but small. Critically, this means that the appetite for political violence did not increase in the weeks after the attempted assassination, and it may have declined a bit. This is good news for democracy.

Furthermore, in a separate question, we asked people why they think public officials may seek to speak publicly about their experiences with political violence.

We find that since the assassination attempt, respondents have been significantly more likely to believe that public officials are speaking out about threats and violence out of genuine concern for their safety, not for more self-serving reasons.

These patterns give us some optimism that elected officials can share their experiences and that the public will respond, not with heightened support for violence, but with recognition and perhaps empathy.

One thing that our experiments and the real-world response to the assassination attempt against Trump have in common is that the response from partisan elites did not involve incitement of further violence.

In our experiments, the articles presented the events without any commentary from the victim. In the case of the assassination attempt, most leaders in both parties, including Trump himself, spoke out to condemn violence.

Combined with research showing that what partisan leaders say about violence matters, our research suggests that exposure to stories of political violence does not drive partisans to view violence as justified. Instead, it may reduce support for violence as people come face-to-face with the true human cost of such events. However, this may depend on how trusted partisan leaders respond and whether they actively work to promote peaceful co-existence and denounce violence.

Exercising restraint is key to the preservation of democratic institutions, and during this contentious election cycle, both citizens and leaders should heed that lesson.

Alexandra Filindra is an associate professor of political science and psychology at University of Illinois Chicago. Paul Teas and Andrea Manning are graduate students at UIC. Laurel Harbridge-Yong is a professor of political science at Northwestern University.

The views and opinions expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Chicago Sun-Times or any of its affiliates.

The Sun-Times welcomes letters to the editor and op-eds. See our guidelines .

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Divisive political rhetoric is dangerous for America. The Trump rally shooting shows it.

The future of our republic is at a crossroads and hinges on the unity of americans in the face of recent adversity..

Mother America escaped an assassination attempt on its democratic values on July 13, when former President Donald Trump barely survived a bullet while a fellow American lost his life and two others were critically injured at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania. A swift action by law enforcement agencies prevented further loss of human lives by taking down the assailant. 

It reignited the trauma of growing up in a nation ravaged by political instability and violence. My land of birth, Pakistan, was marred by political uncertainty right after its independence from British colonial rule in 1947 when the country's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951 while addressing a public rally. It had a significant destabilizing effect on the nascent democracy of Pakistan, which soon after got derailed by military martial law.

In my lifetime, Pakistan was once again shaken by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the Muslim world's first democratically elected prime minister, in 2007 during a political rally. It was too personal as I lost a high school classmate who was accompanying her at the rally.

Our own country has its fair share of political violence, causing the untimely deaths of many prominent political leaders, including Presidents Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, William McKinley, John F. Kennedy and Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Similarly, our nation lost a fearless civil rights champion, Martin Luther King Jr., whose life was cut short by a bullet in 1968. Moreover, President Ronald Reagan barely escaped death in 1981 when a bullet hit his lung.

Gun violence is no stranger to Louisville

Gun violence is impacting communities across the country and is no stranger to Louisville. 

This year so far 60 citizens have been recklessly gunned down leaving behind families with unimaginable emotional burden. 

Louisville was rocked by a mass shooting at Old National Bank in April 2023 which resulted in loss of five innocent lives. Mayor Greenberg and his campaign staff barely survived a shooting at his office in 2022. 

The future of our Republic is at a crossroads and hinges on the unity of Americans in the face of recent adversity. Democratic values depend on national unity to flourish and survive the challenges that are looming on the horizon for our country and world.

Stakes are too high for Kentucky. President Biden must endorse a new Democratic Party slate.

Political violence will only further divide America

Our nation is facing polarization around many social issues. Still, these issues will only find solutions if Americans recognize the importance of national reconciliation by following the principle of give and take. Political violence will sow further seeds of division and weaken the strength of Mother America, which depends on national solidarity.

Political leaders from all sides need to ponder how their rhetoric has catalyzed a violent act by a 21-year-old young man . They need to remind themselves that the country comes first before their agendas and should reaffirm the principles upon which Mother America was founded.

The media should also play an important role in cooling down the political heat with balanced coverage that avoids sensationalism. Similarly, religious leaders and faith-based organizations should reject bigotry and promote inclusiveness.

Is American solidarity possible? Submit your letters to the editor here.

Most Americans are moderates who believe in coexistence in peace and tranquility. They are incumbent upon taking charge of their destiny by strengthening the democratic values of political discourse. They can either stand together to prevent the crumbling of the fabric of American society or stay divided on the sidelines to witness the collapse of our nation's foundation.

Remember that Mother America's future comes before the self-interest of politicians and their followers. In the end, no political cause is above the viability of the United States of America as a land of freedom where every citizen has an equal opportunity to pursue life, liberty and happiness.

Dr. Muhammad Babar is a physician who specializes in geriatric medicine. He is president of Muslim Americans for Compassion and Doctors for Healthy Communities.

What happened in the Kolkata rape case that triggered doctors’ protests?

Activists and doctors in India demand better safeguarding of women and medical professionals after a trainee medic was raped and murdered in Kolkata.

Activists and doctors across India continued to protest on Wednesday to demand justice for a female doctor, who was raped and murdered while on duty in a hospital in the eastern city of Kolkata.

Feminist groups rallied on the streets in protests titled “Reclaim the Night” in Kolkata overnight on Wednesday – on the eve of India’s independence day – in solidarity with the victim, demanding the principal of RG Kar Medical College resign. Some feminist protesters also marched well beyond Kolkata, including in the capital Delhi.

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While the protests were largely peaceful, a small mob of men stormed the medical college and vandalised property. This group was dispersed by the police.

This comes after two days of nationwide protests by doctors following the incident at RG Kar Medical College in West Bengal’s capital city. “Sit-in demonstrations and agitation in the hospital campus will continue,” one of the protesting doctors, identified as Dr Mridul, told Al Jazeera.

Services in some medical centres were halted indefinitely, and marches and vigils shed light on issues of sexual violence, as well as doctors’ safety in the world’s most populous nation.

What happened to the doctor in Kolkata?

A 31-year-old trainee doctor’s dead body, bearing multiple injuries, was found on August 9 in a government teaching hospital in Kolkata.

The parents of the victim were initially told “by hospital authorities that their daughter had committed suicide,” lawyer and women’s rights activist Vrinda Grover told Al Jazeera. But an autopsy confirmed that the victim was raped and killed.

Grover has appeared for victims in sexual violence cases in India in the past, including Bilkis Bano , a Muslim woman who was gang-raped during the 2002 Gujarat riots, and Soni Sori, a tribal activist based in Chhattisgarh state.

Thousands of doctors marched in Kolkata on Monday, demanding better security measures and justice for the victim.

On Tuesday, the Kolkata High Court transferred the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

The Federation of Resident Doctors Association (FORDA) called for a nationwide halting of elective services in hospitals starting on Monday. Elective services are medical treatments that can be deferred or are not deemed medically necessary.

On Tuesday, FORDA announced on its X account that it is calling off the strike after Health Minister Jagat Prakash Nadda accepted protest demands.

One of these demands was solidifying the Central Protection Act, intended to be a central law to protect medical professionals from violence, which was proposed in the parliament’s lower house in 2022, but has not yet been enacted.

FORDA said that the ministry would begin working on the Act within 15 days of the news release, and that a written statement from the ministry was expected to be released soon.

Press release regarding call off of strike. In our fight for the sad incident at R G Kar, the demands raised by us have been met in full by the @OfficeofJPNadda , with concrete steps in place, and not just verbal assurances. Central Healthcare Protection Act ratification… pic.twitter.com/OXdSZgM1Jc — FORDA INDIA (@FordaIndia) August 13, 2024

Why are some Indian doctors continuing to protest?

However, other doctors’ federations and hospitals have said they will not back down on the strike until a concrete solution is found, including a central law to curb attacks on doctors.

Those continuing to strike included the Federation of All India Medical Associations (FAIMA), Delhi-based All India Institute Of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and Indira Gandhi Hospital, local media reported.

Ragunandan Dixit, the general secretary of the AIIMS Resident Doctors’ Association, said that the indefinite strike will continue until their demands are met, including a written guarantee of the implementation of the Central Protection Act.

Medical professionals in India want a central law that makes violence against doctors a non-bailable, punishable offence, in hopes that it deters such violent crimes against doctors in the future.

Those continuing to protest also call for the dismissal of the principal of the college, who was transferred. “We’re demanding his termination, not just transfer,” Dr Abdul Waqim Khan, a protesting doctor told ANI news agency. “We’re also demanding a death penalty for the criminal,” he added.

“Calling off the strike now would mean that female resident doctors might never receive justice,” Dr Dhruv Chauhan, member of the National Council of the Indian Medical Association’s Junior Doctors’ Network told local news agency Press Trust of India (PTI).

Which states in India saw doctors’ protests?

While the protests started in West Bengal’s Kolkata on Monday, they spread across the country on Tuesday.

The capital New Delhi, union territory Chandigarh, Uttar Pradesh capital Lucknow and city Prayagraj, Bihar capital Patna and southern state Goa also saw doctors’ protests.

Who is the suspect in the Kolkata rape case?

Local media reported that the police arrested suspect Sanjoy Roy, a civic volunteer who would visit the hospital often. He has unrestricted access to the ward and the police found compelling evidence against him.

The parents of the victim told the court that they suspect that it was a case of gang rape, local media reported.

Why is sexual violence on the rise in India?

Sexual violence is rampant in India, where 90 rapes were reported on average every day in 2022.

Laws against sexual violence were made stricter following a rape case in 2012, when a 22-year-old physiotherapy intern was brutally gang-raped and murdered on a bus in Delhi. Four men were hanged for the gang rape, which had triggered a nationwide protests.

But despite new laws in place, “the graph of sexual violence in India continues to spiral unabated,” said Grover.

She added that in her experience at most workplaces, scant attention is paid to diligent and rigorous enforcement of the laws.

“It is regrettable that government and institutions respond only after the woman has already suffered sexual assault and often succumbed to death in the incident,” she added, saying preventive measures are not taken.

In many rape cases in India, perpetrators have not been held accountable. In 2002, Bano was raped by 11 men, who were sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2022, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi authorised the release of the men, who were greeted with applause and garlands upon their release.

However, their remission was overruled and the Supreme Court sent the rapists back to jail after public outcry.

Grover believes that the death penalty will not deter rapists until India addresses the deeply entrenched problem of sexual violence. “For any change, India as a society will have to confront and challenge, patriarchy, discrimination and inequality that is embedded in our homes, families, cultural practices, social norms and religious traditions”.

What makes this case particularly prominent is that it happened in Kolkata, Sandip Roy, a freelance contributor to NPR, told Al Jazeera. “Kolkata actually prided itself for a long time on being really low in the case of violence against women and being relatively safe for women.”

A National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) report said that Kolkata had the lowest number of rape cases in 2021 among 19 metropolitan cities, with 11 cases in the whole year. In comparison, New Delhi was reported to have recorded 1, 226 cases that year.

Prime Minister Modi’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has called for dismissing the government in West Bengal, where Kolkata is located, led by Mamata Banerjee of All India Trinamool Congress (AITC). Banerjee’s party is part of the opposition alliance.

Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the opposition in parliament, also called for justice for the victim.

“The attempt to save the accused instead of providing justice to the victim raises serious questions on the hospital and the local administration,” he posted on X on Wednesday.

Roy spoke about the politicisation of the case since an opposition party governs West Bengal. “The local government’s opposition will try to make this an issue of women’s safety in the state,” he said.

Have doctors in India protested before?

Roy explained to Al Jazeera that this case is an overlap of two kinds of violence, the violence against a woman, as well as violence against “an overworked medical professional”.

Doctors in India do not have sufficient workplace security, and attacks on doctors have started protests in India before.

In 2019, two junior doctors were physically assaulted in Kolkata’s Nil Ratan Sircar Medical College and Hospital (NRSMCH) by a mob of people after a 75-year-old patient passed away in the hospital.

Those attacks set off doctors’ protests in Kolkata, and senior doctors in West Bengal offered to resign from their positions to express solidarity with the junior doctors who were attacked.

More than 75 percent of Indian doctors have faced some form of violence, according to a survey by the Indian Medical Association in 2015.

What happens next?

The case will now be handled by the CBI, which sent a team to the hospital premises to inspect the crime scene on Wednesday morning, local media reported.

According to Indian law, the investigation into a case of rape or gang rape is to be completed within two months from the date of lodging of the First Information Report (police complaint), according to Grover, the lawyer.

The highest court in West Bengal, which transferred the case from the local police to the CBI on Tuesday, has directed the central investigating agency to file periodic status reports regarding the progress of the investigation.

The FIR was filed on August 9, which means the investigation is expected to be completed by October 9.

Bengal women will create history with a night long protest in various major locations in the state for at 11.55pm on 14th of August’24,the night that’ll mark our 78th year as an independent country. The campaign, 'Women, Reclaim the Night: The Night is Ours', is aimed at seeking… pic.twitter.com/Si9fd6YGNb — purpleready (@epicnephrin_e) August 13, 2024

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Kenya Dispatch

Flying Kenya’s Flag Can Be a Crime. Protesters Now Wave It Proudly.

Kenya has strict rules about displaying the flag. But some people have been wearing and waving them, and draping them on coffins, as a symbol of resistance.

By Abdi Latif Dahir

Reporting from Nairobi, Kenya

The actors onstage reached for their pockets, each pulling out and then unfurling a Kenyan flag before a hushed crowd that packed the theater.

Then, in a solemn and chilling delivery, they began reciting the names of the dozens of people they say were killed by security forces in the monthslong mass protests that have convulsed Kenya. As they waved the flags, several members of the audience wrapped their own flags around themselves, some weeping quietly.

“The flag is no longer a cloth that flaps overhead and that is detached from the people,” Ngatia Kimathi, one of the actors in the play staged in the capital, Nairobi, said in an interview.

“The flag has become a symbol of unity and a symbol of the people’s power,” said Mr. Kimathi, who had been arrested in the protests. “In these times of death but also hope, everyone is holding onto it.”

Kenya has strict legal limits on the use of its national flag , which features two crossed spears and a shield against stripes of black, red, green and white. The law specifies that the flag is to be displayed only on government properties or on public holidays and that violators can be prosecuted. The rules were first introduced in the 1960s to limit the desecration of the flag — and a proposal to amend them several years ago never passed the Senate.

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Watch CBS News

Attempted assassination of Donald Trump spurred a huge spike in calls for violence and civil war online

By Anna Schecter

Updated on: August 7, 2024 / 2:56 PM EDT / CBS News

The day after the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, the internet saw a huge spike in calls for violence, and in particular an increase in calls for a modern-day civil war — a chilling reflection of a small group of users who create and amplify messages glorifying mass shooters and perpetrators of targeted violence.

The spike was documented by Moonshot, a company that monitors domestic violent extremism, or DVE, spaces online. A team of six researchers documented 1,599 calls for civil war — a 633% increase from a normal day — across a range of online platforms including 4Chan and Reddit, more mainstream platforms like YouTube, and new sites for far-right discussions geared towards angry and disillusioned young men.

"The uptick in online calls is fairly typical of online discourse in spaces that glorify violence," Elizabeth Neumann, chief strategy officer for Moonshot, told CBS News. "The fact is, there is an online ecosystem out there working day in, day out to encourage violence of all kinds, from political civil war to mindless school shootings," she said.

The alarming findings follow a longstanding pattern. Every mass shooting or instance of targeted violence in the last decade has been followed by increased calls for violence online. In most cases, the perpetrators posted about violence prior to carrying out the act in the real world.

In the case of Matthew Crooks , the 20-year-old who opened fire at the Trump rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, last month, the FBI is still working to uncover his full online footprint, but CBS News has learned that investigators believe he posted troubling content online in the past.

Officials have found "a social media account which is believed to be associated with the shooter, in about the 2019, 2020 timeframe," FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate told a joint hearing of the Senate Judiciary and Homeland Security committees last week. "There were over 700 comments," he said, that "appear to reflect antisemitic and anti-immigration themes, to espouse political violence, and are described as extreme in nature."

The gunman grazed Trump's ear , killed volunteer firefighter and father of two Corey Comperatore , and injured two more rally-goers. A Secret Service sniper shot and killed Crooks within seconds of him opening fire.

In the day following the shooting, Moonshot also found 2,051 specific threats or encouragements to violence online — more than double the regular volume of daily threats the group documents as part of its ongoing monitoring of extremist spaces.

Everytown for Gun Safety, an advocacy group combating gun violence, partnered with Moonshot on a new report out Tuesday that tracked interest and engagement in online discussions of mass shootings and targeted violence from January through June of last year.  

Researchers found that the glorification of mass shootings and targeted violence, and the valorization of the perpetrators, was common in online discussions devoted to such content. They also found that Google searches were the gateway to other platforms that hosted the troubling chats. The report found that actual calls for carrying out violence in the real world came from a smaller subset of individuals online.

"In the aftermath of mass shootings, we often learn that the shooter was radicalized with help from vile content he found on sites like YouTube — and yet the leaders of these platforms consistently refuse to crack down on users who violate their own policies," said John Feinblatt, president of Everytown for Gun Safety. 

More research needs to be done on the connection between violent online rhetoric and violent attacks in the real world, according to Everytown, but for more than a decade, both have been on an upward trend.

Since the dawn of the internet, a small subset of chat rooms have harbored hateful content like Nazi glorification. But in the last 10 years, as the number of mass shootings — particularly school shootings — has increased, the online glorification of school shooters has ballooned.

"We call on these companies to put public safety ahead of traffic numbers, and proactively moderate spaces that are breeding grounds for hate and violence," Feinblatt said.

Mainstream platforms like Facebook, Instagram and YouTube have devoted significant resources to clearing out such content, with some success, but YouTube in particular has struggled with the game of whack-a-mole to stamp out harmful content. 

A spokesperson for YouTube said the company has a policy that explicitly prohibits content that glorifies or promotes violent tragedies, such as school shootings, and said in the first quarter of 2024 the company removed more than 2.1 million videos for violating its policies against harmful or dangerous content.

"YouTube's Community Guidelines prohibit hate speech, graphic violence and content promoting or glorifying violent acts, and we strictly enforce these policies," said Javier Hernandez, the YouTube spokesperson.

Fringe extremist platforms that make no attempt to monitor extremist content have been cropping up, including a website devoted to the discussion and glorification of mass shootings.

The perpetrators of the Columbine High School shooting in 1999 are celebrated the most in the online discussions, according to the report by Everytown and Moonshot.

"When I survived the shooting 25 years ago… I could never have imagined social media, let alone what these sites would become," said Salli Garrigan, a Moms Demand Action volunteer and senior fellow with the Everytown Survivor Network. The shooting claimed the lives of 12 of her classmates and her teacher.

"As a mother now, it's terrifying to know how easy it is to access violent content, especially when it's content glorifying one of the worst days of my life," Garrigan said.

A spokesperson for Reddit, who did not see the report prior to publication, said the platform's content policy "strictly prohibits content that encourages, glorifies, incites, or calls for violence or physical harm against an individual or a group of people," and that this includes "mass killer manifestos and related media, as well as any support or cheering for these attacks."

The Reddit spokesperson said the platform has dedicated "safety teams" that "rapidly monitor and remove violating content" following "significant external events."

A spokesperson for 4Chan did not respond to CBS News' request for comment.

E.D. Cauchi contributed to this report.

• Social Media
• Gun Violence
• Domestic Terrorism
• Donald Trump

Anna Schecter is the senior coordinating producer for CBS News and Stations' Crime and Public Safety Unit, based in New York.

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