what is natural theology essay

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Natural Theology: Anselm and Aquinas

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Natural theology is a set of philosophical arguments that aim to demonstrate either that a god exists or (assuming he exists) that he possesses certain properties, like being the cause of everything in the universe or being unchanging.  Most branches of the major Abrahamic religions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — believe that God is importantly  transcendent : our typical ways of understanding the physical world are not as reliable when it comes to understanding God.  This means that philosophical argumentation is a useful tool in developing theories of god, even if these religions also depend importantly on  divine revelation : God sharing information about himself directly in holy texts or in religious experiences.

In this interactive essay we are going to look at arguments from arguably the two greatest natural theologians in the Christian tradition:  St. Anselm of Canterbury  (1033-1109 AD) and  St. Thomas Aquinas  (1225-1274 AD).

The Ontological Argument

Our first example of natural theology comes from Anselm, who discovered the  ontological argument .  Anselm’s motto was “faith seeking understanding”.  He was a French Benedictine who eventually became the Archibishop of Canterbury.  In the  Proslogion , Anselm is praying through the philosophical questions he has about God and his nature.  In the most famous passage of the  Proslogion , Anselm argues that even a “Foole” must concede God exists.  “Foole” is his term for atheist… not exactly a charitable way of setting up the argument!  But as you’ll see, his argument also suggests some important ideas for how we might understand atheism.  We’ll come back to this when we read Nietzsche.

Anselm’s ontological argument proceeds like a geometric proof.  He argues that everyone (theist and atheist alike) should agree to some definitions about what God is like.  Then he argues from those definition premises for the proposition that God exists.  Let’s look at the text, then break it down…

Analyzing the Ontological Argument Part I

• Proslogion, Chap 2
• Existing in Understanding and in Reality
• The Fool’s Assumption
• Anselm’s Conclusion

Truly there is a God, although the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.

AND so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? ( Psalms xiv. 1 ). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak—a being than which nothing greater can be conceived—understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

Anselm makes an important distinction between objects that exist in the understanding (i.e. are the kinds of things we can have ideas about) and objects that exist in reality.  Some objects (like you and me) exist in both.  Some objects are purely imaginary.  And some objects exist but are perhaps completely beyond our understanding.

Anselm says the Fool mistakenly classifies God as an object that exists  only in the understanding .

But Anselm believes he can demonstrate that God is  by definition  something in both understand and reality.

Analyzing the Ontological Argument Part II

• Premise (1): Understanding and Reality
• Premise (2): Definition of God
• Divine Attributes
• Premise (3): Existence in Reality is Greater

With this distinction, we can now outline Anselm’s argument.   There are many formulations of the ontological argument (and how it works is a matter of dispute in the history of philosophy).  Here one simple reconstruction.

• Premise (1): Everything either exists in the understanding, in reality, or both. [Assumption]

Premise (2): Everyone (theist and atheist) agrees that God is defined as the greatest possible being — the being than which none greater can be conceived.

AND so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And indeed,  we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived . Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? ( Psalms xiv. 1 ). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak—a being than which nothing greater can be conceived—understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

Hence,  even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived.  For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

In Premise (2), Anselm assumes that the atheist will agree that  if there were a God,  God would be the greatest possible being.  Being perfect is one of the  divine attributes .  Divine attributes play a crucial role in natural theological arguments, because these arguments are typically aimed at showing either something must have this attribute (and that thing=God) or a certain attribute must be understood a particular way.  The ontological argument is going to to succeed or fail partly on how we understand what it would be for something to be perfect and the greatest possible thing that can be conceived.

• Premise (3): Existence in reality is greater than existence merely in understanding. [Assumption]

Conclusion: Everyone (theist and atheist) should agree that God also exists in reality.

Hence,   even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And  assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

The Perfect Island Objection

As soon as Anselm offered his argument it attracted objections.  Guanilo, another monk, argued that Anselm’s argument form must not be sound, because if it were, then we could equally prove the existence in reality of some truly crazy entities.  Here Guanilo’s “Reply on Behalf of the Fool”.  Is he attacking the validity or soundness of Anselm’s argument?

..they say that there is the ocean somewhere an island which, because of the difficulty (or rather the impossibility) of finding that which does not exist, some have called the ‘Lost Island.’ And the story goes that it is blessed with all manner of priceless riches and delights in abundance …and …is superior everywhere in abundance to all those other lands that men inhabit. Now, if anyone tell me that it is like this, I shall easily understand what is said, since nothing is difficult about it. But if he should then go on to say, as though it were a logical consequence of this: You cannot any more doubt that this island that is more excellent than all other lands truly exists somewhere in reality than you can doubt that it is in your mind; and since it is more excellent to exist not only in the mind alone but also in reality, therefore it must needs be that it exists. For if it did not exist, any other land existing in reality would be more excellent than it, and so this island, already conceived by you to be more excellent than others, will not be more excellent. If, I say, someone wishes thus to persuade me that this island really exists beyond all doubt, I should either think that he was joking, or I should find it hard to decide which of us I ought to judge the bigger fool – I, if I agreed with him, or he, if he thought that he had proved the existence of this island..

Guanilo is offering a parody of Anselm’s argument, trying to convince us to reject either Anslem’s logic or the assumptions he makes about greatness as an attribute.

• Premise (2): The Magic Island is defined as the perfect island — the island than which none greater can be conceived. [Parody Premise]
• Conclusion: Everyone should agree that the Magic Island also exists in reality.

The parody gives us some reason to question Anselm’s logic.  But where does the ontological argument for God’s existence go wrong?  Should we think that existence does not making something “greater”?

The Five Ways (Arguments) of Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas took a different approach for arguing for God’s existence.  He focuses on the need for there to be some entity responsible for all of the change we observe in the world — an “unmoved mover” at the foundation of everything in reality.  That entity, he argues, must be God.  This approach tends to be called the cosmological argument(s) for the existence of God.  We will be reading more Aquinas in this class, and like Anselm, he has a distinctive way of presenting his arguments.  Here is an introduction to reading Aquinas from  ND President John Jenkins  (also an Aquinas scholar).  Here you can  download a PDF of the text of the Five Ways , in Aquinas’s  Summa Theologica . (Developer note: Video that was embedded here was made private by its Owner.)

Way 1: The Argument from Change

• The Change Argument in P-C Form

Note:  Motion or “motus” here means movement or change.  Not just physical movement.

It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.

Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.

Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Key Concept: Motion is a change from potentiality to actuality.

(1) In the world some things are in motion.

(2) Whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.

(3) Nothing can be changed from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.

(4) And it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects.

Conclusion 1: Therefore, it is impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.

(5) Whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

(6) If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again.

(7) But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover).

Conclusion 2: Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other, and this everyone understands to be God.

Way 2: The Argument from Causation

• The Argument in P-C Form
• A Video Illustration of the First Mover Argument

Note: Think of causation here in a broad sense.  It refers to any causes that bring about effects in the world.  For example, parents are the joint cause of their children.  The cause of a sculpture is the artist who created it.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.

There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

(1) Nothing is the efficient cause of itself (for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible).

(2) To take away the cause is to take away the effect.

Conclusion 1: Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause.

(3) But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.

(4) Thus, in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity.

Conclusion 2: Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Way 3: The Argument from Contingency

• Divine Attributes (Again!)

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

(1) Since objects in the universe come into being and pass away, it is possible for those objects to exist or for those objects not to exist at any given time.

(2) Since objects are countable, the objects in the universe are finite in number.

(3) If, for all existent objects, they do not exist at some time, then, given infinite time, there would be nothing in existence. (Nothing can come from nothing—there is no creation  ex nihilo ) for individual existent objects.

(4) But, in fact, many objects exist in the universe.

Conclusion: a Necessary Being (i.e., a Being of which it is impossible that it should not exist) exists.

By this third way, Aquinas has focused his attention on two important divine attributes that are important to his argument.

• • He assumes God is the first cause or unmoved mover of everything else.  Put another way, for Aquinas’s argument to work we must at least agree that whatever the self-sustained original creator is, that is God.
• • He assumes that God is also a necessary being.  Seemingly everything else in the universe that exists could have not existed.  We might not have been born and someday we will die.  The Eiffel Tower, Mt. Everest, the Milky Way — all had times when they came into existence and if conditions were different might have never existed.  God, on the other hand, has no start or end and couldn’t fail to exist on Aquinas’s definition.

Way 4: The Argument from Degree

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

Note:  In this argument Aquinas seems to assume that is some property can be spoken of as coming in greater and lesser degrees, then there must be some being that has that property to the maximal degree.  For instance, there could be more of less cold, therefore there is a maximally cold being.  Many philosophers have challenged this assumption.

(1) All things are more or less perfect, more or less beautiful, etc

(2) But gradation of each perfections implies the existence of a being with the maximal degree of that perfection.

(3) And we know that that which is greatest in truth is also greatest in wisdom, beauty, and all the other perfections.

Conclusion: There exists a maximally perfect being, whom we call God.

*Compare Aquinas’s (2) to Premise (2) of Anselm’s Ontological Argument.  How is it different?

Way 5: The Argument from Design

• Other Design Arguments

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Here we see the profound influence of Aristotle on Aquinas.  Recall the assumptions in the function argument in Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics.  Aquinas argues…

(1) All things act toward some end or purpose

(2) But only things that are designed act toward ends or purposes

(3) Therefore all things are designed

(4) But anything that’s designed has a designer

Conclusion: A designer of all things exists, and this we call God

Some Objections to the Five Ways

Aquinas considers and replies to objections to his argument at the end of the Five Ways.  

Objection 1: A Version of the Problem of Evil

It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word “God” means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Aquinas’s Reply:  As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): “Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.” This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Objection 2: What if there are multiple explanations and none of them require God?

Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God’s existence.

Aquinas’s Reply:   Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

Other objections Aquinas does not consider in this passage.  For instance we might wonder…

Objection 3:   What if there just is an infinite chain of causes and explanations that never stops?

Objection 4: And how can the design argument explain all of the apparent design failures in the world?

Summary and Next Steps

As we’ve seen, the natural theological arguments tend to reply on premises about key  divine attributes .  Atheists can resist the arguments by denying that these attributes are coherent or possible (i.e. it is incoherent to imagine a perfect being).  Or they can resist the logic of the arguments.  A further question is whether theism could be rational even if there is no decisive argument proving God’s existence or nature.  This introduces the broader debate in philosophy of religion — what does rational faith require of us?

Acknowledgments

This digital essay was prepared by Paul Blaschko and Meghan Sullivan.

For this class, Scheffler’s concept of being homeless in time is one of the most important parts of this chapter. The notion is similar to temporal mobility in the sense that we cannot control our movement. However, temporal mobility refers to individuals occupying space. It is true that we cannot control our movement at all times, but we do have some influence on our surroundings at certain points in life. For instance, one can control whether they attend class one day or not. In that sense, one expresses ownership over the possibility of occupying a classroom. Now, Scheffler is consider the ownership of time. According to him, it is not possible to express ownership over time, even in an insignificant amount. It is a dimension humans simply cannot express ownership over. Time is a constantly moving force and individuals have no control over its direction or magnitude. In this way, humans have no ability to occupy time itself.

Temporal mobility refers to the notion that humans cannot control our movement through time. While we may be able to influence our movement or actions in particular moments, we have very little influence on the broad scope of our entire life. Regardless of our wishes, time is always moving forward and we must adapt to it. While Scheffler notes that this is often taken for granted, it is a frustrating fact of life. As individuals (supposedly with free will), we expect to have full dominion over our lives; yet, we cannot master time and its influence over us. According to Scheffler, these circumstances emphasize the importance of tradition. A particular practice repeated at regular intervals enables an individual to have ownership over at least some aspects of one’s life.

Normativity refers to an evaluative statement as to whether something is desirable. It is important to distinguish normativity from positivism, which postulates one should only make claims based on empirical evidence. A positive statement makes a claim as to how things are, whereas a normative statement makes a claim to how things should be. A normative statement seeks to attach a belief or expectation to already established facts. To understand this distinction, refer to the following example:

Positive Statement: “Jake’s dog is a German Shepherd.”

Normative Statement: “German Shepherds are the best breed of dogs.”

Scheffler provides a definition of tradition that provides insight into his understanding of the term and its significance in human culture. Read it below as context for the rest of the digital essay. This is what Scheffler means by “tradition”:

Two points of clarification are in order. First, in one broad and standard sense of the term, a tradition is a set of beliefs, customs, teachings, values, practices, and procedures that is transmitted from generation to generation. However, a tradition need not incorporate items of all the kinds just mentioned. In this essay, I am interested in those traditions that are seen by people as providing them with reasons for action, and so I will limit myself to traditions that include norms of practice and behavior.

Second, there is a looser sense of the term in which a tradition need not extend over multiple generations. A family or a group of friends may establish a “tradition,” for example, of celebrating special occasions by going to a certain restaurant, without any thought that subsequent generations will do the same thing. Even a single individual may be described as having established certain traditions, in this extended sense of the term. [B]ut my primary interest is in the more standard cases in which traditions are understood to involve multiple people and to extend over generations.

The transition from personal salvation to universal redemption marks the transition of humanity from pursuing evil to seeking the good. Once an individual realizes that satisfying one’s pleasures and self-interest is not worthy, as it provides no meaning to life, one will instead actively look for goodness as a higher source of meaning. This leads one to pursuing God and developing a close relationship with God, actualized through acts of justice and mercy in pursuit of a better world.

One should note also that this redemption is universal. Heschel draws a distinction between his argument and personal salvation, arguing that simply pursuing the latter is another form of self-interest. Rather, the way to truly prevent suffering is committing oneself to salvation for the entire world, which he terms as universal redemption. It is through this method that humanity can become closer to God and end evil in the world.

Here, Heschel refers to the prophets of the Hebrew Bible who frequently criticized the Israelites for various offenses against God, such as worshipping false gods. An interesting notion that Heschel introduces here and develops in the subsequent paragraphs is a distinction between history and redemption. For him, history refers to human activities, ripe with the injustices and suffering associated with the pursuit of human self-interest. This is separate from the redemption, which refers to a state of affairs beyond history that involves concepts of salvation, the kingship of God, and other faith-based ideas. Heschel uses this distinction to separate the evils of our world from the goodness of God, counteracting the illusion of evil he mentioned earlier in the excerpt.

For Heschel, “alien thoughts” are ideas that enter one’s mind that dissuade one from pursuing righteous actions. He believes that even if an individual pursues good acts and remains faithful to God, foreign concepts will enter one’s thoughts with the mission to drive them away from God and goodness. This exacerbates the tension between God and humanity because it is rooted in human self-interest.

One of Heschel’s concerns is that God’s will and human nature are inherently opposed to one another. He believes that humans are naturally selfish and pursue ends that benefit themselves, even at the expense of others, which inevitably leads to situations where one will sacrifice piety or adherence to God’s will for some other goal. The desire to pursue self-interest introduces deceitful thoughts that drive one away from God and a life of holiness. Heschel also believes that self-interest contributes to suffering in the world. To prevent evil, humans must work towards rejecting their pursuit of self-interest through activities like faith and following God’s will.

Heschel is also concerned with how good and evil can often be confused for one another. What appears as holy and good may actually be evil in disguise around the illusion of self-interest. An example is worshipping a false idol. One may believe that their act is holy and upholds God’s will, but according to Heschel, the act only reinforces the evil and sinful nature of the world.

Here, Cohen is describing humanity grappling with the concept of absolute evil once it has entered reality. He argues that prior to the tremendum, the notion of absolute evil was simply a concept that existed in the mind that was thought to never exist in the real world. This enabled individuals to justify “relative evils” that were comparably smaller to the absolute evil that existed only in human consciousness. However, the Holocaust demonstrated that absolute evil, suffering and horror exercised without rationality or moral consideration, is certainly possible in this world. For Cohen, this means that there are no more excuses for the relative evil because the absolute evil is as real as it.

Cohen uses the term “vector” similar to mathematicians and physicians, in that it refers to something that has both magnitude and direction. When he says reason has a “moral vector,” he is suggesting that rationality is accompanied by moral considerations that drive the process of reasoning. Cohen believes that moral principles and rationality are intertwined, in that morality is rational and rationality is moral. As a result, any rational conclusion must also be morally acceptable. For this reason, Cohen notes that an evil like the Holocaust cannot be rational because it is not moral in any sense. Likewise, it cannot be moral because it is not rational.

What do you think of Cohen’s intertwining of reason and morality? Do you think that rationality has a moral vector? Should reason and morality be inherently connected or separate? Can someone reason something that is not moral?

Tremendum typically means “awefulness, terror, dread” and other similar feelings. Here, it is Cohen’s term for the Holocaust. He uses this term because he believes there is no evil equivalent to the Holocaust, so using the terms typically used to describe mass suffering is not an adequate description. He adopts the word tremendum because he believes it best captures the horrible realities of the Holocaust compared to other available terms, although it still ultimately falls short because humanity simply cannot comprehend the true extent of the events that took place during the Holocaust.

Mipnei Hataeinu  is Hebrew for “because of our own sins” and refers to the concept that humanity’s suffering is brought about by its sins. In other words, destruction and pain are punishments for sinful behavior. The interpretation would suggest that humanity deserves this chastising, as indicated by Isaiah 59:12:  “For our transgressions against You are many, and our sins have testified against us, for our transgressions are with us, and our iniquities – we know them.”  Mipnei Hataeinu reveals that punishment is justified because it is a response to humanity’s sins, similar to how a parent might discipline a child.

However, recall that such an explanation for the Holocaust does not suffice. There is no rational explanation for anything committed by the Jews that would warrant such a devastating slaughter and genocide. For this reason, Berkovits rejects this view and instead relies on the free will argument to explain why God would permit the Holocaust to occur.

Hester Panim  is a Hebrew phrase that means “hiding face” and is used commonly in Jewish biblical interpretation. It refers to the concept of God literally hiding Himself from the suffering of humanity. As the Torah (the Hebrew Bible) demonstrates, there are many times that God rescues the Israelites from devastation, whether it is being brought against the Israelites or they committed the evil themselves. Hester Panim is usually interpreted as those times that God does not save the Israelites. It is interpreted as a punishment for not following the covenant or breaking God’s laws. Some scholars take a less vindictive approach, believing that God hiding Himself is an act of love and compassion because He cannot bear to watch His people suffer, similar to how a father does not want to watch his son get hurt.

Berkovits uses an entirely different interpretation of Hester Panim, drawing from the Jewish concept of  nahama d’kissufa  (Hebrew for “bread of shame”). Nahama d’kissufa refers to the notion that greater satisfaction derives from being deserving of a reward than simply receiving it as a gift. For example, giving yourself a dessert as a reward for doing well on an exam is more meaningful than simply eating the dessert. Berkovits argues that God granted humanity free will to make our achievements more significant and worthwhile. As a result, God must distance himself from humanity to enable humans to exercise that free will to the greatest extent. This inevitably allows evil to occur in the world, as any interference by God to prevent evil would undermine humanity’s free will.

Here, Marx argues that in practicing religion, man becomes alien from his own life. How might other philosophers, such as Aquinas or Nietzsche, agree or disagree with this claim?

Key Terms: Objectification and Alienation: Marx defines a sort of two-pronged process of objectification and alienation. He defines objectification as the process of labor becoming a commodity in itself– and alienation refers to that commodity becoming something that is separate from the laborer.

Key Point: Stoicism is an ancient philosophy known for its emphasis on wisdom, virtue, and harmony with divine reason. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/

The Grand Inquisitor was the lead official of the Inquisition, appointed by the Church. During the Inquisition, a time infamous for the torture and execution of heretics, the Inquisitor was a powerful authority figure in society. Note that Dostoevsky does not portray the Inquisitor as evil, but rather as a character whose aims are understandable.

A heretic is a person who has been baptized as a Christian but doubts or denies established religious principles. In the sixteenth century, the time when Christ is reborn on Earth in this story, heretics were executed or even burned at the stake during the Inquisition.

Key Term: remote effects refer to more distant and difficult-to-anticipate consequences that someone’s actions may have, ex. someone’s decision to take public transportation to save on gas costs may unwittingly cost a car salesman their job.

Ernest Partridge was an environmental philosopher who wrote extensively on duty to future generations. You can find more of his work on his website, The Online Gadfly, a title with a clever reference to Socrates. This website, according to his obituary, is also a virtual monument to continue on his legacy and work into the future.

Taylor is a Canadian philosopher and professor emeritus at McGill University known especially for his work related to political and historical philosophy. Taylor has critiqued Liberalism, naturalism, and secularism throughout his long career. He will be 90 in November of 2021.

Here Kavka is accounting for population growth or decline.

Otherwise known as the Lockean Proviso, this idea is that a person has a right to the property that they put work into as long as in claiming this property there is enough of that quality resource left for others. In other words, no one is worse off with that resource claimed.

An English Enlightenment philosopher, John Locke is known for his political philosophy and work on epistemology and metaphysics. Kavka is drawing from his writing in section 4 of the second treatise in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government.

There’s a distinction here…. not nec strongest possible reason, all things being equal, no one is required to have millions of kids.

Remember Kavka’s previous argument about contingency: if it is certain that there will be no future people, then they have no moral weight.

The “contingency” of people is the last concept that Kavka grounds his discussion on. The idea is that we cannot be certain as to whether future people will exist at all; in some respects, we can only assume that they will, but there’s always a chance that they won’t.

The term “temporal location” refers to a thing’s existence in a particular time. This concept is the basis of Kavka’s first point in the following section.

Kavka calls this “the more modest conditional conclusion” because it leaves open the possibility for further discussion. If someone does not accept the initial premise that “we are obligated to make sacrifices for needy strangers” then they do not have to accept the conclusion that they must sacrifice for future generations.

A telling title to his essay, “futurity” refers to all future time and events. Kavka will wrestle with the moral challenges that arise when we consider the obligations futurity imposes on us in the present.

When Ivan says “I hasten to return my ticket,” he is referring to the possibility that he might be rewarded in the afterlife after suffering in this world. Ivan cannot rationalize any argument that might justify unnecessary suffering and refuses to participate in such a system. This is where Ivan rejects the harmony, participating in what his brother deems rebellion.

When Dostoyevsky uses the term harmony, he refers to the belief that one’s suffering in this world is worthwhile because it will be rewarded in the afterlife. Ivan is adamantly against this idea, explaining that future benefit does not justify current suffering. If someone is sent to Heaven after having suffered immensely, it does not erase that the suffering happened in the first place. For Ivan, no future benefit can justify the current injustice of suffering.

Here, Ivan is referencing Jesus giving the Great Commandment. The verses (Matthew 22:35-40) of the passage are below.

And one of them, a lawyer, asked him a question, to test him. “Teacher, which is the great commandment in the law?” And he said to him, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the prophets.

Even after receiving a wage that is less than the value they have contributed to production, the proletariat must give much of their earnings to other members of the bourgeoisie in order to survive. For Marx, capitalism places the proletariat in constant subjugation to the bourgeoisie.

Marx argues that capitalism provides unjust wages to the proletariat. Think about the process of capitalism: a business owner provides resources, a worker produces a product, the worker receives a wage for that labor, and the business owner sells the product. For the business owner to have a profit, the selling price  must  be higher than the wage earned by the worker. Marx contends that this process devalues the worker’s wage, and therefore their humanity. This suggests that capitalism, as a system, dehumanizes and oppresses the proletariat. For capitalism to survive, and profit to exist, the proletariat must be devalued.

Just as the proletariat are reliant on labor to survive, they become an object to the system. Similar to the products they produce, the proletariat are bought and sold by the bourgeoisie to benefit the capitalist system.

Here, Marx argues that in capitalism, workers are only valuable to society if they are productive. When he says “labour increases capital”, he means that the proletariat’s work must contribute to the wealth of the bourgeoisie for the proletariat to survive. If a worker is unproductive, they will be deprived of a wage and will lack the resources to live. This is a key part of Marx’s criticism, that survival is dependent on productivity.

This is one of the most famous phrases from  The Communist Manifesto . Here, Marx argues that the bourgeoisie, driven by a constant need to expand their markets (and therefore wealth) are forced to fundamentally change society. The simple, laboring feudal lifestyle is replaced with industrial machines creating elaborate products with little effort. Thus, capitalist relations of production tend to spread geographically, as well as into more and more areas of human life.

A key part of Marx’s theory is that common laborers have been  reduced  to wage earners and that this is bad for human well-being. For Marx, work is an essential part of human identity. It is a way of human flourishing, because your work is an extension of who you are. However, Marx contends that industrialization has led to the commodification of work — a worker is the kind of thing that a price is put on, that bourgeosie trade. Instead of doing your job simply for the sake of it, the proletariat are forced to work only to survive. And even then, the work is more and more disconnected from human life – it is reduced down to simple tasks alongside machines that have further dehumanized the work experience. When Marx says these individuals have become “paid wage labourers”, he is criticizing capitalism’s deteriorating effect on the value of work for individuals.

Aristotle also used knife imagery to talk about the purpose of human beings. For him, a good knife is one that fulfills its purpose (a sharp knife!), and a good human is someone who lives as a rational animal to the best of their ability. As you continue reading through Sartre, see if you can pick up on the difference in Sartre’s use of the knife. How does he relate the knife image to human beings? Why does he think humans are different from knives?

It is precisely the opinions that are most disagreeable to us that we have to do the most to preserve. They are the most in danger of being legally or socially suppressed, and society would be worse off if they were suppressed because our beliefs would become lively and understood.

Because the common consensus is one-sided, we shouldn’t be upset when the minority opinion is biased and one-sided too. What’s more, one-sided people are usually more emphatic and passionate about their belief, so Mill says it’s actually a good thing if the disagreement is expressed in a one-sided way.

Open-mindedness is difficult for people. Usually, we act and think as if what we do is the only way to do things.

Suspending judgment, is refraining from either believing or disbelieving in something. (Suspending judgment on whether God exists is agnosticism.) Mill thinks we sometimes ought to suspend and admit that we don’t have enough information to make a call. Better to admit your ignorance than to hold an opinion without knowing why you hold it.

A geocentric model of the solar system has earth at the center; a heliocentric model has the sun at the center. Phlogiston was believed to be a chemical substance playing some of the roles that we now know oxygen plays. Scientists now agree there is no such substance as phlogiston.

To be a ‘rational being’ just means that we humans can  reason , we can think critically, imagine possible futures and choose between them, and make arguments. Because we have this unique strength, Mill believes we should use it as much as possible. In the next paragraph, Mill will discuss what it means to use our reason.

Mill is criticizing here people who consider blind faith a virtue, who believe things simply because their god or another authority figure told them they are true, and who cannot give good arguments for why they believe what they believe. This is no way for a  rational  person to live, he says.

For a defense of blind faith in certain circumstances, see our lesson on Kierkegaard.

Mill is calling out people here who walk confidently through life with two competing thoughts: “Everybody makes mistakes” and “I’m certain I’m not making a mistake right now.”

Usually, you’re not making a mistake. But those few times when you  are  making a mistake and you haven’t prepared for it, it blows up in your face.

Has anyone ever said to you, “If everyone jumped off a cliff, would you jump too?” Mill is making the same argument here. Mill argues that just because all people in your community believe something, that doesn’t make it true. If all people are fallible, then all groups of people are also fallible.

To call a person infallible is to say they can never be wrong. A fallible person, on the other hand, is sometimes wrong.

Philosophical Jargon: The Ethical

The ethical is the ultimate telos, the ultimate guiding principle of everything in the universe, according to Kierkegaard’s understanding of the dominant ethical paradigm of his time. This essentially means ethics, what is right and wrong, is an objective truth, and our purpose in life is to align ourselves as much as possible with it by doing good things and avoiding bad things.

Philosophical Jargon:  Telos

Telos is an Aristotelian term that means an ultimate guiding principle or fundamental purpose engrained in the nature of a thing. Aristotle believed all things, from rocks to human beings, had a telos.

Philosophical Jargon: Subjectivity vs. Objectivity

A subjective truth is one from a  particular  person’s viewpoint with particular feelings, biases, and predispositions.

This is opposed to “Objectivity,” which is a lack of subjectivity. An objective truth would be true independently of anyone’s perspective on it.

The Greek city of Delphi was the site of a major temple dedicated to the god Apollo. The temple’s high priestess, known as the Pythia, was a famous oracle who played an important role in Greek culture and religious life throughout classical antiquity. By bringing up the God of Delphi, Socrates not only lends divine authority to his life’s mission, but also indirectly rebuts the charge of impiety brought against him.

Socrates here is alluding to the Sophists, professional teachers of rhetoric and debate often hired by wealthy families to help ensure successful political careers for their sons.

St. Thomas Aquinas’  Natural Law Theory  centers on the idea that all people are called by God to be and do good while avoiding evil. Further, any rational being should be able to understand and know these obligations of the Natural Moral Law:

“I am the gadfly of the Athenian people, given to them by God, and they will never have another, if they kill me. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long 1and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me.” –Socrates

Key Point:  Dr. King iterates that his motivation for nonviolent protest is to promote healthy tension. Without the friction caused by breaking the status quo of oppression, the door to negotiation will remain closed. King will cite this reason as necessary for any progress and in anticipation to arguments posed by his opposition of religious leaders and passive moderates. 

Dr. King makes the appeal to his audience that all people of the world are pieces of a single community of moral concern. This philosophical idea is similar to cosmopolitanism. Derived from the Greek word kosmopolitês (‘citizen of the world’), cosmopolitanism is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single community. Different versions of cosmopolitanism focus on political institutions, moral norms, relationships, or shared markets of cultural expression. 

April 12, 1963

We the undersigned clergymen are among those who, in January, issued “An Appeal for Law and Order and Common Sense,” in dealing with racial problems in Alabama. We expressed understanding that honest convictions in racial matters could properly be pursued in the courts, but urged that decisions of those courts should in the meantime be peacefully obeyed.

Since that time there had been some evidence of increased forbearance and a willingness to face facts. Responsible citizens have undertaken to work on various problems which cause racial friction and unrest. In Birmingham, recent public events have given indication that we all have opportunity for a new constructive and realistic approach to racial problems.

However, we are now confronted by a series of demonstrations by some of our Negro citizens, directed and led in part by outsiders. We recognize the natural impatience of people who feel that their hopes are slow in being realized. But we are convinced that these demonstrations are unwise and untimely.

We agree rather with certain local Negro leadership which has called for honest and open negotiation of racial issues in our area. And we believe this kind of facing of issues can best be accomplished by citizens of our own metropolitan area, white and Negro, meeting with their knowledge and experience of the local situation. All of us need to face that responsibility and find proper channels for its accomplishment.

Just as we formerly pointed out that “hatred and violence have no sanction in our religious and political traditions,” we also point out that such actions as incite to hatred and violence, however technically peaceful those actions may be, have not contributed to the resolution of our local problems. We do not believe that these days of new hope are days when extreme measures are justified in Birmingham.

We commend the community as a whole, and the local news media and law enforcement in particular, on the calm manner in which these demonstrations have been handled. We urge the public to continue to show restraint should the demonstrations continue, and the law enforcement official to remain calm and continue to protect our city from violence.

We further strongly urge our own Negro community to withdraw support from these demonstrations, and to unite locally in working peacefully for a better Birmingham. When rights are consistently denied, a cause should be pressed in the courts and in negotiations among local leaders, and not in the streets. We appeal to both our white and Negro citizenry to observe the principles of law and order and common sense.

C. C. J. Carpenter, D.D., LL.D. Bishop of Alabama

Joseph A. Durick, D.D. Auxiliary Bishop, Diocese of Mobile, Birmingham

Rabbi Hilton L. Grafman Temple Emanu-El, Birmingham, Alabama

Bishop Paul Hardin Bishop of the Alabama-West Florida Conference

Bishop Nolan B. Harmon Bishop of the North Alabama Conference of the Methodist Church

George M. Murray, D.D., LL.D . Bishop Coadjutor, Episcopal Diocese of Alabama

Edward V. Ramage Moderator, Synod of the Alabama Presbyterian Church in the United States

Earl Stallings Pastor, First Baptist Church, Birmingham, Alabama

Fitz James Stephen was an English lawyer, judge, and writer. For more, see  his biography .

Kant claims that we can achieve ‘synthetic a priori knowledge’ of objects in our experience when we understand the ‘conditions of experience’ or what structures our experience.  Click here  for more on Kant and his ideas.

Reid upholds the ‘common-sense’ view that we can acquire certain knowledge through our observations of the external world. For more on Reid and his ideas,  click here .

Descartes holds that we can only be certain of ‘clear and distinct ideas’, and that the truth of these ideas are guaranteed by God’s existence, and the fact that God is not a deceiver.  Click here  for more on Descartes and his ideas.

Pyrrhonistic Skepticism, introduce by Pyrrho of Elis, is a philosophy which proposes that one should suspend judgment about matters that are ‘non-evident’ (most of them), in order to reach ataraxia – a state of equanimity or peace of mind. For more about this philosophy,  click here .

Empiricists claim that we must rely on our observations and experiences of the world to gain knowledge, while Rationalists hold that we can gain knowledge through things like reason. For more on empiricists and rationalists click here.

Ontological  means having to do with what exists.  Ontology is the study of existence.  Do numbers and sets exist in reality or are they just human concepts?  Does god exist?  Are natural laws part of the fabric of the universe or just useful ways for us to make sense of the world we observe?  These are all the kinds of questions that worry philosophers working on ontology.

Glaucon and Socrates both agree that being just and morally good is is instrumentally valuable. If you were unjust, you wouldn’t have friends, you’d lose your job, and you might very well end up in prison—all definitely bad outcomes. The puzzle is, once you have stripped away all of the good things morality gets you (friends, jobs, freedoms), then is there anything left that is good about it?

Socrates was famous for asking those who claimed to have adequate theories of, say, courage or justice, pointed questions designed to show they really did not know what they were talking about.  As part of this questioning, Socrates would often emphasize his own ignorance.  Hence the term “Socratic irony”: though Socrates claimed to be ignorant, he understood better than his interlocutors how difficult the puzzles were.

Thrasymachus (pronounced Thruh-SIM-ah-kus) is another character in the  Republic . He argued earlier in the dialogue that justice is simply another name for whatever those in power desire and that injustice is better than our ordinary conceptions of justice, at least for those who can get away with it.

Examples of Goods that are Both Intrinsic and Instrumental:

These goods can both be enjoyed on their own and tend to get you other goods you want.

• Eudaimonia (in Aristotle’s sense)

These are just good, by themselves, no matter what else you are aiming at.

Examples of Purely Instrumental Goods:

Money – Money is only valuable insofar as it can be traded for other things you want Being good at standardized testing – Being good at standardized testing only really matters while you are in school. Knowing how to drive – Knowing how to drive is only good to the extent that you need to drive.

For Kant, a  person  is an autonomous rational being — someone capable of deciding which rules to follow, planning for the future, and recognizing what their moral obligations are. Someone can be a human organism and not a person, in Kant’s sense. For instance, Kant would not regard someone in a permanent coma as a person.

Kant thinks persons are “ends in themselves” — sources of value that must be respected unconditionally by other rational beings.

For Kant, a  mere thing  is anything that is not a person — not a being capable of rational autonomy. Mere things can be used as a mere means by rational agents. For example, when I use a shovel to dig a hole, I have no moral duty to respect the shovel. Similarly, we do not owe respect to the animals we use for food.

Example 1 : Suppose you decide to help out your sick friend by bringing her aspirin. Unbeknownst to you, the medicine has gone bad and is now poisonous. Your friend gets more ill. A defender of the Principle of Control would argue you are not responsible for making your friend sicker, since you could not have known or controlled the outcome. You are just responsible for a good deed—namely, the will to help your friend.

Example 2 : Suppose Alex and Bea both have several drinks at a bar one night and decide to drive home. Alex loses control of his car an ends up killing another driver. Bea arrives home safely. By the Principle of Control, both are equally morally blameworthy for their decision to drive drunk. Bea does not get “off the hook” just because she was lucky enough to not harm another person.

Unknown Truths: Knowing something entails believing it. There aren’t precise examples of unknown truths but you might think there is a fact of the matter whether, for instance, there are an even number or an odd number of stars in the Milky Way Galaxy. That fact, whatever it is, is a truth we are not now capable of believing based on any evidence we have.

Well-Justified but False:  Sometimes our evidence turns out to be misleading.  For example, for many centuries we believed the Earth was the center of the solar system, based on the kinds of observations we were able to make about the movement of the sun and moon.  We had reasons for those beliefs, but we were wrong.  We eventually got better reasons.

For many decades we believed that fat caused heart disease.  Now we have much  better evidence that sugar is the culprit.

True but Unjustified:  For example, a child might believe she will get money whenever she loses a tooth because she believes the tooth fairy will visit her.  The belief is true (most children get money when they lose teeth — at least in the US).  But her belief is unjustified — it is her parents leaving the money not a magical fairy.

Or a lottery winner might have believed his ticket would win.  His belief turned out to be true, but he had no good reason for believing he’d win a highly random lottery.

A Posteriori:  An a posteriori belief is something that you believe on the basis of observations and experience.  For instance, you might believe that it is cold in your room right now.  Or that your room was cold yesterday.  Or that this screen is white and black.

A Priori:  An a priori belief is something that you believe without making observations out in the world (you believe it  prior  to making observations).  For instance, you might think mathematical facts are known a priori — you know that 1+1=2 without performing any experiments.  You might also know that you are thinking or that you have a headache a priori.  Some a priori beliefs are called  intuitions  — beliefs that simply occur to us as true.  For example, you might have a moral intuition that is wrong to kick puppies.

Premise 1: A necessary condition for being a sandwich is having two or more slices of bread.

Premise 2: Burritos have one and only one tortilla shell.

(C) Not a sandwich.

But what about chalupas?

Aristotle famously claims that there are no general moral theories that will always guide you in figuring out what’s right and wrong. For Aristotle, determining what’s right or good (what a virtuous person would do) always depends on the particulars of the case. Hence, learning to live well is more like learning to diagnose diseases, and less like learning to solve equations.

Aristotle contrasts natural properties and those acquired by habit. The key idea here is that properties things have by nature cannot be changed, but those that we acquire by habit can be changed (for instance, by training ourselves in a different way).

Example: I naturally have the property of being alive. I could acquire (through training and practice) the property of being able to speak Japanese.

An instrumental end or goal is one you pursue in order to get closer to another end or goal.  For instance, you might pursue studying for the SATs because you are pursuing the more important goal of attending college.  But why are you attending college?  Presumably that is also an instrumental end: you are attending college so you can get a good job, learn about subjects you are interested in, and make friends.

Aristotle thinks a final end or goal is one for which we cannot reasonably wonder anymore why we are pursuing it.  We are pursuing it  for its own sake. 

Presumably all instrumental ends have a final end at the end of the chain.

Take SATs. –> Go to college. –> Get a great job. –> Make money. –> Be Happy. –> ? If nothing comes next, this is the final end.

Upcoming Events

as a Way of Life

Natural Theology: Reason about God

Is there a god, introduction.

Anselm’s Ontological Argument

About anselm.

Truly there is a God, although the foole hath said in his heart, There is no God.

And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived . Or is there no such nature, since the foole hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very foole, when he hears of this being of which I speak—a being than which nothing greater can be conceived—understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence, even the foole is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

Reality vs. Understanding

The Ontological Argument Explained

Guanilo's Objection: The Perfect Island

They say that there is the ocean somewhere an island which, because of the difficulty (or rather the impossibility) of finding that which does not exist, some have called the ‘Lost Island.’ And the story goes that it is blessed with all manner of priceless riches and delights in abundance and is superior everywhere in abundance to all those other lands that men inhabit. Now, if anyone tell me that it is like this, I shall easily understand what is said, since nothing is difficult about it. But if he should then go on to say, as though it were a logical consequence of this: You cannot any more doubt that this island that is more excellent than all other lands truly exists somewhere in reality than you can doubt that it is in your mind; and since it is more excellent to exist not only in the mind alone but also in reality, therefore it must needs be that it exists. For if it did not exist, any other land existing in reality would be more excellent than it, and so this island, already conceived by you to be more excellent than others, will not be more excellent. If, I say, someone wishes thus to persuade me that this island really exists beyond all doubt, I should either think that he was joking, or I should find it hard to decide which of us I ought to judge the bigger fool – I, if I agreed with him, or he, if he thought that he had proved the existence of this island.

The Five Ways (Arguments) of Aquinas

Way 1: Change

It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.

Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.

Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Broken Down

Way 2: Causation

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.

There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Way 3: Contingency

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

Divine Attributes in Aquinas' Third Way

Way 4: Degree

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

Way 5: Design

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Other Design Arguments

Objections to the Five Ways

Objection 1: The Problem of Evil

It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Aquinas’ Reply

As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Objection 2: Occam’s Razor (the simplest explanation is best)

Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

Aquinas’ Reply (God explains more)

Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self necessary first principle.

Other Objections Not Considered

Summary and Next Steps

Acknowledgements

This digital essay was prepared by Paul Blaschko and Meghan Sullivan from the University of Notre Dame, and edited by Justin Christy and Sam Kennedy.

Blaschko, Paul and Meghan Sullivan. 2022. "Natural Theology: Reason about God." The Notre Dame Philosophy Commons. Justin Christy and Sam Kennedy (eds.).

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by William Paley

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Based on several sermons, Natural Theology is an argumentative piece that explains the absolute existence of a deity of God based on the common knowledge of mankind.

Paley's first analogy is that of a watch being made, and how that relates to human thoughts on the unknown. People that buy watches don't really know how they work, have never seen one made, and the watch has functions that are practically unknown. Although this is a very biased an haphazard analogy, Paley connects this to religion in that, even though a watch is one of many possible material combination, we know it is there even though we don't know how it is made. The same, he argues, is true of a God - we don't know how it works or is made/makes, but we know - or, should know - it is there.

Paley continues on the topic of a watch, explaining that the maker of the first watch has now made a second watch. In a way, the first watch reproduced itself, using the watchmaker simply as a vehicle for creation. In the same sense, he says, a person makes a water mill, and the mill grinds corn. The water is what is grinding the corn, but a person simply made the mill so that the water would have a vehicle or medium to grind the corn.

Paley argues that the same type of thing can be applied to the rest of the world and to nature - things are built by design to have some meaning or purpose in society. While it is true that these things may not be alive, one might not know exactly how they work, just like one does not know how a deity works. Paley's conclusions are perhaps outdated, as scientific evidence has come the its own conclusion on the topic.

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Natural Theology and Natural Religion

The term “natural religion” is sometimes taken to refer to a pantheistic doctrine according to which nature itself is divine. “Natural theology”, by contrast, originally referred to (and still sometimes refers to) [ 1 ] the project of arguing for the existence of God on the basis of observed natural facts .

In contemporary philosophy, however, both “natural religion” and “natural theology” typically refer to the project of using the cognitive faculties that are “natural” to human beings—reason, sense-perception, introspection—to investigate religious or theological matters. Natural religion or theology, on the present understanding, is not limited to empirical inquiry into nature, and it is not wedded to a pantheistic result. It does, however, avoid appeals to special non-natural faculties (ESP, telepathy, mystical experience) or supernatural sources of information (sacred texts, revealed theology, creedal authorities, direct supernatural communication). In general, natural religion or theology (hereafter “natural theology”) aims to adhere to the same standards of rational investigation as other philosophical and scientific enterprises, and is subject to the same methods of evaluation and critique.

Philosophers and religious thinkers across almost every epoch and tradition (Near Eastern, African, Asian, and European) have engaged the project of natural theology, either as proponents or critics. The question of whether natural theology is a viable project is at the root of some of the deepest religious divisions: Shiite thinkers are optimistic about reason’s ability to prove various theological and ethical truths, for instance, while Sunnis are not; Roman Catholic theologians typically think that reason can demonstrate the existence of God, while many Protestant theologians do not. Unlike most of the topics discussed in an encyclopedia of philosophy, this is one over which wars have been fought and throats have been cut.

The most active discussions of natural theology in the West occurred during the high medieval period (roughly 1100–1400 C.E.) and the early modern period (1600–1800 C.E.). The past few decades have witnessed a revival of debate in the public sphere: there are now institutes promoting “Intelligent Design Theory”, popular apologetics courses, campus debates between believers and agnostics, a “New Atheist” movement, Youtube debates between pastors and atheistic apologists regarding new books in natural theology (such as the one between Nathan Lewis and Bernie Dehler on the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology), [ 2 ] and TED talks by famous atheists on resisting natural religion (such as the one by Richard Dawkins in February 2002). [ 3 ]

Among professional philosophers (who aren’t typically part of these more popular debates), arguments over our ability to justify positive or negative answers to religious questions have become fairly technical, often employing sophisticated logical techniques in an effort to advance the discussion instead of retreading the same old ground. The prestigious Gifford Lectures series hosted by a consortium of Scottish universities, however, has tried to feature new but still accessible work in natural theology for over 100 years (it too has a Youtube channel!) [ 4 ]

In this article, we aim to avoid most the more recent complexities but also explain their origins by focusing on some central developments in the early modern period that helped to frame contemporary natural theological debates.

• 1.1 Religious language and concepts
• 1.2 Rational access

2.1.1 Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109)

2.1.2 rené descartes (1596–1650), 2.1.3 gottfried leibniz (1646–1716), 2.1.4 immanuel kant (1724–1804), 2.1.5 contemporary modal versions, 2.2 the argument from necessary truths, 2.3 the argument from possibility, 3.1 the classical cosmological argument, 3.2.1 hume on the teleological argument, 3.2.2 the teleological argument from fine-tuning, 3.3 arguments from religious experience.

• 4. “Ramified” natural theology

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Related entries, 1. prolegomenal considerations.

Theologians often follow Kant’s example and address various “prolegomena” or preliminary questions before trying to do any substantive metaphysics. These include questions about the semantics of religious speech and the ability that we do (or do not) have to access religious truths.

1.1 Religious Language and Concepts

We will use the term “natural theologian” to refer to someone who aims to use ordinary human cognitive faculties (reason, sense-perception, introspection) to establish positive truths about God. Such a person presupposes that sentences in human language (or at least sentences in the language of human thought) can express some theological truths, even if other such truths are beyond us.

Critics of natural theology sometimes challenge these semantic presuppositions. They provide reasons to think that our thoughts, concepts, or words are incapable of referring adequately to the transcendent entities that play an important role in many religious doctrines—entities such as Judaism’s YHWH, Neo-Platonism’s One, Vedanta’s Brahman, Mormonism’s Heavenly Father, and so on. The debate surrounding these issues is often designated “the problem of religious language”, but it is usually as much about human concepts as it is about sentences in actual languages.

In the western tradition, there have been a few periods of especially active discussion of this problem. The Neo-Platonic era was one (see the discussion of negative theology in the entry on Plotinus ), the high medieval period (1100–1400 or so) was another, the Enlightenment movement in 17 th –18 th century Europe (especially the empiricist portion of it) was a third. More recent discussions have involved both analytic and continental figures: A.J. Ayer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, Antony Flew, Norman Malcolm, Emmanuel Levinas, and William P. Alston have each discussed, in very different ways, the question of whether and how our language might succeed in referring to transcendent entities. Since the 1970s, however, when analytic philosophers turned away from a focus on language to a revival of metaphysics, the “problem of religious language” has been less prominent.

1.2 Rational Access

In addition to questions about what religious language refers to and how (if at all) religious concepts apply , the natural theologian faces another set of preliminary questions about our ability to generate sound arguments about such entities or facts. Our sense-perceptual and rational faculties are clearly limited and fallible. There are presumably many facts about the natural universe that we are incapable of understanding due to their complexity or inaccessibility. So why should we think that our natural faculties can deliver truths about even more remote or transcendent entities?

A related question concerns whether natural theology exhausts the domain of truths which we could even in principle have access. Some practitioners (call them rationalists ) argue that only propositions that can be justified by unaided human reason are candidates for permissible belief. Others (call them hybridists ) allow that our natural faculties can take us a certain distance—to knowledge of the basic nature and even existence of God, say—but argue that we must ultimately appeal to faith when it comes to more specific doctrines regarding the divine nature, acts, and intentions. This is the canonical Roman Catholic position on faith and reason developed in authors such as Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and revived in the natural scientific context of the Renaissance by Catalan scholar Raymond Sebond (1385–1436). Sebond’s Latin work, Theologia Naturalis (1434–1436), became famous when Michel de Montaigne translated it into French in 1569 and made it the subject of the longest of his renowned Essays (‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’), in 1580.

There are many kinds of hybridists: while they all think a turn to faith is necessary at some point, some seek to establish little more than the bare existence of God before turning to faith for greater details. Others think it is possible to develop a more robust understanding of God from within the bounds of reason and sense-perception. Indeed, in recent years the so-called “ramified natural theology” movement has sought to use our natural faculties to demonstrate (or show to be highly probable) robust doctrines that go well beyond bare theism—for example, specifically Christian doctrines such as that of the Trinity, the resurrection, or the historical authenticity of certain miracles or biblical prophecies (Swinburne 2003; Newman et al. 2003; Gauch Jr. 2011; see section 4 below ).

Opponents of natural religion or theology, by contrast, deny that reason or our other ordinary capacities can justify religious beliefs. Some of these opponents are fideists (e.g., on some readings, Tertullian, Blaise Pascal, Pierre Bayle, J.G. Hamann, and Søren Kierkegaard) who hold these same beliefs as articles of faith rather than as teachings of reason (see the entry on fideism ). Pascal, for instance, was a preeminent mathematician with strong interests in natural theology, but ultimately concluded (during what he called a “night of fire” in November 1654) that unaided reason is more likely to lead us to the false god “of philosophers and scholars” than to the true “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob”. The 20 th century Reformed theologian Karl Barth opposed natural theology for much the same reason, and made his opposition to Emil Brunner’s version of the hybridist project clear in a book titled simply “ Nein! ” (Barth 1934). In his Gifford Lectures, contemporary theologian Stanley Hauerwas espouses a fideistic view in the tradition of Pascal and Barth but claims (somewhat perversely) that his project (which incorporates biblical texts and specifically Christian doctrines) is one in “natural theology” all the same (Hauerwas 2001: 15ff).

Other opponents of natural theology are agnostics who do not find the fideist’s turn to faith appealing. They deny that our natural faculties succeed in justifying any positive or negative substantial (i.e., non-analytic) theistic beliefs, and consequently suspend belief. Agnostics differ, however, as to whether unaided reason could in principle but does not in fact justify such beliefs (thus Bertrand Russell’s famous response to a question about what he would say if he were to die and then confront God on judgment day: “not enough evidence, God, not enough evidence!”) or whether our unaided faculties are not even in principle adequate to the task.

Still other opponents of natural theology are atheists . Atheists agree with fideists and agnostics that our natural faculties cannot establish the existence of God or other religious entities. But that’s because they think those faculties provide reasons to believe that such entities do not exist at all (see the entry on atheism and agnosticism ). One such reason is the negative one that we cannot produce any sound arguments for theistic claims. But atheists also often maintain that there are positive reasons to believe that God does not exist—the incoherence of the concept of God, for instance, or the incompatibility of God’s existence and the existence of horrendous suffering and evil (see the entry on the problem of evil ).

There are many ways to approach a survey of natural theology. Here we have chosen to focus largely on the classic historical discussions, and in particular on the debates in the Enlightenment (17 th –18 th century) period. We will consider versions of the two basic kinds of positive argument in favor of religious theses: a priori arguments and a posteriori arguments. There are species of each of these.

2. A priori arguments

2.1 ontological arguments.

A priori arguments are those that do not require an appeal to particular sense-perceptual experiences in order to justify their conclusions. Immanuel Kant gave the name “ontological” to a priori arguments that aim to prove the existence of an object from a concept or an idea of that object (see the entry on ontological arguments ). But the argument over whether such a strategy can establish the existence of God began well before Kant’s time.

An early and now-canonical formulation of the ontological argument is found in the second book of St. Anselm’s Proslogion (Anselm 1077–78). Anselm begins by characterizing God as the “being than which none greater can be thought” and then seeks to show that such a being does and indeed must exist.

Anselm’s argument can be reconstructed in various ways (see the entry on Saint Anselm ), but here is one:

• By “God” we understand something than which nothing greater can be thought. [premise]
• When we understand the term “God”, God is in the understanding. [premise]
• Therefore, something than which nothing greater can be thought is in the understanding. [by (1) and (2)]
• What is in the understanding and in reality is greater than what is in the understanding alone. [premise]
• Therefore, God exists in the understanding and in reality. [by (3) and (4)]

In support of (2), Anselm notes that

[T]he fool has said in his heart that “There is no God”. But when this same Fool hears me say “something than which nothing greater can be thought”, he surely understands what he hears; and what he understands exists in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists [in reality]. (Anselm 81–2)

So according to Anselm, even the “foolish” atheist understands the term “God” when he argues that God does not exist. By this Anselm simply means that the atheist has the idea of God, and thus has God “in his understanding”.

(4) presupposes that things can exist in a number of different ways or modes. One of those ways is as the object of an idea—i.e., existence “in the understanding”. Another way for it to exist is “in reality”. (4) articulates a comparative value judgment about these ways of existing: it is greater for something to exist in both ways than it is to exist merely in the first way.

In order to deduce (5) from (3) and (4), Anselm uses a reductio ad absurdum argument:

And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it exists only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist in reality as well, which is greater. (Anselm 82)

More explicitly:

• Suppose a certain being, B 1 , is conceived of as God is in the proof, and B 1 is in the understanding alone. [supposition for reductio ]
• But we can conceive of another being, B 2 , that is exactly like B 1 , except that B 2 exists in reality as well as in the understanding. [introspection]
• Thus, B 2 is greater than B 1 . [by (4)]
• It is impossible to conceive of a being that is greater than B 1 . [by (a) and (1)]
• Contradiction. [by (c) and (d)]
• Therefore, (a) is false: If B 1 is conceived of as God is in the proof, then B 1 must exist in reality as well as in the understanding. [by (e)]

Philosophers and theologians have made numerous efforts to revive or demolish Anselm’s argument over the centuries. The most influential proponents include René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, Robert M. Adams, and Alvin Plantinga. Its main detractors include Anselm’s contemporaneous interlocutor—a monk named Gaunilo—as well as Thomas Aquinas, Descartes’ correspondents Johannes Caterus, Marin Mersenne, and Antoine Arnauld, Immanuel Kant, and, more recently, David Lewis (1970), Peter van Inwagen (1977), and Graham Oppy (1996, 2009). In what follows, a number of the relevant moves in the early modern discussion will be considered, as well as some contemporary developments of the 17 th century modal argument.

Descartes’ ontological argument, first presented in the Fifth Meditation, aims to prove the existence of God from the idea of God (Descartes 1641, cited below from the edition by Adam and Tannery (1962–1976) and referred to as “AT”). Here is one way to formulate the argument (compare Pereboom 1996, 2010; for alternatives see the entry on Descartes’ Ontological Argument ):

• When I have an idea of an object, the object really has whatever characteristics I clearly and distinctly understand it to have. (premise)
• I have an idea of God in which I clearly and distinctly understand God to be the maximally perfect being. (premise)
• Therefore, God has all perfections. [by (1) and (2)]
• Everlasting existence is a perfection. (premise)
• Therefore, God has everlasting existence. [by (3) and (4)]
• Therefore, God exists. [by (5)] (AT 7.63–71)

One prominent way of resisting this argument is to reduce it to absurdity by appeal to “parity of reasoning”. Johannes Caterus, for instance, objected to Descartes that by a precisely parallel form of reasoning we could prove the real existence of the object of an idea of an existent lion (AT 7.99). Gaunilo’s reply to Anselm centuries earlier was similar: by parity of reasoning, one can prove the existence in reality (and not just in the understanding) of the maximally perfect island (Anselm 102).

The objection aims to show that, like the idea God, the idea of the existent lion and the idea of the maximally perfect island include existence, and thus the existence of these objects can be established via an ontological argument. But the claim that the existence of Caterus’s lion and Gaunilo’s island can be established in this way is absurd, and thus the same holds for the theistic ontological argument. Note that this parity argument via a reductio ad absurdum , if successful, would show that the ontological argument is unsound, but without indicating which premise or which step in the reasoning is at fault.

A second objection, anticipated by Descartes in the Fifth Meditation, is that truly predicating a property of something without indicating any conditions or intentional contexts seems already to presume that the thing exists. So if we say that “Obama is President of the USA” is true, it follows that Obama exists. As a result, “Pegasus is a winged horse” is strictly-speaking false, though by using the intentional context “according to the myth” we can say, truly, that “According to the myth, Pegasus is a winged horse”. This suggests that premise (3) above is in trouble: it may be that Descartes can legitimately claim only something like “According to the idea of God, God has all perfections”, or, equivalently, “If God exists, then God has all perfections”. But then all that follows in step (6) is the unspectacular conclusion that “According to the idea of God, God exists”, or, equivalently, “If God exists, then God exists”.

A third problem, raised in the Second Objections by Father Marin Mersenne, is that the argument would be sound only if a maximally perfect being is really possible (or, equivalently, only if there is a genuine divine essence). But this, Mersenne complains, has not been established (AT 7.127). (Side note: Gaunilo and Mersenne are good examples of how devout theists might still take issue with certain kinds of efforts to prove God’s existence.)

Descartes’ reply to these objections involves the notion of a “true and immutable nature” (“TIN”) (AT 7.101ff.). Only some of our ideas are ideas of things that have TINs. Moreover, TINs themselves exist in some way, although they need not exist in concrete or empirical reality. Maybe they are abstract objects, like numbers or sets (Descartes explicitly compares them to Plato’s Forms). In any case, the kind of existence TINs have is sufficient to undermine the second objection above: the divine essence—God’s nature—is a true and immutable nature, and thus we do not need to prefix anything like the phrase “According to the idea of God” to premise (3). Rather, we can clearly and distinctly perceive that God’s nature is a TIN, and then say simply that “God has all perfections”. And that would then make the inference to (6) a valid one.

Descartes’ challenge then is to show that God’s nature is a TIN and that the natures of an “existent lion” and “the maximally perfect island” are not. In the Fifth Meditation Descartes maintains that TINs are different from fictitious ideas in that TINs are in some sense independent of the thought of their conceivers. For example, the nature of a triangle is a TIN because it contains properties that we don’t grasp when we first form the idea of a triangle, and deducing these further properties is a process “more like discovery than creation”. God’s nature also has this feature—we obviously don’t grasp all of the properties of the maximally perfect being when we first form an idea of it. The problem, however, is that it is not clear how this criterion would rule out the natures of a most perfect island or an existent lion.

Later, Descartes (AT 7.83–4) characterizes a TIN as having a unity such that it cannot be divided by the intellect. He thinks that having this feature shows that is hasn’t been simply put together by the intellect or imagination, and is thus a genuine nature. Accordingly, the idea of an existent lion does not correspond to a TIN because I can coherently conceive of a lion that doesn’t exist. As for the maximally perfect island, I can conceive of it having fewer coconut trees but one more mango tree, and so on. But although Descartes does not seem to recognize this, it also seems that I can conceive of an omnipotent being that is lacking maximal benevolence. So by this standard it appears that the idea of God also fails to correspond to a true and immutable nature.

To the third problem, concerning the real possibility of God, Descartes replies that our clear and distinct ideas of TINs—produced in us by reason—are reliable. Since we can (supposedly) see clearly and distinctly that there is no contradiction in our idea of God’s nature, the denial that God is possible is on equal footing with the denial that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles (AT 7.150–1).

Leibniz takes on several difficulties for Descartes’ ontological argument (in, e.g., Leibniz 1676 [1969]: 167–8; 1677 [1969]: 177–80; 1684 [1969]: 292–3; 1692 [1969]: 386; 1678 [1989]: 237–39; 1699 [1989]: 287–88; Adams 1994: 135–56). These can be grouped as follows:

• that the claim that the essence of a most perfect being includes its existence—that existence is a perfection—hasn’t been substantiated;
• that all this argument can establish is the conditional “If an object of the concept of God exists, then God exists”; and
• that the real possibility of a most perfect being cannot be demonstrated

In several places Leibniz addresses (A) by arguing that by “God” we understand a necessary being, and from this it just follows that the essence of God involves existence. In this way we supposedly avoid altogether the premise that existence is a perfection. (One wonders, however, whether the argument for including “necessary existence” in the idea of God will need to rely on the premise that necessary existence is a perfection.)

In some writings Leibniz bypasses problem (B) by presenting an argument with a different conditional as its conclusion:

• If there is a divine essence, then the divine essence involves necessary existence. [premise]
• If God is a possible being, then there is a divine essence. [premise]
• If God is a possible being, then the divine essence involves necessary existence. [by (1), (2)]
• If God is a possible being, then God necessarily exists. [by (3)]
• Therefore, if God is a possible being, then God actually exists. [by (4)]

What has yet to be dealt with, clearly, is Mersenne’s problem above—namely, (C), that the real possibility of a most perfect being cannot be demonstrated. Leibniz offers several types of arguments against this. One relies on the fact that other things are clearly possible, together with the claim that only a necessary being provides a satisfactory ground or explanation for the possible existence of contingent beings. So on the assumption that contingent beings possibly exist, it must be at least possible for a necessary God to exist (for more on this kind of argument from possibility, see section 2.3 below).

A second type of Leibnizean argument for God’s real possibility returns to the thesis that God is the most perfect being, and adds that perfections are positive and simple, unanalyzable qualities. So, for example, consider any proposition of the form “ A and B are incompatible”, where A and B are any two perfections. Two properties are incompatible only if they are logically incompatible, according to Leibniz. Thus “ A and B are incompatible” will be true only if one of these perfections turns out to be the negation of the other (as in omniscient and non-omniscient), or if their analyses reveal simpler properties, one of which is a negation of another. But on the assumption that all the divine perfections are positive, simple, and thus unanalyzable, neither of these scenarios can obtain. Consequently, “ A and B are compatible” will always be true for any two perfections, and thus a being with all perfections will be really possible (Leibniz 1678 [1989]: 238–39; Adams 1994: 142–48).

A third Leibnizean response to Mersenne’s objection is that it is rational to presume the real possibility of the things we can conceive, at least until their impossibility has been demonstrated.

Kant’s most famous criticism of the ontological argument is encapsulated in his claim that “existence” (or “exists”) is not a “real predicate” (Kant 1781/1787: A592/B619ff). Alternatively, “existence” is not “a predicate that is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it” (A598/B626). Kant’s idea here is that since “existence” is not a real predicate, existing cannot be one of God’s necessary perfections.

One way to interpret the objection is as follows:

• Suppose A and B are two entities, and A is greater than B at t 1 . [premise]
• If B becomes as great as A at t 2 , then B changes. [by (1)]
• there is a time t 1 at which x has (or lacks) some property P , and
• there is a later time t 2 at which x lacks (or has) P as a result of x ’s acting or being acted upon. [premise]
• For every entity x , if x comes into existence in reality, conditions (3a) and (3b) are not satisfied. [premise]
• Therefore, when an entity comes into existence in reality, it doesn’t change. [by (3), (4)]
• Therefore, B cannot become as great as A solely in virtue of B ’s coming into existence in reality. [by (2), (5)]
• Therefore, A cannot be greater than B solely in virtue of existing in reality. [by (6)]

(4) is the key premise in this formulation—does coming into existence involve a genuine change? There is clearly a technical sense in which saying that a concept applies to something does not enlarge the concept or change our conception of the being it refers to. But it might still remain open that a being that has all perfections but does not exist is not as great as a being that has all perfections and also exists.

Finally, Kant’s objection can perhaps be avoided altogether by proposing that the perfection at issue is necessary existence , and not mere existence. Adding necessary existence to our concept of a being would presumably involve changing it (and thus enlarging its concept). This is effectively a modal version of the ontological argument (see section 2.1.5 ).

Kant’s most pressing criticism, in our view, goes back to the issue raised by Mersenne: we cannot determine whether God (conceived as having necessary existence or not) is really possible. Kant grants to Leibniz that the notion of a most perfect being may not involve a logical contradiction, but he argues that this is not enough to show that it is really possible, for there are ways of being impossible that do not involve logical contradictions (A602/B630). The implication for the ontological argument is that we cannot know whether it is really possible for the divine perfections to be jointly exemplified even if we know that they involve no contradiction,

for how can my reason presume to know how the highest realities operate, what effects would arise from them, and what sort of relation all these realities would have to each other? (Kant 1830, 1015–16)

Versions of the ontological argument discussed by Leibniz and Kant have been elaborated by Robert M. Adams (1971), Alvin Plantinga (1979), Peter van Inwagen (1977, 2009) and others. These versions employ contemporary modal semantics and metaphysics to motivate the following two assumptions:

The argument then proceeds as follows:

• It’s possible that God exists. [premise]
• Therefore, God exists in some possible world (call it w *). [by (1), (Assumption 1)]
• If God exists, then God necessarily exists. [by definition of “God”]
• Therefore, in w * God necessarily exists. [by (2), (3)]
• Therefore, in w * God is such that God exists in every possible world [by (4), (Assumption 2)]
• The actual world is one of the possible worlds [premise]
• Therefore, in w * God is such that God exists in the actual world [by (5), (6)]
• Therefore, God exists in the actual world [by (7)]

Critics have resisted numerous aspects of the argument (for comprehensive discussion, see Oppy 1996). The inference to (7), for instance, assumes that the actual world is possible relative to w *. But that assumption is only legitimate on some models of how modal talk works. Thus, the critic claims, it hasn’t been shown that w * has the relation to the actual world that licenses the conclusion that God actually exists.

The most significant disagreement, however, is again the one that Mersenne raised against Descartes. How can the possibility claim in (1) be justified? Adams (1994: ch.8) claims that we are rationally permitted, in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary, to presume the real possibility of most things, including God. Others argue that no such presumption of possibility is justified, especially regarding supersensible things.

Leibniz’s argument for God’s existence from the existence of the necessary truths crucially involves the premises that all truths must be true in virtue of something distinct from them (they need what contemporary metaphysicans sometimes call a “truth-maker”). Since necessary truths would be true even if there were no finite minds to think them, such truths cannot be true in virtue of facts about human psychology. Against the Platonic suggestion that they are true in virtue of Forms existing outside of any mind whatsoever, Leibniz argues that some of the truths are about abstract entities, which are not the kinds of things that could have mind-independent existence. The only contender that remains, then, is that these truths are true in virtue of the ideas in an infinite and necessarily existent (divine) mind (Leibniz 1714 [1969]: 647; Adams 1994: 177ff.).

Leibniz’s argument stakes out one position on the grounding of necessary truths, but there are many rival and contending views that do not invoke the existence of a necessary, concrete divine being. A Platonist might respond by claiming that it hasn’t been shown that abstract entities do not have mind-independent existence, while Humeans would argue that necessary truths are all analytic, and that therefore only the structure of language or of our conceptual scheme is required to ground their truth.

A third sort of a priori proof argues from facts about the mere possibility of something (or of some collection of things) to the existence of a “ground of possibility” that somehow explains them. An early version of such an argument can be found in Augustine and the Neo-Platonic tradition, but the canonical presentations of this sort of “possibility proof” are in Leibniz’s Monadology (1714) and, much more elaborately, in Kant’s book-length treatise called The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763). Note that if the truths about what is possible are necessary truths, as they indeed seem to be, then this might be a more specific version of the argument from necessary truths (see 2.2 ).

Kant’s version of the argument is based on the claim that there are real possibilities that are not grounded in the principle of non-contradiction, but that nevertheless must have a ground or explanation (Kant 1763 [1902–], 2: 63ff). If they are not grounded in the principle of non-contradiction, then they are not grounded in God’s thinking them rather than their negation, which is how Leibniz had proposed that all such possibilities are grounded. Put the other way around, Kant thinks that some impossibilities are grounded not in the law of non-contradiction, but in a non-logical kind of “real repugnance” between two or more of their properties. Kant maintains, for instance, that it is impossible for a material being to be conscious, even though no logical contradiction exists between material and conscious (Kant 1763 [1902–], 2: 85–6). It follows that this impossibility is not grounded in divine thought, for God can think any proposition that does not involve a contradiction. So facts about some real possibilities and real impossibilities can only be grounded in a necessary being that somehow exemplifies (rather than merely thinking) every combination of fundamental properties whose joint exemplification is possible. That being, of course, is supposed to be God. (For discussion, see Fisher and Watkins 1998; Adams 2000; Chignell 2009, 2012, 2014; Stang 2010; Abaci 2014; Yong 2014).

One way out of this argument is simply to claim that some real possibilities are primitive or ungrounded. This appears to be an option for Kant in his critical period insofar as he is no longer committed to rationalist principles such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Still, even in his critical period (i.e., after 1770 or so), Kant never repudiated the earlier proof—and supposedly claimed in a lecture from the 1780s that it “can in no way be refuted” (Kant 1830, 1034). This suggests that in his critical period Kant still held that God’s existence is the only available ground for real possibility, but that the explanatory point may justify at most a kind of theoretical belief ( Glaube ) rather than full demonstrative knowledge (see Chignell 2007).

3. A posteriori Arguments

An a posteriori argument involves at least one premise whose justification essentially appeals to some sort of empirical fact or experience. The main demonstrative a posteriori argument is what Kant dubbed “the cosmological argument”. It is motivated by the familiar question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” and goes from the empirical fact of the existence of something (or of the cosmos as a whole, perhaps) to the existence of a first cause or ground of that cosmos that is, at least in part, not identical to that cosmos. Cosmological arguments of this sort are found across almost every human philosophical tradition, and find prominence in the West in the writings of Aristotle, numerous medieval Islamic authors, Maimonides, Aquinas, Locke, Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, and David Hume. Here again we will focus largely on the early modern period.

Leibniz’s cosmological argument aims to demonstrate the existence of God from the need to explain certain facts about the actual world. For Leibniz the world is the collection of all the actual contingent beings -- that is, all of the actual beings whose existence is possible but not necessary (Leibniz 1714 [1969]: 646).

Leibniz’s cosmological argument overcomes an important hurdle for earlier versions, such as the Kaläm cosmological argument (Craig 2000), since Leibniz’s does not assume or argue that the world has a beginning in time (a claim that detractors might well dispute, but for which some, such as Craig (2000), have argued). Suppose that in fact the world has no beginning in time, and that each being in the world has an explanation in some previously existing being(s). Two demands for explanation might still arise: Why is there a world at all rather than none? and: Why does this world exist and not some other world? Neither explanation can be provided on the basis of entities within the world (or within time). Leibniz’s conclusion is that there must be a being that is not merely hypothetically, but absolutely necessary, and whose own explanation is contained within itself. This being is God. (A similar cosmological argument is advanced around the same time by Samuel Clarke (1705), see also the entry on Samuel Clarke ).

David Hume advances three objections to the type of cosmological argument offered by Leibniz and Clarke (Hume 1779, Part IX, and the entry Hume on religion ). The first is that the notion of (absolutely) necessary existence is problematic. Suppose that some being is absolutely necessary—then its nonexistence should be absolutely inconceivable. But, says Hume, for any being whose existence we can conceive, we can also conceive its nonexistence, and thus there isn’t a necessary being. Hume anticipates the objection that if we truly understood the divine nature, we would be unable to conceive God’s nonexistence. He replies that an analogous point can be made about matter: for all we know, if we truly understood the nature of matter, we would be unable to conceive its nonexistence. This would show that the existence of matter is not contingent after all, and that it does not require an external explanation. Thus the cosmological argument cannot establish that God is the necessary being who is responsible for the rest of the cosmos.

Hume’s second objection is that God cannot be the causal explanation for the existence of a series of contingent beings that has no temporal beginning, since any causal relation “implies a priority in time and a beginning of existence” (Part IV). In reply, it seems quite possible to conceive of a non-temporal causal relation, and thus to conceive of God, from outside of time, causing a series of contingent beings that has always existed. Indeed, this view is common in the theological tradition. Similarly, Kant and various contemporary metaphysicians think we can coherently conceive of a relation of simultaneous causation . If this is right, then even a God who is in time could ground the existence of a series of contingent beings with no temporal beginning.

Hume’s third objection is that in a causal series of contingent beings without a temporal beginning, each being will have a causal explanation by virtue of its predecessors. Since there is no first being, there will be a causal explanation for every contingent being on the basis of previously existing contingent beings. However, if each individual contingent being has a causal explanation, then the entire causal series has an explanation. For wholes are nothing over and above their parts:

did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable should you afterwards ask me what was the cause of the whole twenty. (Part IV)

A reply to this last objection might be that even if one has explained in this way the existence of each individual in the contingent series, one still has not answered the two questions mentioned earlier: Why is there a world at all rather than none? and: Why does this world exist and not some other world? (for more discussion, see Rowe 1975; Pruss 2006).

Kant, too, objects to the cosmological argument, but mainly on the grounds that it delivers an object that is inadequate to the classical conception of God. Any effort to turn the ultimate ground into the most perfect of all beings, Kant says, will have to smuggle in some sort of ontological argument (see Pasternack 2001; Forgie 2003; Proops 2014; and the entry on Kant’s philosophy of religion ).

In general, objections to the cosmological argument (both historical and contemporary) take one of the following forms:

• not every fact requires explanation, and the fact that the cosmological arguer is pointing to is one of those;
• each being in the cosmos has an explanation, but the cosmos as an entire series does not require an additional explanation, over and above the explanations of each member of the series;
• the sort of explanation required to explain the empirical data cited by the cosmological arguer does not amount to a supernatural explanation (e.g., the Big Bang could suffice);
• the sort of explanation required to explain the empirical data cited by the cosmological arguer is not going to deliver anything as august as the God of traditional religious doctrine but rather, in Hume’s terms, a somewhat “mediocre deity”.

3.2 Teleological or design arguments

The Greek word “telos” means “end” or “purpose”. The a posteriori arguments in natural theology that are referred to as “teleological” claim that the natural world displays some sort of purposive or end-directed design, and that this licenses the conclusion that the natural world has some sort of very powerful and intelligent designer (see the entry on teleological arguments for God’s existence ). Earlier authors dubbed this sort of non-demonstrative, inductive argument a “physico-theological” argument (see, e.g., William Derham 1713).

Teleological arguments are often associated with William Paley (1743–1805), although in fact this type of argument has a much longer history (see Taliaferro 2005). The fact that Paley’s 1802 book was called Natural Theology is no doubt part of why natural theology as a whole is sometimes equated with the a posteriori investigations of nature for the purposes of supporting religious theses. In Paley’s famous analogy, the relationship between a watch and a watch-maker is taken to be saliently similar to the relationship between the natural world and its author. If we were to go walking upon the heath and stumble upon a watch, a quick examination of its inner workings would reveal, with a high probability, that “its several parts were framed and put together for a purpose” by what must have been “an intelligence” (1802: 1–6). Likewise with nature as a whole.

A different kind of teleological argument is developed by George Berkeley (1685–1753), for whom natural, physical objects do not exist independently of minds, but consist solely in ideas. Given the regularity, complexity, and involuntariness of our sensory ideas, their source (Berkeley argues) must be an infinitely powerful, benevolent mind that produces these ideas in us in a lawlike fashion. God’s existence can also be demonstrated from the harmony and beauty that the ideas of the world display (Berkeley 1710: §146). Since according to Berkeley our ordinary experience is a type of direct divine communication with us, our relationship with God is in this respect especially intimate. Thus he frequently remarks, quoting St. Paul, that “in God we live and move and have our being” ( Acts 17:28).

Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion pre-date Paley, of course, but they feature an especially influential and elegant critical discussion of teleological arguments (1779), a discussion of which Paley was no doubt aware. Hume’s argument can be formulated as follows (compare Pereboom 1996, 2010):

• Nature is a great machine, composed of lesser machines, all of which exhibit order (especially adaptation of means to ends). [premise]
• Machines caused by human minds exhibit order (especially adaptation of means to ends). [premise]
• Nature resembles machines caused by human minds. [by (1), (2)]
• If effects resemble each other, their causes resemble each other as well. [premise]
• The cause of nature resembles human minds. [by (3), (4)]
• Greater effects demand greater causes (causes adequate to the effects). [premise]
• Nature is much greater than machines caused by human minds. [premise]
• The cause of nature resembles but is much greater than human minds. [by (5), (6), (7)]
• The cause of nature is God. [by (8)]
• Therefore, God exists. [by (9)]

Hume’s objections to this argument include the claims that the analogies on which it is dependent are not exact, and thus that there are alternative explanations for order and apparent design in the universe. One response to these objections is that the teleological argument should be conceived as an argument to the best explanation, on the model of many scientific arguments. In that case the analogy need not be exact, but might still show that a theistic explanation is best. Indeed, even Hume, or at least his character Philo, concedes

that the works of nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art is evident; and according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. (Part XII)

But Philo also affirms that we cannot infer any important similarities between humans and the author of nature beyond intelligence, and in particular we cannot infer some of the divine attributes that are most important for sustaining traditional theistic religion (Part V). Most significantly, given the evil that there is in the universe, we cannot conclude that its designer has the moral qualities traditional religion requires God to have (Part X). Thus, again, we are left with a rather “mediocre deity”.

One of Hume’s neglected objections to the teleological argument is that it generates an absurd infinite regress (Part IV). If order and apparent design in the material universe are explained by divine intelligence, what explains the order and apparent design that give rise to intelligence in the divine mind? By dint of the reasoning employed in the teleological argument, it would have to be a super-divine intelligence. But what explains the order and apparent design that give rise to super-divine intelligence? An absurd infinite regress results, and to avoid it one might well suppose the material world “contain[s] the principle of order within itself”.

To this Hume has the theist Cleanthes reply that

even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question which may incessantly be started?

In scientific theorizing it is no decisive objection against an explanation that it contains entities that are themselves not adequately explained. Crucial to the value of scientific explanations is that they supply an explanatory advance , and we can reasonably believe that a theory does so without our having in hand adequate explanations for all of the entities it posits.

In recent decades, some natural theologians have developed an inductive argument for the existence of God that appeals to the fact that the values of various forces of nature appear to be “fine-tuned” for the existence of intelligent life. William Lane Craig (see e.g., Craig 1990, 2003) argues as follows. The world is conditioned principally by the values of the fundamental constants:

• a: the fine structure constant, or electromagnetic interaction;
• mn/me: proton to electron mass ratio;
• aG: gravitation;
• aw: the weak force; and
• as: the strong force.

When one imagines different values to these constants or forces, one discovers that in fact the number of observable universes, that is to say, universes capable of supporting intelligent life, is very small. Just a slight variation in any one of these values would render life impossible. For example, if the strong force ( as ) were increased as much as 1%, nuclear resonance levels would be so altered that almost all carbon would be burned into oxygen; an increase of 2% would preclude formation of protons out of quarks, preventing the existence of atoms. Furthermore, weakening the strong force by as much as 5% would unbind deuteron, which is essential to stellar nucleosynthesis, leading to a universe composed only of hydrogen. It has been estimated that the strong force must be within 0.8 and 1.2 its actual strength or all elements of atomic weight greater than four would not have formed. Or again, if the weak force had been appreciably stronger, then the Big Bang’s nuclear burning would have proceeded past helium to iron, making fusion-powered stars impossible. But if it had been much weaker, then we should have had a universe entirely of helium. Or again, if gravitation aG had been a little greater, all stars would have been red dwarfs, which are too cold to support life-bearing planets. If it had been a little smaller, the universe would have been composed exclusively of blue giants, which burn too briefly for life to develop. This gives us reason to believe that there is an intelligent agent who fine-tuned the universe to precisely these levels.

A number of opponents press the following objection:

• (1) We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe that are incompatible with our own existence.

This is the “anthropic principle”—the idea is just that if the features of the universe were incompatible with our existence, we would not be here to notice it. Thus it is not surprising that we do not observe such features.

Craig replies by arguing that it does not follow from (1) that

• (2) We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe that are compatible with our existence.

Here is his analogy. Suppose you are dragged before a firing squad of 100 trained marksmen, all of them with rifles aimed at your heart, to be executed. The command is given; you hear the deafening sound of the guns. And you observe that you are still alive, that all of the 100 marksmen missed! Now while it is true that

• (3) You should not be surprised that you do not observe that you are dead,

it is equally true that

• (4) You should be surprised that you do observe that you are alive.

Because the firing squad’s missing you altogether is extremely improbable, the surprise expressed in (4) is wholly appropriate, though you are not surprised that you do not observe that you are dead, since if you were dead you could not observe it. Similarly, while we should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our existence, it is nevertheless true that

• (5) We should be surprised that we do observe features of the universe that are compatible with our existence

in view of the enormous improbability that the universe should possess such features.

John Leslie (2002) proposes that the hypothesis of multiple universes would provide the explanation demanded by (5) (although he is also an advocate of a fine-tuning argument). Here is his analogy (which involves guns again, oddly). You are alone at night in an extremely dark forest when a gun is fired from far away and you are hit. If you assume that there is no one out to get you, this would be surprising. But now suppose that you were not in fact alone, but instead part of a large crowd (which you do not see because it’s so dark). In that case, Leslie suggests, you would be less surprised at being shot, since it seems a least somewhat likely that a gunman would be trying to shoot someone in the crowd. Leslie suggests that this story supports the multiple universe explanation for the fact that the values of the fundamental forces of the universe appear fine-tuned for life.

Roger White (2000) argues that there is a problem with Leslie’s account. While the multiple-universe hypothesis would explain why there is some universe or other that is fine-tuned for life , since it would raise the probability of that hypothesis, it would not similarly explain why this universe is fine-tuned for life . He contends that supposing that the gunman was firing at random, being part of a large crowd explains—raises the probability— that someone or other is shot , but not that you are shot . By contrast, the hypothesis that the gunman was aiming at you, as opposed to firing at random, does explain in this way that you are shot. Similarly, the multiple universe hypothesis explains in this way that there is some universe or other that is fine-tuned for life , but not that this universe is fine-tuned for life . By contrast, the hypothesis of a designer does explain why—raises the probability—that this universe is fine-tuned for life. White argues:

Postulate as many other universes as you wish, they do not make it any more likely that ours should be life-permitting or that we should be here. So our good fortune to exist in a life-permitting universe gives us no reason to suppose that there are many universes. (White 2000: 274)

Arguments for the existence of God from a special kind of experience are often called “arguments from religious experience”. Some philosophers and theologians have argued that our ordinary human cognitive faculties include what John Calvin called a special “sense of divinity” that, when not impeded or blocked, will deliver immediately justified beliefs about supernatural entities (Plantinga 1981, 1984). Some such thinkers, then, might construe an argument from religious experience as belonging to the category of natural religion or natural theology. Others, however, insist that “characteristic of the Continental Calvinist tradition is a revulsion against arguments in favor of theism or Christianity” (Wolterstorff 1984: 7; see also Sudduth 2009). In any case, most authors who write about religious experience generally construe it as caused by something other than our ordinary faculties and their intersubjectively available objects, and thus do not think of it as one of the topics of natural theology (see Alston 1991).

4. “Ramified” Natural Theology

Some supporters of natural religion or natural theology seek to use our ordinary cognitive faculties to support theses that are more robust and specific than those of generic or “perfect-being” theism. This project has recently been dubbed “ramified” natural theology by Richard Swinburne (see Holder 2013). A few of these efforts involve a priori argumentation: an ancient argument for the Trinity (found in St. Augustine ( De Trinitate , c. 399–419, Book IX), and Richard of St. Victor ( De Trinitate , c. 1162–1173, III.1–25)) is that any supreme being would have to be a supremely loving being, and any omnipotent supremely loving being would ultimately have to emanate from itself something that is both other and yet just as supreme and lovable as itself, and that a third such person would be necessary as a kind of product of that love between the first two. More recently, Marilyn McCord Adams’s books on theodicy(Adams 2000, 2006) and Eleonore Stump’s Gifford Lectures (Stump 2010) constitute an effort to consider the a priori problem of evil from within the context of a ramified (and thus in this case more robustly Christian) kind of natural theology.

But most ramified natural theology is inductive in spirit: thus John Locke (1695) famously argued for the “Reasonableness of Christianity” using a broadly historical, probabilistic approach. William Paley (1794) further developed this approach, and much more recently the contemporary Lockean Richard Swinburne argued for the conclusion that Bayesian-style reasoning justifies belief in the resurrection of Jesus with a probability of 97% (Swinburne 2003). Numerous other philosophers (and also many natural scientists) appeal to historical and scientific data as well as empirical and statistical principles of reasoning to support the authenticity of various biblical claims, the probability of various miracle stories, and so forth (see e.g., Olding 1990; Polkinghorne 2009; Gauch Jr. 2011). Note that this is a way of appealing to the content of sacred texts and special revelation which is consistent with the methods of natural theology: the prophetic or historical claims of those texts are evaluated using public evidence and accepted canons of inductive reasoning. Still, even such optimistic natural theologians as Locke, Paley, Swinburne, and these others count as hybridists insofar as they think that there are some important doctrines about the divine or supernatural that cannot be justified by our natural cognitive faculties. Thus even they will at some point be willing (in Kant’s famous phrase) to “deny knowledge in order to leave room for faith”.

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Acknowledgments

Our thanks to Monica Burnett, Hugh Gauch, Chad McIntosh, and Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this entry.

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• Evolutionary Concepts
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The Argument from Design: A Guided Tour of William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802)

• T. Ryan Gregory 1  

Evolution: Education and Outreach volume  2 ,  pages 602–611 ( 2009 ) Cite this article

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According to the classic “argument from design,” observations of complex functionality in nature can be taken to imply the action of a supernatural designer, just as the purposeful construction of human artifacts reveals the hand of the artificer. The argument from design has been in use for millennia, but it is most commonly associated with the nineteenth century English theologian William Paley and his 1802 treatise Natural Theology , or Evidence of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity , Collected from the Appearances of Nature . The book remains relevant more than 200 years after it was written, in large part because arguments very similar to Paley’s underlie current challenges to the teaching of evolution (indeed, his name arises with considerable frequency in associated discussions). This paper provides an accessible overview of the arguments presented by Paley in Natural Theology and considers them both in their own terms and in the context of contemporary issues.

I did not at that time [as a Cambridge theology student, 1827–1831] trouble myself about Paley’s premises; and taking these on trust, I was charmed and convinced by the long line of argumentation. (p. 59)

The old argument from design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered. (p. 87) Charles Darwin, Autobiography

Introduction

The “teleological argument,” better known as the “argument from design,” is the claim that the appearance of “design” in nature—such as the complexity, order, purposefulness, and functionality of living organisms—can only be explained by the existence of a “designer” (typically of the supernatural variety). In its most familiar manifestation, the argument from design involves drawing parallels between human-designed objects (e.g., telescopes, outboard motors) and biological counterparts with similar functional roles (e.g., eyes, bacterial flagella). The former are complex, often indivisibly so if they are to maintain their current function, clearly perform specific functions, and are known to have been the product of intentional design. The functional complexity of living organisms is far greater still, it is argued, and, therefore, must present even stronger evidence for the role of intelligent agency.

Though the basic premise of the teleological argument had been articulated by thinkers as far back as ancient Greece and Rome, today it is almost universally associated with the writings of one person: William Paley (Fig.  1 ). Paley was born in July 1743 in Peterborough, Cambridgeshire, England. He was educated at Christ’s College, Cambridge, and was ordained a deacon in 1766 and soon thereafter a priest in Cambridge. He was appointed Archdeacon of Carlisle Cathedral in 1782 and awarded a Doctor of Divinity degree at Cambridge in 1795. He authored several successful theological works, the best-known being Natural Theology , or Evidence of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity , Collected from the Appearances of Nature .

William Paley (1743–1805). Portrait circa 1790 by George Romney (National Portrait Gallery, London)

Natural Theology was published in 1802, only three years before Paley’s death on May 25, 1805. It was very successful, going through ten editions in the first four years alone (see Fyfe 2002 ). Despite being written in labyrinthine prose (by modern standards), Natural Theology remains an especially lucid exposition of the classic argument from design. This undoubtedly is one of the reasons that Paley’s name is most commonly linked with the design argument even though it was by no means original to him. Footnote 1

Darwin was influenced by Paley’s work, and some modern authors have cited it as an important example of pre-Darwinian “adaptationist” thinking (e.g., Dawkins 1986 ; Williams 1992 ; but see Gliboff 2000 ; McLaughlin 2008 ). Whatever its significance in the past, it is clear that Paley’s contribution continues to be of direct relevance in the current educational and political climate. Notably, Natural Theology was exhibit P-751 in the landmark 2005 Kitzmiller v. Dover trial, which successfully challenged the constitutionality of promoting “intelligent design” in US public schools. Paley’s name appears more than 80 times in the trial testimony transcripts, and he is mentioned a further half a dozen times in Judge Jones’s decision. Footnote 2

In light of their continuing importance in current discourse, it is worth exploring the arguments presented in Paley’s classic treatise. This review is intended to provide a “guided tour” of Natural Theology , Footnote 3 giving the reader an abridged and annotated rendition of Paley’s widely referenced (but less often read) account of the argument from design.

Watches and Watchmakers

Natural Theology opens with the paragraph for which it is best (if not exclusively) known, in which Paley draws a contrast between a rock and a pocket watch: Footnote 4

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone , and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. (p.1–2)

Thus, in the very first passage of a book written more than two centuries ago, Paley encapsulates the core components of the argument from design—an argument that has been revived in much the same form by proponents of “intelligent design.” Specifically, Paley points out that the watch exhibits an irreducibly complex organization that was obviously constructed to perform a specific function. Remove or rearrange any of its intricate inner workings, and the watch becomes barely more effective at keeping time than the rock formerly dismissed with a kick. Footnote 5 From this, Paley concludes that

...the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker: that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use. (p.3)

Furthermore, like modern proponents of the argument from design, Paley argues that one need not know any details of the designer’s identity or methods to conclude that an intelligent agent was involved:

Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. (p.3–4)

Today’s neo-Paleyans must also concur with Paley that the watch’s delicate functionality could not be the product of chance, inherent “principles of order,” or laws of matter, nor merely an illusion of design. For Paley, this conclusion supersedes all other considerations and renders additional details largely superfluous. As he wrote,

Neither...would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument: he knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know. Footnote 6 (p.7)

However, given their aggressive resistance to the notion of suboptimality or nonfunction of biological structures, Footnote 7 it appears that many modern design proponents disagree with Paley’s subsequent assertions that neither imperfections nor ambiguous—or even nonexistent—functions refute the thesis of design for the origin of complex, (mostly) functional objects or organs. In this sense, Paley could be said to adhere more closely to the analogy with human artifacts than do many of his present-day counterparts:

Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all. (p.4–5)

Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain, whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For...if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connexion by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared, without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment,—these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before. (p.5–6)

Continuing with the analogy of the watch, Paley next argues that one could not explain away the evidence of design even if the watch in hand had, through some exceptional mechanics, been produced by the self-replication of a parental watch. It matters not, according to Paley, whether any particular entity had been born of similar entities, as this accounts only for its existence and not its complex functional characteristics. Indeed, discovering the watch’s capacity to reproduce would only increase an observer’s admiration for its remarkable complexity:

No answer is given to this question, by telling us that a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without a contriver; order without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office, in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it;—could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for, as they were before. (p.11–12)

Thus, Paley argues, no matter how many generations of watches beget watches (or, by obvious implication, organisms produce offspring or cells generate daughter cells), the specific, irreducible, and purposeful arrangement of watches’ inner workings can only be attributed to the action of intelligent agency.

The Cosmic Optician

Having established the connection between watches and watchmakers, Paley begins his third chapter by arguing that the principle applies equally to living organisms and their components—or indeed, more so, given that their degree of adaptive complexity is vastly greater. As he might have argued, human hands more thoroughly evince design than anything crafted by them.

As did many of his predecessors Footnote 8 (and followers), Paley considered eyes to provide a particularly illuminating exemplar of organic design: “there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it” (p. 18). Paley noted that telescopes and eyes rely on similar optical principles but that in fact vertebrate eyes are much more effective by virtue of their ability to adjust to different distances and brightness, in their well-developed protective features including eyelids and nictitating membranes, and by their capacity to correct for spherical aberration. In fact, he pointed out, telescope designers solved the problem of aberration by adopting features observed in biological lenses. In the absence of a natural explanation for their occurrence, eyes provided one of the best-known cases in support of the design argument. Darwin exposed the fallacy of this conclusion, and the efforts of countless scientists since then have resolved in increasingly fine detail how the various components of eyes are likely to have evolved. Footnote 9

In considering the eyes of different types of animals, Paley noted two critical facts: (1) that eyes differ according to the environment in which they are used to see and (2) that despite these differences, all vertebrate eyes are constructed according to the same basic physical plan. Eyes specialized for sight underwater, on land, or in the dark are not fundamentally different from each other; rather, they are modifications of a general theme: “Thus, in comparing the eyes of different kinds of animals, we see, in their resemblances and distinctions, one general plan laid down, and that plan varied with the varying exigencies to which it is to be applied” (p. 31). Today, this similarity amidst diversity is explained by the fact that all vertebrates share a common ancestor that was possessed of eyes and that specializations to different lifestyles have involved descent with modification of this ancestral organ.

The fact that all eyes have evolved through the modification of prior form and the cooption of preexisting components also explains some otherwise puzzling structural complications (not to mention features that are downright maladaptive; see Novella 2008 for several examples). However, through his teleological lens, Paley viewed complexities as further evidence of good design, as with his example of muscles in the eyes of cassowaries:

In the configuration of the muscle which, though placed behind the eye, draws the nictitating membrane over the eye, there is...a marvellous mechanism....The muscle is passed through a loop formed by another muscle: and is there inflected, as if it were round a pulley. This is a peculiarity; and observe the advantage of it. A single muscle with a straight tendon, which is the common muscular form, would have been sufficient, if it had had power to draw far enough. But the contraction, necessary to draw the membrane over the whole eye, required a longer muscle than could lie straight at the bottom of the eye. Therefore, in order to have a greater length in a less compass, the cord of the main muscle makes an angle. This, so far, answers the end; but, still further, it makes an angle, not round a fixed pivot, but round a loop formed by another muscle; which second muscle, whenever it contracts, of course twitches the first muscle at the point of inflection, and thereby assists the action designed by both. (p.37–38; italics in original)

In mammals, the recurrent laryngeal nerve provides a connection between the brain and the larynx, though not a direct one. Instead of taking a direct route, it passes down into the chest, circles under the aorta, and ascends back up to the neck (in giraffes, this nerve is more than 2 meters long; Harrison 1995 ). Similarly, the mammalian vas deferens connects the testes to the urethra, but not before passing into the pelvic cavity, looping around the urinary bladder and then descending back to complete its circuitous path. Meanwhile, the urethra itself passes directly through the prostate gland, an arrangement that readily engenders urinary difficulties if the prostate becomes swollen. It is only with great effort that arrangements such as these might be characterized as optimizations rather than as simple quirks of evolutionary history Footnote 10 (for additional examples, see Williams 1997 ; Shubin 2008 ; Coyne 2009 ).

But why bother with eyes at all? If the designer is omnipotent, why does the detection of visual information require such a complex arrangement of lenses, receptors, nerves, muscles, and neurons? In Paley’s words,

Why make the difficulty in order to surmount it? If to perceive objects by some other mode than that of touch, or objects which lay out of the reach of that sense, were the thing proposed; could not a simple volition of the Creator have communicated the capacity? Why resort to contrivance, where power is omnipotent? Contrivance, by its very definition and nature, is the refuge of imperfection. To have recourse to expedients, implies difficulty, impediment, restraint, defect of power. (p.39)

Thus answers Paley his own rhetorical queries:

...beside reasons of which probably we are ignorant, one answer is this: It is only by the display of contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity, could be testified to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena, or the works of nature. Take away this, and you take away from us every subject of observation, and ground of reasoning; I mean as our rational faculties are formed at present. Whatever is done, God could have done without the intervention of instruments or means: but it is in the construction of instruments, in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is seen. It is this which constitutes the order and beauty of the universe. God, therefore, has been pleased to prescribe limits to his own power, and to work his end within those limits. (p.40)

According to Paley, the exquisite function of eyes bespeaks the great power of a designer, but the very decision to create eyes reflects an intentional limitation of this power so that humans might understand how eyes came to be. This logic may strike the modern reader as rather tortuous, but it serves to illustrate a very important point: that any explanation for complex organs must account not only for their adaptive characteristics but also their imperfections. Today, this duality can be accounted for by the countervailing influences of adaptive modification and the constraints of genetics, anatomy, and history, but for Paley, the intent of a designer provided the only conceivable answer. As noted, Paley did not consider imperfections to challenge the conclusion that design indicates the work of a designer. It is only if one wishes to defend the infallibility of the designer that one must assume all features of an object to be functional, and optimally so (see pp.56–57). Paley considered nonfunctional aspects of organisms to be “extremely rare,” and as is clear from later chapters, he viewed most aspects of the world to be optimally designed, but he was careful not to base his argument for the existence of a designer on these secondary considerations. Again, this represents something of a more sophisticated application of the argument from design than is often encountered in contemporary discourse.

Not a Chance

One of the most obstinate misconceptions about evolutionary theory is that it hypothesizes that eyes and other complex organs arise “by chance.” Even under the most charitable assessment, such a view of adaptive evolution must be considered deeply misguided. Whereas genetic mutation is both integral to the process and indeed is random with respect to its effects, natural selection is, by definition, the nonrandom survival and reproduction of individuals. Variation is generated at random, but whether or not it is preserved depends on its effects on survival and reproduction within a given environment Footnote 11 (for reviews, see Gregory 2008 , 2009 ). No serious evolutionary biologist of the past 150 years has suggested that the emergence of complex organs is merely the result of chance.

Writing as he did before Darwin and Wallace proposed the theory of natural selection, it was not possible for Paley to make this error (modern neo-Paleyans, by contrast, do so with remarkable proficiency). In the early 1800s, chance was not the only suggested alternative to conscious design (McLaughlin 2008 ), but Paley viewed its refutation as an important part of his argument. Paley (and Darwin) understood that chance plays a role in nature, but that it is incapable of producing adaptive complexity:

What does chance ever do for us? In the human body, for instance, chance, i.e. the operation of causes without design, may produce a wen, a wart, a mole, a pimple, but never an eye. Amongst inanimate substances, a clod, a pebble, a liquid drop might be; but never was a watch, a telescope, an organized body of any kind, answering a valuable purpose by a complicated mechanism, the effect of chance. (p.63)

Modern evolutionary biologists do not part company with Paley on the claim that complex organs must arise through a mechanism other than pure chance. The disagreement is only with his subsequent assertion, that “in no assignable instance hath such a thing existed without intention somewhere” (p.63).

Paley takes his argument against the role of chance a step farther, in the process raising—and summarily rejecting—a possible explanation that exhibits shades of the principle of natural selection. However, his description is of an ancient version of the idea that, as Paley rightly notes, is unworkable in practice. Footnote 12

There is another answer which has the same effect as the resolving of things into chance; which answer would persuade us to believe, that the eye, the animal to which it belongs, every other animal, every plant, indeed every organized body which we see, are only so many out of the possible varieties and combinations of being, which the lapse of infinite ages has brought into existence; that the present world is the relict of that variety: millions of other bodily forms and other species having perished, being by the defect of their constitution incapable of preservation, or of continuance by generation. Now there is no foundation whatever for this conjecture in any thing which we observe in the works of nature; no such experiments are going on at present: no such energy operates, as that which is here supposed, and which should be constantly pushing into existence new varieties of beings. Nor are there any appearances to support an opinion, that every possible combination of vegetable or animal structure has formerly been tried. Multitudes of conformations, both of vegetables and animals, may be conceived capable of existence and succession, which yet do not exist. Perhaps almost as many forms of plants might have been found in the fields, as figures of plants can be delineated upon paper. A countless variety of animals might have existed, which do not exist. Upon the supposition here stated, we should see unicorns and mermaids, sylphs and centaurs, the fancies of painters, and the fables of poets, realized by examples. Or, if it be alleged that these may transgress the limits of possible life and propagation, we might, at least, have nations of human beings without nails upon their fingers, with more or fewer fingers and toes than ten, some with one eye, others with one ear, with one nostril, or without the sense of smelling at all. All these, and a thousand other imaginable varieties, might live and propagate. We may modify any one species many different ways, all consistent with life, and with the actions necessary to preservation, although affording different degrees of conveniency and enjoyment to the animal. And if we carry these modifications through the different species which are known to subsist, their number would be incalculable. No reason can be given why, if these deperdits ever existed, they have now disappeared. Yet, if all possible existences have been tried, they must have formed part of the catalogue. (p.63–65)

The problem, of course, is not the notion that great variety may arise by chance and be narrowed by differential survival—this is the basis of natural selection as it is now understood. Rather, the implausibility of Paley’s scenario is the scale at which he considered the process. Specifically, he envisioned an unconstrained morphospace in which drastically divergent species continually pop into existence. This lies in stark contrast to Darwin’s later emphasis on small-scale variation arising within species and then being sorted generation by generation.

In this context, it is also worth noting Paley’s view on extinction—namely that it does not happen. According to Paley, the classification of species into larger taxa would be rendered impossible by widespread extinction. In contrast, extinction was established as a common process in the history of life by Darwin’s time, and today it is acknowledged that the overwhelming majority of species that have existed no longer grace the Earth. In fact, the major divisions among extant lineages are now understood to exist precisely because so many ancestors and intermediate forms have perished.

Design and Diversity

The preceding arguments occupy only the first six of the 27 chapters in Natural Theology . In Chapters 7 through 20, Paley leads the reader on an expedition through the annals of early nineteenth century biological knowledge as he understands it, pausing along the way to admire the elegance of the bones (Chapter 8), muscles (Chapter 9), blood vessels (Chapter 10), and digestive systems (Chapters 7 and 10) of vertebrates, as well as features of insects (Chapter 19) and plants (Chapter 20) which, though less well understood, he also described as bearing the hallmarks of design.

Once again, modern biology does not contradict Paley’s enthusiastic exposition of features well-suited to specific functions, only the way in which their origin is explained. Similarly, Paley takes a broad comparative approach that would be at home in modern evolutionary biology were it interpreted from a different perspective. He recognizes that specializations for particular lifestyles reflect modifications of traits shared by many animals. He grasps the unity of underlying body plans. And he notes that though it dissipates among groups living in widely divergent habitats, the similarity does not disappear. Consider the following passages from Chapter 12 on “Comparative Anatomy”:

Whenever we find a general plan pursued, yet with such variations in it as are, in each case, required by the particular exigency of the subject to which it is applied, we possess, in such plan and such adaptation, the strongest evidence that can be afforded of intelligence and design; an evidence which most completely excludes every other hypothesis. If the general plan proceeded from any fixed necessity in the nature of things, how could it accommodate itself to the various wants and uses which it had to serve under different circumstances, and on different occasions? (p.211)

Very much of this reasoning is applicable to what has been called Comparative Anatomy . In their general economy, in the outlines of the plan, in the construction as well as offices of their principal parts, there exists between all large terrestrial animals a close resemblance. In all, life is sustained, and the body nourished by nearly the same apparatus. The heart, the lungs, the stomach, the liver, the kidneys, are much alike in all. The same fluid (for no distinction of blood has been observed) circulates through their vessels, and nearly in the same order. The same cause, therefore, whatever that cause was, has been concerned in the origin, has governed the production of these different animal forms.

When we pass on to smaller animals, or to the inhabitants of a different element, the resemblance becomes more distant and more obscure; but still the plan accompanies us. (pp.212–213)

Chapter 13 deals with the opposite subject, namely adaptations (“Peculiar Organizations”) that are unique to particular groups: features of the neck of large mammals, the swim bladder of fishes, the fangs of snakes, the pouches of marsupials, the claws of birds, the stomach of camels, the tongue of woodpeckers, and the curved tusks of wild boars. These, like functional traits shared more broadly, also reflect the remarkable fit of species to their environments which Paley takes as strong evidence for their origin by design.

In Chapter 14, Paley lends particular credence to examples of adaptive features that emerge ontogenetically before they are needed, in preparation for use later in life (“Prospective Contrivances”):

I can hardly imagine to myself a more distinguishing mark, and, consequently, a more certain proof of design, than preparation , i.e. the providing of things beforehand, which are not to be used until a considerable time afterwards; for this implies a contemplation of the future, which belongs only to intelligence. (p.252)

The teeth of mammals, the milk that nourishes their young, their eyes that develop while still in the darkness of the womb, and their lungs that form before encountering any opportunity to draw a breath—in the absence of knowledge about developmental genetics, these struck Paley as especially weighty examples of foresightful design.

Fitting Together

Paley does not only rely on individual examples of function to support his position. In addition, he expounds upon the close interaction of parts in service of a specific function. He returns to the analogy of the watch in this capacity at the opening of Chapter 15:

When several different parts contribute to one effect; or, which is the same thing, when an effect is produced by the joint action of different instruments; the fitness of such parts or instruments to one another, for the purpose of producing, by their united action the effect, is what I call relation: and wherever this is observed in the works of nature or of man, it appears to me to carry along with it decisive evidence of understanding, intention, art. In examining, for instance, the several parts of a watch , the spring, the barrel, the chain, the fusee, the balance, the wheels of various sizes, forms, and positions, what is it which would take an observer's attention, as most plainly evincing a construction, directed by thought, deliberation, and contrivance? It is the suitableness of these parts to one another; first, in the succession and order in which they act; and, secondly, with a view to the effect finally produced. (pp. 261–262)

These “relations” are common in nature, and they form a central part of the modern incarnation of the argument from design just as they did two centuries before (albeit recast in terms of the “specified,” “irreducibly complex,” or “purposeful” arrangements of parts in service of a particular function). Contemporary embodiments of the teleological argument typically appeal to examples from microbiology and biochemistry, but the basic approach is the same as in Paley’s discussion of systems involved in feeding, digestion, and excretion. Paley is especially taken by close interactions among independent components (which today are explained as the product of co-evolution):

But relation perhaps is never so striking as when it subsists, not between different parts of the same thing, but between different things. The relation between a lock and a key is more obvious, than it is between different parts of the lock. A bow was designed for an arrow, and an arrow for a bow: and the design is more evident for their being separate implements.

Nor do the works of the Deity want this clearest species of relation. The sexes are manifestly made for each other. They form the grand relation of animated nature; universal, organic, mechanical; subsisting like the clearest relations of art, in different individuals; unequivocal, inexplicable without design.

So much so, that, were every other proof of contrivance in nature dubious or obscure, this alone would be sufficient. The example is complete. Nothing is wanting to the argument. I see no way whatever of getting over it. (pp. 268–270)

According to Paley, the fit of parts is also especially significant “when the defects of one part, or of one organ, are supplied by the structure of another part or of another organ” (p.275), a special case of “relation” that he dubs “compensation.” For example, the neck of an elephant is inflexible, but this is compensated for by its dexterous trunk. Paley’s ideas of “inconveniency” and “compensation” are recognizable in the modern concept of tradeoffs:

When I speak of an inconveniency, I have a view to a dilemma which frequently occurs in the works of nature, viz. that the peculiarity of structure by which an organ is made to answer one purpose, necessarily unfits it for some other purpose. (pp.278–279)

Not surprisingly, the fit of organisms to their physical environments (e.g., wings for movement in air, fins in water) also provides evidence for design under Paley’s view:

We have already considered relation , and under different views; but it was the relation of parts to parts, of the parts of an animal to other parts of the same animal, or of another individual of the same species.

But the bodies of animals hold, in their constitution and properties, a close and important relation to natures altogether external to their own; to inanimate substances, and to the specific qualities of these, e.g. they hold a strict relation to the elements by which they are surrounded. (p.291; italics in original)

Paley also contemplates instincts as an example of “relations” indicative of design. In so doing, he confronts what are now labeled as proximate versus ultimate causes (and, in a long-outdated dichotomy, “nature vs. nurture”). Citing examples of reproductive behaviors—the incubation of eggs by birds, the host specificity of egg laying by butterflies, the spawning journeys of salmon—he argues that many behaviors are neither learned nor simple reactions to stimuli but are hardwired by design.

Beyond Biology

For Paley, evidence of design is not restricted to examples from the living world but also comes from the conditions of the world that make life possible. Chapter 21, dedicated to “The Elements,” considers the beneficial properties of air, water, fire, and light. The extent of Paley’s teleological reasoning is illustrated with particular clarity in the case of light which, he argues, travels so fast that it might obliterate both eyes and beholders had the designer not provided a safeguard: Footnote 13

Urged by such a velocity, with what force must its particles drive against (I will not say the eye, the tenderest of animal substances, but) every substance, animate or inanimate, which stands in its way! It might seem to be a force sufficient to shatter to atoms the hardest bodies.

How then is this effect, the consequence of such prodigious velocity, guarded against? By a proportionable minuteness of the particles of which light is composed. (p.376)

The properties of the sun, the planets, and the physical laws that govern their motions also point to the action of a designer according to Paley’s interpretation. For example, the sun, which provides heat and light, is situated in a convenient central location; the Earth’s axis of rotation provides climatological stability; and the laws of gravity are restricted to the miniscule subset of all possible configurations that is compatible with life. Paley held to a particularly strong version of the anthropic principle (not unlike one still invoked by many modern creationists):

That the subsisting law of attraction falls within the limits which utility requires, when these limits bear so small a proportion to the range of possibilities upon which chance might equally have cast it, is not, with any appearance of reason, to be accounted for, by any other cause than a regulation proceeding from a designing mind. But our next proposition carries the matter somewhat further. We say, in the third place, that, out of the different laws which lie within the limits of admissible laws, the best is made choice of; that there are advantages in this particular law which cannot be demonstrated to belong to any other law; and, concerning some of which, it can be demonstrated that they do not belong to any other. (pp. 395–396)

The Nature of the Maker

Unlike modern proponents of “intelligent design,” Paley is totally forthright in his view on the identity of the designer. As he concludes at the close of Chapter 23, “The marks of design are too strong to be gotten over. Design must have had a designer. That designer must have been a person. That person is God.” (p.441). From this starting position, Paley proceeds in Chapters 24 through 26 to rally evidence from nature for the omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence of the Designer. He must, therefore, contend with examples not only confirmatory (e.g., the good fit of organisms to their needs, the capacity for pleasure) but also seemingly contradictory (e.g., death, disease, predation, pain) to such a theological stance. Thus, predation is presented as a form of population control that prevents the potentially disastrous effects of superfecundity (and the application of venom is a particularly merciful method of dispatching prey). Other apparent ills are depicted as being similarly beneficial upon closer inspection. As Paley argues, “It is a happy world after all” (p. 456).

Design Since Darwin

As Darwin noted, Paley’s thesis that the appearance of design must in fact be the outcome of design was refuted by the advent of a workable theory of evolutionary change. Nevertheless, 150 years later, biologists are still awed—but are no longer stunned—by complexity in natural systems. Evolutionary theory provides a means of exploring the origin of complex adaptations using a variety of analytical approaches (e.g., fossil record, genetics, comparative anatomy and physiology, phylogenetics, developmental biology), rather than drawing a conclusion based on the observation of complexity alone. Evolutionary theory, which includes more than adaptive mechanisms, also provides a straightforward explanation for suboptimality, vestigial traits, and wastefulness, including excessive complexity and redundancy where simpler solutions could easily be envisioned.

Interestingly, evolutionary biologists who strongly emphasize adaptive evolution by natural selection (e.g., Dawkins 1986 ; Williams 1992 )—the theory that undermined Paley’s central conclusion—more often express positive opinions of Natural Theology than do modern proponents of the argument from design. It is not difficult to see why, as Paley passionately addressed what they see as the most important question in evolutionary biology: the origins of complex adaptations. Contemporary design proponents, by contrast, generally attempt to distance themselves from Paley so as not to be seen as simply repackaging a 200-year-old theological argument. The examples may have changed (e.g., from eyes to flagella), but the premise has not.

Concluding Remarks

Like many of the early works that have had a lasting impact on biological thought, Paley’s Natural Theology remains worthy of reading by the current generation of biologists, educators, and students. It presents the argument from design in a clear fashion, unencumbered by the mathematical and biochemical accoutrements with which it recently has been festooned. That arguments very similar to Paley’s are now being used in an attempt to undermine the teaching and acceptance of evolutionary science gives Natural Theology continued relevance. From a much more positive point of view, his wonder at the complexity of the natural world, expressed with sincerity and style, is something to which all evolutionary biologists can relate. It is to be hoped that, in time, it will be for this reason alone that Paley’s classic treatise retains its significance.

John Ray’s 1691 treatise The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation was a notable forerunner (available online: http://books.google.ca/books?id=HvQ4AAAAMAAJ ).

Online copies are available for both the transcripts ( http://ncseweb.org/creationism/legal/kitzmiller-trial-transcripts ) and the decision ( http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/kitzmiller_342.pdf ).

The first edition of Natural Theology of 1802 is available in the Oxford World’s Classics series from Oxford University Press. Quotes and associated page numbers given in this review come from the 12th edition, as provided by The Complete Work of Charles Darwin Online ( http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=A142 ). A later edition is also available at Google Books ( http://books.google.com/books?id=-XFHAAAAIAAJ ). The differences between editions are minor.

Like many of the arguments most famously attributed to Paley, an analogy to a timepiece was used by various thinkers before him. For example, Marcus Tullius Cicero wrote in his De Natura Deorum in 45 BCE: “When you see a sundial or a waterclock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their artificers?” Numerous other examples are reviewed by Moore ( 2009 ).

But, as the old cliché goes, even a broken watch gives the correct time twice per day.

For Paley, biochemistry represented a particularly impenetrable frontier that reinforced the existence of a designer with a more thorough knowledge of chemistry (pp.83–91). For their part, modern design proponents tend to focus on subcellular and molecular features whose origins have only recently become amenable to investigation.

A prime example is provided by so-called junk DNA. A common myth, repeatedly invoked by anti-evolutionists, science writers, and misinformed biologists alike, asserts that potential functions for non-genic components of the genome were long dismissed by mainstream science. Reference to the scientific literature from the relevant time period thoroughly undermines this claim ( http://genomicron.blogspot.com/2008/02/junk-dna-quotes-of-interest-series.html ).

For example, Paley cites the work of Johann Christophorous Sturm from a century before: “Sturmius held, that the examination of the eye was a cure for atheism” (p.33). Paley himself wrote that “Were there no example in the world, of contrivance, except that of the eye , it would be alone sufficient to support the conclusion which we draw from it, as to the necessity of an intelligent Creator” (p.75).

For two recent special issues of peer-reviewed journals dedicated to eye evolution, see Evolution: Education and Outreach volume 1, issue 4, Oct. 2008 ( http://www.springerlink.com/content/m3k441k67q3n/ ) and Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B volume 364, issue 1531, Oct. 19, 2009 ( http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/364/1531.toc ).

Paley does make an effort to portray the tiny vestigial eyes of moles, which are permanently covered with skin, as an example of good design (pp.273–274).

This refers specifically to evolution by natural selection. Variation can also be sorted by chance through genetic drift, especially when it is neutral with respect to reproductive success and in small populations, but this mechanism is not responsible for the evolution of complex adaptations.

Similar notions of extreme trial-and-error date back to the ancient Greeks, including Lucretius and Empedocles (Gliboff 2000 ).

Indeed, he later states that “The eye is made for light , and light for the eye. The eye would be of no use without light, and light perhaps of little without eyes” (p.424).

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Gregory, T.R. The Argument from Design: A Guided Tour of William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802). Evo Edu Outreach 2 , 602–611 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12052-009-0184-6

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What is Natural Theology? (And Should We Dispense with It

2022, Zygon

In a series of impressive works, Alister McGrath has made a major contribution to contemporary natural theology. The natural theology he has in mind is not the "established" variety, which seeks to provide rational support for religious beliefs from nonreligious premises. Rather, it is an explicitly Christian natural theology that involves "seeing" the world through the lens of Christian revelation. Nevertheless, McGrath seems to hold that a sufficiently capacious understanding of natural theology can encompass both the established version and the broader vision that constitutes his own project. This article suggests that there is a significant tension between these two conceptions of natural theology. It argues that the supposedly "established" version of natural theology was never really established within the Christian tradition to any significant degree but was instead belatedly projected onto it for various reasons. The historical tradition comports with McGrath's project, but not with his generous comprehension of the established conception within a genuinely Christian natural theology.

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In leading academic publications, Oxford theologian Andrew Moore has systematically developed new objections to natural theology based on Karl Barth's methodological arguments, historical considerations as well as theological considerations related to Scriptural passages such as Romans 1:18ff, the noetic effects of sin, whether natural theology leads to the God who has revealed himself in Christ, the work of the Holy Spirit, and attitudes such as humility and self-denial. I demonstrate the inadequacy of his methodological and historical arguments and show that the numerous Scriptural passages cited by Moore do not really support his objections, and that Moore neglects other passages (e.g. Acts 14:15-17, 17:22-31) which contradict his arguments. I defend the value of natural theology as the first of a two-step approach which (1) shows that there is a Creator God (2) shows that this God has revealed himself in Christ.

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It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility.

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3 (page 25) p. 25 Arguments for the existence of God

• Published: February 2018
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Is it possible to prove that God exists? There is certainly no shortage of arguments that purport to establish God’s existence, but ‘Arguments for the existence of God’ focuses on three of the most influential arguments: the cosmological argument, the design argument, and the argument from religious experience. Before examining these arguments, it first considers the very enterprise of attempting to establish God’s existence. What should we expect from an argument for God’s existence? What would it take for such an argument to be successful? The attempt to justify claims about the nature and existence of God on the basis of commonly accepted truths is known as natural theology.

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“the voice of the universe”: cosmic immanence in john elof boodin’s process thought, what it is and why it matters.

1. Introduction

2. functional realism, 3. cosmic immanence and the “rainbow universe”.

Obviously this view [of entanglement and decoherence] is quite the opposite of the classical, commonsense one that objects truly have the shapes and position we see, and that they have them “by themselves”, quite independently of the limitations of our own aptitudes, as well as of the size of the Universe or anything else. Were some simile requested, the best one would probably consist in comparing the quantum objects to rainbows. If you are driving, you see the rainbow moving. If you stop it stops. If you start again, so does the rainbow. In other words, its properties partly depend on you. Taken literally, quantum physics, when thought of as universal, imparts to all objects such a status relative to the sentient beings that we are. ( d’Espagnat 2006, p. 19 )

4. “No Man Liveth Unto Himself”

5. boodin, process thought and whitehead.

It has no meaning to say that a stone has experience of the ground upon which it rests or that chemical elements have experience of the synthesis or analysis which they undergo. I cannot, therefore, accept A. N. Whitehead’s generalization: ‘The direct evidence as to the connectedness of one’s immediate present occasion of experience with one’s immediately past occasions can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the connectedness of all occasions in nature .’ I am obliged to translate Whitehead’s statement into our common vernacular. We are organisms characterized by mnemic causation. By habit and memory we conserve our behavior in such a way that we can refer backward to events which are no longer perceptually present and, since we are conative organisms, having instincts and desires, we can by means of imagination anticipate future events. Can we generalize from our experience of nature to a similar connectedness in nature’s activities everywhere? … The trick lies in the phrase, ‘occasion of experience.’ There are occasions of experiencing or having experience of events acting upon our organism. Experience is not a substantive. There are no occasions of experience. There is no continuum of experience. Whether there is a continuum of experiencing is another question. We have a succession of occasions of experiencing events. And we have experience of a great variety of simultaneous events. But whether, temporally or spatially, we can prove a continuum, in either a mathematical or metaphysical sense, is doubtful. The quantum character of nature makes such a supposition improbable. Whitehead implies the substantival conception of experience in his grades of ‘occasions of experience’ of which human nature is an extreme instance. We can grade individuals on some basis, such as complexity. But individuals are not occasions of experience but occasions of experiencing other individuals. The grades are not based on the experiencing but on the character of the individuals. There is no stuff of experience out of which individuals are constituted. Experiencing is a relation, not a substantive. It is the substantival conception of experience which makes the relation of experience to its world so mysterious for Whitehead: ‘The world within experience is identical with the world beyond experience, the occasion of experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion. The categories have to elucidate this paradox of the connectedness of things: the many things, the one world without and within.’ The paradox is of Whitehead’s own making. It disappears if we view experience as relational or prepositional (to use J. Loewenberg’s expression) instead of as substantival. We, as organisms, with mnemic causation, have experience of a variety of things under a variety of conditions. The world is in our experience in the sense that the world enters into relation to our organisms; or, conversely, that our organism establishes relations to the world in the way of perception and interpretation. In this sense, we can say that the structure of the world becomes immanent in our organism and the structure of our organism becomes immanent in the world as selected by our interest. ( Boodin 1943c, pp. 701–2 )

6. A New Synthesis

7. conclusions, institutional review board statement, informed consent statement, data availability statement, conflicts of interest.

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Share and Cite

Flannery, M.A. “The Voice of the Universe”: Cosmic Immanence in John Elof Boodin’s Process Thought, What It Is and Why It Matters. Religions 2024 , 15 , 995. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080995

Flannery MA. “The Voice of the Universe”: Cosmic Immanence in John Elof Boodin’s Process Thought, What It Is and Why It Matters. Religions . 2024; 15(8):995. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080995

Flannery, Michael A. 2024. "“The Voice of the Universe”: Cosmic Immanence in John Elof Boodin’s Process Thought, What It Is and Why It Matters" Religions 15, no. 8: 995. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080995

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Truth Points Toward Protestantism

Review: ‘what it means to be protestant’ by gavin ortlund.

The year I turned 30, after a lifetime as a secular Jew, I experienced a crisis that led me to investigate in earnest the existence of God. As any card-carrying academic would do, I read a lot of books.

I read such Christian apologetics as C. S. Lewis’s Mere Christianity (which was intriguing), Tim Keller’s The Reason for God (more powerful), and N. T. Wright’s majestic The Resurrection of the Son of God (most powerful of all). Ultimately, my conversion moment came overnight—literally, as I was stuck in the Amsterdam airport, with a copy of the Gospels to keep me company, on my way home from an academic conference. That moment also didn’t feel intellectual at all; it felt like an out-of-body experience—which, I suppose, it was.

Considering in retrospect how thoroughly Protestant my approach was, I was surprised to read in Gavin Ortlund’s book What It Means to Be Protestant : The Case for an Always-Reforming Church that “on the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox side (especially Catholic), there is a huge body of literature, social media presence, and apologetics ministries that are unmatched on the Protestant side” (xv). In this book, he sets out to balance out the field.

What It Means to Be Protestant: The Case for an Always-Reforming Church

Gavin ortlund.

In his characteristically charitable and irenic style, Gavin Ortlund demonstrates that the 16th century Reformation represented a genuine renewal of the gospel. This does not entail that Protestantism is without faults. But because it is built upon the principle of semper reformanda (always reforming), Protestantism is capable of reforming itself according to Scripture as the ultimate authority. This scholarly and yet accessible book breaks new ground in ecumenical theology and will be a staple text in the field for many years to come.

Apology for Protestantism

What about the massive number of books like those of Lewis or Keller, and so many other works of apologetics written by Protestants? Their purpose is different from the kind of apologetics Ortlund does here.

Lewis and Keller wrote to skeptics—to people like me at age 30. Their invitation was to mere Christianity, as the title of Lewis’s famous apologetic book indicates. But Ortlund’s audience is different. Rather than skeptics, he addresses Protestants who feel confused and are questioning not God or Christianity but Protestantism, wondering if Roman Catholicism or Eastern Orthodoxy got things right. Both traditions had been around for nearly 1,500 years by the time Luther nailed up the Ninety-five Theses. What if Luther was wrong?

Ortlund addresses Protestants who feel confused and are questioning not God or Christianity but Protestantism.

Considering how many prominent converts from evangelicalism to Roman Catholicism dominate the current intellectual and political scene in the U.S. (including J. D. Vance, the vice-presidential Republican candidate), it’s clear something is afoot. Is this something, though, based on truth?

This question is at the heart of Ortlund’s popular YouTube ministry , and it undergirds this well-researched book. Convinced the Bible and history provide a clear case for Protestantism over both Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, Ortlund has put a sort of FAQ into this readable and compact volume. This isn’t an academic book that presents an exhaustive analysis of any of the many key doctrines he discusses, on which educated people have vehemently disagreed over the past 500 to 2,000 years. Rather, the strength of this book is that it doesn’t get lost in the weeds; it recognizes that people can investigate those further for themselves.

Reformed Catholicity

Though Ortlund is obviously arguing for a robust Protestantism, part of his mission is to pursue Reformed catholicity. He argues the reformers weren’t trying to do anything new but instead stripped various accretions and abusive practices (e.g., the selling of indulgences) that had corrupted the medieval church. Rather than trying to split the church and attack its spirit of togetherness—the original sense of “catholicity”—Protestantism aimed to restore wholeness and truth by pointing people back to God and the gospel.

Thus, Ortlund argues, “This is the single greatest contribution of Protestantism to the Christian church: its insight into the gracious heart of God revealed in the gospel, by which God offers to us as a free gift the righteousness we cannot attain through our own efforts” (68).

The church’s source of authority is at the heart of the Roman Catholic/Protestant divide. Ortlund argues for the authority of sola scriptura over and against the papacy and apostolic succession. There are certainly efficiencies in that model of church government, but we must understand they’re not present in the Bible and arose in fits and spurts. He quotes Anthony Lane’s point: “ Sola Scriptura is the statement that the church can err” (72)—but obviously, Scripture can’t.

One of the pressing concerns of papal authority against Scripture’s primacy is the obvious development of new Roman Catholic doctrines over time. Ortlund provides two detailed case studies of Catholic doctrines that were historical accretions: the bodily assumption of Mary and the veneration of icons. The novelty of these doctrines provides a potent counterpunch to Roman Catholic accusations of Protestant innovation and to arguments that the papacy functions as a buttress against doctrinal change.

Evenhanded Critique

What It Means to Be Protestant is obviously making an argument that Protestant Christianity is to be preferred. However, this is no anti-Catholic screed. Even while making the case for Protestantism, Ortlund joins thoughtful evangelicals like Tim Keller and Mark Noll in the affirmation that some Roman Catholics are brothers and sisters in Christ.

No less important, in my view, is Ortlund’s discussion of how some contemporary Protestant churches miss the mark. He writes,

Many critics of Protestantism will immediately dismiss the interpretation of the Reformation as a historical retrieval and a removal of accretions because of the general sense of historical shallowness in many contemporary Protestant churches. This brings up a point that represents a theme of this book: We must distinguish between particular contemporary expressions of Protestantism versus Protestantism as such . (147)

Apologetics as a method of strengthening faith leans on facts and persuasion based on information—not feelings or vibes. This requires educating God’s people much more thoroughly in both theology and history. We need to show Protestantism’s connection with the true center of the Christian tradition. Better biblical literacy is essential too.

We need to show Protestantism’s connection with the true center of the Christian tradition.

And yet vibes and feelings too often carry the day for decisions in the 21st century. Anemic evangelical understanding of theology got us here, as surveys like Ligonier’s “ The State of Theology ” remind us. My mantra lately in response to so many contemporary crises has been this: we must all become better theologians. For any evangelicals seeking to understand Protestantism better, Ortlund provides a valuable resource.

Nadya Williams (PhD, Princeton) is book review editor at Current and a contributing editor at Providence Magazine. She and her husband, Dan, are parents to one adult son and two children still at home. She is the author of Cultural Christians in the Early Church and Mothers, Children, and the Body Politic .

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Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology

Overview Essay

Christianity and Ecology

Heather Eaton, St. Paul University

See also Ernst Conradie's article on Christianity and ecology in the Routledge Handbook of Religion and Ecology

Christians have been grappling with the ecological crisis for several decades, in many ways and in distinct contexts and traditions. Ecological issues have seeped into all aspects of Christian theologies, church leadership and practices, noting that Christianity must always be understood as diverse, with multiple historical and existing cultural traditions and challenges. The overall aims are to orient Christianity towards ecological sustainability, and to transform the traditions and practices. An ecological influence on Christian traditions is now worldwide and growing and is considered here under the rubric of ecotheology. There are countless people developing ecotheology across traditions and theological disciplines. A few will be mentioned throughout, noting there are many more.

Ecotheology is prominent in theological studies, seminaries, workshops, conferences and parishes. This work represents a significant range of perspectives, traditions and topics, as well as differing emphases on interpretation, ethics, leadership, ritual and social practices. Ecotheology, while confessional, provides critiques of Christianity as well as comprehensive reforms, generating constructive and creative transformations. These include assessments of biblical and other texts and teachings, and revisions of meaning on such themes as creation, revelation, redemption and soteriology. There are three prevalent methods: retrieval, such as the Earth Bible Project, (Norman Habel, Elaine Wainright, Vicky Balabanski); reinterpretation, such as expanding the precept of a ‘preferential option for the poor’ to include the Earth (Ivone Gebara, Leonardo Boff), and; reconstruction, such as with Process theology (John Cobb, Catherine Keller), ecological sin (Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople) and the renewal of creation theologies (Sallie MdFague, Jürgen Moltmann, John Haught, Elizabeth Johnson, Celia Deane-Drummond). There are deliberations on ecological hermeneutics (Ernst Conradie, Kim Yong Bok), ethics (James Nash, Larry Rasmussen, Sigurd Bergmann) ecojustice (Dieter Hessel, Cynthia Moe-Lobeda, Mary Grey, John Hart) and ecofeminism (Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gebara, Heather Eaton).  Rituals, symbols, and spiritual practices are being revised (Paul Santmire, Denis Edwards, Nancy Wright). There are reflections on cosmology, science and worldviews (Thomas Berry, Ian Barbour, Charles Birch, Anne Primavesi, Ilia Delio), as well as religiously motivated activism against local ecological deterioration. Ecotheology crosses into systematics, ethics, history, biblical studies, rituals and liturgies, and spirituality, and spans the diversity of Christianities. Ecotheology is a fertile field of study in theology and Process thought, feminist analyses, Black, Mujerista and Ecowomanist theologies, postcolonial and animal studies, and other topics and approaches.  Ecotheology is vast in scope and includes revitalizations of all these aspects, and often has an emphasis on justice, and social, political and ecological ethics.

Ecotheologies may accentuate either the ecological or theological aspects, and unites around goals of connecting Christianity with nature, promoting constructive human-Earth relations, and resisting ecological decline.  As a whole ecotheology represents significant developments in, and renewal of, Christian thought, worldviews, and practices. The consequences are both comprehensive reforms of Christianity, as well as new expressions, noting that experiences and interpretations of adherents vary widely as does the variance between beliefs and actions, and principles and practices. Distinct approaches have been developed in Catholic, Anglican, Reformed, United, Evangelical, Eastern and Greek Orthodox, Methodist, Lutheran and more, and these are further differentiated in countries and contexts.  In fact, within the spectrum of Christianity all the major ecclesial traditions are involved. In addition, there is a range of traditionalist, reformist, progressive and radical.  Regardless of the diversity, from the 1970’s to the present, the force and flourishing of ecotheology is astounding. 

Challenges and contributions

Several challenges and contributions occur at the intersection of Christianity and ecology. These can be internal to theology, on how theology engages with other religions and disciplines, or how to relate to global diversity, or respond to the complexity of ecological issues.  Examples of each are given, noting that work in ecotheology is extensive, and is making contributions to all of these topics.

Early publications stressed an urgency to respond to ecological issues  as well as to address prevalent, albeit simplistic, claims against Christianity, such as the in infamous essay by Lynn White suggesting that Christianity’s devaluation of nature is a cause of the ecological crisis. [i]    Of course, there is no direct cause and effect between Christianity and ecological disregard.  Also, many other factors, such as economics and capitalism, and the lack of ecological literacy, have created the cultural conditions for ecological crises to develop.  Nonetheless, ecotheologians reexamined the worldview and basic values ingrained in Eurowestern consciousness and Christian theological presuppositions. They engaged in extensive ideological excavation of the ideals and theories embedded in the worldview(s) that have led to pervasive and unfettered ecological decline in Christian-influenced cultures. For example, they had to address the historical, and contemporary, Christian anthropocentrism, an emphasis on humanity’s transcendence over the natural world, and the claims nature was void of divine presence. Throughout much of Christian history is the idea that the natural world is fallen, corrupt, imperfect or irrelevant. The result is death. Humans must then be saved, redeemed or restored from nature, with a promise of eternal life.  Although each religious worldview has some perception that life does not end with death, the Christian tradition has potent otherworldly imagery that has both depreciated Earth life and supported notions that salvation means from this world . This led ecotheologians to criticize otherworldly interpretations of redemption, salvation, and resurrection. Dualist imagery, which was operative across all Christian traditions -  heaven/earth, spirit/matter, culture/nature, mind/body, men/women, divine/demonic – was excavated and exposed, and assessed as neither accurate nor informative. Christian worldviews were rethought at a foundational level.

Other challenges concerning beliefs around Christologies, a closed canon, biblical inerrancy, and Christian imperialism and colonialism also had to be addressed. It became clear that Christianity, as with all religious views, must remain fluid, attentive to presuppositions, values, orientation and impact. Religions should be supple, receptive to new insights, and able to abandon out-dated or unworkable beliefs, interpretations and dogmas in order to be relevant to the exigences of the era.

All this work is part of the critique and internal reformation of aspects of the Christian traditions.  It sparked intense re-evaluations of Christian thought, with different emphases according to the tradition, context and operative beliefs. These intro- and retrospections have resulted in the retrieval of texts and teachings that connect the natural world to divine presence, and in multiple ways. Revising elements of Christianity, and encouraging Christians to participate, should be seen as a rapid yet deep and ongoing transformation, in response to increasing and complex ecological issues. 

Developments in Christian ethics also represents both challenges and contributions. The challenges are how to include ecological concerns in customary approaches to ethics, and/or to expand approaches to ethics to be responsive. For example, feminist ethics became influenced by ecofeminism, and social justice discourses were transformed by global efforts in ecojustice, environmental racism, climate justice and ecological activism. Issues and analyses of inequality, discriminations, economic exploitation, structural violence and systemic domination were expanded to include ecological aspects, and in turn influenced a range of Christian ethics and appeals for ecological and social justice.  

It is important to note that Christian ecotheology is developing as other disciplines are being pressured to be ecologically relevant. New knowledge from sciences, reports about climate instability, the state of ocean life, deforestations, extinctions, water quality, plastics, and myriad ecological deteriorations is emerging constantly, and requiring responses. Christianity, among other disciplines and religions, had to undergo an ecological conversion.

Other challenges and contributions come from collaborations with the emerging field of religion and ecology, which is occurring in tandem with Christian ecotheology. Today, the alliance of religion and ecology is a multifaceted global agenda, and countless programs. The Forum on Religion and Ecology has been a leader and supporter of many initiatives. Most religions have engaged in similar reconstructions as has Christianity. The collaborative efforts across religious traditions evokes questions about the nature of religion, religious epistemologies, sensibilities, orientation and sources, and the importance of theories of lived and critical religions. Challenges exist, at times, when ecotheologians enter the field of religion and ecology, as theology tends to overlook other religions, including the histories, diversities and complexities. In general, theology operates with deficient theories of religion and epistemology.  Thus, at times there is an uneasy placement of ecotheology within academic spheres of religion and ecology.  However, while some streams of eco-Christianity remain in traditional boundaries, others venture into the field of religion and ecology and embrace new questions and insights. The dialogues between ecotheology and the field of religion and ecology are important, albeit distinct depending on competence, experience and interest in these more comprehensive frameworks.

For example, every religion and culture present a creation or origin story which provides meaning and orientation to human life and fulfills the need to grapple with the perennial questions of time, space, origins and destiny. Such stories are usually longstanding and may have lost their relevance or effectiveness in the face of new knowledge, global exchanges, or the plurality of viewpoints. Christianity has examined the biblical origin story and reflected on various meanings of the role of humanity as ecological steward, gardener, or Earth-keeper rather than as having dominion. Religious traditions have been challenged by discoveries from sciences about Earth origins, biospheric development, and the evolution of life, as well as the processes of the universe out of which emerged the solar system and planet Earth.  Some Christian traditions have integrated evolutionary biology and cosmology into a new understanding of ‘origins’.  

There are several other noteworthy challenges that pertain to religions engaging on ecological issues.  One is the radical diversity and plurality of cultures, views, values and beliefs.  How do we assess these? For example, the social construction of nature is contested.  Is a forest a sacred grove, an ecosystem, animal habitat, lumber, real estate, or an eco-tourism destination? Is the natural world a set of resources with instrumental value or a living community with intrinsic value?  A great deal depends on the answer, and yet an ecological sustainable vision is imperative. However, which vision? In whose interests?  How can a community decide which vision to embrace?  What vision will inspire? There are diverse and competing visions, and the processes of change from one to another are not straightforward.  It is crucial to embrace radical diversity and plurality and unity: an ecological vision with agreed values, ethical principles and cooperative actions.

A connected challenge is that some problems cannot be grappled with contextually, as they are global in scope and/or the administrators are trans or multinational.  Some pertinent concerns are climate change, international land grabs, corporate rights on fresh water sources or icebergs, energy (transnational pipelines), mining privileges, food insecurities, corporate ownership of food, environmental refugees (who surpass political refugees), environmental illnesses, and more. These issues require several disciplines to understand and cross many contexts.  They are global, local and contextual realities. The term ‘global issues’ is too vague, and contextual is inaccurate, resulting in additional challenges for a robust ecotheology to address. 

The last challenge to be mentioned is that a correlation between Christian-influenced cultures and ecological exploitation, extractive economies, extreme consumption, and climate emissions is evident. In tandem, Christian bodies have done little to restrain deforestation, species extinction, water contamination, and so on. There are tensions between ecotheology from the global South, where poverty, ecological decline, and often political instability are intense, and that of the affluent post-industrialized, high consumer and waste production regions. Questions arise as to the key priorities, and the fundamental global inequities around ecological resources, access, ownership and decline. These cultural, denominational and theological divergences can be a call to greater equality and justice and cooperation, and/or a distraction to an overall agreement that Christians need to address ecological issues locally, nationally and internationally.  Planetary solidarity is becoming a prophetic call.

Countless contributions around Christianity and ecology are effective and active in their communities. At the local levels there are innumerable contributions of conferences, workshops, retreat centres, and church groups addressing everything from the range of ecotheology topics to public policy on waste, water, transportation, and climate activism.  At the national level, many denominations and theological organizations have incorporated forms of Earth ministries, Earth-keeping, stewardship, climate justice and more into their national policies.

Internationally, The World Council of Churches and their initiative of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation (JPIC), has provided leadership and sustained programs in many Christian traditions, countless contexts and on multiple issues for decades. The importance of connecting Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation has been recognized worldwide, and has opened possibilities of working locally, with Indigenous peoples for example, of opening national offices, and devising international campaigns on climate justice, nonviolence, and poverty. Another important contribution is the document, Laudato Si: On Care of Our Common Home, from the Catholic Institutional church, released in 2015, as part of the Catholic social teaching encyclicals.  It is a comprehensive overview of the need to connect integral ecology to peace, justice, education and governance, as well as to understand the mechanisms that create poverty, ecological ruin and social injustices.  This document has resonance around the world, within multiple Christian traditions and with other religions. These speak to the need for programs and visions that are sufficiently clear yet open-ended to encourage creativity, participation and action. There are multiple robust efforts addressing religion and ecology from diverse organizations, such as The Earth Charter, Alliance of Religion and Conservation, the National Religious Partnership for the Environment, The Parliament of Religions of the World, United Nations Environment Program, World Wildlife Fund, Earth Democracy, Global Peace Initiative of Women, and more, and each encourages collaboration.

There is no doubt that the field of Christianity and ecology, representing efforts of all kinds, is a much-needed response to the ecological challenges of this era and for the future.  The internal challenges to Christianity have been somewhat replaced with an engagement with ecological issues. This means that Christianity - adherents, churches, theological schools, retreat centres, national offices – has many options, and places of transformation. While some issues are local, others relate to ecosystems and bioregions, or are planetary, such as climate instability. This supports the need to collaborate across regions, religions and disciplines. Christianity is a religion: a worldview offering meaning and orientation, as well as a political, economic and ethical force. Christian themes of revelation, liberation and solidarity are compelling for ecological concerns.  Human experiences of wonder, humility, grace and gratitude are of utmost importance, as are the ethics of equality, resistance and sacrifice.  The commitments of justice, flourishing, equality, preferential option for the Earth, and the goodness of creation can be integrated deeply, and be a transformative power. It can take the form of ritual, education, persuasion, policymaking, activism and resistance. Prophetic voices are needed. The conviction of the centrality of love, hope, faith, and an ever-renewing spirit provide energy and inspiration, and at times consolation.

Some consider this era to be a new religious moment.  Not only is the ecological crisis provoking concern, new thinking, social engagement and cross-sector collaboration.  It is evident that there is a need for global commitments to ecologically sustainable communities, and ones that will preserve the elegance and beauty of the whole Earth community. Thomas Berry, a Catholic priest and historian of religions, addressed the question of vision.  Much of his work was an inquiry into what could be an adequate, ecological, and spiritual vision.  For Berry, it must comprise a sufficiently broad horizon commensurate with scientific knowledge of the emergent universe, of time, space and Earth dynamics, incorporate a suitable grasp of the histories and complexities of religions, be ecologically literate, and deeply inspiring.  Such a vision must give humanity a way to live within the rhythms and limits of the natural world, and as a member of this Earth community.  The insights about the origins and developments of the universe, the emergence and dynamics of evolution, and Earth’s integrated and entangled processes reveal how embedded humans are in what Christians can refer to as the deep incarnation.  For some this knowledge, perspective and vision offers the most power and promise for an overall orientation for a viable future.

Lynn White,(1967), The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” Science (155: 1203-1207.

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Theology Essay | Theology Definition, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the Study of Theology

December 4, 2021 by Prasanna

Theology Essay: While theology is a broad topic, it can be broken up into smaller sections and defined in more detail. For example, the study of theology is the study of what one believes about God. This can be broken down into understanding God’s nature, attributes, and interventions. Understanding what one believes about God is important for understanding beliefs about other things as well. This includes life after death or how to live this life. In this essay, we shall explore the detailed definition of theology, origins and implications on the real world.

You can also find more  Essay Writing  articles on events, persons, sports, technology and many more.

What is Theology?

The word theology is derived from the Greek word “théo” meaning “God”and the suffix “logy” meaning “study of.” Theology can be generally defined as the study of God and religion. Theology is closely related to philosophy, because both fields share similar questions about life, God, and ultimate truths. In other words, Theology refers to the study of the nature of God, divine revelation, and the relationship between the divine and human. Theology has been around for centuries. Its origins can be traced back to Greek philosopher Aristotle. Theologians spend much of their time studying various religions to gain a better understanding of them. There are many different topics that theologians may study including biblical analysis, comparative religion, ethics, and history.

How Religion Relates to Theology

Religion is often thought of as a personal belief system that provides explanations for the origin and meaning of life, but it can also refer to communal behavior. Unsurprisingly, religion impacts theology because it helps shape theological beliefs about the nature of God, humanity, and the universe.

One of the most influential and notable contributors to the discussion of religion and theology is Karl Marx. His theories, which are based on the idea that social status is determined by economic class, have garnered a large body of supporters and detractors alike. He also popularized the idea that religion may be a form of social control and can inhibit critical thinking. Karl Marx was an atheist who believed in a classless society where human beings were not controlled by religion or other forms of ideology. To achieve this goal, he thought that the working class had to take control from those who possessed power – namely capitalists, landlords, and other members of the upper-class. Marx thought that all religions should be equal because they were equally false; he didn’t believe in spirituality or any type of afterlife; and, therefore, he didn’t have a strong opinion on the existence of God.

What are Types of Theological Views?

Theological views are diverse and manifold. However, mainstream views can be grouped into the following four types- Biblical theology, historical theology, Systematic theology and Practical theology.

• Biblical theology: Biblical theology is the study of theology through a biblical lens. The Bible is the primary source for information on the topic. These studies are used to learn more about God, Jesus Christ, and what they have done for humanity. It also seeks to understand how what we read in scriptures points us to both Jesus Christ and our lives today.
• Historical theology: One of the theological disciplines, it focuses on how Christian beliefs and practices evolved over time. In other words, historical theology is an approach to Christian theology that holds that its events and doctrines are related to the historical and cultural context in which they occur.
• Systematic theology: Also called dogmatic theology, Systematic theology is the study of the divine attributes, nature, and works of God. It includes doctrine and biblical interpretation from a Christian perspective.
• Practical theology: Practical theology is not a theological discipline in itself, but rather a term that refers to the application of any theological understanding to the needs and realities of life. Practical theology has often been used as a synonym for pastoral care and counseling.

Christian Theological Perspectives

Christianity has a rich theological history that includes many different perspectives. These perspectives are often in disagreement with one another. There are three major perspectives that are often discussed when it comes to Christianity which are the Orthodox Perspective, the Catholic Perspective, and the Protestant Perspective.

Jewish Theological Perspectives

The Jewish religion has a rich history of theological thought. There are many different branches of Judaism, all with their own views on God, morality, and what happens to the soul after death. Jewish theological perspectives are heavily influenced by the Tanakh, or Hebrew Bible. These perspectives can be divided into two schools of thought: Orthodox Judaism, which believes in the superiority of Torah law, and Conservative Judaism, which believes that Judaism is a religion that develops and changes over time.

The Role of Faith in Theology

Faith is an important and often-overlooked topic in theology. Faith is defined as the belief in a deity, religious idea, or other concepts without any proof or evidence. It can also be defined as the belief in the truth of something that one has no scientific or empirical evidence of. While there are many ways to define faith, it is central to all religions and is thought of as the most important aspect of religion.

Faith may have originated from human beings’ need for hope in an uncertain world. Faith can also be seen as a coping mechanism for dealing with life’s tough situations that may not have any solutions – this being because faith helps people believe that things will get better soon. Furthermore, psychologists have found that people who have more faith are generally happier than those who don’t.

Faith in religion is something that many people have differing opinions on. One of the most common reasons that people have faith in religion is because it is a deep personal belief for them. They believe that their religion helps them to make sense of life, death, and what happens after this life. Religion also provides a community for many people who may feel alone otherwise.

Do non-believers have faith?

There are many people who do not believe in any religion or spiritual system. They often consider themselves to be non-religious, and there is no doubt that their way of life is much simpler than for those who do believe in something greater. As humans, it’s hard not to have some sort of faith in something.Whether that faith is put into a higher power or a scientific theory, the idea of an omniscient being creating the universe fills people with much needed hope.

Does God Exist?

“Does God exist?” This question has been debated for centuries. Theologians, philosophers, and scientists have all taken a stab at it. The definition of God varies by religion, but it is generally agreed that God is omnipresent and omnipotent. Moreover, the idea of God, as a transcendent Creator and Ruler, has been around for a long time. It is arguably the most prevalent religious belief in the world.

This has caused scholars to ask questions pertaining to the existence of God. Some people believe that it is possible that there is no God because there is no proof or evidence of his existence. Others believe that faith alone is enough to know that he exists because it gives them hope and purpose for their lives. Others say that God needs to prove his existence through miracles or by speaking to us plainly through visions or dreams.

FAQ’s on Theology

Question 1. What is theology?

Answer: Theology is the study of the nature of God, divine things, and spiritual matters. Theology seeks to answer questions about God’s nature and attributes, the creation of the world by God, human beings’ relationship with God, and other religious issues.

Question 2. What is an example of theology?

Answer: Theology is the study of religious beliefs, practices, and teachings. Theology looks at the history of religion to understand how religion began and how it has evolved. It can be applied to any religion, even if it is not considered Abrahamic.

Question 3. What is the meaning of biblical theology?

Answer: Biblical theology is a type of theology that seeks to understand the relationship between the Bible’s narrative and its authors. Biblical theologians have traditionally attempted to answer questions about how biblical narratives are both historically accurate, while still being divinely inspired.

Question 4. What is the difference between religion and theology?

Answer: Religion is often seen as a set of beliefs and practices, typically with a supernatural or spiritual element, which unites the faith community. Theology is an academic discipline that involves the study of religion in terms of its intellectual history, cultural expressions and sacred texts.

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