article 21 research paper

Article 21 of Indian Constitution - Mandate for Life Saving

5 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2006

Meduri Aparna

ICFAI University

Date Written: March 12, 2006

Indian Judiciary though is restrained, in many ways has evolved itself as a savior of mankind by applying its judicial activism. This article discusses few recent landmark cases of India wherein it threw focus on how the Indian Supreme Court by taking the resort of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution evolved itself as a savior of mankind.

Keywords: Article 21, Right to Life, Saviour of Mankind

JEL Classification: K40

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DICHOTOMY OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A) AND ARTICLE 21 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Introduction

A constitutional debate has begun in the Supreme Court  through the case of Kasuhal Kishor V. State of U.P before a constitutional bench.  An issue has been framed that is pertinent in today’s time as it deals with the fundamental rights of the citizens. The issue is- Whether the free speech right conferred under Article 19(1)(a) is controlled singularly by the language employed under Article 19(2) or might also be obstructed by Article 21 of the Constitution? Through this issue, a discourse has been initiated to see whether Article 19(1)(a) is only restricted by Article 19(2) or whether it can also be restricted by Article 21 of the Constitution?  This article discusses the jurisprudence of Article 19 and analyses how Article 19(1) can also be obstructed by Article 21 of the Constitution as there is a need to balance the rights. 

Freedom of Expression and Speech Vis-À-Vis Article 19

Article 19 of the Constitution grants the citizens’ rights pertaining to freedom of speech and expression. As rightly stated by the Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal , , “ Article 19 guarantees those great and basic rights which are recognized and guaranteed as the natural rights inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country ”. Therefore, the importance of safeguarding this right is to disseminate the opinions of masses without any fear and threat from state coercion as the flow of ideas is essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry.

Self-governance, societal tolerance, and autonomy are the pillars of inscribing this right in Part III of the Constitution. A democracy is run on the principles of criticism as the government is made of elective representatives by the citizens itself; therefore, it is the citizen who in reality governs the nation. A democracy cannot survive when there are no dissenting opinions. o suppose that every citizen is happy with the ruling government is just utopianism and panglossianism assumption. Emphasis is to be added when it comes to the word responsible government; as the government remains responsive to the will of people when there is a peaceful exchange of ideas even if it is disgraceful in nature.  It shows the importance of Article 19 in the democracy of India constituting the touchstone of individual liberty.

Whether the Right Under Article 19 (1)(a) is Subject to Article 21? RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A) IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 21?

Free speech is not absolutely free in the truest sense due to reasonable restrictions that are followed in the Constitution. absolute or unrestricted rights in a democracy are an Elysian concept and cannot be accepted in a modern state .  In a welfare society, one shall promote common good rather than selfish interest. Unfettered liberty is a threat to liberty itself; it is the duty of the state to put a restraint on the freedom of wrong-doing of one person to secure the liberty of the intended victims.  Freedom of speech is not a license to abuse, but a higher sense of responsibility. In light of the same, Article 19 (2)  has been engraved in the Constitution that restricts the freedom provided under Article 19(1)(a).

Even so, can a set of limited restrictions articulated in these provisions be sufficient to keep a check on such wider application of freedom as provided and interpreted under Article 19(1)(a)?  If we remember the golden triangle or the trilogy of Article 14,19, and 21 which was carved out in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , it is held that they are not mutually exclusive and share no border amongst them. Basic tenet to propose the trilogy was to empanel a suitable ecosystem where a human being can have enjoyed its right without any fear of life. It was stated by the court in the case of A.K. Gopalan that rights guaranteed by Article 19(1) are capable of being enjoyed only so long a person remains free under Article 21. 

As rightly held in the case of K.S. Puttuswamy v. Union of India , a constitutional document has to be read as whole rather in isolation. One cannot interpret the provisions of the Constitution by reading it in a closed sphere. It is and it should be a deemed practice to give a full play approach to the document where its width shall be counted from the first letter to the last word of the Constitution. This sacred document has to be interpreted to accommodate the competing rights of the citizens to meet each emerging challenge which shall affect the balance of the society.

It will be a threat to any right if it is not given an organic approach where one article supports the other. One’s right can be a duty to another and therefore, it is unreasonable to even think that Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted by the restrictions as mentioned in the other provisions of the same article. The constitution is a document to protect not the right of some but of the whole society. The basic fabric of the constitution binds the right and obligations together. When we say that the articles have to be read in conjunction i.e. 14, 19, 21; it ultimately means that we are keeping all these rights in the same basket. The famous Cooper case has observed that the Article 21 stands as a self-contained code is not correct and to say that, Article 19 on one hand and Article 21 on the other constitutes two water-tight compartments is also wrong. The settled position also portrays that when the constitutionality of the statues has to be challenged , the court has to test its validity on the anvil of the trinity of Articles , read together.

There can be instances where the right to freedom of expression and speech is abused by any citizen or by any governmental institution or its members but they are not restricted by Article 19(2) to (6) as they don’t fall under any of the restrictions given them  a strict interpretation. Whether the judiciary should allow such abuse to take place violating as many rights as it could impact or whether it should devise a mechanism to fill the vacuum? The constitutional court built on the mandate of the Constitution will ensure zero tolerance to abuse of any given right and may boldly fight against such legislative vacuum. India’s fragile democratic system will come in danger if a strict interpretation has been given even in cases where there is a manifest abuse of rights.

Taking the example of right to privacy which is a part of Article 21. The recently celebrated judgment of right to privacy has defined privacy in both the context; the positive as well as the negative. The latter part has been discussed to characterize and protect the human being from being intruded by any agency whether State or private into someone’s life, especially the character of a person whereas the positive right to privacy entails an obligation of States to remove obstacles for an autonomous shaping of individual identities. 

The moot question here is, can we claim immunity on violation of privacy just on the ground that there was another fundamental right of expression and speech which allows anyone to peek into someone’s bedroom and speak any statement whatever the person thinks of? Harder it is to state the reality that privacy isn’t a luxury just for the aristocrats who hold the power. Privacy is a common good and every human is equitable to it and thus there is no greater loss than violating and interfering with someone’s privacy. Article 19(1)(a) cannot be an escape route to intrude the privacy of the other. Privacy is protected on the principles of negative freedom where the state can curtail the power of another person to not violate the privacy of another.

The courts are well aware of the dichotomy between Article 19(1)(a) and Right to Privacy under Article 21. In the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd v. State of Kerala , the court has ruled that a balance should be created between the rights that fall under Article 19(1) and Article 21 with a special reference to Right to Privacy so as to protect the competing interests of the individual and society at large as Right to privacy is the sacrosanct facet of the Article 21. This case pertained to excessive right under RTI act but the court held that it should not outwit the privacy of the person. 

Substantiating this, similarly in a recent case of Central Public Information officer  v. Subhash Agarwal ,  it was held that Chief Justice of India office comes under the purview of RTI act but with conditions, and it was settled by the court that right to information under Article 19 and right to privacy under Article 21 both are important, however, when in conflict, the test of larger public interest or comparative examination of public interest should be the guiding path. It was also said that if one’s right to know is absolute, then the same may assault another’s right to privacy and breach confidentiality, and, therefore, the former right has to be harmonised with the need for personal privacy and hence, it was ordered that invasion of privacy will not be tolerated and thus the court curtailed the power of right to know. Privacy is not subject to freedom of expression but rather an opposite situation shall be the law of the land. The former cannot be sacrificed on the anvil of fervid desire of some individual who is welcome with open arms to intrude the privacy just because he has the right to enjoy the liberty of expression.

Balancing of Rights as a Solution

 The doors of the Supreme Court are ajar for everyone to try one last fling. The Constitution is such a document that its interpretation is dynamic in nature and changes with time. The concept of transformative constitutionalism was propounded in seeing such circumstances that may occur in future. The dichotomy that is being raised in the current case of Kaushal Kishore v State of U.P. shall be seen in the light of this concept.  The rights that are guaranteed as Fundamental Rights under our Constitution are the dynamic and timeless rights of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ and it would be against the principles of our Constitution to give them a static interpretation without recognizing their transformative and evolving nature. Transformative Constitutionalism is there to fill the vacuum wherever it has been created in the society for the betterment as whole as transformative constitutionalism is the fundamental pillar of the Constitution. The idea of inheriting the Constitution with such progressive views is to guide the nation towards a resplendent future.

The solution to the debate of contradicting rights is the propounded theory of balancing of rights . This theory can be the appropriate remedy to interpret the statute as it weighs and balances the contradicting rights and determine which outweighs the other. It is relevant while weighing that the importance of constitutional morality shall be one of the driving forces and a key element to be weighed. The Preambular goals of our Constitution which comprehends the noble objectives of Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity can only be realized through the commitment and loyalty of the organs of the State to the principle of constitutional morality as the concept of constitutional morality which endeavours and urges the organs of the State to maintain a heterogeneous fibre in the society in a multifarious ways. The culture of the Constitution shall always be preserved if the Fundamental rights are ensured to every human being in its truest sense. 

Sahajveer Baweja is currently a Law Student at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Patiala. His research interests are Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights. He can be contacted at [email protected] .

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Safeguarding Human Rights Through Environmental Protection: An Analysis of Article 21 of the Constitution of India

• Bhupal Bhattacharya Associate Professor, Banasthali , (A Deemed University)

Environmental protection is crucial for safeguarding human rights, particularly in the face of growing environmental degradation and climate change. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which courts have interpreted to include the right to a clean and healthy environment. This research paper analyzes the role of Article 21 in safeguarding human rights through environmental protection in India. It examines the constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, and legal frameworks related to environmental protection and human rights in India. The paper highlights the challenges faced in implementing environmental laws and policies in India, and suggests measures to ensure effective enforcement and protection of human rights. The study concludes that Article 21 plays a critical role in protecting human rights through environmental protection, and that greater efforts are needed to promote environmental justice and sustainable development in India.

Author Biography

Bhupal bhattacharya, associate professor, banasthali , (a deemed university).

BHUPAL BHATTACHARYA    

Address     :    Amity Law school, Amity University Mumbai, Bhatan,

P.O. Samathne, Kasalkhand, Dist. Raigarh, Maharashtra- 410206

E-mail     :    [email protected] ; [email protected]

Skype id: bhupalbhattacharya

Phone     :    09564368001/ 7718972360   

PROFESSIONAL PROFILE

• Accomplishing career as an Administrator and Educator at the Graduate and Post Graduate levels.
• Outstanding track record in assuring student success and in litigation and drafting.
• Extensive background of developing and implementing special programs for at-risk and special needs.
• Effective communicator with excellent planning, organizational, and negotiation strengths as well as the ability to lead, reach consensus, establish goals, and attain results.

PROFESSIONAL & ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS:    

Pursuing Ph.D. in Law. (2015 Registered)

Assam University

Post Graduation in Social Work (2 Year MSW) with specialization in Family and Child Welfare

Post Graduation in Law (2 year LL.M) with specialization  in Business Laws

Kurukshetra University

Graduation in Law (LL.B.) with First Rank in College (2nd in University)

Graduation in Commerce with Honours in Accountancy

Tripura University

Post Graduate Diploma in Computer Application (1 year PGDCA)

National Academy of Computer Careers

ACADEMIC /TEACHING EXPERIENCE

» Assistant Professor, Scale-II, Amity Law school, Amity University Mumbai , ( October 2016 to present date )

Subjects Entrusted :

3 year LL.B.                      : Law of Contracts, Hindu Law, Company Law.

5 year B.A., LL.B. & BBA LL.B. ( Hons.) : Law of Contracts, Hindu Law, Direct Tax, Company Law,  Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Property Law

1 Year LL.M: Competition Law

» Lecturer, Law College Durgapur , July 2011 to 5th October 2016

3 year LL.B.                      : Law of Contracts, Hindu Law, Direct Tax, Company Law.

5 year B.A., LL.B. ( Hons.) : Law of Contracts, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), Hindu Law, Direct Tax, Company Law,  Consumer Protection Act, 1986,

» Visiting Lecturer cum Consultant, Sikkim Manipal University , Agartala Learning Center (Two Academic Sessions viz. Fall 2008 & Spring 2009)

For MBA     :    (a) Legal Aspects of Business; and (b) Taxation Management.

For BBA     :    (a) Legal Regulatory Framework.

» Visiting Faculty , State Institute of Public Administration and Rural Development (SIPARD), Agartala, Tripura (2003), Taught: Basic concepts of Information Technology along with Programming Language.

PUBLICATIONS, SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS & PARTICIPATIONS (UGC SPONSORED)

• Polluter pays principle: A critical Review (Published in JCC Law Review, Vol. VI No. I, ISSN 2231 296X 2015)
• Studying Development: A step towards Sustainable Environment and protection of Human Rights (Published in Forest and Environment in India- Law, History, Culture, and Modern Approaches, ISBN 978-93-83252-85-5, EBH Publications, India, December 2015)
• Conjugal Visits In Prisons In India: A Human Rights Justification

(Paper presented in International Seminar in Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, Purulia, West Bengal, India, on April 29 & 30, 2014)

• Insensitive Gender Justice in Modern India . (Published in Global Journal of Juridical Sciences, ISSN 2347- 5668, September 2013)
• Arrest suspends the right to life and liberty of an individual: A study of societal sanction towards custodial crime.

(Paper presented in National seminar in Kalyani University, 18th & 19Th November 2013.)

• “Development, Environment and Sustainable Livelihood”

(Participated : Department of Economics, University of Burdwan, January 18-19, 2013)

• Privatization of Higher Education in India with Special Focus on the Role of  Private Universities in Legal Education

( Participated in: Jogesh Chandra Chaudhuri Law College, Kolkata in collaboration with Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat, Haryana on 10th February 2013)

• Arrest suspends the right to life and liberty of an individual: A study of societal sanction towards custodial crime (Paper presented in National Seminar in The Department of Political Science, The University of Kalyani)
• Unbridled Exploitation of Poor Indians in Clinical Trials, ISBN 978-81-909143-6-9

( Paper presented in: Ambedkar College, Fatikroy, North Tripura on 9th and 10th February 2012, ).

• Changing Forms of Crimes in Our Society and Ways for Its Prevention,

(Published in: Changing Society, Culture and Its Impacts on People, ISBN-978-81-909878-9-9) ( Paper presented in: Sambhu Nath College, Labpur, Birbhum, West Bengal on 15th & 16th February, 2012.)

• Water Sharing: New Equation of Indo Bangladesh Relation

(Published in: JCC Law Review, Vol. III No. 1, ISSN 2231 296X 2012)

• An Analysis of Prolific and Unplanned Expansion of Higher Education in India

(Paper presented in: Calcutta University, West Bengal March 15th & 16th  2012)

• Corruption Control: An Insight

( Paper presented in: Durgapur Institute of Legal Studies, Durgapur, District Burdwan, West Bengal September 28th & 29th 2012)

• Tipaimukh: New Equation Of Indo Bangladesh Bilateral Relation

(Published in: Centre for Juridical Studies Dibrugarh Uniersity, 2012, ISSN No. -0976-1543 )

• A Journey Towards Implementing Directive Principles Of State Policy An Analysis Of Landmark Cases
• In search of Human Rights in Legislation and Regulatory Practices

( Paper presented in: Directorate of Distance Education, Tripura University, Tripura, 2nd December 2012)

ASSOCIATED MEMBERSHIPS

• Enrolled as Member of the Gauhati High Court Bar Council 89/2007.
• Enrolled as Member of the Tripura Human Rights Organization, 2008.
• Enrolled as Member of the Tripura Bar Association, 2007.

HIGHLIGHTS OF LITIGATIONS & PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES

Kings & Alliance -Advocates & Solicitors, New Delhi (with Advocate on Record Ms. Puja Sharma and Mohit Chaudhary), E-45, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi.

» Advocate and Associate (Aug 2009 – Jul 2011)

• Handling of Cases; drafting and finalizing agreements and preparing Legal Notices
• Keeping track over the journals, circulars, notifications on Criminal and Civil Laws etc.
• Reviewing the documents relevant to the case, Privilege and Specific Concepts etc.

Sr. Adocate Mr. Saktimoy Chakraborti, Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench

• » Advocate and Associate (November 2006 – Jul 2009)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

• Final Exam Paper setter & Examiner of 5 Years B.A. LL.B., (Hons.), University of Burdwan, & Kalyani University from 2011 to till date
• Executive Member, Journal Committee Law College Durgapur, Rahul Foundation. 2011 to till date
• Disciplinary Committee, Member, Law College Durgapur, Rahul Foundation. 2011 to till date
• Consultant of Sikkim Manipal University, Agartala Branch- 2008-2009

ADDITIONAL SOCIAL WORK CONTRIBUTIONS:

• Unified Transcendence: Founder Member cum Secretary (August 2016 onwards to till date)

Remarkable Achievements :

• Organized Awareness Programmes in the State of Assam (Shibsagar), and about to organize 3 days Rural Entrepreneurship Fair from 31st March to 2nd April 2017 focusing in the potential sectors of Crafts and Arts, Women Empowerment, FMCG, Micro Finance, Agriculture, Training Projects in the state of West Bengal (Durgapur).
• Organized a Rural Entrepreneurship fair in collaboration with NIT Durgapur, West Bengal on 31st March to 2nd April 2017.
• ARC Foundation: Director of Netaji Subhas Chandra- Centre for Welfare and Social Development (An independent wing of the ARC Foundation (from 15th January 2014 onwards to till date; Registration No. IV - 00101 of 2012, Sl. No. 02326 of 2012)
• Remarkable Achievement: Opening of lakhs of Jan Dhan Bank Accounts under the Government Scheme.

I.T. SKILLS :

• Office Packages    :    MS Office (MS Word, MS Excel, MS Access and MS PowerPoint).
• Programming    :    GW BASIC Language, FoxPro Language and ‘C’ Language.
• Operating Systems    :    Windows. 97-2003/ Win. 2007/ Win.  XP/ Win. NT/ Win. Vista.

PERSONAL DETAILS :

• Father’s Name      :    Prof. Bhakti Prasanna Bhattacharjee (Ex Professor & H.O.D.,

The Maharaja Bir Bikram College, Tripura University, Agartala).

• Mother’s Name       :    Smt. Sankari Bhattacharjee (Housewife).
• Date of Birth       :    17 th December 1981 .
• Nationality        :    Indian by Birth .
• Permanent Address : C/o. Prof. B. P. Bhattacharjee, Bhattacharya Enclave,

        Indranagar,   Agartala, Tripura (West) PIN 799006

• Languages known       :    English, Hindi, Bengali and Assamese .
• Strengths       :    Attentive, Adaptive, Co-operative, and Hardworking .

INTERESTS & HOBBIES:

• Social Work activities, Professional Counseling, Travelling, Singing and Listening Music.

DECLARATION: To the best of my knowledge and belief, I hereby declare that all the information as furnished above is true and correct.

BHUPAL BHATTACHARYA

Agyeman, Julian, Robert D. Bullard, and Bob Evans. "Exploring the nexus: Bringing together sustainability, environmental justice and equity." Space and polity 6, no. 1 (2002): 77-90.

Bhattacharya, Bhupal, Priya Roy, Sarmistha Bhattacharya, Biresh Prasad, and Amit Kumar Mandal. "Nanotechnology and sustainable development: overcoming the obstacles by adopting ethical practices for future farming." In Engineered Nanomaterials for Sustainable Agricultural Production, Soil Improvement and Stress Management, pp. 431-445. Academic Press, 2023.

Corvalan, Carlos, Simon Hales, Anthony J. McMichael, and Colin Butler. Ecosystems and human well-being: health synthesis. Vol. 1. World Health Organization, 2005.

Atapattu, Sumudu. "The right to a healthy life or the right to die polluted: The emergence of a human right to a healthy environment under international law." Tul. Envtl. LJ 16 (2002): 65.

Liebenberg, Sandra. "The international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights and its implications for South Africa." South African Journal on Human Rights 11, no. 3 (1995): 359-378.

Anaya, James. "Indigenous peoples' participatory rights in relation to decisions about natural resource extraction: the more fundamental issue of what rights indigenous peoples have in lands and resources." Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 22 (2005): 7.

Singh, R. B. "Environmental consequences of agricultural development: a case study from the Green Revolution state of Haryana, India." Agriculture, ecosystems & environment 82, no. 1-3 (2000): 97-103.

Ebeku, Kaniye SA. "Constitutional right to a healthy environment and human rights approaches to environmental protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell revisited." Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 16, no. 3 (2007): 312-320.

AI 1991 SC 420

1996 5 SCC 647

(1997) 2 SCC 267

Anton, Donald K., and Dinah L. Shelton. Environmental protection and human rights. Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW, POLITY AND ADMINISTRATION STUDY ON ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

• Bharati Vidyapeeth Deemed University

• Goa Institute of Management

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Article 21 of the Indian Constitution: An In-Depth Analysis

Article 21 - protection of life and personal liberty, meaning of the word life, meaning of the word liberty, procedure established by law, due process of law, procedure established by law vs due process of law in india, interpretation of article 21 according to traditional approach, interpretation of article 21 according to modern approach, the extended dimensions of article 21, right to livelihood, right to live with human dignity, right to shelter, right against sexual harassment, right for prisoners, right to life does not include right to die, right to privacy, right to clean environment.

• P.N. Bhagwati, J.
• Indian Constitution, Article 21
• AIR 1971 SC 337
• AIR 2000 SC 998
• 1963 AIR 1295
• AIR 1950 SC 27
• 1978 AIR 597
• 1981 AIR 746
• 1986 AIR 180
• AIR 1976 SC 1207
• 1993 AIR 2178
• Re Sant Ram, AIR 1960 SC 932
• Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar R. Nadkarni, AIR 1983 SC 109
• 1980 AIR 1579
• AIR 1984 SC 802
• AIR 1996 SC 114
• (1990) 1 SCC 520
• Air 1996 SC 1051
• (1997)6 SCC 241
• AIR 1978 SC 1548
• AIR 1979 SC 1369
• AIR 1992 SC 170
• AIR 2001 SC 3173
• (1996) 2 SCC 648
• AIR 1994 SC 1844
• AIR 1963 SC 1295
• AIR 1991 SC 420
• AIR 1999 SC 812

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Article 21: Understanding The Right to Life and Personal Liberty from Case Laws-Academike Explainer

Article 21 (and its many interpretations) is the perfect example of the transformative character of the Constitution of India. The Indian judiciary has attributed wider connotation and meaning to Article 21, extending beyond the Constitution makers’ imagination. These meanings derived from the ‘right to life’ present unique complexities. It is impossible to understand the expansive jurisprudence on Article 21 within the length of this piece. Therefore, Riya Jain understands the various components of freedom that stem from the ‘right to life’. She presents a straightforward and comprehensive explainer on the case laws that have interpreted the right.

By Riya Jain, UILS Panjab University.

*The piece was first published by Riya in 2015, this is the updated form. 

Introduction of Article 21

Article 21 of Indian constitution reads:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law.”

In Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator (1981), Justice P. Bhagwati had said that Article 21 ’embodies a constitutional value of supreme importance in a democratic society’. Further, Justice Iyer characterised Article 21 as ‘the procedural Magna Carta protective of life and liberty’.

Article 21 is at the heart of the Constitution . It is the most organic and progressive provision in our living Constitution. Article 21 can only be claimed when a person is deprived of his ‘life or ‘personal liberty’ by the ‘State’ as defined in Article 12. Thus, violation of the right by private individuals is not within the preview of Article 21.

Article 21 secures two rights:

1)  Right to life, and

2) Right to personal liberty.

It prohibits the deprivation of the above rights except according to a procedure established by law. Article 21 corresponds to the Magna Carta of 1215, the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution, Article 40(4) of Eire 1937, and Article XXXI of the Constitution of Japan, 1946.

It is also fundamental to democracy as it extends to natural persons and not just citizens. The right is available to every person, citizen or alien. Thus, even a foreigner can claim this right. It, however, does not entitle a foreigner to the right to reside and settle in India, as mentioned in Article 19 (1) (e).

This Article is an all tell for Article 21. The first part will understand the meaning and concept of ‘right to life’ as understood by the judiciary. Further, the piece will lay out how several violations of the body, reputation and equality have been understood and brought under the purview of the right to life and the right to live with dignity.

Meaning, Concept and Interpretation of ‘Right to Life’ under Article 21

‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.’

The right to life is undoubtedly the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. As human rights can only attach to living beings, one might expect the right to life itself to be in some sense primary since none of the other rights would have any value or utility without it. There would have been no Fundamental Rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense. This Section will examine the right to life as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court of India.

Article 21 of the Constitution of India , 1950 provides,

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

‘Life’ in Article 21 of the Constitution is not merely the physical act of breathing. It does not connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider, including, including the right to live with human dignity, Right to livelihood, Right to health, Right to pollution-free air, etc.

The right to life is fundamental to our very existence, without which we cannot live as human beings and includes all those aspects of life, which make a man’s life meaningful, complete, and worth living. It is the only Article in the Constitution that has received the broadest possible interpretation. Thus, the bare necessities, minimum and basic requirements for a person from the core concept of the right to life.

In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [i] , the Supreme Court quoted and held:

By the term ‘life’ as here used, something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by amputation of an armored leg or the pulling out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world.

In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [ii] , the Supreme Court approved the above observations. It held that the ‘right to life’ included the right to lead a healthy life to enjoy all faculties of the human body in their prime conditions. It would even include the right to protect a person’s tradition, culture, heritage and all that gives meaning to a man’s life. In addition, it consists of the Right to live and sleep in peace and the Right to repose and health.

Right To Live with Human Dignity

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [iii] , the Supreme Court gave a new dimension to Art. 21. The Court held that the right to live is not merely a physical right but includes within its ambit the right to live with human dignity. Elaborating the same view, the Court in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi [iv]  observed:

“The right to live includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, viz., the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and mingling with fellow human beings and must include the right to basic necessities the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of human self.”

Another broad formulation of life to dignity is found in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [v] . Characterising Art. 21 as the heart of fundamental rights, the Court gave it an expanded interpretation. Bhagwati J. observed:

“It is the fundamental right of everyone in this country… to live with human dignity free from exploitation. This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers, men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. “These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no State neither the Central Government nor any State Government-has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials.”

Following the above-stated cases, the Supreme Court in Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India [vi] , held that non-payment of minimum wages to the workers employed in various Asiad Projects in Delhi was a denial to them of their right to live with basic human dignity and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.

Bhagwati J. held that rights and benefits conferred on workmen employed by a contractor under various labour laws are intended to ensure basic human dignity to workers. He held that the non-implementation by the private contractors engaged for constructing a building for holding Asian Games in Delhi, and non-enforcement of these laws by the State Authorities of the provisions of these laws was held to be violative of the fundamental right of workers to live with human dignity contained in Art. 21 [vii] .

In Chandra Raja Kumar v. Police Commissioner Hyderabad [viii] , it has been held that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and decency. Therefore, keeping of beauty contest is repugnant to the dignity or decency of women and offends Article 21 of the Constitution only if the same is grossly indecent, scurrilous, obscene or intended for blackmailing. Therefore, the government is empowered to prohibit the contest as objectionable performance under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Objectionable Performances Prohibition Act, 1956.

In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan [ix] , the Court struck down a provision of Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959. Thi provision provided for payment of only a nominal subsistence allowance of Re. 1 per month to a suspended government servant upon his conviction during the pendency of his appeal as unconstitutional on the ground that it was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.

Right Against Sexual Harassment at Workplace

Sexual harassment of women has been held by the Supreme Court to be violative of the most cherished of the fundamental rights, namely, the Right to Life contained in Art. 21.

“The meaning and content of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are of sufficient amplitude to compass all the facets of gender equality including prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. “

The above statement by Justice Verma in the famous Vishakha judgment liberalised the understanding of Article 21. Therefore, making it even more emancipatory.

In Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan [x] , the Supreme Court declared sexual harassment at the workplace to violate the right to equality, life and liberty. Therefore, a violation of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

In this case, in the absence of a relevant law against sexual harassment, the Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines to ensure gender parity in the workplace:

This meant that all employers or persons in charge of the workplace, whether in the public or private sector, should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment.

• Express prohibition of sexual harassment as defined above at the workplace should be notified, published and circulated inappropriate ways.
• The Rules/Regulations of Government and Public Sector bodies relating to conduct and discipline should include rules/regulations prohibiting sexual harassment and provide for appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender.
• As regards private employers steps should be taken to include the prohibitions above in the standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
• Appropriate work conditions should be provided for work, leisure, health, and hygiene to ensure that there is no hostile environment towards women at workplaces. No employee woman should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection with her employment.
• Where such conduct amounts to specific offences under IPC or under any other law, the employer shall initiate appropriate action by making a complaint with the appropriate authority.
• The victims of Sexual harassment should have the option to seek the transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer.

In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra [xi] , the Supreme Court reiterated the Vishakha ruling and observed that:

“There is no gainsaying that each incident of sexual harassment, at the place of work, results in the violation of the Fundamental Right to Gender Equality and the Right to Life and Liberty the two most precious Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India…. “In our opinion, the contents of the fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution are of sufficient amplitude to encompass all facets of gender equality, including prevention of sexual harassment and abuse and the courts are under a constitutional obligation to protect and preserve those fundamental rights. That sexual harassment of a female at the place of work is incompatible with the dignity and honour of a female and needs to be eliminated….”

Understanding Article 21 Through Against Sexual Assault and Rape 

Rape has been held to be a violation of a person’s fundamental life guaranteed under Article 21. Therefore, the right to life would include all those aspects of life that go on to make life meaningful, complete and worth living.

In Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty [xii] , the Supreme Court observed:

“Rape is thus not only a crime against the person of a woman (victim), it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushed her into deep emotional crises. It is only by her sheer will power that she rehabilitates herself in the society, which, on coming to know of the rape, looks down upon her in derision and contempt. Rape is, therefore, the most hated crime. It is a crime against basic human rights and is also violative of the victim’s most cherished of the fundamental rights, namely, the right to life with human dignity contained in Art 21”.

Right to Reputation and Article 21

Reputation is an essential part of one’s life. It is one of the finer graces of human civilisation that makes life worth living. The Supreme Court referred to D.F. Marion v. Minnie Davis [xiii] in Smt. Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry [xiv] . It said:

“good reputation was an element of personal security and was protected by the Constitution, equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. The Court affirmed that the right to enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. The Court affirmed that the right to enjoyment of private reputation was of ancient origin and was necessary to human society.”

The same American decision has also been referred to in State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern of Governance Trust [xv]. The Court held that good reputation was an element of personal security and was protected by the Constitution, equally with the right to enjoy life, liberty and property.

It has been held that the right equally covers a person’s reputation during and after his death. Thus, any wrong action of the state or agencies that sullies the reputation of a virtuous person would undoubtedly come under the scope of Article 21.

State of UP v. Mohammaad Naim [xvi] succinctly laid down the following tests while dealing the question of expunction of disgracing remarks against a person or authority whose conduct comes in consideration before a court of law. These are:

• whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself.
• whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks.
• Whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct, it has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial. It should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation, and reserve.

In State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani [xvii] , a two-member commission got appointed to inquire into the communal disturbances in the Bhagalpur district on  October 24, 1989. The commission made certain remarks in the report, which impinged upon the respondent’s reputation as a public man without allowing him to be heard. The Apex Court ruled that it was amply clear that one was entitled to have and preserve one’s reputation, and one also had the right to protect it.

The Court further said that if any authority, in the discharge of its duties fastened upon it under the law, transverse into the realm of personal reputation adversely affecting him, it must provide a chance to have his say in the matter. Finally, the Court observed that the principle of natural justice made it incumbent upon the authority to allow the person before any comment was made or opinion was expressed, likely to affect that person prejudicially.

Right To Livelihood

To begin with, the Supreme Court took the view that the right to life in Art. 21 would not include the right to livelihood. In Re Sant Ram [xviii] , a case arose before the Maneka Gandhi case, where the Supreme Court ruled that the right to livelihood would not fall within the expression ‘life’ in Article 21. The Court said curtly:

“The Right to livelihood would be included in the freedoms enumerated in Art.19, or even in Art.16, in a limited sense. But the language of Art.21 cannot be pressed into aid of the argument that the word ‘life’ in Art. 21 includes ‘livelihood’ also.”

But then the view changed. The definition of the word ‘life’ in Article 21 was read broadly. The Court, in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni [xix] , came to hold that ‘the right to life’ guaranteed by Article 21 includes ‘the right to livelihood’.

The Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [xx] , popularly known as the ‘Pavement Dwellers Case’, is important. Herein, a five-judge bench of the Court implied that the right to livelihood is borne out of the right to life. It said so as no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. The Court further observed:

“The sweep of the right to life conferred by Art.21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean, merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of the right to life is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of livelihood.”

If the right to livelihood is not treated as part and parcel of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation [xxi] .

In the instant case, the Court further opined:

“The state may not by affirmative action, be compelled to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred in Article 21.”

Emphasising upon the close relationship of life and livelihood, the Court stated:

“That, which alone makes it impossible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral part of the right to life. Deprive a person from his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life [xxii] .”

Article 21 does not place an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty and, for that matter, on the right to livelihood. What Article 21 insists is that such lack ought to be according to procedure established by law which must be fair, just and reasonable. Therefore, anyone deprived of the right to livelihood without a just and fair procedure set by law can challenge such deprivation as being against Article 21 and get it declared void [xxiii] .

In DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress [xxiv] , the Court was hearing a matter where an employee was laid off by issuing a notice without any reason. The Court held that the same was utterly arbitrary and violative of Article 21.

In M. Paul Anthony v. Bihar Gold Mines Ltd [xxv] , it was held that when a government servant or one in a public undertaking is suspended pending a departmental disciplinary inquiry against him, subsistence allowance must be paid to him. The Court has emphasised that a government servant does not have his right to life and other fundamental rights.

However, if a person is deprived of such a right according to procedure established by law which must be fair, just and reasonable and in the larger interest of people, the plea of deprivation of the right to livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable.

In Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [xxvi] , the SC held that the state acquired a landowner’s land following the procedure laid down in the relevant law of acquisition. So even though the right to livelihood of the landowner is adversely affected, it is not violated.

The Court opined that the state acquires land in exercising its power of eminent domain for a public purpose. The landowner is paid compensation in place of land. Therefore, the plea of deprivation of the right to livelihood under Art. 21 is unsustainable.

In M. J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka & Ors [xxvii] , the Supreme Court held that the right to life under Article 21 does protect livelihood. However, the Court added a rider that its deprivation could not be extended too far or projected or stretched to the recreation, business or trade detrimental to the public interest or has an insidious effect on public moral or public order.

The Court further held that regulating video games of pure chance or mixed chance and skill are not violative of Article 21, nor is the procedure unreasonable, unfair or unjust.

An important case that needs to be mentioned when speaking about the right to livelihood is MX of Bombay Indian Inhabitants v. M/s. ZY [xxviii].   In this case, the Court had held that a person could not be denied employment if they tested positive for HIV. And they cannot be rendered ‘medically unfit’ owing to the same. In interpreting the right to livelihood, the Court emphasised that the same couldn’t hang on to the fancies of the individuals in authority.

Is Right to Work a Fundamental Right under Article 21?

In Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee [xxix] , the five-judge bench of the Supreme Court distinguished the concept of life and liberty within Art.21 from the right to carry on any trade or business, a fundamental right conferred by Art. 19(1)(g). Regarding the same, the Court held that the right to carry on trade or business is not included in the concept of life and personal liberty. Thus, Article 21 is not attracted in the case of trade and business.

The petitioners in the case were hawkers doing business off the paved roads in Delhi. They had claimed against the Municipal authorities who did not allow former to carry out their business. The hawkers claimed that the refusal to do so violated their Right under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Court opined that the petitioners had a fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) to carry on trade or business of their choice. However, they had no right to do so in a particular place. Hence, they couldn’t be permitted to carry on their trade on every road in the city. If the road is not wide enough to conveniently accommodate the traffic on it, no hawking may be permitted at all or permitted once a week.

The Court also held that footpaths, streets or roads are public property intended to several general public and are not meant for private use. However, the Court said that the affected persons could apply for relocation and the concerned authorities were to consider the representation and pass orders thereon. Therefore, the two rights were too remote to be connected.

The Court distinguished the ruling in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [xxx]. In the case the Court held:

“in that case, the petitioners were very poor persons who had made pavements their homes existing in the midst of filth and squalor and that they had to stay on the pavements so that they could get odd jobs in the city. It was not the case of a business of selling articles after investing some capital.”

In Secretary, the State of Karnataka v. Umadevi [xxxi] , the Court rejected that right to employment at the present point of time can be included as a fundamental right under Right to Life under Art. 21.

Right to Shelter

In UP Avas Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Limited [xxxii] , the right to shelter has been held to be a fundamental right which springs from the right to residence secured under Article 19(1)(e) and the right to life guaranteed under Article 21. The state has to provide facilities and opportunities to build houses to make the right meaningful for the poor. [xxxiii] .

Upholding the importance of the right to a decent environment and a reasonable accommodation in Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame [xxxiv] , the Court held:

“The Right to life would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and reasonable accommodation to live in. The difference between the need for an animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in view.

The Court advanced:

“For the animal it is the bare protection of the body, for a human being it has to be a suitable accommodation, which would allow him to grow in every aspect – physical, mental and intellectual. The Constitution aims at ensuring fuller development of every child. That would be possible only if the child is in a proper home. It is not necessary that every citizen must be ensured of living in a well-built comfortable house but a reasonable home, particularly for people in India, can even be a mud-built thatched house or a mud-built fireproof accommodation.”

In Chameli Singh v. State of U P [xxxv] , a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court had considered and held that the right to shelter is a fundamental right available to every citizen. And the same was read into Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus, ‘right to shelter’ was considered encompassing the right to life, making the latter more meaningful. The Court advanced:

“Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not mere protection of his life and limb. It is however where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being [xxxvi] .”

Right to Social Security and Protection of Family

Right to life covers within its ambit the right to social security and protection of the family. K. Ramaswamy J., in Calcutta Electricity Supply Corporation (India) Ltd. v. Subhash Chandra Bose [xxxvii] , held that right to social and economic justice is a fundamental right under Art. 21. The learned judge explained:

“right to life and dignity of a person and status without means were cosmetic rights. Socio-economic rights were, therefore, basic aspirations for meaning the right to life and that Right to Social Security and Protection of Family were an integral part of the right to life.”

In NHRC v. State of Arunachal Pradesh [xxxviii]  (Chakmas Case), the SC said that the state is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being, be he a citizen or otherwise. Further, it cannot permit anybody or a group of persons to threaten another person or group of persons. No state government worth the name can tolerate such threats from one group of persons to another group of persons. Therefore, the state is duty-bound to protect the threatened group from such assaults. If it fails to do so, it will fail to perform its constitutional as well as statutory obligations.

In  Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pande Barde [xxxix] , it was held that the right to economic empowerment of poor, disadvantaged and oppressed Dalits was a fundamental right to make their right of life and dignity of person meaningful.

In Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa [xl] , the Supreme held that security against sickness and disablement was a fundamental right under Article 21 read with Section 39(e) of the Constitution of India.

In LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre [xli] , it was further held that right to life and livelihood included right to life insurance policies of LIC of India, but that it must be within the paying capacity and means of the insured.

Further, Surjit Kumar v. State of UP. [xlii] is a crucial case that reads Article 21 as extending protection against honour killing.  In the case, a division bench of Allahabad high court took serious note on harassment, ill-treatment, and killing of a person for wanting to get married to a person of another caste or community. The accused justified the harassment and killing, claiming that the victim had brought dishonour to the family. The Court said that such a practice of ‘honor killing’ was a blot on society and inter-caste marriage was not against the law. Therefore, the Court directed the police to take strong measures against the accused.

Right to Health and Medical Care

In State of Punjab v. M.S. Chawla [xliii] , it was held that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 includes within its ‘ambit the right to health and medical care’.

In Vincent v. Union of India , [xliv] the Supreme Court   emphasised that a healthy body is the very foundation of all human activities. Further, Article 47, a Directive Principle of State Policy, lays stress note on the improvement of public health and prohibition of drugs detrimental to health as one of the primary duties of the state [xlv] .

In Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India [xlvi] , the Supreme Court laid down:

“Social justice which is a device to ensure life to be meaningful and livable with human dignity requires the state to provide to workmen facilities and opportunities to reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security and civilised living. The health and strength of worker, the Court said, was an important facet of right to life. Denial thereof denudes the workmen the finer facets of life violating Art. 21.”

In Parmananda Katara v. Union of India [xlvii] , the Supreme Court has very specifically clarified that preservation of life is of paramount importance. The Apex Court stated that ‘once life is lost, status quo ante cannot be restored’. [xlviii] It was held that it is the professional obligation of all doctors (government or private) to extent medical aid to the injured immediately to preserve life without legal formalities to be complied with by the police.

Article 21 casts the obligation on the state to preserve life. It is the obligation of those in charge of the community’s health to protect life so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may be punished. No law can intervene to delay and discharge this paramount obligation of the members of the medical profession.

The Court also observed:

“Art. 21 of the Constitution cast the obligation on the state to preserve life. The patient whether he be an innocent person or a criminal liable to punishment under the laws of the society, it is the obligation of those who are in charge of the health of the community to preserve life so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may be punished. Social laws do not contemplate death by negligence to tantamount to legal punishment…. Every doctor whether at a Government hospital or otherwise has the professional obligation to extend his services with due expertise for protecting life.”

This link between the right to medical care and health and Article 21 played out most vividly during the pandemic. Especially since the state couldn’t manage the crisis and many people were left to fend for themselves.

To read about the right to health and Article 21, click here

Coming back to understanding the right to medical care pre-covid era, another case that understands this interlink better is Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal. [xlix] In this case, a person suffering from severe head injuries from a train accident was refused treatment at various hospitals on the excuse that they lacked the adequate facilities and infrastructure to provide treatment.

Through this case, the Supreme Court developed the right to emergency treatment. The Court went on to say that the failure on the part of the government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment results in the violation of his right to life guaranteed under Article 21.

It acknowledged the limitation of financial resources to give effect to such a right. Still, it maintained that the state needed to provide for the resources to give effect to the people’s entitlement of receiving emergency medical treatment [l] .

It has been reiterated, time and again, that there should be no impediment to providing emergency medical care. Again, in Pravat Kumar Mukherjee v. Ruby General Hospital & Others [li] , it was held that a hospital is duty-bound to accept accident victims and patients who are in critical condition and that it cannot refuse treatment on the ground that the victim is not in a position to pay the fee or meet the expenses or on the ground that there is no close relation of the victim available who can give consent for medical treatment [lii] .

The Court has laid stress on a crucial point, viz., the state cannot plead lack of financial resources to carry out these directions meant to provide adequate medical services to the people. The state cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide adequate medical assistance to people on account of financial constraints.

But, in State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga [liii] , the Supreme Court recognised that provision of health facilities could not be unlimited. The Court held that it has to be to the extent finance permits. No country has unlimited resources to spend on any of its projects.

In Confederation of Ex-servicemen Association v. Union of India [liv] , the right to get free and timely legal aid or facilities was not held as a fundamental right of ex-servicemen. Therefore, a policy decision in formulating a contributory scheme for ex-servicemen and asking them to pay a one-time contribution does not violate Art. 21, nor is it inconsistent with Part IV of the Constitution.

No Right to Die

While Article 21 confers on a person the right to live a dignified life, does it also confers a right to a person to end their life? If so, then what is the fate of Section 309 Indian Penal Code (1860), which punishes a person convicted of attempting to commit suicide? There has been a difference of opinion on the justification of this provision to continue on the statute book.

This question came for consideration for the first time before the High Court of Bombay in State of Maharashtra v. Maruti Sripati Dubal. In this case, the Bombay High Court held that the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 includes the right to die. The Hon’ble High Court struck down Section 309 of the IPC that provides punishment for an attempt to commit suicide on a person as unconstitutional.

In P. Rathinam v. Union of India [lv] , a two-judge Division Bench of the Supreme Court took cognisance of the relationship/contradiction between Section 309 IPC and Article 21. The Court supported the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Maruti Sripati Dubal’s Case held that the right to life embodies in Article 21 also embodied in it a right not to live a forced life, to his detriment, disadvantage or disliking.

The Court argued that the word life in Article 21 means the right to live with human dignity, and the same does not merely connote continued drudgery. Thus the Court concluded that the right to live of which Article 21 speaks could bring in the right not to live a forced life. The Court further emphasised that an ‘attempt to commit suicide is, in reality, a cry for held and not for punishment’.

The Rathinam ruling came to be reviewed by a full bench of the Court in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab [lvi] . The question before the Court was:  if the principal offence of attempting to commit suicide is void as unconstitutional vis-à-vis Article 21, then how abetment can thereof be punishable under Section 306 IPC?

It was argued that ‘the right to die’ had been included in Article 21 (Rathinam ruling) and Sec. 309 declared unconstitutional. Thus, any person abetting the commission of suicide by another is merely assisting in enforcing his fundamental Right under Article 21.

The Court overruled the decision of the Division Bench in the above-stated case and has put an end to the controversy and ruled that Art.21 is a provision guaranteeing the protection of life and personal liberty and by no stretch of imagination can extinction of life’ be read to be included in the protection of life. The Court observed further:

“……’Right to life’ is a natural right embodied in Article 21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of right to life”

However, in this regard, in 2020, the Supreme Court had sought a response from the central government. The Court had asked the center to explain its stance on the conflict between Section 309 and the Mental Healthcare Act, promulgated in 2017 (MHCA). As opposed to Section 309, which criminalises attempts to suicide, the MHCA proscribes prosecution of the person attempting it. Given that the Section is colonial legislation, many have vocalised to do away with the same altogether. Additionally, in 2018, in a 134-page-long judgment, Justice DY Chandrachud said it was ‘inhuman’ to punish someone who was already distressed .

Euthanasia and Right to Life

Euthanasia is the termination of the life of a person who is terminally ill or in a permanent vegetative state. In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab [lvii] , the Supreme Court has distinguished between Euthanasia and an attempt to commit suicide.

The Court held that death due to termination of natural life is certain and imminent, and the process of natural death has commenced. Therefore, these are not cases of extinguishing life but only of accelerating the conclusion of the process of natural death that has already started.

The Court further held that this might fall within the ambit of the right to live with human dignity up to the end of natural life. This may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when his life is ebbing out. However, this cannot be equated with the right to die an unnatural death curtailing the natural span of life.

Sentence of Death –Rarest of Rare Cases

The law commission of India has dealt with the issue of abolition or retention of capital punishment, collecting as much available material as possible and assessing the views expressed by western scholars. The commission recommended the retention of capital punishment in the present state of the country.

The commission held recognised the on-ground conditions of India. By that, it meant the difference in the social upbringing, morality and education, its diversity and population. Given all these factors, India could not risk the experiment of the abolition of capital punishment.

In Jagmohan v. State of U P [lviii] , the Supreme Court had held that the death penalty was not violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21. It was said that the judge was to make the choice between the death penalty and imprisonment for life based on circumstances, facts, and nature of crime brought on record during trial. Therefore, the choice of awarding death sentence was done in accordance with the procedure established by law as required under article 21

But, in Rajindera Parsad v. State of U.P. [lix] , Krishna Iyer J., speaking for the majority, held that capital punishment would not be justified unless it was shown that the criminal was dangerous to society. The learned judge plead for the abolition of the death penalty and said that it should be retained only for ‘white collar crimes’

However, in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [lx] , the leading case of on the question, a constitution bench of the Supreme Court explained that article 21 recognised the right of the state to deprive a person of his life in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure established by valid law. It was further held that the death penalty for the offence of murder awarded under section 302 of IPC did not violate the basic feature of the Constitution.

Right to get Pollution Free Water and Air

In Subhas Kumar v. State of Bihar [lxi] , it has held that a Public Interest Litigation is maintainable for ensuring enjoyment of pollution-free water and air which is included in ‘right to live’ under Art.21 of the Constitution. The Court observed:

“Right to live is a fundamental right under Art 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a citizen has right to have recourse to Art.32 of     the Constitution for removing the pollution of water or air which may be detrimental to the quality of life.”  

Right to Clean Environment

The “Right to Life” under Article 21 means a life of dignity to live in a proper environment free from the dangers of diseases and infection. Maintenance of health, preservation of the sanitation and environment have been held to fall within the purview of Article 21 as it adversely affects the life of the citizens and it amounts to slow poisoning and reducing the life of the citizens because of the hazards created if not checked.

The following are some of the well-known cases on the environment under Article 21:

In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1988) [lxii] , the Supreme Court ordered the closure of tanneries polluting the water.

In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1997) [lxiii] , the Supreme Court issued several guidelines and directions for the protection of the Taj Mahal, an ancient monument, from environmental degradation.

In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India [lxiv] , the Court took cognisance of the environmental problems being caused by tanneries that were polluting the water resources, rivers, canals, underground water, and agricultural land. As a result, the Court issued several directions to deal with the problem.

In Milk Men Colony Vikas Samiti v. State Of Rajasthan [lxv] , the Supreme Court held that the “right to life” means clean surroundings, which leads to a healthy body and mind. It includes the right to freedom from stray cattle and animals in urban areas.

In  M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2006) [lxvi] , the Court held that the blatant and large-scale misuse of residential premises for commercial use in Delhi violated the right to a salubrious sand decent environment. Taking note of the problem, the Court issued directives to the government on the same.

In  Murli S. Deora v. Union of India [lxvii] , the persons not indulging in smoking cannot be compelled to or subjected to passive smoking on account of the act of sTherefore, rights. Right to Life under Article 21 is affected as a non-smoker may become a victim of someone smoking in a public place.

Right Against Noise Pollution

In Re: Noise Pollution [lxviii] , the case was regarding noise pollution caused by obnoxious noise levels due to the bursting of crackers during Diwali. The Apex Court suggested to desist from bursting and making use of such noise-making crackers and observed that:

“Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the life and personal liberty to all persons. It guarantees the right of persons to life with human dignity. Therein are included, all the aspects of life which go to make a person’s life meaningful, complete and worth living. The human life has its charm and there is no reason why life should not be enjoyed along with all permissible pleasures. Anyone who wishes to live in peace, comfort, and quiet within his house has a right to prevent the noise as pollutant reaching him.”

Continued…

“No one can claim a right to create noise even in his own premises that would travel beyond his precincts and cause the nuisance to neighbors or others. Any noise, which has the effect of materially interfering with the ordinary comforts of life judged by the standard of a reasonable man, is nuisance…. While one has a right to speech, others have a right to listen or decline to listen. Nobody can be compelled to listen and nobody can claim that he has a right to make his voice trespass into the ears or mind of others. Nobody can indulge in aural aggression. If anyone increases his volume of speech and that too with the assistance of artificial devices so as to compulsorily expose unwilling persons to hear a noise raised to unpleasant or obnoxious levels then the person speaking is violating the right of others to a peaceful, comfortable and pollution-free life guaranteed by Article 21. Article 19(1)(a) cannot be pressed into service for defeating the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 [lxix] “.

Right to Know

Holding that the right to life has reached new dimensions and urgency the Supreme Court in RP Ltd. v. Proprietors Indian Express Newspapers, Bombay Pvt. Ltd., observed that if democracy had to function effectively, people must have the right to know and to obtain the conduct of affairs of the state.

In Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti, the Supreme Court said that there was a strong link between Art.21 and the right to know, particularly where secret government decisions may affect health, life, and livelihood.

Reiterating the above observations made in the instant case, the Apex Court in Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers, ruled that the citizens who had been made responsible for protecting the environment had a right to know the government proposal.

Read more about right to know here .

Personal Liberty

The liberty of the person is one of the oldest concepts to be protected by national courts. As long as 1215, the English Magna Carta provided that,

No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned… but… by the law of the land.

The smallest Article of eighteen words has the greatest significance for those who cherish the ideals of liberty. What can be more important than liberty? In India, the concept of ‘liberty’ has received a far more expansive interpretation. The Supreme Court of India has rejected the view that liberty denotes merely freedom from bodily restraint, and has held that it encompasses those rights and privileges that have long been recognised as being essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

The meaning of the term’ personal liberty’ was considered by the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh’s case, which arose out of the challenge to Constitutional validity of the U. P. Police Regulations that provided for surveillance by way of domiciliary visits secret picketing.

Oddly enough, both the majority and minority on the bench relied on the meaning given to the term ‘personal liberty’ by an American judgment (per Field, J.,) in Munn v Illinois , which held the term ‘life’ meant something more than mere animal existence. The prohibition against its deprivation extended to all those limits and faculties by which life was enjoyed.

This provision equally prohibited the mutilation of the body or the amputation of an arm or leg or the putting of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicated with the outer world. The majority held that the U. P. Police Regulations authorising domiciliary visits [at night by police officers as a form of surveillance, constituted a deprivation of liberty and thus] unconstitutional.

The Court observed that the right to personal liberty in the Indian Constitution is the right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether they are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures.

The Supreme Court has held that even lawful imprisonment does not spell farewell to all fundamental rights. A prisoner retains all the rights enjoyed by a free citizen except only those ‘necessarily’ lost as an incident of imprisonment

Right to Privacy and Article 21

Although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the right to privacy was considered a ‘penumbral right’ under the Constitution, i.e. a right declared by the Supreme Court as integral to the fundamental right to life and liberty. After the KS Puttuswamy judgment, the right to privacy has been read and understood by the Court in various landmark judgments.

The Supreme Court has culled the right to privacy from Article 21 and other provisions of the Constitution, read with the Directive Principles of State Policy.

Although no single statute confers a crosscutting ‘horizontal’ right to privacy, various statutes had provisions that either implicitly or explicitly preserved this right . [lxx]

For the first time in Kharak Singh v. State of UP , [lxxi] the Court questioned whether the right to privacy could be implied from the existing fundamental rights such as Art. 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e) and 21, came before the Court. “Surveillance” under Chapter XX of the UP Police Regulations constituted an infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Regulation 236(b), which permitted surveillance by “domiciliary visits at night”, was held to violate Article 21.  A seven-judge bench held that:

“the meanings of the expressions “life” and “personal liberty” in Article 21 were considered by this Court in Kharak Singh’s case. Although the majority found that the Constitution contained no explicit guarantee of a “right to privacy”, it read the right to personal liberty expansively to include a right to dignity. It held that “an unauthorised intrusion into a person’s home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man -an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation”

In a minority judgment, in this case, Justice Subba Rao held that:

“the right to personal liberty takes in not only a right to be free from restrictions placed on his movements but also free from encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person’s house, where he lives with his family, is his ‘castle’; it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty”.

This case, especially Justice Subba Rao’s observations, paved the way for later elaborations on the right to privacy using Article 21.

In Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh [lxxii] , The Supreme Court took a more elaborate appraisal of the right to privacy. In this case, the Court was evaluating the constitutional validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations, which provided for police surveillance of habitual offenders including domiciliary visits and picketing of the suspects. The Supreme Court desisted from striking down these invasive provisions holding that:

“It cannot be said that surveillance by domiciliary visit would always be an unreasonable restriction upon the right of privacy. It is only persons who are suspected to be habitual criminals and those who are determined to lead a criminal life that is subjected to surveillance.”

The Court accepted a limited fundamental right to privacy as an emanation from Arts.19(a), (d) and 21. Mathew J. observed in the instant case,

“The Right to privacy will, therefore, necessarily, have to go through a process of case by case development.        Hence, assuming that the right to personal liberty. the right to move freely throughout India and the freedom of speech create an independent fundamental right of privacy as an emanation from them that one can characterise as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute….. …… Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right that fundamental right must be subject to restrictions on the basis of compelling public interest.”

Scope and Content of Right to Privacy Pre-Puttaswamy Judgment

Read more about the right to privacy as part of Academike’s Constitutional Rights Series here

Tapping of Telephone

Emanating from the right to privacy is the question of tapping of the telephone.

In RM Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that Courts would protect the telephonic conversation of an innocent citizen against wrongful or high handed’ interference by tapping the conversation. However, the protection is not for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the police to vindicate the law and prevent corruption of public servants.

Telephone tapping is permissible in India under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 . The Section lays down the circumstances and grounds when an order for tapping a telephone may be passed, but no procedure for making the order is laid down therein.

The Supreme Court in PUCL v. Union of India held that in the absence of just and fair procedure for regulating the exercise of power under Section 5(2) of the Act, it is not possible to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens under Section 19 and 21. Accordingly, the Court issued procedural safeguards to be observed before restoring to telephone tapping under Section 5(2) of the Act.

The Court further ruled:

“right to privacy is a part of the right to ‘life’ and ‘personal liberty’ enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Once the facts in a given case constitute a right to privacy, Article 21 is attracted. The said right cannot be curtailed “except according to procedure established by law”. The Court has further ruled that Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man’s private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office. Telephone tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law. The procedure has to be just, fair and reasonable.”

Disclosure of Dreadful Diseases

In Mr X v. Hospital Z [lxxv] , the question before the Supreme Court was whether the disclosure by the doctor that his patient, who was to get married had tested HIV positive, would be violative of the patient’s right to privacy.

The Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy was not absolute and might be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others.

The Court explained that the right to life of a lady with whom the patient was to marry would positively include the right to be told that a person with whom she was proposed to be married was the victim of a deadly disease, which was sexually communicable.

Since the right to life included the right to a healthy life to enjoy all the facilities of the human body in prime condition, it was held that the doctors had not violated the right to privacy.

Right to Privacy and Subjecting a Person to Medical Tests

It is well settled that the right to privacy is not treated as absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken to prevent crimes or disorder or protect health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others. If there is a conflict between the fundamental rights of two parties, which advances public morality would prevail.

In the case Sharda v. Dharmpal [lxxvi] , a three-judge bench ruled that a matrimonial court had the power to direct the parties in a divorce proceeding to undergo a medical examination. A direction issued for this could not be held to violate one’s right to privacy. The Court, however, said that there must be sufficient material for this.

Right to Privacy: Woman’s Right to Make Reproductive Choices

A woman’s right to make reproductive choices includes the woman’s right to refuse participation in the sexual activity or the insistence on using contraceptive methods such as undergoing sterilisation procedures. The woman’s entitlement to carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth subsequently raise children.

Right to Travel Abroad

In Satwant Singh Sawhney v. Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi [lxxvii] , the Supreme Court has included the right to travel abroad contained in the expression “personal liberty” within the meaning of Article 21.

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [lxxviii] , the validity of Sec. 10(3)(c) of the passport Act 1967, which empowered the government to impound the passport of a person, in the interest of the general public, was challenged before the seven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court.

It was contended that, right to travel abroad being a part of the right to “personal liberty” the impugned Section didn’t prescribe any procedure to deprive her of her liberty and hence it was violative of Art. 21.

The Court held that the procedure contemplated must stand the test of reasonableness in order to conform to Art.21 other fundamental rights. It was further held that the right to travel abroad falls under Art. 21, natural justice must be applied while exercising the power of impounding a passport under the Passport Act. Bhagwati, J., observed:

The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and that It must be “‘right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.

Right against Illegal Detention

In  Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [lxxix] , the petitioner was detained by the police officers and his whereabouts were not told to his family members for a period of five days. Taking serious note of the police high headedness and illegal detention of a free citizen, the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines governing arrest of a person during the investigation:

An arrested person being held in custody is entitled if he so requests to have a friend, relative or other person told as far as is practicable that he has been arrested and where he is being detained.

The police officer shall inform the arrested person when he is brought to the police station of this right. An entry shall be required to be made in the diary as to who was informed of the arrest.

In the case of  DK. Basu v. State of West Bengal [lxxx] , the Supreme Court laid down detailed guidelines to be followed by the central and state investigating agencies in all cases of arrest and detention. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the guidelines be followed till legal provisions are made on that behalf as preventive measures. It also held that any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, whether it occurs during interrogation or otherwise, falls within the ambit of Article 21.

Article 21 and Prisoner’s Rights

The protection of Article 21 is available even to convicts in jail. The convicts are not deprived of all the fundamental rights they otherwise possess by mere reason of their conviction. Following the conviction of a convict is put into jail he may be deprived of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the territory of India. But a convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed under Article 21, and he shall not be deprived of his life and personal liberty except by a procedure established by law [lxxxi] .

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , the Supreme Court gave a new dimension to Article 21. The Court has interpreted Article 21 to have the widest possible amplitude. On being convicted of a crime and deprived of their liberty following the procedure established by law. Article 21 has laid down a new constitutional and prison jurisprudence [lxxxii] .

The rights and protections recognised to be given in the topics to follow.

Right to Free Legal Aid & Right to Appeal

In  M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra [lxxxiii] , while holding free legal aid as an integral part of fair procedure, the Court explained:

“the two important ingredients of the right of appeal are; firstly, service of a copy of a judgement to the prisoner in time to enable him to file an appeal and secondly, provision of free legal service to the prisoner who is indigent or otherwise disabled from securing legal assistance. This right to free legal aid is the duty of the government and is an implicit aspect of Article 21 in ensuring fairness and reasonableness; this cannot be termed as government charity.”

In other words, an accused person, where the charge is of an offence punishable with imprisonment, is entitled to be offered legal aid if he is too poor to afford counsel. In addition, counsel for the accused must be given sufficient time and facility for preparing his defence. Breach of these safeguards of a fair trial would invalidate the trial and conviction.

Right to Speedy Trial

In  Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [lxxxiv] , the Supreme Court observed that an alarming number of men, women and children were kept in prisons for years awaiting trial in courts of law.

The Court noted the situation and observed that it was carrying a shame on the judicial system that permitted incarceration of men and women for such long periods without trials.

The Court held that detention of undertrial prisoners in jail for a period more than what they would have been sentenced to if convicted was illegal. And the same violated Article 21. The Court ordered to release of undertrial prisoners who had been in jail for a longer period than the punishment meted out in case of conviction.

In  A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [lxxxv] , a Constitution Bench of five judges of the Supreme Court dealt with the question and laid down specific guidelines for ensuring speedy trial of offences some of them have been listed below [lxxxvi] :

Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily.

Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, appeal, revision, and retrial.

The concerns underlying the right of the speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are:

The period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible.

The worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and

Undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend him.

While determining whether the undue delay has occurred, one must regard all the attendant circumstances, including the nature of the offence, the number of accused and witnesses, and the Court’s workload concerned. Every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. An accuser’s plea of denial of the speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial

In the case of  Anil Rai v. State of Bihar [lxxxvii] , the Supreme Court directed the Judges of the High Courts to give quick judgments, and in certain circumstances, the parties are to apply to the Chief Justice to move the case to another bench or to do the needful at his discretion.

Right to Fair Trial

The free and fair trial has been said to be the sine qua non of Article 21. The Supreme Court in  Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [lxxxviii] said that the right to free and fair trial to the accused and the victims, their family members, and relatives and society at large.

Right to Bail

The Supreme Court has diagnosed the root cause for long pre-trial incarceration to bathe present-day unsatisfactory and irrational rules for bail, which insists merely on financial security from the accused and their sureties. Many of the undertrials being poor and indigent are unable to provide any financial security. Consequently, they have to languish in prisons awaiting their trials.

But incarceration of persons charged with non-bailable offences during the pendency of trial cannot be questioned as violative of Article 21 since the same is authorised by law. In Babu Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [lxxxix] , the Court held that the right to bail was included in the personal liberty under Article 21. Its refusal would be the deprivation of that liberty, which could be authorised in accordance with the procedure established by law.

Anticipatory bail is a statutory right, and it does not arise out of Article 21. Therefore, anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of right as it cannot be granted as a matter of right as it cannot be considered as an essential ingredient of Article 21.

Right Against Handcuffing

Handcuffing has been considered prima facie inhuman and therefore unreasonable, over-harsh and at first flush, arbitrary. It has been held to be unwarranted and violative of Article 21.

In Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration [xc] , the Supreme Court struck down the Rules that provided that every undertrial accused of a non-bailable offence punishable with more than three years prison term would be routinely handcuffed. Instead, the Court ruled that handcuffing should be resorted to only when there was “clear and present danger of escape” of the accused under  -trial, breaking out of police control.

Right Against Solitary Confinement

It has been held that a convict is not wholly denuded of his fundamental rights, and his conviction does not reduce him into a non – person whose rights are subjected to the whims of the prison administration. Therefore, the imposition of any major punishment within the prison system is conditional upon the observance of procedural safeguard.

In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [xci] , the petitioner was sentenced to death by the Delhi session court and his appeal against the decision was pending before the high Court. He was detained in Tihar Jail during the pendency of the appeal. He complained that since the date of conviction by the session court, he was kept in solitary confinement.

It was contended that Section 30 of the Prisoners Act does not authorise jail authorities to send him to solitary confinement, which by itself was a substantive punishment under Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and could be imposed by a court of law. Therefore, it could not be left to the whim and caprice of the prison authorities. The Supreme Court accepted the petitioner’s argument and held that the imposition of solitary confinement on the petitioner was violative of Article 21.

Right Against Custodial Violence

The incidents of brutal police behaviour towards persons detained on suspicion of having committed crimes are routine. There has been a lot of public outcry from time to time against custodial deaths.

The Supreme Court has taken a very positive stand against the atrocities, intimidation, harassment and use of third-degree methods to extort confessions. The Court has classified these as being against human dignity. The rights under Article 21 secure life with human dignity and the same are available against torture.

Death by hanging is Not Violative of Article 21

In  Deena v. Union of India [xcii] , the constitutional validity of the death sentence by hanging was challenged as being “barbarous, inhuman, and degrading” and therefore violative of Article 21.

The Court, in this case, referred to the Report of the UK Royal Commission, 1949, the opinion of the Director-General of Health Services of India, the 35 th Report of the Law Commission and the opinion of the Prison Advisers and Forensic Medicine Experts. Finally, it held that death by hanging was the best and least painful method of carrying out the death penalty. Thus, not violative of Article 21.

Right against Public Hanging

The Rajasthan High Court, by an order, directed the execution of the death sentence of an accused by hanging at the Stadium Ground of Jaipur. It was also directed that the execution should be done after giving widespread publicity through the media.

On receipt of the above order, the Supreme Court in  Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi [xciii] held that the direction for the execution of the death sentence was unconstitutional and violative of Article 21.

It was further made clear that death by public hanging would be a barbaric practice. Although the crime for which the accused has been found guilty was barbaric, it would be a shame on the civilised society to reciprocate the same. The Court said,

“a barbaric crime should not have to be visited with a barbaric penalty.”

Right Against Delayed Execution

In T.V. Vatheeswaram v. State of Tamil Nadu [xcv] , the Supreme Court held that the delay in execution of a death sentence exceeding 2 years would be sufficient ground to invoke protection under Article 21 and the death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment. The cause of the delay is immaterial. The accused himself may be the cause of the delay.

In Sher Singh v. State of Punjab [xcvi] , the Supreme Court said that prolonged wait for the execution of a death sentence is an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure, and the only way to undo that is through Article 21.

But the Court held that this could not be taken as the rule of law and applied to each case, and each case should be decided upon its own facts.  

Procedure Established by Law and Article 21

The expression ‘procedure established by law’ has been the subject of interpretation in a catena of cases. A survey of these cases reveals that courts in judicial interpretation have enlarged the scope of the expression.

The Supreme Court took the view that ‘procedure established by law’ in Article 21 means procedure prescribed by law as enacted by the state and rejected to equate it with the American ‘due process of law’.

But, in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, the Supreme Court observed that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his life and personal liberty must be ‘right, just and fair’ and not ‘arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive’.

It also held that otherwise, it would be no procedure, and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. Thus, the ‘procedure established by law’ has acquired the same significance in India as the ‘due process of law’ clause in America.

Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, speaking in Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration said:

“(though) our Constitution has no due process clause (but after Maneka Gandhi’s case) the consequence is the same, and as much as such Article 21 may be treated as counterpart of the due process clause in American Constitution.”

In December 1985, the Rajasthan High Court sentenced a man, Jagdish Kumar, and a woman, Lichma Devi, to death for killing two young women by setting them on fire. In an unprecedented move, the Court ordered both prisoners to be publicly executed.

In response to a review petition by the Attorney General against this judgment, the Supreme Court in December 1985 stayed the public hangings, observing that ‘a barbaric crime does not have to be met with a barbaric penalty’.

Furthermore, the Court observed that the execution of a death sentence by public hanging violates Article 21, which mandates the observance of a just, fair and reasonable procedure.

Thus, an order passed by the High Court of Rajasthan for public hanging was set aside by the Supreme Court on the ground, among other things, that it was violative of Article 21. Again, in Sher Singh v State of Punjab , the Supreme Court held that unjustifiable delay in execution of death sentence violates Article 21.

The Supreme Court has taken the view that this Article read is concerned with the fullest development of an individual, ensuring his dignity through the rule of law. Therefore, every procedure must seem to be ‘reasonable, fair and just’.

The right to life and personal liberty has been interpreted widely to include the right to livelihood, health, education, environment and all those matters that contributed to life with dignity.

The test of procedural fairness has been deemed to be proportional to protecting such rights. Thus, where workers have been deemed to have the right to public employment and the right to livelihood, a hire-fire clause in favour of the state is not reasonable, fair and just, even though the state cannot affirmatively provide a livelihood for all.

Under this doctrine, the Court will examine whether the procedure itself is reasonable, fair and just. And whether it has been operated in a fair, just and reasonable manner.

This has meant, for example, the right to a speedy trial and legal aid is part of any reasonable, fair and just procedure. The process clause is comprehensive and applicable in all areas of State action covering civil, criminal and administrative action.

In one of the landmark decisions in the case of Murli S. Deora v. Union of India , the Supreme Court of India observed that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides that none shall be deprived of his life without due process of law.

The Court observed that smoking in public places is an indirect deprivation of life of non-smokers without any process of law. Considering the adverse effect of smoking on smokers and passive smokers, the Supreme Court directed the prohibition of smoking in public places.

It issued directions to the Union of India, State Governments and the Union Territories to take adequate steps to ensure the prohibition of smoking in public places such as auditoriums, hospital buildings, health institutions etc.

In this manner, the Supreme Court gave a liberal interpretation to Article 21 of the Constitution and expanded its horizon to include the rights of non-smokers.

Further, when there is an inordinate delay in the investigation – it affects the right of the accused, as he is kept in tenterhooks and suspense about the outcome of the case. If the investigating authority pursues the investigation as per the provisions of the Code, there can be no cause of action.

But, if the case is kept alive without any progress in any investigation, then the provisions of Article 21 are attracted. The right is against actual proceedings in Court and against police investigation.

The Supreme Court has widened the scope of ‘procedure established by law’ and held that merely a procedure had been established by law, a person cannot be deprived of his life and liberty unless the procedure is just, fair and reasonable.

Hence, it is well established that to deprive a person of his life and personal liberty must be done under a ‘procedure, established by law’. Such an exception must be made in a just, fair and reasonable manner and must not be arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Therefore, for the procedure to be valid, it must comply with the principles of natural justice.

Article 21 and The Emergency 

In ADM Jabalpur v. S. Shukla [xcviii] , popularly known as the habeas corpus case, the Supreme Court held that Article 21 was the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty.

Therefore, if the presidential order suspended the right to move any court to enforce that right under Article 359, the detune would have no locus standi to a writ petition for challenging the legality of his detention.

Hence, such a wide connotation of Article 359 denied the cherished right to personal liberty guaranteed to the citizens. Experience established that during the emergence of 1975, the people’s fundamental freedom had lost all meaning.

So that it must not occur again, the constitution act, 1978, amended article 359 to the effect that during the operation of the proclamation of emergency, the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental right guaranteed by article 21 would not be suspended under a presidential order.

Given the 44 th amendment, 1978, the observations in the above-cited judgments are left merely of academic importance.

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Annavarapu, Sneha. “Honor Killings, Human Rights and Indian Law.” Economic and Political Weekly , www.academia.edu/5386926/Honor_Killings_Human_Rights_and_Indian_Law.

Nandimath, Omprakash V. “Consent and Medical Treatment: The Legal Paradigm in India.” Indian Journal of Urology : IJU : Journal of the Urological Society of India , Medknow Publications, July 2009, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2779959/.

http://www.hrln.org/hrln/peoples-health-rights/pils-a-cases/1484-sc-reaffirms-workers-right-to-health-and-medical-care.html

Cases as appearing in the Article:

[i] AIR 1963 SC 1295

[ii] AIR 1978 SC 1675

[iii] 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621

[iv] 1981 AIR 746, 1981 SCR (2) 516

[v] 1984 AIR 802, 1984 SCR (2) 67

[vi] 1982 AIR 1473, 1983 SCR (1) 456

[vii] J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, Central Law Agency, 42 nd Ed. (2005), p. 222

[viii] AIR 1998 AP 302

[ix] 983 AIR 803, 1983 SCR (3) 327

[x] AIR 1997 SC 3011 : (1997) 6 SCC 241

[xi] AIR 1999 SC 625

[xii] 1996 AIR 922, 1996 SCC (1) 490

[xiii] 55 American LR 171

[xiv] 1989 AIR 714, 1989 SCR (1) 20

[xv] AIR 1989 SC 714.

[xvi] 1964 AIR 703, 1964 SCR (2) 363

[xvii] AIR 2003 SC 3357

[xviii] AIR 1960 SC 932

[xix] AIR 1983 SC 109: (1983) 1 SCC 124

[xx] AIR 1986 SC 180

[xxii] http://rshrc.nic.in/07%20Human%20Right%20Article-21.pdf

[xxiii] M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Wadhwa, 5 th Ed. (2003), p. 1315

[xxiv] AIR 1991 SC 101

[xxv] AIR 1999 SC 1416 : (1999) 3 SCC 679

[xxvi] Air 1996 SC 1051 : (1996) 2 SCC 549

[xxvii] AIR 1995 SC 1770, JT 1995 (4) SC 141, (1995) 2 MLJ 38 SC

[xxviii] AIR 1997 Bom. 406

[xxix] AIR 1989 SC 1988

[xxx] Supra Note ( 10 to be corrected.. olgatellis)

[xxxi] 2006) 4 SCC 1: AIR 2006 SC 1806.

[xxxii] AIR 1996 SC 114

[xxxiii] http://www.scribd.com/doc/52481658/Article-21-of-the-Constitution-of-India

[xxxiv] AIR (1990) SC 630 : (1990) 92 BOMLR 145 : JT 1990 (1) SC 106

[xxxv] 1996 AIR 1051, 1995( 6 )Suppl. SCR 827, 1996( 2 )SCC 549

[xxxvi] http://nsm.org.in/2008/08/29/judicial-activism-on-right-to-shelter-rights-of-the-urban-poor/

[xxxvii] AIR (1992)573 :(1991) SCR Supl. (2) 267 (Minority Opinion)

[xxxviii] AIR (1996) 1234 :(1996) SCC (1) 742

[xxxix] (1995) Supp 2 SCC 549

[xl] AIR 1995 SC 1811

[xli] AIR (1995)1811 :(1995) SCC (5) 482

[xlii] AIR 2002 NOC 265

[xliii] AIR (1997) SC 1225

[xliv] 1987 AIR 990 : 1987 SCR (2) 468

[xlv] Supra note p.1639

[xlvi] AIR (1995) 922, (1995) SCC (3) 42

[xlvii] AIR (1989) 2039, (1989) SCR (3) 997

[xlviii] M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Ed. 6 th (2010), p. 1616

[xlix] 1996 SCC (4) 37, JT 1996 (6) 43

[l] http://blog.medicallaw.in/supreme-court-of-india-on-emergency-healthcare/

[li] II (2005) CPJ 35 NC

[lii] Supra note 41 paschim bagga case online like at end of paragraph

[liii] AIR 1998 SC 1703 : (1998) 4 SCC 117

[liv] AIR 2006 SC 2945 : (2006) 8 SCC 199

[lv] 1994 AIR 1844, 1994 SCC (3) 394

[lvi] 1996 AIR 946, 1996 SCC (2) 648

[lvii] Ibid

[lviii] AIR 1973 SC 947

[lix] AIR 1979 SC 916

[lx] AIR 1980 SC 898

[lxi] 1991 AIR 420, 1991 SCR (1) 5

[lxii] AIR 1988 SC 1037 : (1987) 4 SCC 463

[lxiii] AIR 1997 SC 734 : (1997) 2 SCC 353

[lxiv] AIR 1996 SC 2721 : (1996) 5 SCC 647

[lxv] (2007) 2 SCC 413

[lxvi] (2006) 3 SCC 399

[lxvii] AIR 2002 SC 40 : (2001) 8 SCC 765

[lxviii] Writ Petition (civil) 72 of 1998

[lxix] Forum, Prevention of Environment & Sound Pollution v. Union Of India &Anr, AIR 2005 SC 3136 : (2005) 5 SCC 439

[lxx] https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/india/ii-legal-framework-0

[lxxi] AIR 1963 SC 1295

[lxxii] 1975 AIR 1378, 1975 SCR (3) 946

[lxxiii] 1995 AIR 264, 1994 SCC (6) 632

[lxxiv] AIR 1997 SC 568

[lxxv] AIR 1995 SC 495

[lxxvi] AIR 2003 SC 3450

[lxxvii] 967 AIR 1836, 1967 SCR (2) 525

[lxxviii] 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621

[lxxix] AIR 1994 SC 1349

[lxxx] AIR 1997 SC 610

[lxxxi] Pandey, J.N., The Constitutional Law of India 47 th Ed., Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 2010, p. 269

[lxxxii] See Kumar, Narender, The Constitutional Law of India, 1 st Ed., Allahabad Law Agency, Allahabad, 2009, p-158

[lxxxiii] AIR 1978 SC 1548

[lxxxiv] AIR 1979 SC 1360

[lxxxv] AIR 1992 SC 170

[lxxxvi] Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, 6 th Ed., LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, Gurgaon, 2010, p.1200

[lxxxvii] AIR 2001 SC 3173

[lxxxviii] AIR 2006 SC 1367

[lxxxix] AIR 1978 SC 527

[xc] AIR 1980 SC 1535

[xci] AIR 1978 SC 1675

[xcii] AIR 1983 SC 1155

[xciii] AIR 1986 SC 467

[xciv] AIR 1983 SC 1155

[xcv] AIR 1981 SC 643

[xcvi] AIR 1983 SC 465

[xcvii] AIR 1966 SC 424

[xcviii] AIR 1976 SC 1207

Related Posts:

47 thoughts on “Article 21: Understanding The Right to Life and Personal Liberty from Case Laws-Academike Explainer”

The information is quite helpful. Thanks

above the information sufficient for my case……….thanks

thanks ? If u need any help please let me know

very very informative…thanks..god bless you for spreading knowledge….

Awesome .this is 360′ information canopy .

very well presented…very useful and informative article

it is very nice work to 21 artices i am very heipful in all my acadimc year .LLb

what about right to choice falling under the same article?

I would expect, that falls within the ambit of “personal liberty.”

Sir how could I get natural justice as poor man, I am not able to afford fees of court etc. Help me. Facts with related land disputed.

Very Well drafted after depth research on the topic. Good reference specially to the judgments/law passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. THANK YOU for serving society. Very useful for everyone.

Good work. It is very helpful to everyone to know about Article 21, especially to law students.Thanks a lot.

Thanks for the details

it’s good relay helping to the staudy

1. Thanks for a very exhaustive discussion and its footnotes. 2. I am an accused in a fake criminal case filed by my sibling about misappropriation of funds from our father’s firm. Based on this the IO sealed all bank accounts belonging to my father, me, my wife etc., in year-2014. They continue to be sealed. 3. My father died in 2016, so anyways the banks have sealed his accounts till a successor is decided. The charge sheet was filed in Feb-2017. 4. There is a nexus between my sibling and the IO and whatever information that I provide to the IO reaches my sibling, which is detrimental to me. 5. U/s 173(8) CrPC, (ongoing investigation), can the IO force me to provide details of my new bank accounts, which I started after the date when he sealed all accounts in 2014? 6. Can I refuse to provide the IO this information using the protection offered by Article 21 of the Constitution? 7. Thanks.

It’s really help me for my clat preparation ….

can a resident of society ,write on Facebook /social media that association members are goonda/goons ,related to apartment owners association

thank u for the wonderful explanation

Thank u so much This information is really helpful

its very effective

A wonderful article

Is there any special format for filing cases in supreme court for the violation of dignity?

Floods, due to human negligence and loss of human lives, loss of livestock and agricultural loss that disrupts Right to Life which also comes under Article 21, have not been covered in the article.

People are fighting for resarvations these days why? Art 21 of our constitution embodies Equal right to life and liberty still why they fight for Resarvations why?

Reservation is politically motivated, every political party wants to continue reservation for seeking votes, since in our country caste and religion play a vital role In every election. The only solution is to give up reservation by those who don’t really need it.

It is in article 15 where suoreme court held that the state is permitted to make any provision for the advancement of any social and educationally backward classes. I prefer you to go through RIGHT TO EQUALITY article(14-18) Its clear all your fought regarding reservation and quota etc

If you desire to know what is a hard work. Then this thesis on Article 21 shows the brilliant work done by a student. I wish great success to the author.

It is my first comment. If you desire to know what is a hard work. Then this thesis on Article 21 shows the brilliant work done by a student. I wish great success to the author.

If you are going for finest contents like me, simply go to see this site daily as it offers quality contents, thanks

Is premature termination from employment without any reason against Article 21 of our Constitution?

Awesome post.

thankyou your feedback

The whole Article is explained in a very easy laungage, with land mark cases this is the best example of compilation of the work. I appreciate the efforts taken by the author

reservations in education and jobs are supposed to be for 10 years. But they appear to be perennial. In this context in have got certain doubts. 1. Did Dr Ambedkar suggest reservations only based on cast. regardless of merit,aptitude and capability? 2. Is it fair for a collector or doctor to retain the reservation facility for his children? 3.Reservation is snatching away opportunities from poor eligible, so called upper class candidates. Is it not against his fundamental right to live ?

The very purpose of Reservations is Adequate Representation in all feilds mandated by the Indian Constitution.But people from certain communities think Reservations means earmarking certain number of posts in the field of employment for the SC and ST communities.Here one more thing is to mention. Reservations are extended after every ten years.Why? Becasue in the knowledge of Govt the goals set by are not acheived. But the occupancy in high level posts by the non reserved communities is abnormal.It is an open secret but nobody questions.The answer is best known to the people who points their finger at the SC and STs only.

what is the relation between liberty and life

Excellent Information provides To read more visit the link :

‘The Supreme Court of India has rejected the view that liberty denotes merely freedom from bodily restraint, and has held that it encompasses those rights and privileges that have long been recognized as being essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’ Can somebody please cite the case in which this was held by Supreme Court of India?

This article is so informative and yet not too exhaustive to understand! Thankyou so much, it’s of great help

Greetings, Usually I never comment on blogs but your article is so convincing that I never stop myself to say something about it. You’re doing a great job, Keep it up. You can check out this article, might be of help 🙂

it is very useful

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In-depth analysis of Maneka Gandhi v. UOI: The judgment that widened the scope of Article 21

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Table of Contents

Introduction.

Maneka Gandhi v. UOI is one of the landmark cases of the country. The Wide interpretation given in this judgment has widened the meaning of Article 21 which was narrowed due to the earlier interpretation of Article 21 in AK Gopalan Case, the literal interpretation adopted by court make a lot of anomalous results and it is empowering the legislature to take the arbitrary action.

The decision taken in AK Gopalan simply states that the procedure established by law is only the law which the parliament enacts, and it is not subject to reasonability check as it is passed by a competent authority especially empowered by the constitution to enact laws. The court in that case stated that there is no involvement interlinked between the Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the constitution. Principle of natural justice can be curtailed through the legislative actions. But the majority decisions in AK Gopalan is rejected by the decision of Maneka Gandhi.

The Researcher in this paper will analyze the interpretation adopted by the court in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI and what made the court to choose that rule of interpretation when the other rule of Interpretation is adopted by the court in AK Gopalan v. State of Madras . How the rule of interpretation which is involved in the case of Maneka Gandhi is useful and we will also look at the transition phase between AK Gopalan and Maneka Gandhi and find out why the court moves towards more liberal rule of Interpretation after Maneka Gandhi, this will be critically analyzed.

The Researcher will adopt the doctrinal method, and analyze the decision given by every judge and will analyze the interpretation adopted by each justice in Maneka Gandhi. There is huge role of Judicial minds in both the cases. In AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, the judgement is given by a 6-judges bench and in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the judgement is given by 7-judges bench to pass a more authoritative judgement.

Background of the Maneka Gandhi

Maneka Gandhi v. UOI [1] , it is one the most important case of the Country. The Judgement passed in this case has broaden the scope of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Earlier, due to the vague and literal interpretation given by Supreme Court in the case of AK Gopalan v. State of Madras [2] narrows down the scope of the article. Due to AK Gopalan Judgement, there were lot of confusion in the country.

In the case of Ram Singh v. Delhi [3]  anomalous results were given; a person was detained under the Preventive Detention Act for making speeches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. At this time, Article 19(2) does not contain the expression ‘public order’ and so the freedom of speech could not be controlled for that purpose, but a prevention detention order, a much more drastic restriction on the person concerned.

The Supreme Court in this case rejected the petition challenging the validity of preventive detention stating that procedure established by the law does not fall under Article 19 as decision given in Gopalan Case states that the procedure established by law is whatever the parliament enacts. Its reasonability is not checked.

There were various such cases which depicted similar adoption of narrow interpretation after AK Gopalan Case. However, the most notable feature of this case is Justice Fazl Ali’s dissenting verdict, which was one of two in a six-judge panel. His dissenting opinion, issued in 1950, became a model of personal liberty and a more liberal perspective on fundamental rights. Therefore, before delving into Maneka Gandhi case we will first look AK Gopalan Case.

Facts of AK Gopalan

Mr. A. K. Gopalan filed a petition under Article 32(1) of the Indian Constitution in this case, and a writ of Habeus Corpus was issued against his detention in response to an order issued under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Mr. A.K. Gopalan was a communist leader who had been imprisoned since December 1947, after being convicted and sentenced under ordinary criminal laws. The court, however, reversed these convictions.

When Gopalan was arrested on March 1, 1950, he was served with an order from the Madras State Government, which was issued under section 3 (1) of the Act, which grants the State or Central Government powers. After that, he challenged the legality of the order made under the Act in court, claiming that the provisions of Articles 13, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution, as well as the provisions of Act 4 of 1950 of Madras State, violated human fundamental rights. Mr. Gopalan also claimed that the order he was given was erroneous.

Issues Raised

1.     Is the Madras State Detention Act in violation of the Indian Constitution’s Articles 19 and 21?

2.     Is the Indian Constitution’s Article 22 applicable to the State’s Detention Act, 1950?

Arguments and Reasoning

A.K.’s case is a good example of this. The majority of the judges decided that punitive and preventive detention were not covered by Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, and thus the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not violate it. The court also argued that the said article protects free citizens, not citizens whose freedom is restricted by law, and thus the issue of enforcing Article 19(1) is moot.

Because the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 followed the legal procedure as enacted by state law, the Apex court concluded that it did not violate Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Article 22 covers various provisions of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, while Article 21 adds those that are not. The Apex Court held that Section 3 of the Act was justified and that it was legal to give the executive such discretionary powers. The majority court also agreed on the validity of Sections 7 and 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, because under Article 22(7)(b), parliament does not have the mandatory power to set a minimum detention period, and under Article 22(5) and 22(6), the right to a fair trial is protected. Section 14 of the same Act was also declared unconstitutional because it challenged the court’s authority to decide whether or not detention was lawful.

Judgment in AK Gopalan

The Supreme Court of India ruled that every portion of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950, infringed on the provisions of Part III of the constitution, with the exception of Section 14 of the Act, which limits the declaration of detention grounds. The court declared Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950, to be ultra vires; however, the court’s ruling had no bearing on the act’s overall validity.

Dissenting opinion that became majority opinion in Maneka Gandhi Case

Fazl Ali, in his important dissent, stated that when analyzing fundamental rights violations, the court must interpret the various Articles under Part III of the Indian Constitution in a coordinated manner, rather than in silos. Furthermore, it was claimed that Sections 12 and 14 of the Act violated individual freedom and personal liberty by contravening Article 22 of the Indian Constitution. Furthermore, while agreeing with the majority judges’ interpretation, Justice Mahajan differed in his conclusion, declaring Section 12 ultra-vires.

After of AK Gopalan

The fundamental rights are now read separately, as interpreted in the A.K., based on the reasoning of procedural by due process. The case of Gopalan, which was denounced, demonstrates the importance of substantive due process in future cases. The Supreme Court of India held in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India that the procedure for Article 21 must be just, fair, and reasonable, as well as consistent with the principles of equality and freedom set forth in Articles 13 and 19 of the Indian Constitution, and that the provisions of fundamental rights must be read in tandem.

This is a landmark decision by a six-judge panel, with the majority opinion in the case being that article 21, which covers legal procedure, simply refers to state law. It is argued that reading it within the rules of natural justice would provide an overly broad understanding, leaving the connotations of natural justice undefined.

This decision is based on a muddled understanding of law and natural morals. Professor Hart, who stated that while there is a link between law and morals, there is no interdependence between the two. In the aforementioned case, the court exaggerated this reasoning by interpreting that there is a specific standard set for law, which is formed through legislation and legitimizes it.

Furthermore, the court correctly states that law was intended to be understood as “jus,” that is, a law in the abstract sense of natural justice principles, rather than “lex,” which refers to enacted law. Recognizing the principles of natural justice is the true form of legitimacy for any law.

Transition period between AK Gopalan and Maneka Gandhi

There are several cases which has been decided after AK Gopalan and Before Maneka Gandhi on the same issues in which these cases are based. The Interpretation applied in each case is particularly important step towards the development of Art. 21. We will discuss the various cases briefly before moving to Maneka Gandhi. So, we can get the idea about the interpretation done by the Apex Court in the transition period.

The series of cases start from Ram Singh v. Delhi Admn. Which has been previously discussed by the researcher. So, moving to the next case which is RC Cooper v. UOI [4] , it is also known as Bank Nationalization case. In this case court linked Article 19(1)(f) with Article 31(2).

Third case was Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal [5]  in this case court linked Article 19 with Articles 21 and 22. Fourth Case was Bennett Coleman & Company v. UOI [6] , In this case, the court stated that the effect test should be applied and not the subject matter test. The legislation may be passed for different purposes but if they infringe Article 19(1) directly or indirectly then the reasonability of the legislation is in question. All these cases are decided by a lower number of benches then in AK Gopalan. So, to completely overrule the decision taken in AK Gopalan, a higher bench is required and that is done in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI.

Facts of Maneka Gandhi

Maneka Gandhi was a Journalist, her passport was impounded “in public interest”. She filed a writ petition challenging that the impounding of passport violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Contentions of the respondents was her presence was required in connection with the proceeding before a Commission of Inquiry, which was then functioning.

The power given under the Passport Act, 1967 to the executive is unguided and unchallenged. Section 10(3) of the Act provides that the passport authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or a travel document on the grounds set out in clauses (a) to (h). Clause (c) provides that such action may be taken if the passport authority deems it necessary so to do in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of India, friendly relation of India with foreign countries or in the interest of general public.

Maneka Gandhi passport was impounded on ground of interest in general public. Section 10(5) of the Act provides that passport authority compounding the passport should record in writing a brief statement of reasons for making such order and furnish to the holder of the passport.

As Per Contention of Respondent, her passport was impounded to secure her attendance for the inquiry by the commission. It is in no way a matter of public interest according to the reasons given by them that was for the inquiry purpose. How can be the inquiry of such her by some commission be a matter of public interest.

Issues involved in Maneka Gandhi case

1.     Whether there is interrelationship between art. 21, 19 & 14?

2.     Whether the Procedure established by the law had to fulfill the requirements of natural justice?

3.     Whether the act of travelling abroad is right under art. 19(1) (a) or (g)?

4.     Whether the order made by the executive is constitutionally valid or not because of arbitrariness?

Arguments raised by Petitioners

There are lot of issues involved and for every issue court must look for intrinsic as well as extrinsic aid of interpretation. The court pronounced the judgement after hearing both the parties. The contentions of Petitioners were:

First, under section 10(3)(c) of Passports Act, 1967 and it is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Freedom of Speech is violated by the actions of executive. Second, the Principles of Natural Justice i.e., giving fair chance of hearing, Audi Alteram Partem is also violated. Third, right to travel abroad is covered within the definition of Article 19(1) (a) or (g).

Arguments raised by Respondents

The Respondent argued that Government is agreeable to consider any representation made by the petitioner in respect of impounding the passport. So, the Petitioner has given a chance of representation and it is not arbitrary and violative of Art. 14. Also, the decision is backed by proper reason as it is done in the interest of general public.

Judgment in Maneka Gandhi Case

Judgement is the case of Maneka Gandhi was given by 7 judges bench as in the case of AK Gopalan the judgement was delivered by a 6-judge bench. So, it is necessary to setup a bench with higher number of judges to give more authoritative judgment after the decision taken in AK Gopalan and to overrule it.

The Ratio Given by Each Judge in Maneka Gandhi

Y.V. Chandrachud, J.  stated that the procedure prescribed by laws must be fair, just, and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive of arbitrary. He also stated that even the fullest compliance with the requirements of Article 21 is not the journey’s end because a law which prescribes fair and reasonable procedure for curtailing personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 has still to meet a possible challenge under other provision of the Constitution like Article 14 and 19.

The plain meaning of the clause guaranteeing free speech and expression is that Indian citizens are entitled to exercise that right wherever they choose regardless of geographical consideration subject to restrictions. Further he stated that right to travel abroad cannot fall under the meaning of right of freedom of speech and expression because if it is done so then one right leading to another and that another to still another and so on is productive of uncertain and anomalous results.

Krishna Iyer, J.  stated that no rights in the Constitution is pertaining to a Fundamental Right is an island in itself. Personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person. Travel makes liberty worthwhile. He also stated that there is certain normative harmony among the articles is thus attained and Article 21 bears in its bosom the construction of fair procedure legislatively sanctioned.

He stated that just like limbs of human being cannot be separated so as the Fundamental Rights under Art. 21, 19 & 14 are mutually dependent on each other. The proposition is indubitable that Art. 21 does not exclude Art. 19 if both rights are breached. At last, he said that the Act will survive but the order will perish.

P.S. Kailasam, J.  stated that the petitioner is not entitled to any fundamental rights enumerated in Article 19. Also, He stated that the Passport Act is made in accordance with the Constitution as it is the procedure established by law. Further, he stated that the Petitioner is been given a fair chance of representation so, the court now do not need to go into merits of the case any further.

He stated that Article 19(1) is subject to the restrictions that may be placed under Article 19(2) to (6). The Restriction can only be limited within the territory of India and if the legislature wants to use the restrictions outside the territory. It must express it in the provision, but the legislature does not. So, petitioner cannot claim that by denying her passport her Fundamental Rights is abridged.

Further, he stated that the validity of the Passport Act will have to be examined on the basis of whether it directly or indirectly infringes on any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. If a passport is refused according to the procedure established by law, it cannot be said that it is violative of fundamental rights when it is complying with the requirements of Article 21.

He stated that the legislature may deny a person the right to be heard. In this case as mentioned by Attorney General, there is a fear that the petitioner will escape the country. So, prior notice may give her chance to leave India and she has been given fair chance of representation. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was complete denial of the procedure. Government is bound to record the reasons in writing and when it is important for the secrecy of the facts. It cannot disclose the detailed reasons.

M.H. Beg, C.J.  stated that the Constitution must be read as an integral whole, with possible overlapping of the subject-matter of what is sought to be protected by its various provisions particularly by articles relating to fundamental rights. Further, he stated that Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution form the test of validity of executive as well as legislative actions when these actions are subjected to the judicial scrutiny. He also stated that there should be some link between the Natural law and the fundamental rights.

He also proposed that the total effect of the action taken by the government on the individual fundamental rights should be taken into consideration and whether the exercise of restrictions is reasonably permissible on the facts and circumstance of the case. Both the substantive and procedural law and actions taken under them should pass the test imposed by Articles 14 and 19. Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution form the tests of validity of executive as well as legislative actions.

P.N. Bhagwati, J.  (for himself, Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ.) He has given the leading opinion in this case. He stated that Articles 19, 14 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. There is a nexus that has been established between all these Articles and all these Articles are interlinked. Therefore, law violating personal liberty has to fulfill the test under Article 14 and 19. He stated that right to travel abroad is well within the scope of Article 21. The personal liberty should not be read in a restricted sense to exclude all the attributes of personal liberty which are specifically dealt with in Article 19.

Further, He stated that procedure established by law does not means that whatever law legislature can enact. It must satisfy certain requisites in the sense of being fair and reasonable. He examined case decided by Supreme Court that is Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D Ramarathram [7]  in which it is declared that the Right to travel abroad is within the scope of Article 21.

Interpretation Involved in Maneka Gandhi case

The Interpretation applied in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI is very wide. The Interpretation used is Liberal rule. The literal Interpretation used in AK Gopalan was giving absurd meaning to the Art. 21 by Narrowing down the views of Art. 21. There were 7 judges who have given the judgement of this case. Majority judgement of the court in Maneka Gandhi is same as what J. Bhagwati Stated. So, the interpretation adopted by J. Bhagwati is Liberal rule of interpretation. Literal rule of interpretation is used by J. Kailasam in Maneka Gandhi and Majority in AK Gopalan case.

The Reason behind using Literal rule of interpretation is that they stated that legislature is the supreme authority and if they make any law, there reasonability should not be questioned because they have been elected by the people itself.

Whereas the majority in Maneka used Liberal rule of interpretation, the reason of majority is that the Provisions related to Fundamental Rights are made to gives the person or citizen some basic guaranteed rights which cannot be curtailed without a valid reason. Because if we look into the history of our Country, we will find that there is denial of our basic rights, along with it is also important to develop human personality and preserve dignity.

Whenever there is involvement of interpretation of Fundamental Rights the Court should adopt the Liberal rule of interpretation as it would benefit the Individual. The purpose of Fundamental Rights is to preserve an Individual Interest. So, if strict interpretation is used then the very purpose of the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution will remain unfulfilled.

Also, it should be noted that an Individual freedom and rights is the most important thing. No matter who rules whether if people is bound by an Indian ruler or his liberty is infringed by a Britishers it would no longer matter if the fundamental rights of a person is secured. The judgement given by J. Bhagwati reflects the same. He stated there should be reasonability of procedures also. No Right can be curtailed by a valid procedure. Now, the researchers will analyze in detail about the Interpretation used in AK Gopalan, Maneka Gandhi and the cases in transition period.

The Researcher can say that the interpretation applied in Maneka Gandhi is valid and justified after in-depth analysis. The Researcher would like to quote the statement given by Salmond “the essence of law lies in the spirit not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it.”

What will be the broad purpose behind inserting Art. 21? Right to life does not means that there should only be mere animal existence. There should be a broader purpose behind Article 21 and that is fulfilled by Court decision in Maneka Gandhi.

If we go by strict interpretation as given by courts in AK Gopalan. Many of the rights which are now facets of rights to life does not have mere existence. Therefore, The Researchers would like to say that Extrinsic aids of interpretation should be looked upon by the courts while interpreting constitutional provisions such parliamentary history, historical facts and surrounding circumstances and the report of various committees/commissions.

Therefore, the court should take a liberal stance while interpreting fundamental rights because it involves the rights of a citizen and if the government is taking away the right it should take it with reasonable procedure.

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• Volume 58, Issue 17
• Where is the research on sport-related concussion in Olympic athletes? A descriptive report and assessment of the impact of access to multidisciplinary care on recovery
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• http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3298-5719 Thomas Romeas 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1748-7241 Félix Croteau 3 , 4 , 5 ,
• Suzanne Leclerc 3 , 4
• 1 Sport Sciences , Institut national du sport du Québec , Montreal , Quebec , Canada
• 2 School of Optometry , Université de Montréal , Montreal , Quebec , Canada
• 3 IOC Research Centre for Injury Prevention and Protection of Athlete Health , Réseau Francophone Olympique de la Recherche en Médecine du Sport , Montreal , Quebec , Canada
• 4 Sport Medicine , Institut national du sport du Québec , Montreal , Quebec , Canada
• 5 School of Physical and Occupational Therapy , McGill University , Montreal , Quebec , Canada
• Correspondence to Dr Thomas Romeas; thomas.romeas{at}umontreal.ca

Objectives This cohort study reported descriptive statistics in athletes engaged in Summer and Winter Olympic sports who sustained a sport-related concussion (SRC) and assessed the impact of access to multidisciplinary care and injury modifiers on recovery.

Methods 133 athletes formed two subgroups treated in a Canadian sport institute medical clinic: earlier (≤7 days) and late (≥8 days) access. Descriptive sample characteristics were reported and unrestricted return to sport (RTS) was evaluated based on access groups as well as injury modifiers. Correlations were assessed between time to RTS, history of concussions, the number of specialist consults and initial symptoms.

Results 160 SRC (median age 19.1 years; female=86 (54%); male=74 (46%)) were observed with a median (IQR) RTS duration of 34.0 (21.0–63.0) days. Median days to care access was different in the early (1; n SRC =77) and late (20; n SRC =83) groups, resulting in median (IQR) RTS duration of 26.0 (17.0–38.5) and 45.0 (27.5–84.5) days, respectively (p<0.001). Initial symptoms displayed a meaningful correlation with prognosis in this study (p<0.05), and female athletes (52 days (95% CI 42 to 101)) had longer recovery trajectories than male athletes (39 days (95% CI 31 to 65)) in the late access group (p<0.05).

Conclusions Olympic athletes in this cohort experienced an RTS time frame of about a month, partly due to limited access to multidisciplinary care and resources. Earlier access to care shortened the RTS delay. Greater initial symptoms and female sex in the late access group were meaningful modifiers of a longer RTS.

• Brain Concussion
• Cohort Studies
• Retrospective Studies

Data availability statement

Data are available on reasonable request. Due to the confidential nature of the dataset, it will be shared through a controlled access repository and made available on specific and reasonable requests.

https://doi.org/10.1136/bjsports-2024-108211

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WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC

Most data regarding the impact of sport-related concussion (SRC) guidelines on return to sport (RTS) are derived from collegiate or recreational athletes. In these groups, time to RTS has steadily increased in the literature since 2005, coinciding with the evolution of RTS guidelines. However, current evidence suggests that earlier access to care may accelerate recovery and RTS time frames.

WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS

This study reports epidemiological data on the occurrence of SRC in athletes from several Summer and Winter Olympic sports with either early or late access to multidisciplinary care. We found the median time to RTS for Olympic athletes with an SRC was 34.0 days which is longer than that reported in other athletic groups such as professional or collegiate athletes. Time to RTS was reduced by prompt access to multidisciplinary care following SRC, and sex-influenced recovery in the late access group with female athletes having a longer RTS timeline. Greater initial symptoms, but not prior concussion history, were also associated with a longer time to RTS.

HOW THIS STUDY MIGHT AFFECT RESEARCH, PRACTICE OR POLICY

Considerable differences exist in access to care for athletes engaged in Olympic sports, which impact their recovery. In this cohort, several concussions occurred during international competitions where athletes are confronted with poor access to organised healthcare. Pathways for prompt access to multidisciplinary care should be considered by healthcare authorities, especially for athletes who travel internationally and may not have the guidance or financial resources to access recommended care.

Introduction

After two decades of consensus statements, sport-related concussion (SRC) remains a high focus of research, with incidence ranging from 0.1 to 21.5 SRC per 1000 athlete exposures, varying according to age, sex, sport and level of competition. 1 2 Evidence-based guidelines have been proposed by experts to improve its identification and management, such as those from the Concussion in Sport Group. 3 Notably, they recommend specific strategies to improve SRC detection and monitoring such as immediate removal, 4 prompt access to healthcare providers, 5 evidence-based interventions 6 and multidisciplinary team approaches. 7 It is believed that these guidelines contribute to improving the early identification and management of athletes with an SRC, thereby potentially mitigating its long-term consequences.

Nevertheless, evidence regarding the impact of SRC guidelines implementation remains remarkably limited, especially within high-performance sport domains. In fact, most reported SRC data focus on adolescent student-athletes, collegiate and sometimes professional athletes in the USA but often neglect Olympians. 1 2 8–11 Athletes engaged in Olympic sports, often referred to as elite amateurs, are typically classified among the highest performers in elite sport, alongside professional athletes. 12 13 They train year-round and uniquely compete regularly on the international stage in sports that often lack professional leagues and rely on highly variable resources and facilities, mostly dependent on winning medals. 14 Unlike professional athletes, Olympians do not have access to large financial rewards. Although some Olympians work or study in addition to their intensive sports practice, they can devote more time to full-time sports practice compared with collegiate athletes. Competition calendars in Olympians differ from collegiate athletes, with periodic international competitions (eg, World Cups, World Championships) throughout the whole year rather than regular domestic competitions within a shorter season (eg, semester). Olympians outclass most collegiate athletes, and only the best collegiate athletes will have the chance to become Olympians and/or professionals. 12 13 15 In Canada, a primary reason for limited SRC data in Olympic sports is that the Canadian Olympic and Paralympic Sports Institute (COPSI) network only adopted official guidelines in 2018 to standardise care for athletes’ SRC nationwide. 16 17 The second reason could be the absence of a centralised medical structure and surveillance systems, identified as key factors contributing to the under-reporting and underdiagnosis of athletes with an SRC. 18

Among the available evidence on the evolution of SRC management, a 2023 systematic review and meta-analysis in athletic populations including children, adolescents and adults indicated that a full return to sport (RTS) could take up to a month but is estimated to require 19.8 days on average (15.4 days in adults), as opposed to the initial expectation of approximately 10.0 days based on studies published prior to 2005. 19 In comparison, studies focusing strictly on American collegiate athletes report median times to RTS of 16 days. 9 20 21 Notably, a recent study of military cadets reported an even longer return to duty times of 29.4 days on average, attributed to poorer access to care and fewer incentives to return to play compared with elite sports. 22 In addition, several modifiers have also been identified as influencing the time to RTS, such as the history of concussions, type of sport, sex, past medical problems (eg, preinjury modifiers), as well as the initial number of symptoms and their severity (eg, postinjury modifiers). 20 22 The evidence regarding the potential influence of sex on the time to RTS has yielded mixed findings in this area. 23–25 In fact, females are typically under-represented in SRC research, highlighting the need for additional studies that incorporate more balanced sample representation across sexes and control for known sources of bias. 26 Interestingly, a recent Concussion Assessment, Research and Education Consortium study, which included a high representation of concussed female athletes (615 out of 1071 patients), revealed no meaningful differences in RTS between females and males (13.5 and 11.8 days, respectively). 27 Importantly, findings in the sporting population suggested that earlier initiation of clinical care is linked to shorter recovery after concussion. 5 28 However, these factors affecting the time to RTS require a more thorough investigation, especially among athletes engaged in Olympic sports who may or may not have equal access to prompt, high-quality care.

Therefore, the primary objective of this study was to provide descriptive statistics among athletes with SRC engaged in both Summer and Winter Olympic sport programmes over a quadrennial, and to assess the influence of recommended guidelines of the COPSI network and the fifth International Consensus Conference on Concussion in Sport on the duration of RTS performance. 16 17 Building on available evidence, the international schedule constraints, variability in resources 14 and high-performance expectation among this elite population, 22 prolonged durations for RTS, compared with what is typically reported (eg, 16.0 or 15.4 days), were hypothesised in Olympians. 3 19 The secondary objective was to more specifically evaluate the impact of access to multidisciplinary care and injury modifiers on the time to RTS. Based on current evidence, 5 7 29 30 the hypothesis was formulated that athletes with earlier multidisciplinary access would experience a faster RTS. Regarding injury modifiers, it was expected that female and male athletes would show similar time to RTS despite presenting sex-specific characteristics of SRC. 31 The history of concussions, the severity of initial symptoms and the number of specialist consults were expected to be positively correlated to the time to RTS. 20 32

Participants

A total of 133 athletes (F=72; M=61; mean age±SD: 20.7±4.9 years old) who received medical care at the Institut national du sport du Québec, a COPSI training centre set up with a medical clinic, were included in this cohort study with retrospective analysis. They participated in 23 different Summer and Winter Olympic sports which were classified into six categories: team (soccer, water polo), middle distance/power (rowing, swimming), speed/strength (alpine skiing, para alpine skiing, short and long track speed skating), precision/skill-dependent (artistic swimming, diving, equestrian, figure skating, gymnastics, skateboard, synchronised skating, trampoline) and combat/weight-making (boxing, fencing, judo, para judo, karate, para taekwondo, wrestling) sports. 13 This sample consists of two distinct groups: (1) early access group in which athletes had access to a medical integrated support team of multidisciplinary experts within 7 days following their SRC and (2) late access group composed of athletes who had access to a medical integrated support team of multidisciplinary experts eight or more days following their SRC. 5 30 Inclusion criteria for the study were participation in a national or international-level sports programme 13 and having sustained at least one SRC diagnosed by an authorised healthcare practitioner (eg, physician and/or physiotherapist).

Clinical context

The institute clinic provides multidisciplinary services for care of patients with SRC including a broad range of recommended tests for concussion monitoring ( table 1 ). The typical pathway for the athletes consisted of an initial visit to either a sports medicine physician or their team sports therapist. A clinical diagnosis of SRC was then confirmed by a sports medicine physician, and referral for the required multidisciplinary assessments ensued based on the patient’s signs and symptoms. Rehabilitation progression was based on the evaluation of exercise tolerance, 33 priority to return to cognitive tasks and additional targeted support based on clinical findings of a cervical, visual or vestibular nature. 17 The expert team worked in an integrated manner with the athlete and their coaching staff for the rehabilitation phase, including regular round tables and ongoing communication. 34 For some athletes, access to recommended care was fee based, without a priori agreements with a third party payer (eg, National Sports Federation).

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Main evaluations performed to guide the return to sport following sport-related concussion

Data collection

Data were collected at the medical clinic using a standardised injury surveillance form based on International Olympic Committee guidelines. 35 All injury characteristics were extracted from the central injury database between 1 July 2018 and 31 July 2022. This period corresponds to a Winter Olympic sports quadrennial but also covers 3 years for Summer Olympic sports due to the postponing of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games. Therefore, the observation period includes a typical volume of competitions across sports and minimises differences in exposure based on major sports competition schedules. The information extracted from the database included: participant ID, sex, date of birth, sport, date of injury, type of injury, date of their visit at the clinic, clearance date of unrestricted RTS (eg, defined as step 6 of the RTS strategy with a return to normal gameplay including competitions), the number and type of specialist consults, mechanism of injury (eg, fall, hit), environment where the injury took place (eg, training, competition), history of concussions, history of modifiers (eg, previous head injury, migraines, learning disability, attention deficit disorder or attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, anxiety, psychotic disorder), as well as the number of symptoms and the total severity score from the first Sport Concussion Assessment Tool 5 (SCAT5) assessment following SRC. 17

Following a Shapiro-Wilk test, medians, IQR and non-parametric tests were used for the analyses because of the absence of normal distributions for all the variables in the dataset (all p<0.001). The skewness was introduced by the presence of individuals that required lengthy recovery periods. One participant was removed from the analysis because their time to consult with the multidisciplinary team was extremely delayed (>1 year).

Descriptive statistics were used to describe the participant’s demographics, SRC characteristics and risk factors in the total sample. Estimated incidences of SRC were also reported for seven resident sports at the institute for which it was possible to quantify a detailed estimate of training volume based on the annual number of training and competition hours as well as the number of athletes in each sport.

To assess if access to multidisciplinary care modified the time to RTS, we compared time to RTS between early and late access groups using a method based on median differences described elsewhere. 36 Wilcoxon rank sum tests were also performed to make between-group comparisons on single variables of age, time to first consult, the number of specialists consulted and medical visits. Fisher’s exact tests were used to compare count data between groups on variables of sex, history of concussion, time since the previous concussion, presence of injury modifiers, environment and mechanism of injury. Bonferroni corrections were applied for multiple comparisons in case of meaningful differences.

To assess if injury modifiers modified time to RTS in the total sample, we compared time to RTS between sexes, history of concussions, time since previous concussion or other injury modifiers using a method based on median differences described elsewhere. 36 Kaplan-Meier curves were drawn to illustrate time to RTS differences between sexes (origin and start time: date of injury; end time: clearance date of unrestricted RTS). Trajectories were then assessed for statistical differences using Cox proportional hazards model. Wilcoxon rank sum tests were employed for comparing the total number of symptoms and severity scores on the SCAT5. The association of multilevel variables on return to play duration was evaluated in the total sample with Kruskal-Wallis rank tests for environment, mechanism of injury, history of concussions and time since previous concussion. For all subsequent analyses of correlations between SCAT5 results and secondary variables, only data obtained from SCAT5 assessments within the acute phase of injury (≤72 hours) were considered (n=65 SRC episodes in the early access group). 37 Spearman rank correlations were estimated between RTS duration, history of concussions, number of specialist consults and total number of SCAT5 symptoms or total symptom severity. All statistical tests were performed using RStudio (R V.4.1.0, The R Foundation for Statistical Computing). The significance level was set to p<0.05.

Equity, diversity and inclusion statement

The study population is representative of the Canadian athletic population in terms of age, gender, demographics and includes a balanced representation of female and male athletes. The study team consists of investigators from different disciplines and countries, but with a predominantly white composition and under-representation of other ethnic groups. Our study population encompasses data from the Institut national du sport du Québec, covering individuals of all genders, ethnicities and geographical regions across Canada.

Patient and public involvement

The patients or the public were not involved in the design, conduct, reporting or dissemination plans of our research.

Sample characteristics

During the 4-year period covered by this retrospective chart review, a total of 160 SRC episodes were recorded in 132 athletes with a median (IQR) age of 19.1 (17.8–22.2) years old ( table 2 ). 13 female and 10 male athletes had multiple SRC episodes during this time. The sample had a relatively balanced number of females (53.8%) and males (46.2%) with SRC included. 60% of the sample reported a history of concussion, with 35.0% reporting having experienced more than two episodes. However, most of these concussions had occurred more than 1 year before the SRC for which they were being treated. Within this sample, 33.1% of participants reported a history of injury modifiers. Importantly, the median (IQR) time to first clinic consult was 10.0 (1.0–20.0) days and the median (IQR) time to RTS was 34.0 (21.0–63.0) days in this sample ( table 3 ). The majority of SRCs occurred during training (56.3%) rather than competition (33.1%) and were mainly due to a fall (63.7%) or a hit (31.3%). The median (IQR) number of follow-up consultations and specialists consulted after the SRC were, respectively, 9 (5.0–14.3) and 3 (2.0–4.0).

Participants demographics

Sport-related concussion characteristics

Among seven sports of the total sample (n=89 SRC), the estimated incidence of athletes with SRC was highest in short-track speed skating (0.47/1000 hours; 95% CI 0.3 to 0.6), and lower in boxing, trampoline, water polo, judo, artistic swimming, and diving (0.24 (95% CI 0.0 to 0.5), 0.16 (95% CI 0.0 to 0.5), 0.13 (95% CI 0.1 to 0.2), 0.11 (95% CI 0.1 to 0.2), 0.09 (95% CI 0.0 to 0.2) and 0.06 (95% CI 0.0 to 0.1)/1000, respectively ( online supplemental material ). Furthermore, most athletes sustained an SRC in training (66.5%; 95% CI 41.0 to 92.0) rather than competition (26.0%; 95% CI 0.0 to 55.0) except for judo athletes (20.0% (95% CI 4.1 to 62.0) and 80.0% (95% CI 38.0 to 96.0), respectively). Falls were the most common injury mechanism in speed skating, trampoline and judo while hits were the most common injury mechanism in boxing, water polo, artistic swimming and diving.

Supplemental material

Access to care.

The median difference in time to RTS was 19 days (95% CI 9.3 to 28.7; p<0.001) between the early (26 (IQR 17.0–38.5) days) and late (45 (IQR 27.5–84.5) days) access groups ( table 3 ; figure 1 ). Importantly, the distribution of SRC environments was different between both groups (p=0.008). The post hoc analysis demonstrated a meaningful difference in the distribution of SRC in training and competition environments between groups (p=0.029) but not for the other comparisons. There was a meaningful difference between the groups in time to first consult (p<0.001; 95% CI −23.0 to −15.0), but no meaningful differences between groups in median age (p=0.176; 95% CI −0.3 to 1.6), sex distribution (p=0.341; 95% CI 0.7 to 2.8), concussion history (p=0.210), time since last concussion (p=0.866), mechanisms of SRC (p=0.412), the presence of modifiers (p=0.313; 95% CI 0.3 to 1.4) and the number of consulted specialists (p=0.368; 95% CI −5.4 to 1.0) or medical visits (p=0.162; 95% CI −1.0 to 3.0).

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Time to return to sport following sport-related concussion as a function of group’s access to care and sex. Outliers: below=Q1−1.5×IQR; above=Q3+1.5×IQR.

The median difference in time to RTS was 6.5 days (95% CI −19.3 to 5.3; p=0.263; figure 1 ) between female (37.5 (IQR 22.0–65.3) days) and male (31.0 (IQR 20.0–48.0) days) athletes. Survival analyses highlighted an increased hazard of longer recovery trajectory in female compared with male athletes (HR 1.4; 95% CI 1.4 to 0.7; p=0.052; figure 2A ), which was mainly driven by the late (HR 1.8; 95% CI 1.8 to 0.6; p=0.019; figure 2C ) rather than the early (HR 1.1; 95% CI 1.1 to 0.9; p=0.700; figure 2B ) access group. Interestingly, a greater number of female athletes (n=15) required longer than 100 days for RTS as opposed to the male athletes (n=6). There were no meaningful differences between sexes for the total number of symptoms recorded on the SCAT5 (p=0.539; 95% CI −1.0 to 2.0) nor the total symptoms total severity score (p=0.989; 95% CI −5.0 to 5.0).

Time analysis of sex differences in the time to return to sport following sport-related concussion in the (A) total sample, as well as (B) early, and (C) late groups using survival curves with 95% confidence bands and tables of time-specific number of patients at risk (censoring proportion: 0%).

History of modifiers

SRC modifiers are presented in table 2 , and their influence on RTP is shown in table 4 . The median difference in time to RTS was 1.5 days (95% CI −10.6 to 13.6; p=0.807) between athletes with none and one episode of previous concussion, was 3.5 days (95% CI −13.9 to 19.9; p=0.728) between athletes with none and two or more episodes of previous concussion, and was 2 days (95% CI −12.4 to 15.4; p=0.832) between athletes with one and two or more episodes of previous concussion. The history of concussions (none, one, two or more) had no meaningful impact on the time to RTS (p=0.471). The median difference in time to RTS was 4.5 days (95% CI −21.0 to 30.0; p=0.729) between athletes with none and one episode of concussion in the previous year, was 2 days (95% CI −10.0 to 14.0; p=0.744) between athletes with none and one episode of concussion more than 1 year ago, and was 2.5 days (95% CI −27.7 to 22.7; p=0.846) between athletes with an episode of concussion in the previous year and more than 1 year ago. Time since the most recent concussion did not change the time to RTS (p=0.740). The longest time to RTS was observed in the late access group in which athletes had a concussion in the previous year, with a very large spread of durations (65.0 (IQR 33.0–116.5) days). The median difference in time to RTS was 3 days (95% CI −13.1 to 7.1; p=0.561) between athletes with and without other injury modifiers. The history of other injury modifiers had no meaningful influence on the time to RTS (95% CI −6.0 to 11.0; p=0.579).

Preinjury modifiers of time to return to sport following SRC

SCAT5 symptoms and severity scores

Positive associations were observed between the time to RTS and the number of initial symptoms (r=0.3; p=0.010; 95% CI 0.1 to 0.5) or initial severity score (r=0.3; p=0.008; 95% CI 0.1 to 0.5) from the SCAT5. The associations were not meaningful between the number of specialist consultations and the initial number of symptoms (r=−0.1; p=0.633; 95% CI −0.3 to 0.2) or initial severity score (r=−0.1; p=0.432; 95% CI −0.3 to 0.2). Anecdotally, most reported symptoms following SRC were ‘headache’ (86.2%) and ‘pressure in the head’ (80.0%), followed by ‘fatigue’ (72.3%), ‘neck pain’ (70.8%) and ‘not feeling right’ (67.7%; online supplemental material ).

This study is the first to report descriptive data on athletes with SRC collected across several sports during an Olympic quadrennial, including athletes who received the most recent evidence-based care at the time of data collection. Primarily, results indicate that the time to RTS in athletes engaged in Summer and Winter Olympic sports may require a median (IQR) of 34.0 (21.0–63.0) days. Importantly, findings demonstrated that athletes with earlier (≤7 days) access to multidisciplinary concussion care showed faster RTS compared with those with late access. Time to RTS exhibited large variability where sex had a meaningful influence on the recovery pathway in the late access group. Initial symptoms, but not history of concussion, were correlated with prognosis in this sample. The main reported symptoms were consistent with previous studies. 38 39

Time to RTS in Olympic sports

This study provides descriptive data on the impact of SRC monitoring programmes on recovery in elite athletes engaged in Olympic sports. As hypothesised, the median time to RTS found in this study (eg, 34.0 days) was about three times longer than those found in reports from before 2005, and 2 weeks longer than the typical median values (eg, 19.8 days) recently reported in athletic levels including youth (high heterogeneity, I 2 =99.3%). 19 These durations were also twice as long as the median unrestricted time to RTS observed among American collegiate athletes, which averages around 16 days. 9 20 21 However, they were more closely aligned with findings from collegiate athletes with slow recovery (eg, 34.7 days) and evidence from military cadets with poor access where return to duty duration was 29.4 days. 8 22 Several reasons could explain such extended time to RTS, but the most likely seems to be related to the diversity in access among these sports to multidisciplinary services (eg, 10.0 median days (1–20)), well beyond the delays experienced by collegiate athletes, for example (eg, 0.0 median days (0–2)). 40 In the total sample, the delays to first consult with the multidisciplinary clinic were notably mediated by the group with late access, whose athletes had more SRC during international competition. One of the issues for athletes engaged in Olympic sports is that they travel abroad year-round for competitions, in contrast with collegiate athletes who compete domestically. These circumstances likely make access to quality care very variable and make the follow-up of care less centralised. Also, access to resources among these sports is highly variable (eg, medal-dependant), 14 and at the discretion of the sport’s leadership (eg, sport federation), who may decide to prioritise more or fewer resources to concussion management considering the relatively low incidence of this injury. Another explanation for the longer recovery times in these athletes could be the lack of financial incentives to return to play faster, which are less prevalent among Olympic sports compared with professionals. However, the stakes of performance and return to play are still very high among these athletes.

Additionally, it is plausible that studies vary their outcome with shifting operational definitions such as resolution of symptoms, return to activities, graduated return to play or unrestricted RTS. 19 40 It is understood that resolution of symptoms may occur much earlier than return to preinjury performance levels. Finally, an aspect that has been little studied to date is the influence of the sport’s demands on the RTS. For example, acrobatic sports requiring precision/technical skills such as figure skating, trampoline and diving, which involve high visuospatial and vestibular demands, 41 might require more time to recover or elicit symptoms for longer times. Anecdotally, athletes who experienced a long time to RTS (>100 days) were mostly from precision/skill-dependent sports in this sample. The sports demand should be further considered as an injury modifier. More epidemiological reports that consider the latest guidelines are therefore necessary to gain a better understanding of the true time to RTS and impact following SRC in Olympians.

Supporting early multidisciplinary access to care

In this study, athletes who obtained early access to multidisciplinary care after SRC recovered faster than those with late access to multidisciplinary care. This result aligns with findings showing that delayed access to a healthcare practitioner delays recovery, 19 including previous evidence in a sample of patients from a sports medicine clinic (ages 12–22), indicating that the group with a delayed first clinical visit (eg, 8–20 days) was associated with a 5.8 times increased likelihood of a recovery longer than 30 days. 5 Prompt multidisciplinary approach for patients with SRC is suggested to yield greater effectiveness over usual care, 3 6 17 which is currently evaluated under randomised controlled trial. 42 Notably, early physical exercise and prescribed exercise (eg, 48 hours postinjury) are effective in improving recovery compared with strict rest or stretching. 43 44 In fact, preclinical and clinical studies have shown that exercise has the potential to improve neurotransmission, neuroplasticity and cerebral blood flow which supports that the physically trained brain enhanced recovery. 45 46 Prompt access to specialised healthcare professionals can be challenging in some contexts (eg, during international travel), and the cost of accessing medical care privately may prove further prohibitive. This barrier to recovery should be a priority for stakeholders in Olympic sports and given more consideration by health authorities.

Estimated incidences and implications

The estimated incidences of SRC were in the lower range compared with what is reported in other elite sport populations. 1 2 However, the burden of injury remained high for these sports, and the financial resources as well as expertise required to facilitate athletes’ rehabilitation was considerable (median number of consultations: 9.0). Notably, the current standard of public healthcare in Canada does not subsidise the level of support recommended following SRC as first-line care, and the financial subsidisation of this recommended care within each federation is highly dependent on the available funding, varying significantly between sports. 14 Therefore, the ongoing efforts to improve education, prevention and early recognition, modification of rules to make the environments safer and multidisciplinary care access for athletes remain crucial. 7

Strength and limitations

This unique study provides multisport characteristics following the evolution of concussion guidelines in Summer and Winter Olympic sports in North America. Notably, it features a balance between the number of female and male athletes, allowing the analysis of sex differences. 23 26 In a previous review of 171 studies informing consensus statements, samples were mostly composed of more than 80% of male participants, and more than 40% of these studies did not include female participants at all. 26 This study also included multiple non-traditional sports typically not encompassed in SRC research, feature previously identified as a key requirement of future epidemiological research. 47

However, it must be acknowledged that potential confounding factors could influence the results. For example, the number of SRC detected during the study period does not account for potentially unreported concussions. Nevertheless, this figure should be minimal because these athletes are supervised both in training and in competition by medical staff. Next, the sport types were heterogeneous, with inconsistent risk for head impacts or inconsistent sport demand which might have an influence on recovery. Furthermore, the number of participants or sex in each sport was not evenly distributed, with short-track speed skaters representing a large portion of the overall sample (32.5%), for example. Additionally, the number of participants with specific modifiers was too small in the current sample to conclude whether the presence of precise characteristics (eg, history of concussion) impacted the time to RTS. Also, the group with late access was more likely to consist of athletes who sought specialised care for persistent symptoms. These complex cases are often expected to require additional time to recover. 48 Furthermore, athletes in the late group may have sought support outside of the institute medical clinic, without a coordinated multidisciplinary approach. Therefore, the estimation of clinical consultations was tentative for this group and may represent a potential confounding factor in this study.

This is the first study to provide evidence of the prevalence of athletes with SRC and modifiers of recovery in both female and male elite-level athletes across a variety of Summer and Winter Olympic sports. There was a high variability in access to care in this group, and the median (IQR) time to RTS following SRC was 34.0 (21.0–63.0) days. Athletes with earlier access to multidisciplinary care took nearly half the time to RTS compared with those with late access. Sex had a meaningful influence on the recovery pathway in the late access group. Initial symptom number and severity score but not history of concussion were meaningful modifiers of recovery. Injury surveillance programmes targeting national sport organisations should be prioritised to help evaluate the efficacy of recommended injury monitoring programmes and to help athletes engaged in Olympic sports who travel a lot internationally have better access to care. 35 49

Ethics statements

Patient consent for publication.

Not applicable.

Ethics approval

This study involves human participants and was approved by the ethics board of Université de Montréal (certificate #2023-4052). Participants gave informed consent to participate in the study before taking part.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the members of the concussion interdisciplinary clinic of the Institut national du sport du Québec for collecting the data and for their unconditional support to the athletes.

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Correction notice This article has been corrected since it published Online First. The ORCID details have been added for Dr Croteau.

Contributors TR, FC and SL were involved in planning, conducting and reporting the work. François Bieuzen and Magdalena Wojtowicz critically reviewed the manuscript. TR is guarantor.

Funding The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

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Turner Syndrome where are we?

1 Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in Basic Sciences, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, 110025 India

Anam Farooqui

2 Biomedical Informatics Centre, Indian Council of Medical Research-National Institute for Research in Reproductive and Child Health, Mumbai, Maharashtra 400012 India

Romana Ishrat

Associated data.

Not applicable.

Turner syndrome (TS) results from the loss of one X chromosome in phenotypic females, leading to a range of complications such as short stature, cardiovascular issues, autoimmune disorders, metabolic imbalances, osteoporosis, neurocognitive deficits, hearing loss, abnormalities in endocrine functions, infertility, disruptions in bone metabolism, and neurocognitive deficits. These diverse clinical manifestations necessitate a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach to diagnosis and management. Growth hormone therapy stands out as a fundamental treatment for addressing the challenges associated with TS. Ongoing clinical and genomic advancements contribute to an evolving understanding of TS, shedding light on its complexities and potential therapeutic interventions. Despite progress, further research is crucial to identify candidate pathways and critical biomarkers that can alleviate the syndrome’s burden. By uncovering these insights, we aim to empower individuals with TS, enhancing their overall functioning and quality of life. In this review, we have explored the prevalent co-morbidities associated with TS, drawing insights from the current literature.

What is Turner Syndrome?

Turner Syndrome (TS) is a chromosomal disorder characterized by the partial or total loss of one of the two X-chromosomes in female cells due to sporadic nondisjunction. It is among the most common genetic disorders occurring globally. TS affect all geographical regions and cultures equally. It is estimated to occur in 1 in 2500 live-birth females and requires a chromosomal analysis for definitive diagnosis. Multiple karyotypes (e.g., 45, X monosomy, 45, X/46, XX mosaicism, and structurally abnormal X) have been identified that are linked to varying presentations along the TS phenotype spectrum. Girls with 45,X monosomy typically have the most severe phenotype [ 1 ]. Turner patients have significantly higher morbidity and mortality rates compared to normal individuals. [ 2 ], as an increase in the mortality rates in TS is expected by about 4- to 5-fold. The life expectancy of an individual affected with TS reduces by up to 13 years [ 3 ]. It was first described by Ullrich in Germany and as a distinct entity in 1938, by Turner, in seven females with sexual infantilism, cubitus valgus, and webbed neck, and its chromosomal basis was first recognized by Ford et al. in 1959 [ 4 ].

Turner Syndrome’s phenotype and genotype correlations are generally poor, and the exact cause remains incompletely understood. However, it is believed to result from both genomic imbalances induced by sex chromosome genes and the additive effect of epigenetic factors on linked genes within gene networks. The short stature homeobox-containing gene (SHOX) regulates growth, and its haploinsufficiency contributes to the characteristic short stature in TS. Among cases that are detected in live neonates, there is considerable heterogeneity of phenotypic features. Short stature and gonadal dysgenesis stand out as the most consistent symptoms among all those observed. [ 5 ]. Signs and symptoms vary among those affected depending upon the karyotype. Often, a short and webbed neck, low hairline at the back of the neck, low-set ears, short stature, and swollen feet and hands are seen at birth. Generally, they are without menstrual periods and do not develop breasts. Due to premature ovarian failure, they are estrogen deficient and almost all women with TS are infertile, although some of them may conceive with assisted reproduction. Other manifestations include hypertension, elevated hepatic enzymes, and middle ear infections [ 6 ] increased susceptibility to certain diseases such as hypothyroidism, renal malfunctions, osteoporosis, lymphedema, congenital heart problems, deficiencies in cognitive abilities, such as visual-spatial skills, motor function, attentional abilities and autoimmune such as type 1 and type 2 diabetes through an unknown mechanism [ 7 ]. TS girls exhibit distinct growth patterns, with a sharp decline in growth rate until 2 years of age, followed by gradual increase until puberty. After puberty, the growth rate increases slightly due to the lack of epiphyseal closure [ 8 ].

Genetic aspects of Turner Syndrome

Aside from monosomy X (45,X), which is the most prevalent in TS, other cases have been described with mosaicism, in which the 45, X cell line is accompanied by one or more additional cell lines with a complete or structurally abnormal sex chromosome (X or Y) (Fig.  1 ). Structural abnormalities of the sex chromosome (X) can be caused by deletions of the short or long arms (Xp-, Xq-, respectively), creation of the ring (rX) (Fig.  1 ), or duplication of the long arm to produce an isochromosome (isoXq) (Fig.  1 ). Some mosaic females with the Y chromosome carry more cell lines (45, X/46, XX; 45, X/46, XY) (Fig.  1 ). Mosaicism is estimated to be relatively common in affected individuals (67–90%) [ 9 ]. Approximately 99% of all fetuses with TS result in spontaneous termination during the first trimester and as many as 15% of all spontaneous abortions have the 45, X karyotype [ 10 ]. TS is primarily not inherited, with most cases involving monosomy involving the mother’s X chromosome. It is a sporadic event, with no increased risk of recurrence in subsequent pregnancies. However, if a balanced translocation occurs or if the mother has 45, X mosaicism is restricted to her germ cells. In rare cases, partial deletion of the X chromosome can result in TS inheritance by the next generation [ 5 ].

Normal Karyotype and Karyotypes found in TS Patients like mosaicism of X chromosome, deletion of Xp or Xq, ring X (46,X, rX), and isochromosome Xq

Turner Syndrome and comorbidities

TS is characterized by various comorbidities that can impact different systems within the body. Among these comorbidities are cardiovascular issues, autoimmune disorders, metabolic imbalances, osteoporosis, neurocognitive deficits, hearing loss, abnormalities in endocrine functions, infertility, and disruptions in bone metabolism, etc. (Fig.  2 ). These diverse challenges underscore the multifaceted nature of TS, necessitating comprehensive medical care and management strategies to address the wide range of potential health concerns. In this review, we have explored the prevalent co-morbidities associated with TS, drawing insights from the current literature.

TS and its comorbidities: - Cardiovascular malfunction, Skeletal deformities, Renal malfunction, Endocrine disorders, Reproductive disorders, Hearing malfunction, neurocognitive deficits

Cardiovascular malfunction and Turner Syndrome

TS has been associated to a substantial rise in the occurrence of cardiovascular malformations.

[ 11 ], as well as high cardiovascular morbidity and fatality rates in TS patients. Although the frequency appears to rise with age, aberrant aortic dimensions are evident from childhood. Congenital heart abnormalities impact 23–50% of people with TS being one of the main causes of premature death. The mortality rate is higher in individuals with 45, X karyotypes compared to those with X mosaicism or other X structural abnormalities [ 12 ]. According to an epidemiological study, people with TS had a three-fold greater mortality rate than the general population. Notably, cardiovascular events pose a significant risk, with such incidents occurring in 41% of TS patients [ 13 ]. The most prevalent cardiovascular complications in TS are congenital heart abnormalities, aortic dissection, hypertension, and aortic dilatation. Aortic stiffness increases in TS females before the beginning of puberty [ 14 ]. Congenital cardiac defects, like coarctation of the aorta and bicuspid aortic valve, are found in approximately one-third of TS patients, with bicuspid aortic valve being the most prevalent, occurring in approximately 25% of TS patients [ 15 ], the link between TS and the aortic bicuspid valve is most likely due to several complex mechanisms, one of which appears to be the action of TIMP1 and TIMP3. The imbalance of TIMP1 and TIMP3 contributes to the increased vulnerability to aortic morphological abnormalities. The increased prevalence of bicuspid aortic valve in TS is also linked with karyotype and is most common in women with the 45, X karyotype. Other left-sided congenital lesions, like abnormal pulmonary vein drainage, coarctation of the aorta, mitral valve dysplasia, subaortic obstruction, and coronary anomalies, are frequently observed in TS individuals. These cardiovascular complexities contribute significantly to the shortened life expectancy of TS individuals. Hypertension, being a significant risk factor for cardiovascular complications, affects approximately 50% of TS patients [ 16 ]. TS individuals face a heightened risk of mortality primarily due to aortic dissection aneurysms. In comparison to non-TS individuals, young TS individuals exhibit a significantly smaller aortic diameter. To mitigate the risk of aortic dissection, especially in those aged 18 and above, aortic surgery becomes a recommended intervention. Specifically, individuals with TS are advised to undergo aortic surgery when their ascending aortic size index exceeds 2.5 cm/m², aiming to prevent the occurrence of aortic dissection and associated complications [ 13 ]. Cardiovascular disorders in TS include early-onset hypertension, ischemia, and stroke, with hypertension often attributed to coarctation of the aorta, kidney dysfunction, obesity, and metabolic syndromes. In conclusion, understanding the diverse cardiovascular manifestations in TS is crucial for early diagnosis and intervention, given the elevated risk of life-threatening complications. More research on structural, genetic, and epigenetic aspects is necessary to obtain an important understanding of the complex interactions between TS and cardiovascular diseases.

Skeletal malformations and Turner Syndrome

TS is linked with skeletal abnormalities, like short stature, angular deformities in the lower and upper limbs, spine deformities in both coronal and sagittal planes, changes in bone growth, and the early onset of osteoporosis. It was previously believed that the gonadal dysgenesis observed in TS patients was linked to these skeletal abnormalities. But recent studies on genetic variations in TS patients have identified a deficiency of the gene encoding the short stature homeobox (SHOX), which is a bone regulating center for longitudinal growth. With its highest expression in the mesomelic area of the limbs, the SHOX gene (Table  1 ) has significant expression in the perichondrial layer along the diaphysis of long bones. The gene’s (SHOX) dosage insufficiency can cause bowing and shortening in the forearms and lower legs, potentially leading to short stature, Mesomelic Growth, Delayed Skeletal Maturation, Upper Extremity, Spinal Deformity, Lower Extremity, Genu Valgum, Brachymetatarsia, Coalitions, and cubitus varus. Short stature and delayed skeletal development are probably caused by the interplay between SHOX haploinsufficiency and estrogen deprivation. Additionally, the time of skeletal development and growth plate fusion is believed to be influenced by the SHOX gene [ 17 ]. TS Women’s have approximately 25% more chances of bone fractures as compared to normal individuals [ 18 ] with the relative risk ranging from 1.16 to 2.16 [ 19 ]. These fractures occur in both trabecular and cortical bones, generally affecting the femoral neck, metacarpal bones, lower spine, and forearm [ 18 ]. Skeletal fragility in TS is most likely induced by a set of factors. These factors include inherited skeletal dysplasia or defects linked to the underlying chromosomal abnormality, reduced bone mineral density (BMD) and the onset of osteoporosis over time, a vitamin D deficiency, a higher risk of falls as a result of visuospatial cognitive dysfunction, and hearing or vision loss. Additionally, impaired balance is often observed in TS individuals [ 19 ]. The increased risk is noticeable during childhood, especially for wrist fractures, and after the age of 45, due to osteoporosis. Due to increased fracture risk, women with TS have low bone mineral content in cortical bone and the microarchitecture of their trabecular bone is weakened. Bone metabolism is a complicated interplay of physical activity, genetics, food, local growth factors, and hormones. Additionally, young TS girls already have reduced estradiol production [ 18 ].

Risk gene associated with TS Comorbidities

Other TS-related co-morbidities, such as abnormal liver or thyroid function, inflammatory bowel disease, and celiac disease may potentially contribute to skeletal fragility [ 19 ]. TS patients are also more likely to develop scoliosis and kyphosis, while upper and lower extremity anomalies may be identified during clinical examination, surgical procedures are rarely required unless symptomatic [ 17 ].

Low BMD is common in adult TS women, with estrogen insufficiency being a significant modifiable risk factor. Estrogen is the primary hormonal regulator of bone health, playing a significant role in bone mass accumulation throughout skeletal growth, skeletal balance in adulthood, and accelerated bone loss during menopause. Girls with spontaneous menstruation maintain normal BMD, while those with absent menarche experience decreased BMD. Hormone replacement therapy positively impacts bone health and prevents osteoporosis by maintaining bone mineral density and promoting long-term bone health. Healthy lifestyle choices, weight-bearing activities, consuming enough calcium and vitamin D through diet, routinely checking for vitamin D deficiency, and continuing hormone replacement therapy until the natural age of menopause are all preventive strategies to maximize bone health [ 19 ].

Renal malfunctions and Turner Syndrome

Renal malformations are common in TS individuals, with approximately one-third of them having structural abnormalities in the renal system [ 20 ]. The most prevalent renal abnormality found in TS patients is horseshoe kidney, while other anatomical defects include crossed ectopia and duplex collecting systems. These malformations can lead to an increased risk of urinary tract infections, hypertension, recurrent hematuria, and chronic kidney disease [ 21 ].

Ultrasonography and a DMSA (dimercaptosuccinic acid) test are recommended to detect renal malformations early in individuals with TS. These imaging techniques aid in the identification of any malformations as soon as possible, enabling the commencement of appropriate therapy and the avoidance of further complications [ 22 ].

Numerous case studies have been carried out to assess the frequency and nature of renal malformations in TS individuals. A study evaluating 141 TS patients found that 33% of them had renal malformations [ 20 ]. Another study analyzing 82 Turkish children with TS reported that 37.8% of the patients had different renal malformations [ 23 ]. In addition, a case study reported a 17-year-old female with mosaic ring TS and horseshoe kidney [ 24 ]. Another case study reported a five-year-old girl with a horseshoe kidney and growth retardation as the only symptom of TS [ 25 ]. These findings highlight the need of early detection and adequate treatment of renal problems in individuals with TS. Renal abnormalities are quite prevalent in TS patients; about 30% of affected persons have renal complications. Fortunately, there are usually no significant health risks linked to these complications. Regular health checks, including ultrasonography and DMSA tests, are essential for the early detection of renal malformations and the initiation of appropriate therapy. By addressing these issues proactively, it is possible to mitigate the risk of complications and improve the overall health and well-being of girls and women with TS.

Thyroid malfunctions and Turner Syndrome

TS Females are at an elevated risk of developing autoimmune disorders, with autoimmune thyroid dysfunction being the most prevalent among various conditions. The high frequency of autoimmune disorders, particularly autoimmune thyroid dysfunction, in females with TS, has been a subject of significant research and clinical interest. Hashimoto’s disease, a common form of autoimmune hypothyroidism, is found in 30–50% of females with TS [ 17 ], with its prevalence rising as individuals age. By the age of 50, approximately half of the females with TS will experience clinical or subclinical hypothyroidism. Thyroid peroxidase (TPO) antibodies, a key marker for autoimmune thyroid disease, are highly prevalent in 40–45% of women with TS [ 3 ]. The actual etiology of the higher occurrence of autoimmune thyroid diseases in females with TS remains unknown; however, a number of hypotheses have been put forward to understand the phenomenon. One hypothesis is linked to ovarian dysfunction and the lack of androgen and/or estrogen synthesis. According to research, ovarian dysgenesis, a common characteristic of TS, may promote thyroid autoimmunity [ 26 ]. Another hypothesis suggests that the missing second X chromosome in TS females may lead to increased autoimmunity, which is known as the haploinsufficiency hypothesis [ 27 ]. Furthermore, it has been found that the isochromosome Xq, a common genetic rearrangement in TS, has been related to an elevated risk of autoimmune disorders, especially thyroid diseases [ 28 ].Also, a study revealed that autoantibodies (against adrenal cortex, transglutaminase, intrinsic factor, glutamic acid decarboxylase 65, and gliadin) were present in 58% of TS patients. [ 29 ]. Clinical findings have supported the complex nature of the pathophysiology of thyroid dysfunction in TS females. TS is linked to increased prevalence of thyroid diseases such as Hashimoto’s thyroiditis and Graves’ disease, with up to 30% of TS females developing thyroid diseases, primarily Hashimoto thyroiditis [ 30 ]. This indicates that TS females often experience compensated hypothyroidism before progressing to overt hypothyroidism, emphasizing the importance of regular monitoring of thyroid function in this population [ 31 ]. The high risk of autoimmunity in TS females has been recognized as one of the more prominent characteristics of the condition [ 26 ]. These findings emphasize the complex interaction between hormonal and genetic factors in the development of thyroid dysfunction in TS patients. However, the specific processes behind this increased vulnerability to autoimmunity remain poorly understood.

Diabetes and Turner Syndrome

Metabolic syndrome encompasses various factors such as visceral adiposity, irregularities in glucose metabolism, dyslipidemia and hypertension, all of which are found in individuals with TS [ 32 ]. TS individuals are more likely to be overweight during childhood, which increases their risk of developing diabetes in adulthood. Weight increase occurs before puberty onset and does not differ between TS girls with induced and spontaneous puberty [ 33 ]. Ann Forbes and Eric Engel first reported in 1963 that TS patients had a higher incidence of diabetic mellitus [ 34 ] having incidence rate of (SIR 4.1 [95% confidence interval (CI) 2.5–6.3]) ( n  = 18) [ 26 ] and epidemiological studies indicate a relative risk of 8.2 to 11.6 (95% confidence interval (CI) 5.3–21.9) for developing type 1 diabetes and 4.38 (confidence interval (CI) 2.40–7.72) for developing type 2 diabetes (T2DM), as well as three times higher mortality rates than the general population [ 35 ]. Additionally, TS is linked to a 25% reduction in physical fitness compared to unaffected individuals [ 32 ]. However, these study’s findings are based on registries and there’s a risk of misclassification in coding. Few clinical trials have been conducted on females with TS and diabetes, and the pathophysiology of this increased risk is not fully understood, potentially involving complex genes or genetic backgrounds [ 17 ]. Impaired glucose tolerance (IGT) affects approximately 25–78% of adult TS populations, contributing to about 25% of TS related deaths [ 36 ]. Impaired glucose metabolism severity varies by karyotype, with mosaic TS patients showing normal glucose tolerance compared to monosomy X patients [ 17 ]. The prevalence of impaired glucose metabolism in TS patients appears to be higher than in healthy controls and women with primary ovarian failure. All TS women, including young girls who are not obese and have appropriate insulin sensitivity, exhibit this difference [ 37 ]. A study found that T2DM rates were 9% for TS patients having X chromosome with a deleted long arm (delXq), 18% for those with Monosomy X (45, X) 23% for those with an X chromosome with a deleted short arm (delXp) (Fig.  1 ), and an astounding 43% for those with two long arms of X chromosome (isochromosome Xq). Individuals with TS are more susceptible to Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM) due to haploinsufficiency in genes on Xp, while having an extra copy of Xq increases the risk [ 38 ]. Patients with monosomy X have a higher risk of glucose metabolism problems, including insulin resistance and type 2 diabetes. This suggests that haploinsufficiency of genes on the Xp chromosome negatively impacts β-cell and pancreatic islet function [ 33 ]. While the specific etiology of lower glucose tolerance in TS is speculative, several hypotheses have been proposed and researched over the years. Early studies revealed that TS patients had lower insulin sensitivity than age-matched controls. But when the same theory was tested again with age- and BMI-matched controls, the insulin sensitivity in people with TS was similar to that of controls. Glucose metabolic impairments appear to exist upon glucose stimulation, and it has been observed that first-phase insulin production in response to both OGTT and IVGTT is insufficient in TS. Insulin secretion in TS is comparable to controls but insufficient to respond to glucose load, resulting in a lower insulin-to-glucose ratio. IGT may result from a delayed inhibition of hepatic gluconeogenesis caused by inadequate first-phase insulin response. Additionally, in TS, the first-phase insulin response and therefore beta-cell function tend to decline dramatically with age, indicating that IGT eventually develops into overt T2DM [ 17 ]. Despite the divergent outcomes in TS, treatment with estrogen replacement appears to be necessary for maintaining glucose homeostasis. Estrogen therapy is linked to decreased fasting insulin and glucose levels, increased fat-free mass, and improved physical fitness in patients of Type 2 Diabetes [ 28 ]. The reduced glucose tolerance is positively influenced by all factors. However, more studies are required to assess the efficacy of exogenous estrogen treatment. GH treatment has no deleterious effect on glucose levels in TS females, and HbA1c remains stable or even lowers throughout GH therapy. Insulin levels rise during GH administration, showing relative insulin resistance, but drop after treatment is stopped. Interestingly, given the high chances of cardiac disease in TS, myocardial glucose uptake in these women is reduced; nevertheless, GH treatment does not affect this. Additional research is required to ascertain the effectiveness of treating with exogenous estrogen [ 17 ].

Reproduction and Turner Syndrome

TS patients generally exhibit primary amenorrhea or delayed puberty due to premature ovarian failure [ 39 ]. Premature ovarian insufficiency (POI) is a notable issue for TS patients and their parents. Most girls with TS experience premature ovarian failure, despite spontaneous puberty occurring in up to 38% of cases. [ 40 ]. Spontaneous pregnancy is observed in 2–5% of TS patients with a mosaic karyotype. The POI in TS is due to increased follicular apoptosis, which results in reduced fertility potential. TS females are often present with signs of estrogen deficiency due to POI [ 41 ]. Although 5–20% of the TS population experiences spontaneous menarche and regular menstruations, most of this is followed by early secondary ovarian insufficiency [ 42 ]. Ovarian dysfunction is a significant issue in girls and women with TS, leading to delayed puberty and infertility [ 43 ]. TS can also have structural and functional abnormalities in the uterus, impacting the implantation and growth of fertilized eggs. Only a quarter of individuals with TS possess a fully developed uterus in size and shape, with the majority having a slightly smaller or immature form. The average uterine volume of women with TS tends to be smaller than those with a normal karyotype, although the difference in uterine size is not significant. A range of factors, including age, duration of estrogen use, hormone replacement therapy (HRT), and the type of estrogen medication, can influence uterine size in individuals with TS. However, timely and appropriate treatment can lead to normal uterine development in TS individuals [ 44 ]. Pregnancy is scarce in TS patients and exhibit a high risk of miscarriage, stillbirth, and birth defects [ 45 ]. Only 2–5% of TS patients become pregnant spontaneously, and approximately 3.8% of TS patients have one or more live-born children. Pregnancies in TS patients, whether natural or medically aided, are at an increased risk of negative maternal and fetal outcomes compared to healthy women [ 46 ]. For instance, 23–50% of TS patients have congenital cardiac defects, and pregnancy causes a 50% increase in cardiac output, making patients with TS susceptible to aortic dissection or rupture [ 47 ]. As a result, the risk of death during pregnancy for TS patients can reach up to 2%. The colony-stimulating factor 2 receptor alpha (CSF2RA) gene present in the (PAR1) pseudoautosomal region 1 of the X chromosome is possibly involved in intrauterine lethality in fetuses with 45,X TS [ 10 ]. USP9X (located in Xp11.4) is a candidate for the failure of gonadal and oocyte development in TS. Ovarian failure in TS is associated with genes ZFX (located on Xp21.3) and USP9X (located on Xp11.4). In addition, patients who have lost the USP9X (Table  1 ) region experience primary amenorrhea [ 48 ]. Most TS women depend on assisted reproductive technology (ART) or alternative options such as fostering and adoption to become parents [ 49 ]. TS is a multi-system disorder that has a wide range of effects on reproductive health. Early diagnosis and specialist referral are vital for fertility preservation and HRT implementation. Spontaneous pregnancy, occurring mainly in females with mosaic TS, is uncommon and they require fertility treatments. Pregnancy is a high risk in TS females; therefore, pre-pregnancy screening, counseling, and co‐morbidity optimization are imperative. A multidisciplinary specialist team is recommended for managing pregnant women with TS to ensure optimal outcomes for both the mother and infant [ 50 ].

Hearing malfunctions and Turner Syndrome

Hearing malfunctions are prevalent in TS individuals, leading to potential negative impacts on health and overall quality of life [ 51 ]. Hearing loss and ear disease are two of the most significant and challenging chronic health issues faced by individuals with TS. [ 52 ]. TS women frequently experience a greater rate of hearing deterioration compared to the normal individuals [ 53 ]. There hasn’t been much research done on the precise cause of TS-induced Hearing Loss, potential causes include the effect of estrogen [ 54 ], and gene and chromosome abnormalities [ 55 ]. TS individuals have an increased risk of experiencing ear and hearing issues, especially those with the 45,X and 46,X, i (Xq karyotype). [ 53 ]. Moreover, a few genes located on the short arm of the X chromosome could regulate hearing functions. The loss of these genes may cause aberrant craniofacial development and abnormalities in the anatomy of the auricles [ 51 ]. Screening for otological problems in TS involves neonatal screening, early audiometry, and regular evaluations. High-frequency audiometric testing is crucial for detecting hearing loss before it affects verbal communication. TS is associated with a high prevalence of otitis media and hearing difficulties, impacting both the middle and inner ear. The frequency of conductive hearing loss (CHL) in TS is considered to be as high as 80%, primarily due to recurrent Eustachian tube dysfunction, otitis media, and anatomical abnormalities in the external ear and skull base. The etiology of CHL in TS includes hypotonia of the tensor veli palatine muscle, abnormal tympanic ostium, lymphatic hypoplasia, and craniofacial abnormalities. Chromosomal deletions, particularly in the X chromosome’s short arm, believed to be associated with CHL, and decreased levels of (IGF-1) insulin-like growth factor 1 are associated with otitis media. Chronic, severe otitis media is also common in TS and is believed to result from obstructed drainage, possibly due to lymphatic insufficiency or skeletal dysplasia. Otitis can lead to conductive hearing loss in children, which normally resolves as the otitis decreases in the young adult stage [ 56 ]. Sensorineural hearing loss (SNHL), another hearing problem often progresses gradually from late childhood to early adulthood. The prevalence of this condition varies, with some studies suggesting that up to 90% of people are affected. Mixed hearing loss (MHL) in TS includes middle ear problems and SNHL. The challenges associated with hearing problems in TS extend beyond the physical implications, influencing social interactions, educational performance, and overall communication abilities [ 52 ]. Therefore, regular and comprehensive screening methods, including high-frequency audiometric testing, are essential in the management of otological disorders in TS patients.

Social and psychological aspects of Turner Syndrome

Along with physical health difficulties, numerous studies have identified impairments in various psychosocial domains and overall quality of life among TS individuals. Persistent challenges in social interactions are observed throughout their lives, particularly in establishing and maintaining friendships and relationships. Parents often perceive their daughters with TS as less socially competent, with fewer friends, and spending less time socializing at an early age. Furthermore, TS females exhibit a lower likelihood of having a partner and getting married compared to their non-TS counterparts [ 57 ].

TS patients are at a higher risk of developing autism spectrum disorders, psychotic disorders, depression, anxiety, mood disorders, hyperactivity disorder, attention deficit, and schizophrenia. Young TS females often face social difficulties and challenges in adjusting to puberty [ 58 ]. They could encounter lower self-esteem and social difficulties, which can affect their overall well-being and psychopathology [ 59 ]. TS patients can also exhibit cognitive and psychosocial deficits, such as impaired memory and attention, and social interaction difficulties. They are also at an increased risk of receiving a diagnosis of neurodevelopmental including intellectual disability, and eating disorders [ 60 ]. Women with TS may exhibit deficits across various psychosocial issues such as anxiety, depression, ADHD, autism, self-esteem, and social participation. These impairments can have a detrimental impact on their overall quality of life [ 57 ]. Healthcare professionals need to be aware of these psychological and social challenges faced by TS patients and provide appropriate support and resources to aid them deal with these issues. Support groups, like the Turner Syndrome Society of the United States(TSSUS) [ 61 ] and the Turner Syndrome Foundation [ 62 ], can offer resources, education, and emotional support to patients and their families [ 63 ].

Management of Turner Syndrome & future aspects

TS is a multifaceted condition that affects multiple organ systems in females, necessitating a multidisciplinary approach to patient care. The present treatment focuses on growth-promoting therapy, induction and maintenance of secondary sexual characteristics, and osteoporosis prevention. Growth hormone (GH) therapy is fundamental in maintaining body stature. GH treatment accelerates growth and increases adult height, while estrogen replacement treatment induces puberty [ 69 ].TS management requires a holistic approach that includes hormonal, cardiovascular, psychosocial, and reproductive aspects. This method maximizes the health outcomes and enhances the quality of life for individuals with TS. Evidence-based practices, collaboration among medical disciplines, and patient-centered interventions are essential. Continuous research and refinement of therapeutic interventions are crucial for advancing TS management. Expanding our understanding and developing targeted treatments can improve care and outcomes for TS patients in the future.

Despite advancements in understanding TS, fundamental questions and challenges persist in areas like diagnosis, hormone replacement therapy, co-morbidities, fertility, and adult clinic establishment. Advancements in genetic and genomic factors are expected to improve patient care in TS. Next-generation sequencing, such as whole exome sequencing (WES), can uncover the genetic landscape of TS, identifying potential candidate genes that may be responsible for various phenotypic manifestations. This comprehensive approach provides a detailed genetic profile, elucidating the specific genomic alterations underlying TS. Integrating data from genomic studies with functional analyses can unravel protein regulatory networks and disease-associated pathways affected by these genomic variants. Experimental validation techniques like allele-specific PCR and Sanger sequencing can be used for validating candidate genes identified through genomic analyses, confirming their relevance to TS and their potential role in disease progression and severity. This holistic understanding of TS pathogenesis will pave the way for targeted therapeutic interventions and this type of integration holds promise for personalized medicine-enhanced therapeutic strategies and a deeper understanding of the syndrome’s genetic basis and lessens the burden of TS patients.

Acknowledgements

Author contributions.

N.K, A.F & R.I conceived the idea. N.K wrote the manuscript. N.K, A.F & R.I reviewed and edited the manuscript.

Data availability

Declarations.

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Publisher’s note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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Association for Tropical Biology and Conservation at 60: A look back and forward

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• The Association for Tropical Biology and Conservation marked its 60th anniversary with a conference in Kigali, Rwanda this July. The ATBC has diversified its membership and expanded its scope since its founding in 1963, when most members were U.S. scientists working in Latin America, and only one member was a woman.
• This year’s ATBC meeting included 400 attendees from 52 countries, with participants coming from African, Asian and Latin American nations. Annual conferences now rotate between these three tropical realms.
• In the 21st century, conservation has increasingly become an ATBC focus. This July’s meeting in Kigali, like other recent meetings was designed to have a lasting impact on the local scientific community by offering free field courses and scholarships to Rwandan students.
• Today, the distribution of educational resources and employment opportunities for tropical studies is still skewed heavily toward countries in the Global North. ATBC members say they hope to change this by emphasizing “South-South” collaborations, with knowledge sharing between tropical nations around the globe.

KIGALI — When scientists, conservationists and policymakers from around the world gathered in East Africa this July — exchanging ideas, celebrating successes and planning for the future — the international group represented a living showcase of the dramatic transformations in tropical ecology research that has occurred over the last 60 years.

Founded in 1963 by a group of 32 men — mostly white, mostly from the U.S. — and just one woman, the Association for Tropical Biology focused primarily on advancing Neotropical botanical science.

A 2003 name change to the Association for Tropical Biology and Conservation reflected the expansion of that mission to include tropical conservation. With 1,000 members in 70 nations today, the professional society’s international membership represents an increasingly diverse roster of scientists from the Global North, tropical Latin America, Africa and Asia, with expertise in everything from carnivores to climate change.

The roots of tropical ecology

The ATBC was born at the height of the Cold War, a time of intense global geopolitical upheaval. It was also an era in which the study of tropical ecology still heavily reflected the legacy of the 19 th -century colonial period, when jungle collections gathered by European and U.S. explorers attracted the interest of scientists who mostly viewed tropical organisms from afar, and as strange but worth learning about.

In 1898, at the end of the Spanish-American War, the United States annexed Caribbean colonies, and U.S. researchers began advocating for the closer study of tropical organisms in their natural habitats. This facilitated the establishment of important tropical research field stations during the early 20 th century in Soledad, Cuba, and in Panama’s U.S.-administered Canal Zone.

At these early field research stations, local people were present only as cooks and laborers, not as scientific collaborators or as students, a relationship that reflected the larger power imbalance between the Global North and its colonies.

The rise of anti-colonial movements in the mid-20 th century upended that political and scientific order. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, U.S.-Cuba relations deteriorated, the Soledad research station was nationalized, and U.S. scientists left the country. A strong anti-colonial protest movement in Panama and elsewhere in the tropics raised serious concerns about access to field sites.

“The mood I get from the writings of those American tropical scientists is that they’re panicking,” says University of Texas at Austin historian Megan Raby, who studies the origins of tropical ecology. “They’re struggling to find a new way to get to the places they want to work in, and a new way to frame what they’re interested in doing.”

In 1960, the Fairchild Tropical Botanic Garden in Miami, Florida, a facility that had close ties to the now lost research station in Cuba, convened a meeting on tropical botany attended almost exclusively by U.S. participants. Recognition of the need to deepen connections with other tropical countries and embrace a more collaborative model led to a follow-up meeting in Trinidad in 1962. That session, besides U.S. participants, boasted significant representation from Latin America and the Caribbean.

“Even though they were in a minority, those Latin American scientists really pushed for things they were interested in,” Raby says. “And their interest was not so much in establishing stations for foreign researchers as in circulating publications, having classes on applied questions, and really sharing resources.”

This more diverse group formally established itself as the Association for Tropical Biology in 1963. Initial association meetings tended to focus on botany, with annual gatherings alternating between the U.S. and somewhere in the Neotropics. The organization then still reflected a heavy bias toward U.S. researchers and their networks. Among the founders there was only one woman, the esteemed U.S. botanist Mildred Mathias.

Diversifying in the 21 st century

Over the next six decades, the organization’s focus shifted, with the geographic diversity of members increasing, the tropical regions in which conferences were held widening, and the scientific topics on which members worked broadening. Women’s representation also increased, while the emphasis on conservation deepened.

Major changes have taken place over the last two decades. This year’s Kigali conference is only the organization’s third in Africa , with the other two occurring in the last 15 years. Conferences in Asia have also increased, and the ATBC is now devoted to rotating meetings between tropical Asia, Africa and Latin America.

“The reason why we travel the world is because we want to bring people from nearby countries to participate,” says Lúcia Lohmann, ATBC’s executive director since 2019, who originally hails from Brazil and now holds a professorship at the University of California, Berkeley. This year’s ATBC meeting included 400 attendees from 52 countries, with many from African nations.

The theme of the 60 th -anniversary conference was “Achieving Inclusive Science for Effective Conservation, Adaptation, and Resilience in the Tropics,” reflecting a dramatic conceptual expansion from the 50 th -anniversary theme of “New Frontiers in Tropical Biology: The Next 50 years.” In addition to a diverse menu of scientific talks, the ATBC conference held 13 workshops, with topics ranging from incorporating gender into research and practice, to scientific illustration and science communication, to emerging technologies like environmental DNA (eDNA) monitoring.

Today’s ATBC has signaled a commitment to making a positive lasting impact on local scientific capacity and infrastructure wherever it hosts its conferences, and achieves this goal partly by providing scholarships for local students. In Kigali this July, the ATBC made 61 scholarships available to Rwandan students to attend the meeting. Broadening the geographic and gender diversity of those receiving honorary fellowships also plays a big role in increasing the representativeness of the membership at large, according to Lohmann.

Facilitating local conservation

Another key local initiative carried out at annual meetings is the teaching of skills in tropical ecology via workshops and field courses. Before the Kigali conference, 20 Rwandan students attended a free course led by UC Berkeley ecologist Paul Fine, covering the basics of plant systematics and specimen preparation — a course sited in the misty mountains of Rwanda’s Nyungwe National Park, home to much of the country’s imperiled biodiversity.

The local impacts of the ATBC’s globetrotting conferences is quantifiable. For instance, after the association’s 2019 conference in Antananarivo, Madagascar, a survey found that Malagasy researchers made up 34% of the total conference attendees, and 40% of them said that developing a professional network was the most consequential outcome of the meeting. As with other recent ATBC conferences, Kigali attendees will produce a declaration synthesizing the themes emerging from the event with current local conservation issues to raise awareness and spur action.

The ATBC continues focusing not only on basic science to understand how natural systems work, but also on applying that knowledge to tropical conservation. “When you bring conservation in — because conservation is a crisis discipline that deals with imperfect and incomplete data sets — there’s a tension,” says Colombian ecologist Natalia Ocampo-Peñuela, now at the University of California, Santa Cruz. “But I’ve seen that tension dissolve at ATBC over the years as basic science is being used to ask conservation questions that could never be asked before.”

Local conservationists had a strong presence in Kigali, illustrating the benefits of applying a scientific approach to conservation. In one conference session, Rwandan scientist Deogratias Tuyisingize of the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund reviewed efforts to census the endangered Grauer’s swamp warbler ( Bradypterus graueri ), a bird endemic to high-altitude bogs in East Africa’s Albertine Rift mountains. In another, Rwandan bird guide Joseph Lionceau explained approaches by the Rugezi Ornithology Center to restore native vegetation around a lake important to waterfowl.

New models for the future

Despite progress toward creating a strong science and conservation presence in tropical nations, there’s still more to do, say Kigali participants. “We have a biodiversity hotspot here in Rwanda, but funding and training limit how we can explore it, and we have to wait for outsiders from overseas to come do research here,” says Delphine Mpayimana, a Rwandan student who participated in the ATBC field course. While Mpayimana completed her master’s degree at the University of Rwanda, she, like many other science students from tropical developing countries, is mainly looking abroad to advance her career as that is where funding for a Ph.D. or job is more attainable.

That unequal distribution of educational and employment opportunities means that tropical countries lose many of their best scientists to the Global North, which results in an ironic and inefficient situation where scientists need to be employed by institutions half a world away just to study their own countries. An important theme to emerge from the Kigali conference addresses this dilemma by fostering “South-South” collaborations.

“ATBC has done really well at building collaborations ‘North-to-South,’ but what we know from the Neotropics, the African tropics, and the Asian tropics is still not being cross-referenced throughout the tropical belt,” says Ocampo-Peñuela. “Learning from researchers in the tropics for other parts of the tropics and building pan-tropical collaborations is something that would be really powerful.” One way to achieve this goal, she suggests, would be for conservation funders to endow positions in tropical countries in order to retain talent or attract researchers from elsewhere in the tropics.

Advancing these priorities would benefit people everywhere, including in the Global North, because collaborations that boost scientists and research from tropical countries can positively impact the entire world. “We all depend on tropical ecosystems for our existence,” says Lohmann. “If we don’t have tropical forests, we’ll feel the impact through climate change wherever we are.”

Banner image: Panelists from across Africa convene for a session on “Changing the Narrative: Hope in African Conservation” at ATBC’s 2024 conference in Kigali, Rwanda. The panel was hosted by Mongabay Africa Program Director David Akana. Image courtesy of ATBC.” Image courtesy of the ATBC.

Rakotomanana, H., Razanamaro, O. H., Ravelomanana, A., Andriantsaralaza, S., Rafalinirina, A. H., Razanaparany, T. P., … Goodman, S. M. (2023). ATBC 2019 in Madagascar: Its impact on the national scientific community. Biotropica , 56 (1), 50-57. doi: 10.1111/btp.13277

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