morals or money essay

Greater Good Science Center • Magazine • In Action • In Education

How Money Changes the Way You Think and Feel

The term “affluenza”—a portmanteau of affluence and influenza, defined as a “painful, contagious, socially transmitted condition of overload, debt, anxiety, and waste, resulting from the dogged pursuit of more”—is often dismissed as a silly buzzword created to express our cultural disdain for consumerism. Though often used in jest, the term may contain more truth than many of us would like to think.

Whether affluenza is real or imagined, money really does change everything, as the song goes—and those of high social class do tend to see themselves much differently than others. Wealth (and the pursuit of it) has been linked with immoral behavior—and not just in movies like The Wolf of Wall Street .

Psychologists who study the impact of wealth and inequality on human behavior have found that money can powerfully influence our thoughts and actions in ways that we’re often not aware of, no matter our economic circumstances. Although wealth is certainly subjective, most of the current research measures wealth on scales of income, job status, or socioeconomic circumstances, like educational attainment and intergenerational wealth.

Here are seven things you should know about the psychology of money and wealth.

More money, less empathy?

Several studies have shown that wealth may be at odds with empathy and compassion . Research published in the journal Psychological Science found that people of lower economic status were better at reading others’ facial expressions —an important marker of empathy—than wealthier people.

“A lot of what we see is a baseline orientation for the lower class to be more empathetic and the upper class to be less [so],” study co-author Michael Kraus told Time . “Lower-class environments are much different from upper-class environments. Lower-class individuals have to respond chronically to a number of vulnerabilities and social threats. You really need to depend on others so they will tell you if a social threat or opportunity is coming, and that makes you more perceptive of emotions.”

While a lack of resources fosters greater emotional intelligence, having more resources can cause bad behavior in its own right. UC Berkeley research found that even fake money could make people behave with less regard for others. Researchers observed that when two students played Monopoly, one having been given a great deal more Monopoly money than the other, the wealthier player expressed initial discomfort, but then went on to act aggressively, taking up more space and moving his pieces more loudly, and even taunting the player with less money.

Wealth can cloud moral judgment

It is no surprise in this post-2008 world to learn that wealth may cause a sense of moral entitlement. A UC Berkeley study found that in San Francisco—where the law requires that cars stop at crosswalks for pedestrians to pass—drivers of luxury cars were four times less likely than those in less expensive vehicles to stop and allow pedestrians the right of way. They were also more likely to cut off other drivers.

Another study suggested that merely thinking about money could lead to unethical behavior. Researchers from Harvard and the University of Utah found that study participants were more likely to lie or behave immorally after being exposed to money-related words.

“Even if we are well-intentioned, even if we think we know right from wrong, there may be factors influencing our decisions and behaviors that we’re not aware of,” University of Utah associate management professor Kristin Smith-Crowe, one of the study’s co-authors, told MarketWatch .

Wealth has been linked with addiction

While money itself doesn’t cause addiction or substance abuse, wealth has been linked with a higher susceptibility to addiction problems. A number of studies have found that affluent children are more vulnerable to substance-abuse issues , potentially because of high pressure to achieve and isolation from parents. Studies also found that kids who come from wealthy parents aren’t necessarily exempt from adjustment problems—in fact, research found that on several measures of maladjustment, high school students of high socioeconomic status received higher scores than inner-city students. Researchers found that these children may be more likely to internalize problems, which has been linked with substance abuse.

But it’s not just adolescents: Even in adulthood, the rich outdrink the poor by more than 27 percent.

Money itself can become addictive

The pursuit of wealth itself can also become a compulsive behavior. As psychologist Dr. Tian Dayton explained, a compulsive need to acquire money is often considered part of a class of behaviors known as process addictions, or “behavioral addictions,” which are distinct from substance abuse.

These days, the idea of process addictions is widely accepted. Process addictions are addictions that involve a compulsive and/or an out-of-control relationship with certain behaviors such as gambling, sex, eating, and, yes, even money.…There is a change in brain chemistry with a process addiction that’s similar to the mood-altering effects of alcohol or drugs. With process addictions, engaging in a certain activity—say viewing pornography, compulsive eating, or an obsessive relationship with money—can kickstart the release of brain/body chemicals, like dopamine, that actually produce a “high” that’s similar to the chemical high of a drug. The person who is addicted to some form of behavior has learned, albeit unconsciously, to manipulate his own brain chemistry.

While a process addiction is not a chemical addiction, it does involve compulsive behavior —in this case, an addiction to the good feeling that comes from receiving money or possessions—which can ultimately lead to negative consequences and harm the individual’s well-being. Addiction to spending money—sometimes known as shopaholism—is another, more common type of money-associated process addiction.

Wealthy children may be more troubled

Children growing up in wealthy families may seem to have it all, but having it all may come at a high cost. Wealthier children tend to be more distressed than lower-income kids, and are at high risk for anxiety, depression, substance abuse, eating disorders, cheating, and stealing. Research has also found high instances of binge-drinking and marijuana use among the children of high-income, two-parent, white families.

“In upwardly mobile communities, children are often pressed to excel at multiple academic and extracurricular pursuits to maximize their long-term academic prospects—a phenomenon that may well engender high stress,” writes psychologist Suniya Luthar in “The Culture Of Affluence.” “At an emotional level, similarly, isolation may often derive from the erosion of family time together because of the demands of affluent parents’ career obligations and the children’s many after-school activities.”

We tend to perceive the wealthy as “evil”

On the other side of the spectrum, lower-income individuals are likely to judge and stereotype those who are wealthier than themselves, often judging the wealthy as being “cold.” (Of course, it is also true that the poor struggle with their own set of societal stereotypes.)

Rich people tend to be a source of envy and distrust, so much so that we may even take pleasure in their struggles, according to Scientific American . According to a University of Pennsylvania study entitled “ Is Profit Evil? Associations of Profit with Social Harm ,” most people tend to link perceived profits with perceived social harm. When participants were asked to assess various companies and industries (some real, some hypothetical), both liberals and conservatives ranked institutions perceived to have higher profits with greater evil and wrongdoing across the board, independent of the company or industry’s actions in reality.

Money can’t buy happiness (or love)

We tend to seek money and power in our pursuit of success (and who doesn’t want to be successful, after all?), but it may be getting in the way of the things that really matter: happiness and love.

There is no direct correlation between income and happiness. After a certain level of income that can take care of basic needs and relieve strain ( some say $50,000 a year , some say $75,000 ), wealth makes hardly any difference to overall well-being and happiness and, if anything, only harms well-being: Extremely affluent people actually suffer from higher rates of depression . Some data has suggested money itself doesn’t lead to dissatisfaction—instead, it’s the ceaseless striving for wealth and material possessions that may lead to unhappiness. Materialistic values have even been linked with lower relationship satisfaction .

But here’s something to be happy about: More Americans are beginning to look beyond money and status when it comes to defining success in life. According to a 2013 LifeTwist study , only around one-quarter of Americans still believe that wealth determines success.

This article originally appeared in the Huffington Post .

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[…] as well as on Sandel’s What Money Can’t Buy, Barman’s Caring Capitalism, Wilkis’ The Moral Power of Money, Morduch and Schneider’s The Financial Diaries, and Sherman’s Uneasy […]

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The New York Times

Economix | how money affects morality.

How Money Affects Morality

From Judas Iscariot, who betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver, to Bernard L. Madoff to the standard member of Congress fighting tirelessly to further the interests of campaign donors, human history is full of examples of money’s ability to weaken even the firmest ethical backbone.

Money sows mistrust. It ends friendships. Experiments have found that it encourages us to lie and cheat. As Karl Marx, the scourge of capitalism, noted, ‘‘Money then appears as the enemy of man and social bonds that pretend to self-subsistence.’’

Yet though we clearly understand money’s power to debase character, we have less certain a grasp on what it is about money that corrupts us so. Is it simply greed? Does the appetite for the more comfortable life that money can buy push us over the line?

A new study by researchers in organizational behavior from Harvard University and the University of Utah suggests an entirely different dynamic: the simple idea of money changes the way we think – weakening every other social bond.

The researchers performed a suite of experiments on several hundred undergraduates. First they exposed some to phrases like “she spends money liberally” or pictures that would make them think of money, and others to images and phrases that had nothing to do with the stuff.

Then they made them answer questions to flesh out whether their morals would flag in the presence of temptation, and how they articulated the behavior to themselves.

Sure enough, students who had been primed to think of money consistently exhibited weaker ethics. More interestingly, perhaps, they also framed their choices as products of cost-benefit analysis. In other words, they stepped out of morality

For instance, they were more likely to answer that they would filch a ream of paper from the university’s copying room. They were more likely to lie for a financial gain and explain it to themselves as “primarily a business decision.”

“Social relations, which we assume are the fundamental basis of morality, can become de-emphasized so that moral considerations are obscured,” the researchers wrote. “A cost-benefit analysis ensues which focuses on the self to the exclusion of others.”

Money, in other words, puts us in the frame of mind of Michael Corleone as he decides to enter the family business . “It’s not personal,” he tells his brother. “”It’s strictly business.”

What's Next

On Words: ‘Money and Morality’

December 3, 2021 • By Simone Polillo, [email protected] Simone Polillo, [email protected]

• Simone Polillo, [email protected]

Illustration by Alexandra Angelich, University Communications

Editor’s note: Welcome to this installment of “ On Words ,” an occasional series in which University of Virginia faculty members write about evocative words and phrases. Simone Polillo, a professor of sociology, teaches a course on money and morality and dives into that topic in this essay for UVA Today.

In late 1912, banker J.P. Morgan, at the height of his power, spoke at a U.S. Senate committee hearing investigating the “Money Trust,” the tightly knit network of bankers and industrialists who controlled much of the nation’s capital. This was a time in U.S. history with many parallels to today: Inequality was rising, corporations had stifled market competition and public discontent with the banks was growing.

Having been asked how banks grant loans, Morgan provocatively asserted, “A man [sic] I do not trust could not get credit from me on all the bonds of Christendom.”

Morgan was responding head-on to the accusation that personal relationships in the credit system only served the connected at the expense of outsiders and did little to improve public welfare. Instead of denying that social relationships were at the heart of banking, he gave a rationale as to why they should be: collateral (“all the bonds in Christendom”) was but a narrow indicator of the individual’s ability to pay back his or her debt. Through personal relationships, however, creditors could gain a better sense of the borrower’s creditworthiness. The potential for cheating would decrease – “character is everything,” Morgan was fond of saying.

In today’s world, Morgan’s perspective may seem outdated. For most of us, access to credit is regulated by algorithms that produce quantitative indicators of creditworthiness. Personal connections do not seem to be as central to everyday citizens’ access to banking services as they used to be – though the proverbial handshake may still seal a deal when the parties to the transaction belong to a rarified and small social elite, raising important questions about how inequality operates in the world of credit. The larger point that still rings true, however, is that creditworthiness, no matter how quantified and automated, is a type of moral judgment: getting credit – whether a personal loan, funding for college, or a mortgage – requires us to undergo a process of evaluation with an eye to understanding whether we are the “sort of person” who can pay the creditor back. It’s not just about how much money we make: it’s also about our credit history, and specifically what kinds of “mistakes” we have made in our past that would raise a flag to potential creditors.

Related Story

On Words: ‘Commerce’

We have come to accept that morality – a rather strict, even punitive kind of morality at that – is a way of governing credit – limiting or expanding access to it, regulating how it is used, and so on. And yet, when it comes to money – and it is money that passes hands in a credit transaction, after all – the idea that money and morality are just as intimately connected strikes us as dubious. We stand on the shoulders of giants when we take this position: Thinkers as different as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Georg Simmel all made some version of the argument that whenever money is involved, that’s when morality stops. As Marx famously put it, with money, “all that is solid melts into air,” as money knows no boundaries; in fact, it transforms all relationships and experiences we consider to have intrinsic value into a quantitative metric, dissolving their distinctiveness and making them comparable . As sociologist Viviana Zelizer suggests, such views on money produce two perspectives on the relationship between the economy and our social world: first, a view whereby money “corrupts” anything it touches, lending credence to claims that money should be kept at bay from aspects of our lives we understand to have intrinsic or incommensurable value. Second, a view whereby money is “nothing but” money – once monetary evaluation takes root in a previously untouched sphere, its cold, rational logic will relentlessly take over.

Credit is not the same thing as money, and perhaps it is legitimate to accept that credit has moral dimensions that money does not have. There are, to be sure, important differences between the two: credit is granted upon a promise of future repayment, whereas money, once exchanged, completes the transaction (e.g. as a payment). By the same token, credit entails a bet (however informed) about the future, with all the uncertainty it might bring; and so, it binds creditor and debtor into something of a personal relationship, at least for the duration of the loan. Money, by contrast, once exchanged, terminates the transaction. And, especially in the case of cash, a monetary transaction can preserve the anonymity of the parties to the exchange.

Yet, these differences are more superficial than they appear to be. Money is often exchanged in the context of pre-existing, meaningful social relationships, as when you send a friend a gift card for their favorite store. Money, in a case like this, does not “corrupt” the relationship: it would be awkward, of course, if you were gifting your friend an actual stash of cash, but charging the amount to a gift card helps you avoid this sort of faux pas. Or consider the arcane, intricate and often-contested practices that constitute tipping culture in the United States – how much, when and who to tip are questions that can be rarely settled through simple quantitative calculations of the kinds Marx was so worried about. As my Department of Media Studies colleague Lana Swartz argues in her 2020 book about new forms of payment (“New Money: How Payment Became Social Media,” Yale University Press), exchanging money always entails exchanging information, and, in the process, creating a community she calls “transactional,” with its own idiosyncrasies, inside jokes, and yes, even its distinctive sense of the right way of using money.

There is another, important connection between credit and money that infuses money not only with morality, but with politics. Political economists and sociologists have long argued that cash is a special form of credit: It is general credit backed by the authority and power of the national government (the state). The deeper point is not only that governments issue money: It is rather that political communities can decide, collectively, how much and what kind of money they should issue to finance projects the community really cares about. Money, that is, is a democratic tool. When J.P. Morgan emphasized the link between reputation and credit, he forgot to add that credit has social sources, and so it can be directed toward uses that are not reducible to what individuals would plan for their own benefit or self-interest. The morality of money, then, is another way of understanding the morality of politics. And while conventional views about politics can be as cynical about its morality as they are about the morality of money, understanding money in terms of political choices can also alert us to the ways money can empower us.

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August 17, 2024

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Ethics and Psychology

Where ethics is more than a code

Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Wednesday, june 19, 2013, how money affects morality.

• Utility Menu

Michael J. Sandel

Anne t. and robert m. bass professor of government.

• What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets

Should we pay children to read books or to get good grades? Should we put a price on human life to decide how much pollution to allow? Is it ethical to pay people to test risky new drugs or to donate their organs? What about hiring mercenaries to fight our wars, outsourcing inmates to for-profit prisons, auctioning admission to elite universities, or selling citizenship to immigrants willing to pay?  In his  New York Times  bestseller  What Money Can't Buy , Michael J. Sandel takes up one of the biggest ethical questions of our time: Isn't there something wrong with a world in which everything is for sale? If so, how can we prevent market values from reaching into spheres of life where they don't belong? What are the moral limits of markets?  In recent decades, market values have crowded out nonmarket norms in almost every aspect of life. Without quite realizing it, Sandel argues, we have drifted from  having  a market economy to  being  a market society.  In  Justice , an international bestseller, Sandel showed himself to be a master at illuminating, with clarity and verve, the hard moral questions we confront in our everyday lives. Now, in  What Money Can't Buy , he provokes a debate that's been missing in our market-driven age: What is the proper role of markets in a democratic society, and how can we protect the moral and civic goods that markets do not honor and money cannot buy?

“In a culture mesmerized by the market, Sandel’s is the indispensable voice of reason…. What Money Can’t Buy …must surely be one of the most important exercises in public philosophy in many years.”

            --John Gray, New Statesman  

Sandel, “the most famous teacher of philosophy in the world, [has] shown that it is possible to take philosophy into the public square without insulting the public’s intelligence…. [He] is trying to force open a space for a discourse on civic virtue that he believes has been abandoned by both left and right.”

            --Michael Ignatieff, The New Republic  

“ Brilliant, easily readable, beautifully delivered and often funny,…an indispensable book on the relationship between morality and economics.”

            --David Aaronovitch, The Times (London)

“Sandel is probably the world’s most relevant living philosopher.”

            --Michael Fitzgerald, Newsweek

“Michael Sandel’s What Money Can’t Buy is a great book and I recommend every economist to read it…. The book is brimming with interesting examples that make you think.  I read this book cover to cover in less than 48 hours.  And I have written more marginal notes than for any book I have read in a long time.”

--Timothy Besley, Professor of Economics, London School of Economics, Journal of Economics Literature

What Money Can’t Buy is that rare thing: a work of philosophy addressed to non-philosophers that is neither superficial nor condescending.  Its prose is clear and elegant. Its message is simple and direct. Yet the questions it raises are deep ones…. What Money Can’t Buy is, among other things, a narrative of changing social mores in the style of Montesquieu or Tocqueville.”

            --Chris Edward Skidelsky, Philosophy

Sandel “is such a gentle critic that he merely asks us to open our eyes…. Yet What Money Can’t Buy makes it clear that market morality is an exceptionally thin wedge…. Sandel is pointing out…[a] quite profound change in society.”

            --Jonathan V. Last, The Wall Street Journal  

“ What Money Can’t Buy is the work of a truly public philosopher…. [It] recalls John Kenneth Galbraith’s influential 1958 book, The Affluent Society …. Galbraith lamented the impoverishment of the public square. Sandel worries about its abandonment—or, more precisely, its desertion by the more fortunate and capable among us…. [A]n engaging, compelling read, consistently unsettling,…it reminds us how easy it is to slip into a purely material calculus about the meaning of life and the means we adopt in pursuit of happiness.”

--David M. Kennedy, Professor of History Emeritus, Stanford University, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas

Sandel “is currently the most effective communicator of ideas in English.”

            --Editorial, The Guardian

“[An] important book…. Michael Sandel is just the right person to get to the bottom of the tangle of moral damage that is being done by markets to our values.”

--Jeremy Waldron, The New York Review of Books

“Michael Sandel is probably the most popular political philosopher of his generation…. The attention Sandel enjoys is more akin to a stadium-filling self-help guru than a philosopher. But rather than instructing his audiences to maximize earning power or balance their chakras, he challenges them to address fundamental questions about how society is organized…. His new book [ What Money Can’t Buy ] offers an eloquent argument for morality in public life.”

            --Andrew Anthony, The Observer (London)

“ What Money Can’t Buy is replete with examples of what money can, in fact, buy…. Sandel has a genius for showing why such changes are deeply important.”

            --Martin Sandbu, Financial Times

Michael Sandel is “one of the leading political thinkers of our time…. Sandel’s new book is What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets , and I recommend it highly.  It’s a powerful indictment of the market society we have become, where virtually everything has a price.”

            --Michael Tomasky, The Daily Beast

“To understand the importance of [Sandel’s] purpose, you first have to grasp the full extent of the triumph achieved by market thinking in economics, and the extent to which that thinking has spread to other domains. This school sees economics as a discipline that has nothing to do with morality, and is instead the study of incentives, considered in an ethical vacuum. Sandel's book is, in its calm way, an all-out assault on that idea…. Let's hope that What Money Can't Buy , by being so patient and so accumulative in its argument and its examples, marks a permanent shift in these debates.”

            --John Lancaster, The Guardian

“Sandel is among the leading public intellectuals of the age. He writes clearly and concisely in prose that neither oversimplifies nor obfuscates…. Sandel asks the crucial question of our time: ‘Do we want a society where everything is up for sale? Or are there certain moral and civic goods that markets do not honor and money cannot buy?’”

            --Douglas Bell, The Globe and Mail (Toronto)

“[D]eeply provocative and intellectually suggestive…. What Sandel does…is to prod us into asking whether we have any reason for drawing a line between what is and what isn’t exchangeable, what can’t be reduced to commodity terms…. [A] wake-up call to recognize our desperate need to rediscover some intelligible way of talking about humanity.”

            --Rowan Williams, Prospect

“There is no more fundamental question we face than how to best preserve the common good and build strong communities that benefit everyone. Sandel's book is an excellent starting place for that dialogue.”

            --Kevin J. Hamilton, The Seattle Times

“Poring through Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel's new book. . . I found myself over and over again turning pages and saying, 'I had no idea.' I had no idea that in the year 2000, 'a Russian rocket emblazoned with a giant Pizza Hut logo carried advertising into outer space.’. . . I knew that stadiums are now named for corporations, but had no idea that now 'even sliding into home is a corporate-sponsored event.'. . . I had no idea that in 2001 an elementary school in New Jersey became America's first public school 'to sell naming rights to a corporate sponsor.'  Why worry about this trend?  Because, Sandel argues, market values are crowding out civic practices.”

—Thomas Friedman, New York Times

“An exquisitely reasoned, skillfully written treatise on big issues of everyday life.”

-- Kirkus Reviews (starred review)

“In his new book, Michael Sandel —the closest the world of political philosophy comes to a celebrity — argues that we now live in a society where ‘almost everything can be bought and sold.’ As markets have infiltrated more parts of life, Sandel believes we have shifted from a market economy to ‘a market society,’ turning the world — and most of us in it — into commodities. And when Sandel proselytizes, the world listens…. Sandel’s ideas could hardly be more timely.

            -- Rosamund Urwin, Evening Standard (London) 

“ What Money Can’t Buy is an excellent book…. Drawing upon a vast amount of fascinating empirical examples…Sandel explains why markets and market reasoning should not govern the distribution and allocation of all our social goods.  He invites us to a renewed discussion of market principles in the public sphere…. The book is a clear, sharp and timely attack on the cult of the market which has been spreading since the 1970s.

--Christian Olaf Christiansen and Patrick J. L. Cockburn, European Journal of Social Theory

“The renowned political philosopher Michael Sandel asks what has become a pressing question for our age: Is there anything money can’t buy? .... Sandel’s central worry is that commodification is corrupting.  There are certain goods, such as education, nature, health and sex, and certain approaches to life…that instantiate values and norms that are fundamentally incompatible with those that we associate with markets.  When markets interfere with these goods and approaches to life they ‘crowd out’ the appropriate values and norms and thereby corrupt and diminish their value…. Sandel has made a useful and I think lasting contribution.”

--Prince Saprai, International Journal of Law in Context

Recent Publications

• Michael Sandel: ‘The energy of Brexiteers and Trump is born of the failure of elites'
• Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning: Why Economists Should Re-engage with Political Philosophy
• The Moral Economy of Speculation: Gambling, Finance, and the Common Good
• What Isn’t for Sale?
• Obama and Civic Idealism

• News Releases

Morals versus money: How we make social decisions

University of Zurich

Our actions are guided by moral values. However, monetary incentives can get in the way of our good intentions. Neuroeconomists at the University of Zurich have now investigated in which area of the brain conflicts between moral and material motives are resolved. Their findings reveal that our actions are more social when these deliberations are inhibited.

When donating money to a charity or doing volunteer work, we put someone else's needs before our own and forgo our own material interests in favor of moral values. Studies have described this behavior as reflecting either a personal predisposition for altruism, an instrument for personal reputation management, or a mental trade-off of the pros and cons associated with different actions.

Impact of electromagnetic stimulation on donating behavior

A research team led by UZH professor Christian Ruff from the Zurich Center for Neuroeconomics has now investigated the neurobiological origins of unselfish behavior. The researchers focused on the right Temporal Parietal Junction (rTPJ) - an area of the brain that is believed to play a crucial role in social decision-making processes. To understand the exact function of the rTPJ, they engineered an experimental set-up in which participants had to decide whether and how much they wanted to donate to various organizations. Through electromagnetic stimulation of the rTPJ, the researchers were then able to determine which of the three types of considerations - predisposed altruism, reputation management, or trading off moral and material values - are processed in this area of the brain.

Moral by default, money by deliberation

The researchers found that people have a moral preference for supporting good causes and not wanting to support harmful or bad causes. However, depending on the strength of the monetary incentive, people will at one point switch to selfish behavior. When the authors reduced the excitability of the rTPJ using electromagnetic stimulation, the participants' moral behavior remained more stable.

"If we don't let the brain deliberate on conflicting moral and monetary values, people are more likely to stick to their moral convictions and aren't swayed, even by high financial incentives," explains Christian Ruff. According to the neuroeconomist, this is a remarkable finding, since: "In principle, it's also conceivable that people are intuitively guided by financial interests and only take the altruistic path as a result of their deliberations."

Brain region mediates conflicts

Although people's decisions were more social when they thought that their actions were being watched, this behavior was not affected by electromagnetic stimulation of the rTPJ. This means that considerations regarding one's reputation are processed in a different area of the brain. In addition, the electromagnetic stimulation led to no difference in the general motivation to help. Therefore, the authors concluded that the rTPJ is not home to altruistic motives per se, but rather to the ability to trade off moral and material values.

Experimental set-up

In the experimental set-up, the participants received money and were then presented with the opportunity to donate a varying sum to a charitable cause, at a cost to themselves, or donate a sum to an organization that supports the use of firearms, in which case they were rewarded. Some of these decisions were taken while other participants were watching, whereas others were taken in secret.

The researchers then analyzed the decisions the participants took, determining the monetary thresholds at which the participants switched from altruistic to selfish behavior. They compared these findings in settings with and without magnetic stimulation of the rTPJ area.

10.7554/eLife.40671

Disclaimer: AAAS and EurekAlert! are not responsible for the accuracy of news releases posted to EurekAlert! by contributing institutions or for the use of any information through the EurekAlert system.

Original Source

The Morality of Money

An Exploration in Analytic Philosophy

• © 2008
• Adrian Walsh 0 ,
• Tony Lynch 1

University of New England, Australia

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Rescuing tracking theories of morality

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Looking Back and the Way Ahead

• oral discourse

Table of contents (9 chapters)

Front matter, introduction.

Adrian Walsh, Tony Lynch

Money, Commerce and Moral Theory

The profit-motive and morality, usury and the ethics of interest-taking, the morality of pricing: just prices and moral traders, money, commodification and the corrosion of value: an examination of the sacred and intrinsic value, money-measurement as the moral problem, the charge of ‘economic moralism’: might the invisible hand eliminate the need for a morality of money, back matter, authors and affiliations, about the authors, bibliographic information.

Book Title : The Morality of Money

Book Subtitle : An Exploration in Analytic Philosophy

Authors : Adrian Walsh, Tony Lynch

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230227804

Publisher : Palgrave Macmillan London

eBook Packages : Palgrave Religion & Philosophy Collection , Philosophy and Religion (R0)

Copyright Information : Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2008

Hardcover ISBN : 978-0-230-53543-5 Published: 31 July 2008

Softcover ISBN : 978-0-230-53544-2 Published: 31 July 2008

eBook ISBN : 978-0-230-22780-4 Published: 31 July 2008

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : VIII, 255

Topics : Ethics , Moral Philosophy , Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods , Analytic Philosophy

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Does our system of credit and money make upward social mobility possible for anyone willing to work hard?  Or is it just a big Ponzi scheme?  Are corporations the essential structures necessary to harness the capital, energy, intelligence, and leadership on a scale large enough to make and market the inventions that define modern life?  Or are they just devices for evading responsibility and rewarding greed?   Ken and John put these questions and more to Neil Malhotra from the Stanford Graduate School of Business, in a program recorded in front of a live audience at the Classic Residence by Hyatt in Palo Alto, California.

Listening Notes

What do money and morality have to do with each other?  What are the ethics of business?  What obligations do corporations have to society as a whole?  Was the recent financial meltdown a result of immoral behavior?  In this edition of Philosophy Talk, John and Ken delve into these questions with the help of a live audience and guest Neil Malhotra, Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

The show begins with a discussion of corporations as moral agents.  Should corporations be treated as people, as full moral agents held responsible for their actions?  John argues that corporations are not people but rather devices to insulate people from the effects of their own decisions.  Ken, in the spirit of Locke, argues that people are defined as intelligent beings, capable of reason and reflection, with the ability of self recognition at different times and places.  Thus, he argues, it is metaphysically bizarre to call corporations people.  John agrees, but shifts the conversation from metaphysics to morals, questioning whether corporations should be responsible to just their shareholders or to the entire community.

Professor Neil Malhotra joins the discussion concerning moral and economic incentives for corporations, grounded in the case of the subprime mortgage crisis.  Under law, corporations are beholden only to their shareholders, instead of the larger pool of stakeholders, such as consumers, taxpayers, and third parties.  The shareholder model, Malhotra says, encourages short-term thinking, as the price of a stock share is reported every quarter.  Other countries, notably those with stronger traditions of family owned businesses, have adopted the stakeholder model.

The show concludes with a comparison of the European and American economic systems, noting the tradeoff between social welfare and social goods.  While the European economy would seem to stand on higher moral ground by providing social services, the U.S. economy is much more dynamic, with more growth and innovation.  John poses the questions, what if a firm decided to operate on a purely moral basis?  Would profits noticeably differ?  How can a corporation balance moral and economic incentives, so its actions have the most benefit and the least harm?

• Roving Philosophical Report (Seek to 6:51): Rina Palta speaks with Paul Perez, Managing Director of Northern Trust, about the role of trust in the subprime mortgage crisis.  Perez argues that morality and a healthy economy are mutually dependent.
• 60-Second Philosopher (Seek to 49:57):  Ian Shoales discusses the corporation and its role in society, tracing its origin from boroughs, guilds, and monasteries, to the East India Trade Company, to the contemporary American corporation motivated solely by profit.  

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Related Shows

The root of all evil, giving and keeping, related resources.

• Donaldson, Thomas (2008). Ethical Issues in Business:  A Philosophical Approach.
• Friedman, Daniel (2008).  Markets and Morals: An Evolutionary Account of the Modern World.
• (1776). The Wealth of Nations.
• (1749). The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Web Resources

• Business Ethics in Knowledge@Wharton (The Wharton School's online business journal.)
• The Corporation.com (website of the film The Corporation (2010).)
• Friedman, Milton (1970). “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits.” The New York Times Magazine. ( download .pdf )
• Marcoux, Alexei (2008). “Business Ethics.”  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Essay on Money

Introduction to The Power and Perils of Money

“Where Money Talks, Values Listen.”

Money is a fundamental aspect of modern society, serving as the lifeblood of economies and a cornerstone of daily life. Money holds immense significance in our lives, from facilitating transactions to influencing social dynamics. In this essay, we delve into the multifaceted nature of money, exploring its origins, functions, and profound impact on individuals and society.

As we navigate the complexities of money, we’ll unravel its historical roots, examine its various forms and functions, and delve into its role as a catalyst for economic growth and social change. Furthermore, we’ll explore the intricacies of personal finance, discussing the importance of financial literacy and responsible money management in achieving financial stability and well-being.

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Beyond its economic implications, we’ll also explore the broader societal effects of money, including its role in shaping social hierarchies, perpetuating economic inequality, and influencing political landscapes. Ultimately, this essay aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the significance of money in our lives, shedding light on its profound impact on both individual prosperity and societal dynamics.

Origin and Evolution of Money

Money has been an essential part of human civilizations for thousands of years in all its manifestations. From basic barter systems to complex financial tools of the present day, money has always been important. Understanding the origin and evolution of money provides crucial insights into its significance and impact on society.

1. Barter Economy and the Emergence of Money:

• Barter System: In primitive societies, individuals engaged in barter, exchanging goods and services based on mutual needs, with each person trading one commodity for another. Limitations of the barter system, including the “double coincidence of wants,” led to inefficiencies and logistical challenges.
• Evolution to Commodity Money: Commodity money emerged as a solution to the shortcomings of barter, with certain items, such as cattle, grains, or precious metals, gaining widespread acceptance as mediums of exchange. Commodity money possessed intrinsic value and was universally recognized, facilitating trade and commerce across regions.

2. Development of Metal Coins:

• Introduction of Metal Coins: Metal coins, particularly gold and silver, emerged as standardized forms of currency in ancient civilizations, including Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Greece. Metal coins facilitated trade by providing a convenient and durable medium of exchange, standardized in terms of weight and purity.
• Coinage and State Authority: The minting of coins became centralized under the authority of states and rulers, leading to the establishment of monetary systems and the issuing of official currency. Coinage symbolized the sovereignty and power of states, with rulers often inscribing their images and symbols on coins as a means of propaganda and control.

3. Transition to Fiat Money:

• Rise of Paper Money: With the expansion of trade and commerce, the need for a more flexible and portable form of money led to the introduction of paper currency. Paper money initially represented claims to a specific quantity of precious metals, serving as promissory notes issued by banks and governments.
• Decoupling from Precious Metals: Over time, central banks and governments gradually abandoned the linkage between paper money and precious metals, transitioning currencies to fiat money and deriving their value from the trust and confidence of users rather than intrinsic value. Adopting fiat money allowed for greater flexibility in monetary policy and facilitated the expansion of credit and financial markets.

4. Evolution of Digital and Cryptocurrencies:

• Digital Currency: Digital currencies, electronic records with monetary value saved in digital form, result from the Internet’s and electronic banking’s development. Digital currencies, such as electronic bank transfers and payment systems, revolutionized how money is transferred and accessed, offering convenience and efficiency.
• Cryptocurrencies: Blockchain -based cryptocurrencies, like Ethereum and Bitcoin , are examples of decentralized digital money. Cryptocurrencies provide increased privacy, security, and decentralization but also present regulatory and stability concerns because they function independently of governments and central banks.

The Basic Need for Money

• Meeting Basic Needs: Money is essential for meeting basic human needs, such as food, shelter, clothes, and healthcare. Access to money enables individuals to purchase necessary goods and services for survival and well-being, ensuring a decent standard of living.
• Facilitating Economic Transactions: Money serves as a medium of exchange, enabling the exchange of goods and services in the marketplace. It enables individuals to engage in economic transactions, buy goods, pay for services, and participate in economic activities that contribute to economic growth and development.
• Access to Education and Skills Development: Money is necessary for education and skills development opportunities. Investing in education and training enhances individuals’ knowledge, skills, and employability, leading to better job prospects and higher earning potential.
• Healthcare and Medical Services: Money is vital for healthcare services and medical treatment. Individuals require financial resources to pay for medical expenses, health insurance, and access to quality healthcare facilities, ensuring their physical well-being and addressing health-related concerns.
• Housing and Shelter: Money is essential for securing housing and shelter providing individuals and families with a safe and stable living environment. Access to affordable housing options requires financial resources for rent, mortgage payments, or property ownership, ensuring adequate housing for individuals and communities.
• Transportation and Mobility: Money facilitates transportation and mobility, enabling individuals to travel for work, education, healthcare, and recreational purposes. Access to transportation choices, such as public transit, vehicles, or ride-sharing services, requires financial resources to cover transportation costs and maintain mobility.
• Emergency Preparedness and Resilience: Money is crucial for building emergency funds and financial resilience. Having savings and financial resources enables individuals to prepare for unexpected expenses, emergencies, and financial setbacks, providing a safety net during challenging times.
• Social and Recreational Activities: Money plays a role in accessing social and recreational activities that contribute to overall well-being and quality of life. Participating in leisure activities, entertainment, and social events often requires financial resources to cover expenses related to leisure pursuits and social engagements.

The Role of Money in Society

Money is a cornerstone of societal structures, influencing economic activities, social relationships, and individual well-being. Its multifaceted role extends beyond a mere medium of exchange, encompassing various functions integral to modern societies’ functioning.

1. Economic Significance of Money:

• Facilitating Trade and Commerce: Money acts as a universally accepted medium of exchange, facilitating the soft flow of goods and facilities in the market. Eliminating the need for direct barter enhances efficiency and encourages specialization in production.
• Measurement of Value: Money provides a common unit of account, allowing for the standardized measurement of the value of different goods and services. This function enables individuals to compare prices, make informed decisions, and confidently engage in economic transactions.
• Economic Growth and Development: A stable and reliable monetary system fosters economic growth and development . Governments and central banks use monetary policy tools to regulate money supply, interest rates, and inflation to maintain economic stability.

2. Social Significance of Money:

• Influence on Social Status and Power: The possession of wealth and financial resources often correlates with social status and power within a community. Economic disparities can create social hierarchies, impacting individuals’ access to opportunities and resources.
• Impact on Lifestyle and Standard of Living: The availability of financial resources influences an individual’s lifestyle and standard of living. Money provides access to education, healthcare, housing, and other essential services, shaping the quality of life for individuals and communities.

3. Money and Personal Finance:

• Importance of Financial Literacy: Financial education empowers people to make informed decisions about earning, spending, saving, and investing. Understanding the principles of personal finance is essential for achieving financial security and long-term well-being.
• Managing Personal Finances: Budgeting, saving, and investing are key to effective personal finance management. Individuals must make strategic financial decisions to meet their short-term and long-term goals.
• Psychological Aspects of Money: People often tie money to their emotions and psychological well-being. Developing a healthy money mindset involves understanding one’s relationship with money and addressing any emotional factors that may impact financial decisions.

4. Impact of Money on Society:

• Economic Inequality: The distribution of wealth and income in society can contribute to economic inequality. Addressing issues of inequality requires a nuanced understanding of the role of money and the implementation of policies that promote equitable wealth distribution.
• Consumerism and Materialism: Money influences consumer behavior , contributing to a culture of consumerism and materialism. Society’s emphasis on material possessions can impact individuals’ values and priorities.
• Influence on Politics and Governance: Money plays a significant role in political processes, affecting campaigns, lobbying, and policy decisions. The intersection of money and politics raises questions about transparency, accountability, and the democratic process.
• Environmental Implications: Economic activities driven by the pursuit of profit can have environmental consequences. Balancing economic growth with environmental sustainability requires careful consideration of the environmental impact of monetary and economic policies.

Functions of Money

• Medium of Exchange
• Money is a widely acknowledged medium of exchange for goods and services, facilitating transactions between buyers and sellers.
• It eliminates the inefficiencies of barter by providing a common unit of value that simplifies the exchange process.
• Unit of Account:
• Money provides a standardized unit of measurement for the value of goods and services, permitting easy comparison of prices and making economic calculations more efficient.
• It enables individuals and businesses to express the relative worth of different goods and services in terms of a common currency.
• Store of Value:
• Money serves as a store of value, permitting individuals to hold and accumulate wealth over time.
• Unlike perishable goods or assets with fluctuating value, money retains its purchasing power over extended periods, providing a reliable means of preserving wealth.
• Standard of Deferred Payment:
• Money facilitates transactions involving future obligations by serving as a medium for deferred payments.
• Contracts, loans, and other financial agreements often stipulate payments in a specific currency, with money as the standard for settling debts and fulfilling obligations.
• Money’s high liquidity enables it to be readily convertible into goods, services, or other assets without experiencing a significant loss of value.
• Its liquidity enables individuals to quickly access funds for urgent expenses or investment opportunities, contributing to economic flexibility and efficiency.
• Measure of Value:
• Money is a measure of value, providing a common denominator for expressing the worth of different goods and services.
• Its role as a measure of value facilitates economic decision-making, allowing individuals to assess the relative utility and worth of various goods and services.
• Facilitates Specialization and Efficiency:
• Money enables specialization and division of labor by allowing individuals and businesses to focus on producing goods and assistance in which they have a comparative advantage.
• Specialization leads to increased productivity and efficiency, driving economic growth and prosperity.
• Portability and Durability:
• Money is highly portable and durable, making it a convenient medium of interaction for transactions of varying sizes and distances.
• The physical forms of money (such as coins and banknotes) and their digital representation ensure ease of transportation and storage, contributing to its widespread use in modern economies.

The Ethics and Morality of Money

While essential for economic transactions and societal functioning, money raises ethical and moral considerations beyond its economic utility. From wealth distribution issues to the impact of financial decisions on individuals and society, exploring the ethical dimensions of money sheds light on complex moral dilemmas and societal values.

• Wealth Distribution and Economic Inequality: One of the most significant ethical concerns about money is the unequal distribution of wealth and income within societies. Critics argue that extreme wealth disparities contribute to social injustice and perpetuate systemic inequalities, raising questions about fairness and equity.
• Social Responsibility of Wealth: Accumulating wealth brings with it a moral obligation to contribute to society’s well-being. Concepts like philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and impact investing highlight the ethical imperative for individuals and organizations to use their financial resources for the greater good.
• Ethical Consumption and Consumerism: Consumerism fueled by the pursuit of material wealth raises ethical questions about consumption patterns’ environmental and social impact. Ethical consumption movements advocate for mindful spending and sustainable lifestyles that consider the broader consequences of consumer choices.
• Ethics in Financial Services: The financial industry operates within a complex ethical landscape, with issues like transparency, conflicts of interest, and fair treatment of clients coming under scrutiny. Ethical codes of conduct and regulations aim to promote integrity and trust in financial services, ensuring that financial professionals prioritize the interests of their clients.
• Debt and Financial Vulnerability: Ethical considerations arise in lending practices, particularly regarding the responsible provision of credit and the treatment of borrowers, especially those in vulnerable financial situations. Predatory lending practices and exploitative debt arrangements raise ethical concerns about the consequences of financial transactions on individuals’ well-being.
• Corruption and Financial Crime: Money laundering, bribery, and other forms of financial crime undermine the integrity of financial systems and pose ethical challenges to businesses, governments, and individuals. Ethical frameworks and legal regulations aim to combat financial corruption and promote accountability and transparency in financial transactions.
• Psychological Impact of Money: Money’s influence on individuals’ attitudes, behaviors, and relationships raises ethical questions about the psychological effects of wealth and materialism. The pursuit of wealth can lead to ethical dilemmas related to greed, envy, and the prioritization of financial gain over other values.
• Cryptocurrency and Ethical Considerations: Emerging digital currencies, such as cryptocurrencies, introduce new ethical considerations related to privacy, security, and the potential for illegal activities like money laundering and fraud. Ethical discussions surrounding cryptocurrencies also touch on financial inclusivity, decentralization, and the democratization of finance.

Financial Education

Financial education is essential to enable people to make informed decisions concerning their money, investments, and overall economic well-being. It covers many topics, from basic budgeting and savings to more complex concepts like investing, debt relief, and retirement planning. The need for financial literacy is huge in today’s complex financial world, where individuals are more accountable for their financial future.

• Foundational Knowledge: Basic financial concepts like income, expenses, budgeting, and savings are the first things students learn about when they start their financial education. Comprehending these underlying concepts establishes the foundation for prudent financial judgment and accountable handling of finances.
• Budgeting and Saving: Effective budgeting and saving are essential for financial education. Individuals learn how to create and stick to a budget, allocate funds for essential expenses, savings, and discretionary spending, and build an emergency fund to weather unforeseen financial challenges.
• Debt Management: Financial education teaches individuals about managing debt responsibly, including understanding different types of debt, interest rates, and repayment strategies. It emphasizes the importance of avoiding excessive debt and using credit wisely to maintain financial health.
• Investing and Wealth Accumulation: Investing is a key aspect of financial education, enabling individuals to grow their wealth over the long term. Topics covered may include understanding investment options (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc.), risk tolerance, asset allocation, and strategies for assembling a diversified investment portfolio.
• Retirement Planning: Financial education helps individuals plan for their future financial security, including retirement. It covers retirement savings vehicles (e.g., employer-sponsored retirement plans, IRAs), estimating retirement expenses, and developing a strategy to achieve retirement goals.
• Risk Management and Insurance: Understanding risk management and insurance is integral to financial education. Individuals learn about different types of insurance (e.g., health, life, property) and how insurance can mitigate financial risks and protect against unexpected events.
• Financial Decision-making: Financial education supplies individuals with the knowledge and skills to make instructed financial decisions based on their goals, values, and circumstances. It encourages critical thinking and evaluating financial products and services, empowering individuals to navigate the financial marketplace effectively.
• Economic Empowerment: Financial education is a tool for economic empowerment, particularly for marginalized communities and underserved populations. Promoting financial literacy and capability helps individuals build financial resilience, reduce vulnerability to financial exploitation, and achieve greater economic independence.
• Lifelong Learning: Financial education is a lifelong journey with changing financial circumstances and economic conditions. It emphasizes the importance of ongoing learning, staying informed about financial trends and developments, and adapting financial strategies as needed throughout life.
• Social and Policy Implications: Financial education has broader social and policy implications, influencing financial inclusion, economic mobility, and societal well-being. Policies that promote financial education in schools, workplaces, and communities can contribute to building a financially literate society and reducing financial disparities.

Money in the Digital Age

• Digital Payments and Transactions: The addition of digital payment methods, including mobile wallets, online banking, and peer-to-peer payment platforms, has reshaped the conduct of transactions. Digital payments offer convenience, speed, and accessibility, allowing individuals to transfer funds, make purchases, and manage finances seamlessly across various digital channels.
• Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology: Cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, represent a decentralized digital currency powered by blockchain technology. Blockchain technology enables secure, transparent, and tamper-proof transactions without intermediaries like banks or financial institutions.
• Financial Inclusion and Access: The digitalization of money can promote financial inclusion by delivering access to financial services for underserved populations. Digital payment platforms and mobile banking services empower individuals in small areas or underserved communities to participate in the formal financial system.
• Challenges and Risks: Despite the benefits, the digitalization of money presents challenges and risks, including cybersecurity threats, data privacy concerns, and regulatory challenges. Fraud, hacking, and data breaches highlight the importance of robust cybersecurity measures and regulatory frameworks to protect consumers and maintain trust in digital financial systems.
• Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs): Central banks are exploring the vision of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) as a digital alternative to traditional fiat currencies. CBDCs combine the advantages of digital currencies with the stability and regulatory oversight provided by central banks, potentially reshaping the future of money and monetary policy.
• Smart Contracts and Decentralized Finance (DeFi): Smart contracts, facilitated by blockchain technology, automate and enforce the words of contracts without intermediaries. Decentralized finance (DeFi) leverages blockchain and innovative contract technology to create decentralized financial services outside traditional banking systems, including lending, borrowing, and trading.
• Cross-Border Transactions and Remittances: Digital currency and blockchain technologies promise to stream international transfers and reduce expenses and inadequacies linked to conventional remittance systems. Cryptocurrencies and stablecoins offer an alternative means of transferring value globally, bypassing traditional banking channels and intermediaries.
• Regulatory Landscape and Policy Considerations: Governments and officials face regulatory hurdles due to the rapid evolution of digital currency. Regulatory frameworks must actively update to consider the changing landscape of digital finance to preserve consumer protection, financial stability, and compliance with know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) regulations.

Money is a cornerstone of modern society, serving as a medium of exchange, store of value, and facilitator of economic activities. Its significance extends beyond financial transactions, impacting individuals’ access to basic needs, economic opportunities, and overall well-being. Understanding the multifaceted role of money is crucial for promoting financial literacy, responsible money management, and equitable access to financial resources in today’s complex socioeconomic landscape.

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Money and Markets vs. Social Morals Essay

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Introduction

How these assertions are true, works cited.

Michael Sandel was correct in asserting that some aspects of life should never be tainted by money. Money has a perverting effect that devalues human life as well as human relationships. Additionally, it leads to inequality and may even destroy relationships.

Several cultures illustrate the meaning of money by the way they treat it. Some of the results that emanate from excessive proliferation of money are both undesirable and untenable in today’s society.

Sandel (4) explained that the recent, global financial crisis illustrated the imperfections of the market economy. It proved that markets were not effective at allocating risks and was thus ill-suited for certain aspects of life. The proliferation of money into aspects of society that depend on other norms is the root cause of the financial crisis (Sandel 5).

These patterns have also created other crises in society like inequality and corruption. Polanyi (43) explains that liberal economic theorists made a mistake to assume that human behaviour is governed by the need to maximise profits. This is not true for several aspects of life. In fact, prior to the creation of free markets, societies were governed by the need for reciprocity or redistribution.

A typical case is a family in the Trobriand Islands. Persons in this culture focus on subsistence and redistribution through feasts. In other societies, people can be motivated by the need to enhance their national security. Therefore, profit maximisation would be secondary to this goal. The problem with excessive domination of money in society is the subversion of social relations.

When markets penetrate almost all dimensions of life, they may lead to inequality (Sandel 5). This is because money would be the key to success in all spheres. Such a means of exchange would make the difference between acquisition of basic needs and the lack of them. Affluence would dramatically affect the quality of one’s life and thus widen the gap between the rich and the poor.

Commoditisation of public land by enclosures limits access to this vital resource and thus causes dependence on others (employers) (Polanyi 102). Privatisation and sale of certain commodities, like public land, threatens society because it leads to unrest. This process of putting a price to communal land, through enclosures, increases its value, which makes it inaccessible to the large majority.

Many individuals may become frustrated at their inability to acquire property and thus revolt against property owners. Penetration of money into communal property may also lead to adverse environmental consequences such as pollution, deforestation, disruption of craftsmanship and housing.

Living in a pollution-free environment or having skilled and creating craftsmen are all goals that have nothing to do with profit-maximisation; they are instead pegged on human relations and well being.

Sandel (6) points out that money has a corrosive effect when it reaches other spheres of life because it fosters unwanted attitudes towards the items being exchanged. For instance, when private security firms replace army personnel in wars, countries may save their people’s lives, but this may devalue citizenship.

As such, money will have promoted a perverted attitude towards such a crucial ideology. Additionally, if potential mothers choose to pay surrogate mothers for their services regardless of their fertility status, then this devalues motherhood. When money enters such realms of life, it corrupts their true value.

Unlike what previous economists had stated, money is not value-free; every transaction means something to entities participating in it. In fact, the effect of the values that money creates is so influential that it may sometimes neutralise or eliminate the non –market values affecting that activity.

If money were involved in all human activities then it would ruin human relationships. Hart (13) explains that money was not always regarded as impersonal. In traditional societies, people often carried out transactions with individuals they knew. Therefore, they could exercise discretion over the nature or the kind of person that they interacted with.

However, modern society changed this when it was perceived that exchanges would take place in markets, where seemingly unattached individuals met anonymously and exchanged goods. Therefore, one would argue that the impersonal nature of this approach would lead to desirable effects. However, this is not true for several transactions because the state makes this discretion for an individual.

A person who qualifies for a loan from a bank proves that he or she is trustworthy and that he deserves the loan. Alternatively, if one receives payment from one’s employers, then the person testifies to his hard work and commitment to the organisation. Whenever an individual is exposed to a situation where he or she receives money for services rendered, then the transaction testifies to that person’s character.

Not many people understand this truth as they assume that money is impersonal. They also think that such factors only hold true for traditional societies which were highly interpersonal. Money sometimes masks the usefulness of human relationships and characteristics because of the anonymity it provides.

As a result, its proliferation in different aspects of interaction should be re-examined for effectiveness. Only the most prudent individuals will refrain from hiding behind the anonymity of money and truly look into the character of the person they are transacting with.

Zelizer (133) adds that money is not objective depending on the people using it and the activities they partake. For instance, if one won money in a lottery, they would spend that money in a different way than if a friend loaned them the money. Even recipients of money have a profound effect on how the money will be used.

For instance, a waitress can be tipped by a client but one cannot do the same to a policeman man as this would be perceived as a bribe. Additionally, one may have certain intentions for their money. For instance, they may opt to save it for a rainy day or pay rent with it. All these decisions prove that money is not an objective thing.

Therefore, individuals have the right to make decisions regarding how permissive they want to make money. They can make choices on the suitability of a certain activity to a market. Individuals ought to know that engaging in transactions does not delineate them from cultural and social constraints.

Since money has such a powerful effect, then its applicability in life ought to be done very selectively. Zelizer (18) elegantly says that “Money does serve as a key rational tool of the modern economic market; it also exists outside the sphere of the market and is profoundly influenced by social and cultural structures”. Since this is true, then its effect ought to be limited only to certain aspects of life.

Certain items should not be commoditised because money cannot reflect their true value. For instance, one cannot sell one’s baby as this would demean the value of that human life. No matter how unprepared one was for motherhood, it would be immoral to sell a child because that would undermine the value of that child.

All humans deserve to be treated with dignity and respect; consequently, selling them to others for a certain sum of money would be denying them that right.

Public goods are also activities that must be delineated from monetary transactions as they also reflect certain values. Introducing money into the system would destroy these values. For instance, one cannot pay another person to vote for them because this is one’s civic duty.

Public responsibilities cannot be quantified and sold to the highest bidder (Sandel 7). Mauss (67) explains that collective rights exist in almost all countries around the world. When an elderly person falls ill, he or she has the right to access certain forms of protection such as Medicare for the elderly.

These protections stem from the life and labour that a worker provided to his employer and his country in general. This labour is a gift which ought to be returned. Mauss (13) affirms that gift giving has a spirit known as hau. When an individual receives a gift, he or she experiences feelings of reciprocity that will prompt him to return the hau.

Likewise, when a worker has dedicated his entire life towards a certain career, then chances are that wages earned are not enough to compensate for this gift. Governments need to guarantee such workers another social benefit like health insurance in order to reciprocate their hau.

Therefore, public services ought to be perceived as purchases because they are a form of gift for the input that the worker gave throughout his life. On the flipside, if a government pays people unemployment benefits even before they start working, then chances are that the individuals will not experience feelings of reciprocity.

In this regard, they will become dependent on the state as no sense of duty will exist. When public services are treated as transactions, then an unhealthy relationship exists between the government and the beneficiaries. Money would destroy that sense of duty unless it is done in the context of gift-giving.

Money should not pervade all activities in society; the responsible thing to do is to make calculated choices about which activities are suitable for market economies and which ones are not. Society has a tendency to choose the easy way out because it does not involve the painstaking process of moral judgements. Markets have pervaded different aspects of society because they are non judgmental and unbiased.

However, if this state of affairs is left to continue, then chances are that societies will become more corrupt and more unequal. Commodities or transactions often imply rationality and other undesirable traits such as individualism, impersonal relations and material gain.

Conversely, gifts represent moral obligations, personal relations, collective responsibility and non monetary rewards. Gifts are the glue that holds a society together while markets and commodities drive them apart (Parry 55). Capitalism has contributed to excessive focus on commodities and little emphasis on human relationships. A balance ought to be restored in order to make society fair again.

Hart, Keith. “Money is always Personal and Impersonal.” Anthropology Today 23.5(2007): 12-16. Print.

Mauss, Marcel. The gift . London: Routledge, 1990. Print.

Parry, James. The gift, the Indian gift and the ‘Indian gift ‘. NS: Man, 1986. Print.

Polanyi, Karl. The great transformation. New York: Rinehart, 1944. Print.

Sandel, Michael. What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. Harvard: HUP, 2010. Print.

Zelizer, Viviana. The Social Meaning of Money: pin money, paychecks, poor relief and other currencies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Print.

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Moral Theory

There is much disagreement about what, exactly, constitutes a moral theory. Some of that disagreement centers on the issue of demarcating the moral from other areas of practical normativity, such as the ethical and the aesthetic. Some disagreement centers on the issue of what a moral theory’s aims and functions are. In this entry, both questions will be addressed. However, this entry is about moral theories as theories , and is not a survey of specific theories, though specific theories will be used as examples.

1.1 Common-sense Morality

1.2 contrasts between morality and other normative domains, 2.1 the tasks of moral theory, 2.2 theory construction, 3. criteria, 4. decision procedures and practical deliberation, other internet resources, related entries, 1. morality.

When philosophers engage in moral theorizing, what is it that they are doing? Very broadly, they are attempting to provide a systematic account of morality. Thus, the object of moral theorizing is morality, and, further, morality as a normative system.

At the most minimal, morality is a set of norms and principles that govern our actions with respect to each other and which are taken to have a special kind of weight or authority (Strawson 1961). More fundamentally, we can also think of morality as consisting of moral reasons, either grounded in some more basic value, or, the other way around, grounding value (Raz 1999).

It is common, also, to hold that moral norms are universal in the sense that they apply to and bind everyone in similar circumstances. The principles expressing these norms are also thought to be general , rather than specific, in that they are formulable “without the use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite descriptions” (Rawls 1979, 131). They are also commonly held to be impartial , in holding everyone to count equally.

… Common-sense is… an exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system of rules : such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no established principles to guide us … we must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skillful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common-Sense. (Richard Whatley, Elements of Logic , 1851, xi–xii)

“Common-Sense Morality”, as the term is used here, refers to our pre-theoretic set of moral judgments or intuitions or principles. [ 1 ] When we engage in theory construction (see below) it is these common-sense intuitions that provide a touchstone to theory evaluation. Henry Sidgwick believed that the principles of Common-Sense Morality were important in helping us understand the “first” principle or principles of morality. [ 2 ] Indeed, some theory construction explicitly appeals to puzzles in common-sense morality that need resolution – and hence, need to be addressed theoretically.

Features of commons sense morality are determined by our normal reactions to cases which in turn suggest certain normative principles or insights. For example, one feature of common-sense morality that is often remarked upon is the self/other asymmetry in morality, which manifests itself in a variety of ways in our intuitive reactions. For example, many intuitively differentiate morality from prudence in holding that morality concerns our interactions with others, whereas prudence is concerned with the well-being of the individual, from that individual’s point of view.

Also, according to our common-sense intuitions we are allowed to pursue our own important projects even if such pursuit is not “optimific” from the impartial point of view (Slote 1985). It is also considered permissible, and even admirable, for an agent to sacrifice her own good for the sake of another even though that is not optimific. However, it is impermissible, and outrageous, for an agent to similarly sacrifice the well-being of another under the same circumstances. Samuel Scheffler argued for a view in which consequentialism is altered to include agent-centered prerogatives, that is, prerogatives to not act so as to maximize the good (Scheffler 1982).

Our reactions to certain cases also seem to indicate a common-sense commitment to the moral significance of the distinction between intention and foresight, doing versus allowing, as well as the view that distance between agent and patient is morally relevant (Kamm 2007).

Philosophers writing in empirical moral psychology have been working to identify other features of common-sense morality, such as how prior moral evaluations influence how we attribute moral responsibility for actions (Alicke et. al. 2011; Knobe 2003).

What many ethicists agree upon is that common-sense is a bit of a mess. It is fairly easy to set up inconsistencies and tensions between common-sense commitments. The famous Trolley Problem thought experiments illustrate how situations which are structurally similar can elicit very different intuitions about what the morally right course of action would be (Foot 1975). We intuitively believe that it is worse to kill someone than to simply let the person die. And, indeed, we believe it is wrong to kill one person to save five others in the following scenario:

David is a great transplant surgeon. Five of his patients need new parts—one needs a heart, the others need, respectively, liver, stomach, spleen, and spinal cord—but all are of the same, relatively rare, blood-type. By chance, David learns of a healthy specimen with that very blood-type. David can take the healthy specimen's parts, killing him, and install them in his patients, saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen's parts, letting his patients die. (Thomson 1976, 206)

And yet, in the following scenario we intuitively view it entirely permissible, and possibly even obligatory, to kill one to save five:

Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off to the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately there is one person on the right-hand track. Edward can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five. (Thomson 1976, 206).

Theorizing is supposed to help resolve those tensions in a principled way. Theory construction attempts to provide guidance in how to resolve such tensions and how to understand them.

1.2.1 Morality and Ethics

Ethics is generally understood to be the study of “living well as a human being”. This is the topic of works such as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , in which the aim of human beings is to exemplify human excellence of character. The sense in which we understand it here is that ethics is broader than morality, and includes considerations of personal development of oneself and loved ones. This personal development is important to a life well lived, intuitively, since our very identities are centered on projects that we find important. Bernard Williams and others refer to these projects as “ground projects”. These are the sources of many of our reasons for acting. For Williams, if an agent seeks to adopt moral considerations, or be guided by them, then important ethical considerations are neglected, such as personal integrity and authenticity (Williams 1977; Wolf 1982). However, Williams has a very narrow view of what he famously termed “the morality system” (Williams 1985).

Williams lists a variety of objectionable features of the morality system, including the inescapability of moral obligations, the overridingness of moral obligation, impartiality , and the fact that in the morality system there is a push towards generalization .

There has been considerable discussion of each of these features of the morality system, and since Williams, a great deal of work on the part of standard moral theorists on how each theory addresses the considerations he raised. Williams’ critique of the morality system was part of a general criticism of moral theory in the 1980s on the grounds of its uselessness, harmfulness, and even its impossibility (Clarke 1987). This anti-theory trend was prompted by the same dissatisfaction with consequentialism and deontology that led to the resurgence of Virtue Ethics.

A major criticism of this view is that it has a very narrow view of what counts as a moral theory. Thus, some of these approaches simply rejected some features of William’s characterization of the morality system, such as impartiality. Others, however, Williams’ included, attacked the very project of moral theory. This is the ‘anti-theory’ attack on moral theorizing. For example, Annette Baier argued that morality cannot be captured in a system of rules, and this was a very popular theme amongst early virtue ethicists. On this view, moral theory which systematizes and states the moral principles that ought to guide actions is simply impossible: “Norms in the form of virtues may be essentially imprecise in some crucial ways, may be mutually referential, but not hierarchically orderable, may be essentially self-referential” (Baier 220).

Robert Louden even argued that the best construal of virtue ethics is not as an ethical theory, but as anti-theory that should not be evaluated as attempting to theorize morality at all. (Louden 1990). According to Louden, moral theories are formulated to a variety of reasons, including to provide solutions to problems, formulas for action, universal principles, etc. Louden notes that this characterization is very narrow and many would object to it, but he views anti-theory not so much as a position against any kind of moral theorizing, but simply the kind that he viewed as predominant prior to the advent of Virtue Ethics. This is a much less severe version of anti-theory as it, for example, doesn’t seem to regard weightiness or importance of moral reasons as a problem.

Some of the problems that Williams and other anti-theorists have posed for morality, based on the above characteristics, are:

Morality is too demanding and pervasive: that is, the view that moral reasons are weighty indicates that we should be giving them priority over other sorts of reasons. Further, they leach into all aspects of our lives, leaving very little morally neutral.

Morality is alienating. There are a variety of ways in which morality can be alienating. As Adrian Piper notes, morality might alienate the agent from herself or might alienate the agent from others – impartiality and universality might lead to this, for example (Piper 1987; Stocker 1976). Another way we can understand alienation is that the agent is alienated from the true justifications of her own actions – this is one way to hold that theories which opt for indirection can lead to alienation (see section 4 below).

Morality, because it is impartial, makes no room for special obligations. That is, if the right action is the one that is impartial between persons, then it does not favor the near and dear. On this picture it is difficult to account for the moral requirements that parents have towards their own children, and friends have towards each other. These requirements are, by their nature, not impartial.

Morality is committed to providing guides for action that can be captured in a set of rules or general principles. That is, morality is codifiable and the rules of morality are general.

Morality requires too much. The basic worry is that the morality system is voracious and is creeping into all aspects of our lives, to the detriment of other important values. The worry expressed by 4 takes a variety of forms. For example, some take issue with a presupposition of 4, arguing that there are no moral principles at all if we think of these principles as guiding action . Some argue that there are no moral principles that are complete, because morality is not something that is codifiable . And, even if morality was codifiable, the ‘principles’ would be extremely specific , and not qualify as principles at all.

Since Williams’ work, philosophers have tried to respond to the alienation worry by, for example, providing accounts of the ways in which a person’s reasons can guide without forming an explicit part of practical deliberation. Peter Railton, for example, argues in favor of a form of objective consequentialism, Sophisticated Consequentialism , in which the rightness of an action is a function of its actual consequences (Railton 1984). On Railton’s view, one can be a good consequentialist without being alienated from loved ones. Though not attempting to defend moral theory per se , other writers have also provided accounts of how agents can act on the basis of reasons – and thus perform morally worthy actions, even though these reasons are not explicitly articulated in their practical deliberations (Arpaly 2002; Markovits 2014). Deontologists have argued that autonomous action needn’t involve explicit invocation of, for example, the Categorical Imperative (Herman 1985). Generally, what characterizes these moves is the idea that the justifying reasons are present in some form in the agent’s psychology – they are recoverable from the agent’s psychology – but need not be explicitly articulated or invoked by the agent in acting rightly.

One way to elaborate on this strategy is to argue that the morally good agent is one who responds to the right sorts of reasons, even though the agent can’t articulate the nature of the response (Arpaly 2002). This strategy makes no appeal to codifiable principles, and is compatible with a wide variety of approaches to developing a moral theory. It relies heavily on the concept, of course, of “reason” and “moral reason,” which many writers on moral issues take to be fundamental or basic in any case.

There has also been debate concerning the proper scope of morality, and how moral theories can address problems relating to impartiality. Kant and the classical utilitarians believed that moral reasons are impartial, what others have termed agent-neutral. Indeed, this is one point of criticism that virtue ethics has made of these two theories. One might argue that moral reasons are impartial, but that there are other reasons that successfully compete with them – reasons relating to the near and dear, for example, or one’s own ground projects. Or, one could hold that morality includes special reasons, arising from special obligations, that also morally justify our actions.

The first strategy has been pursued by Bernard Williams and other “anti-theorists”. Again, Williams argues that morality is a special system that we would be better off without (Williams 1985). In the morality system we see a special sense of “obligation” – moral obligation – which possesses certain features. For example, moral obligation is inescapable according to the morality system. A theory such as Kant’s, for example, holds that we must act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. It is not optional. This is because morality is represented as having authority over us in ways that even demand sacrifice of our personal projects, of the very things that make our lives go well for us. This seems especially clear for Utilitarianism, which holds that we must maximize the good, and falling short of maximization is wrong . A Kantian will try to avoid this problem by appealing to obligations that are less demanding, the imperfect ones. But, as Williams points out, these are still obligations , and as such can only be overridden by other obligations. Thus, the theories also tend to present morality as pervasive in that morality creeps into every aspect of our lives, making no room for neutral decisions. For example, even decisions about what shoes to wear to work becomes a moral one:

Once the journey into more general obligations has started, we may begin to get into trouble – not just philosophical trouble, but the conscience trouble – with finding room for morally indifferent actions. I have already mentioned the possible moral conclusion that one may take some particular course of action. That means that there is nothing else I am obliged to do. But if we have accepted general and indeterminate obligations to further various moral objectives…they will be waiting to provide work for idle hands… (Williams 1985, 181)

He goes on to write that in order to get out of this problem, “…I shall need one of those fraudulent items, a duty to myself” (Williams 1985, 182). Kantian Ethics does supply this. Many find this counterintuitive, since the self/other asymmetry seems to capture the prudence/morality distinction, but Kantians such as Tom Hill, jr. have made strong cases for at least some moral duties to the self. In any case, for writers such as Williams, so much the worse for morality .

Other writers, also concerned about the problems that Williams has raised argue, instead, that morality does make room for our partial concerns and projects, such as the norms governing our relationships, and our meaningful projects. Virtue ethicists, for example, are often comfortable pointing out that morality is not thoroughly impartial because there are virtues of partiality. Being a good mother involves having a preference for the well-being of one’s own children. The mother who really is impartial would be a very bad mother, lacking in the appropriate virtues.

Another option is to hold that there are partial norms, but those partial norms are themselves justified on impartial grounds. This can be spelled out in a variety of different ways. Consider Marcia Baron’s defense of impartiality, where she notes that critics of impartiality are mistaken because they confuse levels of justification: “Critics suppose that impartialists insisting on impartiality at the level of rules or principles are committed to insisting on impartiality at the level of deciding what to do in one’s day-to-day activities” (Baron 1991). This is a mistake because impartialists can justify partial norms by appealing to impartial rules or principles. She is correct about this. Even Jeremy Bentham believed, for example, that the principle of utility ought not be applied in every case, though he mainly appealed to efficiency costs of using the principle all the time. But one can appeal to other considerations. Frank Jackson uses an analogy with predators to argue that partial norms are strategies for maximizing the good, they offer the best chance of actually doing so given our limitations (Jackson 1991). Similarly, a Kantian such as Tom Hill, jr., as Baron notes, can argue that impartiality is part of an ideal, and ought not govern our day-to-day lives (Hill 1987). Does this alienate people from others? The typical mother shows the right amount of preference for her child, let’s say, but doesn’t herself think that this is justified on the basis of promoting the good, for example. A friend visits another in the hospital and also does not view the partiality as justified by any further principles. But this is no more alienating than someone being able to make good arguments and criticize bad ones without a knowledge of inference rules. Maybe it is better to have an awareness of the underlying justification, but for some theories even that is debatable. For an objective theorist (see below) it may be that knowing the underlying justification can interfere with doing the right thing, in which case it is better not to know. For some theorists, however, such as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists, a person is not truly virtuous without such knowledge and understanding, though Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) does not make this a requirement of right action.

Recently consequentialists have been approaching this issue through the theory of value itself, arguing that there are agent-relative forms of value. This approach is able to explain the intuitions that support partial moral norms while retaining the general structure of consequentialism (Sen 2000). Douglas Portmore, for example, argues for a form of consequentialism that he terms “commonsense consequentialism” as it is able to accommodate many of our everyday moral intuitions (Portmore 2011). He does so by arguing that (1) the deontic status of an act, whether it is right or wrong, is determined by what reasons the agent has for performing it – if an agent has a decisive reason to perform the act in question, then it is morally required. Combined with (2) a teleological view of practical reasons in which our reasons for performing an action are a function of what we have reason to prefer or desire we are led to a form of act-consequentialism but one which is open to accepting that we have reason to prefer or desire the well-being of the near and dear over others.

Though much of this is controversial, there is general agreement that moral reasons are weighty , are not egoistic – that is, to be contrasted with prudential reasons, and are concerned with issues of value [duty, fittingness].

1.2.2. Morality and Aesthetics

Moral modes of evaluation are distinct from the aesthetic in terms of their content, but also in terms of their authority. So, for example, works of art are evaluated as “beautiful” or “ugly”, and those evaluations are not generally considered as universal or as objective as moral evaluations. These distinctions between moral evaluation and aesthetic evaluation have been challenged, and are the subject of some interesting debates in metaethics on the nature of both moral and aesthetic norms and the truth-conditions of moral and aesthetic claims. But, considered intuitively, aesthetics seems at least less objective than morality.

A number of writers have noted that we need to be cognizant of the distinction between moral norms and the norms specific to other normative areas in order to avoid fallacies of evaluation, and much discussion has centered on a problem in aesthetics termed the “Moralistic Fallacy” (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000).

One challenge that the anti-theorists have raised for morality was to note that in a person’s life there will be certain norm clashes – including clashes between types of norms such as the moral and the aesthetic. It is giving too much prominence to the moral that judges a person’s life as going well relative to the fulfillment or respect of those norms. Can’t a human life go well, even when that life sacrifices morality for aesthetics?

This sort of debate has a long history in moral theory. For example, it arose as a form of criticism of G. E. Moore’s Ideal Utilitarianism, which treated beauty as an intrinsic good, and rendering trade-offs between behaving well towards others and creating beauty at least in principle justified morally (Moore 1903). But the anti-theorists do not pursue this method of accommodating the aesthetic, instead arguing that it is a separate normative realm which has its own weight and significance in human flourishing.

2. Theory and Theoretical Virtues

There is agreement that theories play some kind of systematizing role, and that one function is to examine important concepts relevant to morality and moral practice and the connections, if any, between them. For example, one very common view in the middle of the 20 th century, attributed to John Rawls, was to view moral theory as primarily interested in understanding the ‘right’ and the ‘good’ and connections between the two (Rawls). Priority claims are often a central feature in the systematizing role of moral theory. Related to this is the issue of explanatory, or theoretical, depth . That is, the deeper the explanation goes, the better.

Theories also strive for simplicity , coherence , and accuracy . The fewer epicycles the theory has to postulate the better, the parts of the theory should fit well together. For example, the theory should not contain inconsistent principles, or have inconsistent implications. The theory should cover the phenomena in question. In the case of moral theories, the phenomena in question are thought to be our considered moral intuitions or judgements. Another coherence condition involves the theory cohering with a person’s set of considered judgments, as well.

One last feature that needs stressing, particularly for moral theories, is applicability . One criticism of some normative ethical theories is that they are not applicable. For example, Virtue Ethics has been criticized for not providing an account of what our moral obligations are – appealing to what the virtuous person would do in the circumstances would seem to set a very high bar or doesn’t answer the relevant question about how we should structure laws guiding people on what their social obligations are. Similarly, objective consequentialists, who understand “right action” in terms of actual consequences have been criticized for rendering what counts as a right action in a given circumstance unknowable, and thus useless as a guide to action. Both approaches provide responses to this worry, but this supports the claim that a desideratum of a moral theory is that it be applicable.

One task (though this is somewhat controversial) of a moral theory is to give an account of right actions. Often, this will involve an explication of what counts as good – some theories then get spelled out in terms of how they approach the good, by maximizing it, producing enough of it, honoring it, etc. In addition, some theories explicate the right in terms of acting in accordance with one’s duties, or acting as a virtuous person would act. In these cases the notions of ‘duty’ and ‘virtue’ become important to the overall analysis, and one function of moral theory is to explore the systematic connections between duty or virtue and the right and the good.

Moral theories also have both substantive and formal aims. Moral theories try to provide criteria for judging actions. It might be that the criterion is simple, such as right actions maximize the good, or it may be complex, such as the right action is the one that gives adequate weight to each competing duty. Sometimes, in recognition that there is not always “the” right action, the theory simply provides an account of wrongness, or permissibility and impermissibility, which allows that a range of actions might count as “right”.

In addition to simply providing criteria for right or virtuous action, or for being a virtuous person, a given moral theory, for example, will attempt to explain why something, like an action or character trait, has a particular moral quality, such as rightness or virtuousness. Some theories view rightness as grounded in or explained by value . Some view rightness as a matter of reasons that are prior to value. In each case, to provide an explanation of the property of ‘rightness’ or ‘virtuousness’ will be to provide an account of what the grounding value is, or an account of reasons for action.

In addition, moral theories may also provide decision-procedures to employ in determining how to act rightly or virtuously, conditions on being good or virtuous, or conditions on morally appropriate practical deliberation. Thus, the theory provides substance to evaluation and reasons. However, moral theories, in virtue of providing an explanatory framework, help us see connections between criteria and decision-procedures, as well as provide other forms of systemization. Thus, moral theories will be themselves evaluated according to their theoretical virtues: simplicity, explanatory power, elegance, etc. To evaluate moral theories as theories , each needs to be evaluated in terms of how well it succeeds in achieving these theoretical goals.

There are many more specialized elements to moral theories as well. For example, a moral theory often concerns itself with features of moral psychology relevant to action and character, such as motives, intentions, emotions, and reasons responsiveness. A moral theory that incorporates consideration of consequences into the determination of moral quality, will also be concerned with issues surrounding the proper aggregation of those consequences, and the scope of the consequences to be considered.

There’s been a long history of comparing moral theories to other sorts of theories, such as scientific ones. For example, in meta-ethics one issue has to do with the nature of moral “evidence” on analogy with scientific evidence. On what Ronald Dworkin terms the “natural model” the truths of morality are discovered, just as the truths of science are (Dworkin 1977, 160). It is our considered intuitions that provide the clues to discover these moral truths, just as what is observable to us provides the evidence to discover scientific truths. He compared this model with the “constructive model” in which the intuitions themselves are features of the theory being constructed and are not analogous to observations of the external world.

Yet, even if we decide that morality lacks the same type of phenomena to be accounted for as science, morality clearly figures into our normative judgments and reactions. One might view these – our intuitions about moral cases, for example – to provide the basic data that needs to be accounted for by a theory on either model.

One way to “account for” our considered intuitions would be to debunk them. There is a long tradition of this in moral philosophy as well. When scholars provided genealogies of morality that explained our considered intuitions in terms of social or evolutionary forces that are not sensitive the truth, for example, they were debunking morality by undercutting the authority of our intuitions to provide insight into it (Nietzsche 1887 [1998], Joyce 2001, Street 2006). In this entry, however, we consider the ways in which moral theorists have constructed their accounts by taking the intuitions seriously as something to be systematized, explained, and as something that can be applied to generate the correct moral decisions or outcomes.

Along these lines, one method used in theory construction would involve the use of reflective equilibrium and inference to the best explanation. For example, one might notice an apparent inconsistency in moral judgements regarding two structurally similar cases and then try to figure out what principle or set of principles would achieve consistency between them. In this case, the theorist is trying to figure out what best explains both of those intuitions. But one also might, after thinking about principles one already accepts, or finds plausible, reject one of those intuitions on the basis of it not cohering with the rest of one’s considered views. But full theory construction will go beyond this because of the fully theoretical virtues discussed earlier. We want a systematic account that coheres well not only with itself, but with other things that we believe on the basis of good evidence.

Consider the following:

Malory has promised to take Chris grocery shopping. Unfortunately, as Malory is leaving the apartment, Sam calls with an urgent request: please come over to my house right now, my pipes have broken and I need help! Torn, Malory decides to help Sam, and thus breaks a promise to Chris.

Has Malory done the right thing? The virtuous thing? Malory has broken a promise, which is pro tanto wrong, but Sam is in an emergency and needs help right away. Even if it is clear that what Malory did was right in the circumstances, it is an interesting question as to why it is right. What can we appeal to in making these sorts of judgments? This brings to light the issue of how one morally justifies one’s actions. This is the task of understanding what the justifying reasons are for our actions. What makes an action the thing to do in the circumstances? This is the criterion of rightness (or wrongness). We will focus on the criterion of rightness, though the criterion issue comes up with other modes of moral evaluation, such as judging an action to be virtuous, or judging it to be good in some respect, even if not right. Indeed, some writers have argued that ‘morally right’ should be jettisoned from modern secular ethics, as it presupposes a conceptual framework left over from religiously based accounts which assume there is a God (Anscombe 1958). We will leave these worries aside for now, however, and focus on standard accounts of criteria.

The following are some toy examples that exhibit differing structural features for moral theories and set out different criteria:

Consequentialism . The right action is the action that produces good amongst the options open to the agent at the time of action (Singer). The most well-known version of this theory is Classical Utilitarianism, which holds that the right action promotes pleasure (Mill). Kantian Deontology . The morally worthy action is in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, which requires an agent refrain from acting in a way that fails to respect the rational nature of other persons (Kant). Rossian Deontology . The right action is the action that best accords with the fulfillment and/or non-violation of one’s prima facie duties (Ross). Contractualism . An action is morally wrong if it is an act that would be forbidden by principles that rational persons could not reasonably reject (Scanlon). Virtue Ethics . The right action is the action that a virtuous person would characteristically perform in the circumstances (Hursthouse 1999).

These principles set out the criterion or standard for evaluation of actions. They do not necessarily tell us how to perform right actions, and are not, in themselves, decision-procedures, though they can easily be turned into decision procedures, such as: you ought to try to perform the action that maximizes the good amongst the options available to you at the time of action. This might not be, and in ordinary circumstance probably isn’t, a very good decision-procedure, and would itself need to be evaluated according to the criterion set out by the theory.

These theories can be divided, roughly, into the deontological, consequentialist, and virtue ethical categories. There has been a lively debate about how, exactly, to delineate these categories. Some have held that deontological theories were just those theories that were not consequentialist. A popular conception of consequentialist theories is that they are reductionist in a particular way – that is, in virtue of reducing deontic features of actions (e.g. rightness, obligatoriness) to facts about an agent’s options and the consequences of those options (Smith 2009). If that is the case, then it seems that deontological approaches are just the ones that are not reductive in this manner. However, this fails to capture the distinctive features of many forms of virtue ethics, which are neither consequentialist nor necessarily concerned with what we ought to do , our duties as opposed to what sorts of persons we should be.

One way to distinguish consequentialist from deontological theories is in terms of how each approaches value. Philip Pettit has suggested that while consequentialist theories required promotion of value, deontological theories recommend that value be honored or respected. On each of these views, value is an important component of the theory, and theories will be partially delineated according to their theory of value. A utilitarian such as Jeremey Bentham believes that hedonism is the correct theory of value, whereas someone such as G. E. Moore, a utilitarian but a pluralist regarding value, believes that hedonism is much too narrow an account. A Kantian, on the other hand, views value as grounded in rational nature, in a will conforming to the Categorical Imperative.

Because of the systematizing function of moral theory discussed earlier, the simplest account is to be preferred and thus there is a move away from endorsing value pluralism. Of course, as intuitive pressure is put on each of the simpler alternatives, a pluralistic account of criteria for rightness and wrongness has the advantage of according best with moral intuitions.

Reasons-first philosophers will delineate the theories somewhat differently. For example, one might understand goodness as a matter of what we have reason to desire, in which case what we have reason to desire is prior to goodness rather than the other way around. Value is still an important component of the theories, it is simply that the value is grounded in reasons.

Another distinction between normative theories is that between subjective and objective versions of a type of theory. This distinction cuts across other categories. For example, there are subjective forms of all the major moral theories, and objective versions of many. An objective standard of right holds that the agent must actually meet the standard – and meeting the standard is something ‘objective’, not dependent on the agent’s psychological states – in order to count as right or virtuous. Subjective standards come in two broad forms:

• Psychology sensitive : are the justifying reasons part of the agent’s deliberative processes? Or, more weakly, are they “recoverable” from the agent’s psychology [perhaps, for example, the agent has a commitment to the values that provide the reasons].
• Evidence sensitive : the right action isn’t the one that actually meets the standard, but instead, is the action that the agent could foresee would meet that standard. [there are many different ways to spell this out, depending on the degree of evidence that is relevant: in terms of what the agent actually foresees, what is foreseeable by the agent given what the agent knows, is foreseeable by someone in possession of a reasonable amount of evidence, etc.]

Of course, these two can overlap. For theorists who are evaluational internalists , evidence-sensitivity doesn’t seem like a plausible way of spelling out the standard, except, perhaps, indirectly. The distinction frequently comes up in Consequentialism, where the Objective standard is taken to be something like: the right action is the action that actually promotes the good and the Subjective standard is something like: the right action is the action that promotes the good by the agent’s own lights (psychology sensitive) or the right action is the action that promotes the foreseeable good, given evidence available at the time of action (evidence sensitive standard). It is certainly possible for other moral standards to be objective. For example, the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform, even though the agent does not realize it is what the virtuous agent would do in the circumstances, and even if the person with the best available evidence couldn’t realize it is what the virtuous person would do in the circumstances.

We certainly utter locutions that support both subjective and objective uses of what we ‘ought’ to do, or what is ‘right’. Frank Jackson notes this when he writes:

…we have no alternative but to recognize a whole range of oughts – what she ought to do by the light of her beliefs at the time of action, …what she ought to do by the lights of one or another onlooker who has different information on the subject, and, what is more, what she ought to do by God’s lights…that is, by the lights of one who knows what will and would happen for each and every course of action. (Jackson 1991, 471).

For Jackson, the primary ought, the primary sense of ‘rightness’ for an action, is the one that is “most immediately relevant to action” since, otherwise, we have a problem of understanding how the action is the agent’s. Thus, the subjective ‘ought’ is primary in the sense that this is the one that ethical theory should be concerned with (Jackson 1991). Each type of theorist makes use of our ordinary language intuitions to make their case. But one desideratum of a theory is that it not simply reflect those intuitions, but also provides the tools to critically analyze them. Given that our language allows for both sorts of ‘ought,’ the interesting issue becomes which, if either, has primacy in terms of actually providing the standard by which other things are evaluated? Moral theory needn’t only be concerned with what the right action is from the agent’s point of view.

There are three possibilities:

• neither has primacy
• the subjective has primacy
• the objective has primacy

First off we need to understand what we mean by “primacy”. Again, for Frank Jackson, the primary sense of ‘right’ or ‘ought’ is subjective, since what we care about is the ‘right’ that refers to an inward story, the story of our agency, so to speak. On this view, the objective and subjective senses may have no relationship to each other at all, and which counts as primary simply depends upon our interests. However, the issue that concerns us here is whether or not one sense can be accounted for in terms of the other. Option 1 holds that there is no explanatory connection. That is not as theoretically satisfying. Option 2 holds either there really is no meaningful objective sense, just the subjective sense, or the objective sense is understood in terms of the subjective.

Let’s look at the objective locution again “He did the right thing, but he didn’t know it at the time (or he had no way of knowing it at the time)”. Perhaps all this means is “He did what someone with all the facts and correct set of values would have judged right by their own lights” – this would be extensionally the same as “He performed the action with the best actual consequences”. This is certainly a possible account of what objective right means which makes use of a subjective standard. But it violates the spirit of the subjective standard, since it ties rightness neither to the psychology of the agent, or the evidence that is actually available to the agent. For that reason, it seems more natural to opt for 3. An advantage of this option is that gives us a nice, unified account regarding the connection between the objective and the subjective. Subjective standards, then, are standards of praise and blame, which are themselves evaluable according to the objective standard. Over time, people are in a position to tell whether or not a standard actually works in a given type of context. Or, perhaps it turns out that there are several standards of blame that differ in terms of severity. For example, if someone acts negligently a sensible case can be made that the person is blameworthy but not as blameworthy as if they had acted intentionally.

As to the worry that the objective standard doesn’t provide action guidance, the objective theorist can hold that action guidance is provided by the subjective standards of praise/blameworthiness. Further, the standard itself can provide what we need for action guidance through normative review (Driver 2012). Normative review is a retrospective look at what does in fact meet the standard, and under what circumstances.

Now, consider a virtue ethical example. The right action is the action that is the actual action that a virtuous person would perform characteristically, in the circumstances, rather than the action that the agent believes is the one the virtuous person would perform. Then we evaluate an agent’s “v-rules” in terms of how close they meet the virtuous ideal.

Another function of moral theory is to provide a decision procedure for people to follow so as to best insure they perform right actions. Indeed, some writers, such as R. M. Hare hold action guidance to be the function of the moral principles of the theory (Hare 1965). This raises the question of what considerations are relevant to the content of such principles – for example, should the principles be formulated taking into account the epistemic limitations of most human beings? The requirement that moral principles be action guiding is what Holly Smith terms the “Useability Demand”: “…an acceptable moral principle must be useable for guiding moral decisions…” (Smith 2020, 11). Smith enumerates different forms satisfaction of this demand can take, and notes that how one spells out a principle in order to meet the demand will depend upon how the moral theorist views moral success. For example, whether or not success is achieved in virtue of simply making the right decision or if, in addition to making the right decision, the agent must also have successful follow-through on that decision.

There has been enormous debate on the issue of what is involved in following a rule or principle, and some skepticism that this is in fact what we are doing when we take ourselves to be following a rule. (Kripke 1982) Some virtue theorists believe that it is moral perception that actually does the guiding, and that a virtuous person is able to perceive what is morally relevant and act accordingly (McDowell 1979).

As discussed earlier in the section on criteria, however, this is also controversial in that some theorists believe that decision procedures themselves are not of fundamental significance. Again, objective consequentialist who believes that the fundamental task of theory is to establish a criterion for right argues that decision procedures will themselves be established and evaluated on the basis of how well they get us to actually achieving the right. Thus, the decision-procedures are derivative. Others, such as subjective consequentialists, will argue that the decision-procedures specify the criterion in the sense that following the decision-procedure itself is sufficient for meeting the criterion. For example, an objective consequentialist will hold that the right action maximizes the good, whereas the subjective consequentialist might hold that the right action is to try to maximize the good, whether or not one actually achieves it (Mason 2003 and 2019). Following the decision-procedure itself, then, is the criterion.

The distinction between criterion and decision-procedure has been acknowledged and discussed at least since Sidgwick, though it was also mentioned by earlier ethicists. This distinction allows ethical theories to avoid wildly implausible implications. For example, if the standard that the theory recommends is ‘promote the good’ it would be a mistake to think that ‘promote the good’ needs to be part of the agent’s deliberation. The consequentialist might say that, instead, it is an empirical issue as to what the theory is going to recommend as a decision-procedure, and that recommendation could vary from context to context. There will surely be circumstances in which it would be best to think in terms of meeting the standard itself, but again that is an empirical issue. Likewise, it is open to a Virtue Ethicist to hold that the right action is the one the virtuous agent would perform in the circumstances, but also hold that the agent’s deliberative processes need not make reference to the standard. Pretty much all theories will want to make some space between the standard and the decision-procedure in order to avoid a requirement that agent’s must think in terms of the correct standard, in order to act rightly, or even act with moral worth. There is a distinction to be made between doing the right thing, and doing the right thing for the right reasons . Doing the right thing for the right reasons makes the action a morally worthy one, as it exhibits a good quality of the will. It is possible for a theory to hold that the ‘good will’ is one that understands the underlying justification of an action, but that seems overly demanding. If consequentialism is the correct theory, then demanding that people must explicitly act intentionally to maximize the good would result in fewer morally worthy actions than seems plausible. The ‘for the right reasons’ must be understood as allowing for no explicit invocation of the true justifying standard.

This has led to the development of theories that advocate indirection. First, we need to distinguish two ways that indirection figures into moral philosophy.

• Indirection in evaluation of right action.
• Indirection in that the theory does not necessarily advocate the necessity of aiming for the right action.

To use Utilitarianism as an example again, Rule Utilitarianism is an example of the first sort of indirection (Hooker 2000), Sophisticated Consequentialism is an example of the second sort of indirection (Railton 1984). One might hold that some versions of Aristotelian Virtue ethics, such as Rosalind Hursthouse’s version, also are of the first type, since right action is understood in terms of virtue. One could imagine an indirect consequentialist view with a similar structure: the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform, where virtue is understood as a trait conducive to the good, instead of by appeal to an Aristotelian notion of human flourishing.

The second sort relies on the standard/decision-procedure distinction. Railton argues that personal relationships are good for people, and explicitly trying to maximize the good is not a part of our relationship norms, so it is likely good that we develop dispositions to focus on and pay special attention to our loved ones. The account is open to the possibility that people who don’t believe in consequentialism have another way of deciding how to act that is correlated with promotion of the good. If the criteria a theory sets out need not be fulfilled by the agent guiding herself with the reasons set out by the criteria, then it is termed self-effacing . When a theory is self-effacing, it has the problem of alienating a person from the justification of her own actions. A middle ground, which is closer to Railton’s view, holds that the correct justification is a kind of “touchstone” to the morally good person – consulted periodically for self-regulation, but not taken explicitly into consideration in our ordinary, day-to-day lives. In this way, the theory would not be utterly self-effacing and the agent would still understand the moral basis for her own actions.

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Ethics and Morality

Morality, Ethics, Evil, Greed

Reviewed by Psychology Today Staff

To put it simply, ethics represents the moral code that guides a person’s choices and behaviors throughout their life. The idea of a moral code extends beyond the individual to include what is determined to be right, and wrong, for a community or society at large.

Ethics is concerned with rights, responsibilities, use of language, what it means to live an ethical life, and how people make moral decisions. We may think of moralizing as an intellectual exercise, but more frequently it's an attempt to make sense of our gut instincts and reactions. It's a subjective concept, and many people have strong and stubborn beliefs about what's right and wrong that can place them in direct contrast to the moral beliefs of others. Yet even though morals may vary from person to person, religion to religion, and culture to culture, many have been found to be universal, stemming from basic human emotions.

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Those who are considered morally good are said to be virtuous, holding themselves to high ethical standards, while those viewed as morally bad are thought of as wicked, sinful, or even criminal. Morality was a key concern of Aristotle, who first studied questions such as “What is moral responsibility?” and “What does it take for a human being to be virtuous?”

We used to think that people are born with a blank slate, but research has shown that people have an innate sense of morality . Of course, parents and the greater society can certainly nurture and develop morality and ethics in children.

Humans are ethical and moral regardless of religion and God. People are not fundamentally good nor are they fundamentally evil. However, a Pew study found that atheists are much less likely than theists to believe that there are "absolute standards of right and wrong." In effect, atheism does not undermine morality, but the atheist’s conception of morality may depart from that of the traditional theist.

Animals are like humans—and humans are animals, after all. Many studies have been conducted across animal species, and more than 90 percent of their behavior is what can be identified as “prosocial” or positive. Plus, you won’t find mass warfare in animals as you do in humans. Hence, in a way, you can say that animals are more moral than humans.

The examination of moral psychology involves the study of moral philosophy but the field is more concerned with how a person comes to make a right or wrong decision, rather than what sort of decisions he or she should have made. Character, reasoning, responsibility, and altruism , among other areas, also come into play, as does the development of morality.

The seven deadly sins were first enumerated in the sixth century by Pope Gregory I, and represent the sweep of immoral behavior. Also known as the cardinal sins or seven deadly vices, they are vanity, jealousy , anger , laziness, greed, gluttony, and lust. People who demonstrate these immoral behaviors are often said to be flawed in character. Some modern thinkers suggest that virtue often disguises a hidden vice; it just depends on where we tip the scale .

An amoral person has no sense of, or care for, what is right or wrong. There is no regard for either morality or immorality. Conversely, an immoral person knows the difference, yet he does the wrong thing, regardless. The amoral politician, for example, has no conscience and makes choices based on his own personal needs; he is oblivious to whether his actions are right or wrong.

One could argue that the actions of Wells Fargo, for example, were amoral if the bank had no sense of right or wrong. In the 2016 fraud scandal, the bank created fraudulent savings and checking accounts for millions of clients, unbeknownst to them. Of course, if the bank knew what it was doing all along, then the scandal would be labeled immoral.

Everyone tells white lies to a degree, and often the lie is done for the greater good. But the idea that a small percentage of people tell the lion’s share of lies is the Pareto principle, the law of the vital few. It is 20 percent of the population that accounts for 80 percent of a behavior.

We do know what is right from wrong . If you harm and injure another person, that is wrong. However, what is right for one person, may well be wrong for another. A good example of this dichotomy is the religious conservative who thinks that a woman’s right to her body is morally wrong. In this case, one’s ethics are based on one’s values; and the moral divide between values can be vast.

Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg established his stages of moral development in 1958. This framework has led to current research into moral psychology. Kohlberg's work addresses the process of how we think of right and wrong and is based on Jean Piaget's theory of moral judgment for children. His stages include pre-conventional, conventional, post-conventional, and what we learn in one stage is integrated into the subsequent stages.

The pre-conventional stage is driven by obedience and punishment . This is a child's view of what is right or wrong. Examples of this thinking: “I hit my brother and I received a time-out.” “How can I avoid punishment?” “What's in it for me?” 

The conventional stage is when we accept societal views on rights and wrongs. In this stage people follow rules with a  good boy  and nice girl  orientation. An example of this thinking: “Do it for me.” This stage also includes law-and-order morality: “Do your duty.”

The post-conventional stage is more abstract: “Your right and wrong is not my right and wrong.” This stage goes beyond social norms and an individual develops his own moral compass, sticking to personal principles of what is ethical or not.

Shakespeare was gifted with the ability to reveal, on stage, his characters' hidden thoughts, feelings and motivations. He was a psychologist of sorts.

The story of the Evil Queen’s mirror is a warning about using the mirror for vapid validation. It should raise questions for us.

Sometimes, self-acceptance is being satisfied with how you are. Other times, it means changing how you behave. The first step is acknowledging that life is messy and contradictory.

Sex therapists face ethical dilemmas every week—and many have nothing to do with sex. Most therapists get insufficient training about the difficult real-world decisions we face.

To miss out on occasions worthy of rejoicing in life represents the gravest of misfortunes.

If an agency policy sates that clinicians should avoid dual relationships, does this mean they must avoid all dual relationships, or does the policy provide some wiggle room?

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The Wheel of Consent fosters more conscious, consensual, and fulfilling interactions between people, whether in intimate relationships or other social and interpersonal contexts.

Ryan Holiday explains how we can try to be just in his new book.

Guilt can be a burden and a moral compass. Here's how this emotion impacts your life, why high achievers are particularly susceptible, and effective strategies to manage it.

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Sticking up for yourself is no easy task. But there are concrete skills you can use to hone your assertiveness and advocate for yourself.

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Moral or money

Moral or money, which is necessary for survival?

Life is an incredible journey. We pass through different phases when we undertake this journey. Every phase has its beauty. To lead this life and to fulfill all our needs, the most significant factor is money. It is that source through which we can accomplish all our wishes. Money makes life easier. We can purchase whatever we wish for, roam the places we wish to, and so on. It makes life easier and beautiful, but it is a wrong notion that money makes life happier. There are certain things which money can never buy. It can buy everything material, but it can never buy happiness, peace of mind, and sleep. It can buy food but cannot increase our hunger; it can buy soft and spongy beds but can never buy sleep. Money can bring a lot of headaches. It is not easy to maintain wealth and money.

Morals that we have in our life makes our life meaningful. It is because of the proper morals and good characteristics we are recognized and loved in this world. It becomes challenging to imbibe those perfect characteristics and move forward, but life becomes fruitful. Truth, honesty, selflessness, love, respect, and patience are those characteristics that add value to our lives. As human beings, we are an amalgamation of both bad and good characteristics but suppressing our bad and enhancing the good ones is the real challenge of life. One can survive without wealth, but without morals, we are like devils or animals.

What will we do with ample wealth and no one to love us? Can money buy love and satisfaction? People may show off that they love us because of our wealth but imagine how they treat us when we become bankrupt. Our conditions will become pathetic. The most incredible feeling to sense when we are alive is to be loved. Happiness is the greatest asset one can possess. This can be obtained by being grateful for what we have. Being satisfied even with little and feeling blessed for it makes us glad. It makes life optimistic.

But despite having lots of money, if we are never satisfied, what is its use? If one is always jealous of others, thinks of grabbing other’s things, will it make life evocative?

So, morale excels over money. One can survive without money but never without morals to lead a life of a human being.

you have rightly said that devoid of any morals life is the life of barbarians. it is not a life led by people who are god fearing. such people forget...

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The legendary writer and activist James Baldwin would have turned 100 this month. He is best known for his novels and essays and as a moral voice addressing race, sexuality and the very fabric of American democracy. Jeffrey Brown looks at Baldwin's enduring legacy for our series, Art in Action, exploring the intersection of art and democracy and for our arts and culture coverage, CANVAS.

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Notice: Transcripts are machine and human generated and lightly edited for accuracy. They may contain errors.

Amna Nawaz:

This month, the legendary writer and activist James Baldwin would have turned 100 years old.

Baldwin is best known for his novels and essays and as a moral voice addressing race, sexuality and the very fabric of American democracy. Nearly 40 years after his death, his words are more relevant than ever.

Jeffrey Brown looks at his enduring legacy for our series Art in Action, exploring the intersection of art and democracy, and our ongoing Canvas coverage.

James Baldwin, Writer:

The inequality suffered by the American Negro population of the United States has hindered the American dream.

Jeffrey Brown:

James Baldwin, novelist, essayist, civil rights activist, public intellectual, here debating William F. Buckley Jr. at the University of Cambridge in 1965.

Eddie Glaude Jr., Princeton University:

He's engaged in this ongoing work of self-creation, in this sustained reflection on the power of the American idea. He's bringing the full weight of his intellect to bear on this project.

Eddie Glaude Jr. is a professor of African American studies at Princeton University and author of the 2020 book "Begin Again: James Baldwin's America and Its Urgent Lessons for Our Own."

Eddie Glaude Jr.:

I think, if you read Baldwin closely, there is this underlying idea that we have yet to discover who we are, right, because the ghosts of the past in so many ways, not only blind us, but they have us by the throat.

James Arthur Baldwin was born in Harlem in 1924 and raised there by his mother and stepfather, a Baptist preacher. The oldest of nine children, he excelled in school and served as a junior minister.

A man on the margins, Black and queer, he spent years of his life abroad, much of it in France, beginning at age 24. He wrote novels, including "Go Tell It on the Mountain," an autobiographical book about growing up in Harlem, and "Giovanni's Room" about a tormented love affair between two men living in Paris, and powerful essays exploring race and American identity, including "Notes of a Native Son" and "The Fire Next Time."

He's one of the greatest essayists we have ever produced, the world has ever produced I think, and his subject is us. But his vantage point, it's not that of a victim. His vantage point is from those who've had to bear the burden of America's refusal to look itself squarely in the face.

He was also a playwright and poet, an activist who marched and spoke out for civil rights, including on television, here on "The Dick Cavett Show" in 1969.

James Baldwin:

And the word Negro in this country really is designed, finally, to disguise the fact that one is talking about another man, a man like you, who wants what you want.

And insofar as the American public wants to think there has been progress, they overlook one very simple thing. I don't want to be given anything by you. I just want you to leave me alone, so I can do it myself.

Baldwin died in 1987, but he's remained a powerful cultural presence, one that's only grown in the past decade.

There are days — this is one of them — when you wonder what your role is in this country and what your future is in it.

In the 2016 documentary "I Am Not Your Negro," director Raoul Peck drew from Baldwin's own words. As he told me then:

Raoul Peck, Director:

He was already a classic, and he wrote those things 40, 50 years ago. And watching the film, you think that he would have — he wrote that in the morning, the morning before watching the film, because those words are so accurate, they are so prescient and so impactful, that you can't do it better.

In 2018, Baldwin's 1974 novel "If Beale Street Could Talk" was adapted by Oscar-winning director Barry Jenkins.

Barry Jenkins, Director:

Whether I had won eight Oscars or no Oscars, it's James damn Baldwin, you know? It's James Baldwin. That's pressure enough, in and of itself, because I wanted to honor his legacy in the way that I thought it should be honored.

And now a celebration of the centennial of his birth, including an exhibition at the National Portrait Gallery called This Morning, This Evening, So Soon: James Baldwin and the Voices of Queer Resistance, which takes its name from a short story he published in 1960, another at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture titled Jimmy: Gods Black Revolutionary Mouth, presenting Baldwin's archive of personal papers.

There's a new album by singer-songwriter and bassist Meshell Ndegeocello called No More Water: The Gospel of James Baldwin, and reissues of seminal works with new introductions and artwork.

Cree Myles, Host, "The Baldwin 100": What is the best lesson you have learned being in the spiritual community that you are in with James Baldwin?

Along with a podcast, "The Baldwin 100," in which host Cree Myles talks with contemporary writers and thinkers.

What is his relevance today, especially when you think about younger people, younger readers, younger citizens?

Cree Myles:

Despite the time that has passed, his amount of truth is still relatively radical. When I think about his novels and "Giovanni's Room," and we're thinking about the ways that he grappled with, like, sexuality, those are things were still coming to terms with.

Acclaimed Irish novelist Colm Toibin contributed the new book "On James Baldwin."

Colm Toibin, Author, "On James Baldwin": I'm interested in him as, I suppose, someone who really found ways of dealing with individuality versus community, with being an artist in a difficult time.

But more than anything, more than anything, he wrote well.

Toibin saw connections to his own upbringing and told us how Baldwin has influenced him as writer and man.

Colm Toibin:

It's a question of engaging with this great intelligence and with the sensuous intelligence, with someone sort of thinking brilliantly and glittering sort of way.

But it is also, of course, developing strategies, which he did in relation to his family, in relation to Harlem, in relation to Black America, in relation to exile, in relation to attempting to being an artist in a time of flux, and also in a way of being a gay artist, a homosexual artist coming out of a world which is very conservative and very religious, and attempting also to build strategies around that that give you energy, rather than ones that take you down.

One deeply resonant thread through all the commemorations, Baldwin's focus on the fragility of democracy itself.

Baldwin's exposing the lie that is the source of the suffering, that defines this fragile project, it seems to me. He's committed to democracy. He's committed to America. After all, we are deeply American. But, by virtue of that commitment, he has to relentlessly critique it.

It comes as a great shock to discover the country, which is your birthplace and to which you owe your life and your identity, has not, in its whole system of reality, evolved any place for you.

A commitment, as Glaude puts it, to the complex experiment called America.

For the "PBS News Hour," I'm Jeffrey Brown.

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In his more than 30-year career with the News Hour, Brown has served as co-anchor, studio moderator, and field reporter on a wide range of national and international issues, with work taking him around the country and to many parts of the globe. As arts correspondent he has profiled many of the world's leading writers, musicians, actors and other artists. Among his signature works at the News Hour: a multi-year series, “Culture at Risk,” about threatened cultural heritage in the United States and abroad; the creation of the NewsHour’s online “Art Beat”; and hosting the monthly book club, “Now Read This,” a collaboration with The New York Times.

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Institute for Bioethics & Health Humanities committed to moral inquiry, research, teaching, and professional service in healthcare

Call for abstracts: reproductive ethics conference.

The Ninth Annual Reproductive Ethics Conference will take place in Galveston Jan. 9 and 10, 2025. The goal of this conference is to explore the range of topics addressed in reproductive ethics. We welcome individuals from all professional fields to create a rich and robust discussion. We are seeking abstracts for individual presentations, 3-4 person panels, and posters. View the flier linked below for more information.

The Department of Bioethics and Health Humanities Seminar Series Presents: "Concepts of Race in the History of Reproductive Medicine"

By Dr. Miriam Rich Assistant Professor, Department of Bioethics and Health Humanities

Thursday, August 8, 2024 12 - 1 p.m. Health Education Center 3.206 Click HERE to register

50th Anniversary of the Institute for Bioethics and Health Humanities Timeline

In April of 1970, both The University of Texas Graduate School of Biomedical Science at Houston and The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston sponsored the symposium "Humanism in Medicine" that would help shape and give impetus to the new institute that would emerge at UTMB in 1973. This new institute would be dedicated to medicine and the humanities.

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Dr. Moses publishes essay in STAT on the history of stigma amid rising rates of syphilis

Aug 14, 2024, 10:14 AM by Cortney Martin

On May 30, 2024, IBBH Assistant Professor Dr. Jacob D. Moses and Dr. Allan Brandt (Harvard University) published an essay, “ Stigma and the Return of Syphilis, ” in the health news outlet STAT. Syphilis, one of the oldest infections known to humans, has returned to the U.S. at epidemic rates that have been climbing since 2001. In 2022, the last year with complete data, the highest number of infections were recorded in more than 70 years. Stemming the return of syphilis will take more than manufacturing more penicillin. It will require counteracting stigma, a longstanding problem that has resulted in critical failures in health care access and delivery. 

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Thai Court Ejects Prime Minister, as Old Guard Reasserts Power

Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin was considered a figurehead leader in a behind-the-scenes power struggle. He was ousted on ethics charges.

By Sui-Lee Wee

Reporting from Bangkok

Thailand’s Constitutional Court ousted Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin from office on Wednesday, throwing the country into fresh political turmoil just days after the court dissolved the country’s main opposition party.

In a 5-4 verdict, the court ruled that Mr. Srettha, who took office almost a year ago, violated ethics standards after he appointed to his cabinet a member previously convicted of attempted bribery.

Mr. Srettha was seen as a figurehead, closely allied with Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist former prime minister who has long sought to influence the country’s politics even after he was ousted and exiled in a 2006 coup.

The court’s decision is likely to intensify the disillusionment of many Thais, who see the case as the latest proof of intervention by an unelected establishment that is quashing the people’s will. Last week, the same court ordered the disbandment of the Move Forward Party , a progressive party that won last year’s election but was blocked from forming a government.

The constant upheaval in politics has diminished the government’s ability to address pressing issues such as reviving the country’s ailing, tourism-dependent economy.

But this dismissal is unlikely to galvanize angry protests. Mr. Srettha, a mild-mannered 62-year-old billionaire tycoon, was not a popular leader. He was installed only because a military-backed Senate prevented Pita Limjaroenrat , Move Forward’s former leader, from becoming premier. During his short term in office, Mr. Srettha was criticized for traveling abroad frequently with few results to show for it. He has said those trips were necessary to stimulate tourism and foreign investment.

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